不同条件下过度自信CEO薪酬合同设计的实验研究
|
摘要
本文以经典委托代理理论和有关心理学理论为基础,以CEO的过度自信心理偏好为出发点,以委托代理关系中股东和CEO的决策行为为核心,以努力产出风险、努力可观测性、风险态度为主线,从理论上建立模型深入探讨纳入CEO的过度自信心理偏好后,股东对CEO的薪酬合同设计问题,并采用实验经济学方法,分别设计经济学实验,对考虑CEO过度自信的理论模型进行验证。
过度自信是“心理学中最稳健的发现”,是影响经济人进行决策的主要情感因素和心理因素之一。由于在真实的市场环境中无法精确测度人的过度自信程度,虽然对过度自信进行研究的理论层出不穷,但如何利用实证数据检验这些理论的有效性仍然面临着较大的障碍。根据Berg等(1986)的思想,引入实验方法,通过控制交易单位和概率的关系,实验者可以通过控制任意不同形式的偏好来引导参与人的行动,从而使得参与人表现出他们确实具有这种偏好时的行动。因此,本文立足于拓展经典委托代理理论“理性人”的假定,建立以“过度自信”为前提假设的理论模型,在充分借鉴西方实验经济学研究成果的基础上,利用计算机实验操作系统,根据理论假设来控制实验条件,选取真实的参与人,在虚拟的委托代理情景中进行决策,并通过分析实验数据,对基于过度自信的委托代理理论进行检验。
在影响委托代理关系的众多复杂因素中,本文选取了努力产出风险、努力可观测性、风险态度等关键因素作为研究对象,集中探讨当这些条件发生变化时,委托代理双方如何进行决策。在对每一个条件进行研究的过程中,本文遵循的思路是:首先建立不同条件下股东和过度自信CEO的委托代理模型,然后根据理论假设进行实验设计并操作实验,最后对实验数据进行分析得出结论。
本文基于以上思路展开研究,并得出基本结论,包括:1.在多轮重复实验中,参与人的决策向预测的最优行动收敛,且理论模型预测的最优行动和非最优行动有显著差异,理论模型在实验中得到有效验证,具有一定的参考意义;2.过度自信和风险态度无显著相关性,男性比女性更偏好风险和过度自信:3.在努力产出风险、努力可观测性、CEO的风险态度这些条件变化时,股东对不同过度自信程度CEO的薪酬合同设计各不相同。
也正是围绕上述结论,本文形成以下2个主要创新点:
1.在理论上,在第3、4、5章中,拓展了经典委托代理理论的基本假定,即CEO是“理性人”的假定,将CEO的过度自信心理偏好纳入委托代理理论框架,并着重从努力产出风险、努力可观测性、风险态度三个方面,系统研究了不同过度自信程度CEO在不同条件下的最优薪酬合同设计,不仅丰富了经典委托代理理论,而且更清晰、客观地描述了股东和CEO的委托代理关系。
2.在方法上,采用经济学实验的方法,设计了纳入过度自信的委托代理实验,并编制实验程序进行系统研究,分别检验拓展后的理论模型的最优解。在实验室的环境中,使控制CEO不同程度的过度自信成为可能,为理论模型提供了有效的实证支持,也为股东提供了更切合实际的参考和更深刻的理论依据。
Taking the classic principle-agent theory and the relevant psychological theories as research basis, the overconfident psychological preference of CEO as research start point, the decision behaviors of shareholders and CEOs as research focus, the effort output risk, effort observability, and risk attitude as research main line, this dissertation constructs theoretical model with considering CEO's overconfidence, and thoroughly probes into the problem of the designing CEO's compensation contract for the shareholder, and then applies experimental methods to design economic experiments, in order to test the principal-agent model induced into CEO's overconfidence psychology.
Overconfidence is "the most steady finding in psychology", and one of the emotional factors and mental factors influencing economy man to decide. Although great of propositions have studied on overconfidence, how to test them using field data is still faced with obstacle, because overconfidence level can't be evaluated accurately in real world. Based Berg et al (1986), by using experimental methods to control the relationship between trade units and probability, experimenter can control each preference function to induce participant to behave as their real preference. Based on the precondition that CEO is overconfident, this dissertation is established in extending the assumption of "homo economics" in classical principle-agent theory and constructs new theoretical model. Referring adequately researches of experimental economics in western countries and applying the computer experimental system, it controls laboratory conditions according to theoretical assumption and recruits participants to decide in fictitious principle-agent settings, and then tests the theory found on overconfidence by analyzing the experimental data.
There are many factors influencing the principal-agent relationship. Choosing three vita factors of effort output risk, effort observability, and risk attitude from them as our research subjects, this dissertation focuses on how both principles and agents decide when they change. We extend our researches along with the consecution as follows: firstly, construct the principle-agent model between the shareholder and overconfident CEO; secondly, design and run experiments according to the theoretical propositions; finally, draw conclusions after analyzing the experimental data.
This dissertation extends researches based on the above consecutions and draws the basic conclusions as follows: 1. Not only that subject's actions in the repeated experiments convergence into the optimal action but also that the predicted optimal actions are significantly different from other non-optimal ones. The theoretical model is tested effectively and has some validity and significance in a certain extent. 2. Overconfidence has no significant relativity with risk attitude, man is more preferable risk and more overconfident. 3. The shareholders design different compensation contracts for different overconfident CEO when the conditions as risk level, moral hazard and CEO's risk attitude vary.
Based on the basic conclusion, there are following two contributions in this dissertation:
1. In theory, the basic assumption of the classical principal-agent theory that CEO is rational is extended, and CEO is assumed to be overconfident here in chapter 3, 4, 5. Three factors of risk level, moral hazard and CEO's risk attitude are considered into optimal compensation contract design for overconfident CEO under different conditions. It not only expands classical principle-agent model but also describes the relationship between shareholders and CEOs more clearly and actually.
2. In method, experimental methods to address on principle-agent frame systematically through designing a series of economics experiments and making all experimental programs are used. The optimal solutions of extended theoretical models in chapter 3, 4, 5 are tested respectively. That makes it possible to control CEO's different overconfidence level and provides effective empirical supports to theoretical models and offers more practical suggestions and more forceful academic evidences.
过度自信是“心理学中最稳健的发现”,是影响经济人进行决策的主要情感因素和心理因素之一。由于在真实的市场环境中无法精确测度人的过度自信程度,虽然对过度自信进行研究的理论层出不穷,但如何利用实证数据检验这些理论的有效性仍然面临着较大的障碍。根据Berg等(1986)的思想,引入实验方法,通过控制交易单位和概率的关系,实验者可以通过控制任意不同形式的偏好来引导参与人的行动,从而使得参与人表现出他们确实具有这种偏好时的行动。因此,本文立足于拓展经典委托代理理论“理性人”的假定,建立以“过度自信”为前提假设的理论模型,在充分借鉴西方实验经济学研究成果的基础上,利用计算机实验操作系统,根据理论假设来控制实验条件,选取真实的参与人,在虚拟的委托代理情景中进行决策,并通过分析实验数据,对基于过度自信的委托代理理论进行检验。
在影响委托代理关系的众多复杂因素中,本文选取了努力产出风险、努力可观测性、风险态度等关键因素作为研究对象,集中探讨当这些条件发生变化时,委托代理双方如何进行决策。在对每一个条件进行研究的过程中,本文遵循的思路是:首先建立不同条件下股东和过度自信CEO的委托代理模型,然后根据理论假设进行实验设计并操作实验,最后对实验数据进行分析得出结论。
本文基于以上思路展开研究,并得出基本结论,包括:1.在多轮重复实验中,参与人的决策向预测的最优行动收敛,且理论模型预测的最优行动和非最优行动有显著差异,理论模型在实验中得到有效验证,具有一定的参考意义;2.过度自信和风险态度无显著相关性,男性比女性更偏好风险和过度自信:3.在努力产出风险、努力可观测性、CEO的风险态度这些条件变化时,股东对不同过度自信程度CEO的薪酬合同设计各不相同。
也正是围绕上述结论,本文形成以下2个主要创新点:
1.在理论上,在第3、4、5章中,拓展了经典委托代理理论的基本假定,即CEO是“理性人”的假定,将CEO的过度自信心理偏好纳入委托代理理论框架,并着重从努力产出风险、努力可观测性、风险态度三个方面,系统研究了不同过度自信程度CEO在不同条件下的最优薪酬合同设计,不仅丰富了经典委托代理理论,而且更清晰、客观地描述了股东和CEO的委托代理关系。
2.在方法上,采用经济学实验的方法,设计了纳入过度自信的委托代理实验,并编制实验程序进行系统研究,分别检验拓展后的理论模型的最优解。在实验室的环境中,使控制CEO不同程度的过度自信成为可能,为理论模型提供了有效的实证支持,也为股东提供了更切合实际的参考和更深刻的理论依据。
Taking the classic principle-agent theory and the relevant psychological theories as research basis, the overconfident psychological preference of CEO as research start point, the decision behaviors of shareholders and CEOs as research focus, the effort output risk, effort observability, and risk attitude as research main line, this dissertation constructs theoretical model with considering CEO's overconfidence, and thoroughly probes into the problem of the designing CEO's compensation contract for the shareholder, and then applies experimental methods to design economic experiments, in order to test the principal-agent model induced into CEO's overconfidence psychology.
Overconfidence is "the most steady finding in psychology", and one of the emotional factors and mental factors influencing economy man to decide. Although great of propositions have studied on overconfidence, how to test them using field data is still faced with obstacle, because overconfidence level can't be evaluated accurately in real world. Based Berg et al (1986), by using experimental methods to control the relationship between trade units and probability, experimenter can control each preference function to induce participant to behave as their real preference. Based on the precondition that CEO is overconfident, this dissertation is established in extending the assumption of "homo economics" in classical principle-agent theory and constructs new theoretical model. Referring adequately researches of experimental economics in western countries and applying the computer experimental system, it controls laboratory conditions according to theoretical assumption and recruits participants to decide in fictitious principle-agent settings, and then tests the theory found on overconfidence by analyzing the experimental data.
There are many factors influencing the principal-agent relationship. Choosing three vita factors of effort output risk, effort observability, and risk attitude from them as our research subjects, this dissertation focuses on how both principles and agents decide when they change. We extend our researches along with the consecution as follows: firstly, construct the principle-agent model between the shareholder and overconfident CEO; secondly, design and run experiments according to the theoretical propositions; finally, draw conclusions after analyzing the experimental data.
This dissertation extends researches based on the above consecutions and draws the basic conclusions as follows: 1. Not only that subject's actions in the repeated experiments convergence into the optimal action but also that the predicted optimal actions are significantly different from other non-optimal ones. The theoretical model is tested effectively and has some validity and significance in a certain extent. 2. Overconfidence has no significant relativity with risk attitude, man is more preferable risk and more overconfident. 3. The shareholders design different compensation contracts for different overconfident CEO when the conditions as risk level, moral hazard and CEO's risk attitude vary.
Based on the basic conclusion, there are following two contributions in this dissertation:
1. In theory, the basic assumption of the classical principal-agent theory that CEO is rational is extended, and CEO is assumed to be overconfident here in chapter 3, 4, 5. Three factors of risk level, moral hazard and CEO's risk attitude are considered into optimal compensation contract design for overconfident CEO under different conditions. It not only expands classical principle-agent model but also describes the relationship between shareholders and CEOs more clearly and actually.
2. In method, experimental methods to address on principle-agent frame systematically through designing a series of economics experiments and making all experimental programs are used. The optimal solutions of extended theoretical models in chapter 3, 4, 5 are tested respectively. That makes it possible to control CEO's different overconfidence level and provides effective empirical supports to theoretical models and offers more practical suggestions and more forceful academic evidences.
引文
2研究综述中,有关于“CEO过度自信的证据”,见1.2.1.2节。
[1] Alicke, M. D., Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and Controllability of Trait Adjectives[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1985,49(6): 1621-1630.
[2] Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Bretenbecher. D. L., et al. Personal Contact,Individuation, and the Better-than-Average Effect[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995, 68(5): 804-825.
[3] Allen, W. D., Evans, D. A., Bidding and Overconfidence in Experimental Financial Markets[J]. The Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2005, 6(3):108-120.
[4] Alpert, M., Raiffa, H. A., Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors[A]. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[5] Anderhub, V., G(?)chter, S., K(?)nigstein, M., Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment[J]. Experimental Economics,2002, 5(1): 5-27.
[6] Ando, M., Overconfidence in Economic Contests[J]. Working Paper,http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.23374.1080724530.pdf, 2004.
[7] Ang, J. S. and Schwarz, T., Risk Aversion and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets[J].Journal of Finance, 1985,40(3): 825-844.
[8] Barber, B. M., Odean, T, The Courage of Misguided Convictions[J].Financial Analysts Journal, 1999, 55(6): 41-55.
[9] Barber, B. M., Odean, T., Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001,116(1): 261-292.
[10] Basu, A. K., Lal, R., Srinivasan, V., Staelin, R., Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective[J]. Marketing Science, 1985, 4(4):267-291.
[11] Bazerman, M. H., Judgment in Managerial Decision Making[M]. 5~(th) ed.Hoboken NJ: John Wiley&Sons, 2002.
[12] Berg, J. E., Daley, L. A., Dickhaut, J. W., et al. Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101(1): 281-306.
[13] Berg, J. E., Daley, L. A., Dickhaut, J. W., et al. Moral Hazard and Risk Sharing: Experimental Evidence[J]. Research in Experimental Economics,1992(5): 1-34.
[14] Beyer, S., Bowden, E., Gender Differences in self-Perceptions: Convergent Evidence from Three Measures of Accuracy and Bias[J]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1997, 23(2): 157-172.
[15] Beyer, S., Gender Differences in the Accuracy of Self-Evaluations and Performance[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1990, 59,960-970.
[16] Binmore, K., Why Experiment in Economics?[J]. The Economic Journal,1999, 109(453): 16-24.
[17] Bolton, P., Scheinkman, J., Xiong, W., Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2006, 73(3): 577-610.
[18] Brav, A., Inference in Long-Horizon Event Studies: A Bayesian Approach with Application to Initial Public Offerings[J]. The Journal of Finance,2000(5): 1979-2016.
[19] Brehmer, B., Effect of Cue Validity on Learning of Complex Rules in Probabilistic Inference Tasks[J]. Acta Psychologica, 1980(44): 201-210.
[20] Brown, M., Falk, A., Fehr, E., Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions[J]. Econometrica, 2004, 72(3): 747-780.
[21] Busenitz, L. W., Barney, J. B., Differences between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large Organizations: Bias and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1997, 12(1): 9-30.
[22] Camerer, C., Lovallo, D., Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach[J].The American Economic Review,1999,89(1)306-318.
[23]Chow,V.K.and Riley,W.,Asset Allocation and Individual Risk Aversion[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1992,48(6):32-37.
[24]Cooper,A.C.,Dunkelberg,W.C.,Woo.C.Y.,Entrepreneurs Perceived Chances for Success[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1988,3(2):97-108.
[25]Cutler,D.M.,Poterba,J.M.,and Summers,L.H.,Speculative Dynamics[J]Review of Economic Studies,1991,58:529-546.
[26]Daniel,K.D.,Hirshleifer,D.,Subrahmanyam,A.,Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Overreaction[J].The Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1839-1885.
[27]Daniel,K.D.,Hirshleifer,D.,Subrahmanyam,A.,Overconfidence,Arbitrage,and Equilibrium Asset Pricing[J].The Journal of Finance,2001,56(3):921-965.
[28]Davis,D.D.,Holt,C.A.,Experimental Economics[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1993.
[29]De Bondt,W.F.M.,Thaler,R.H.,Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms:A Behavioral Perspective[J].In Jarrow,R.A.,Maksimovic,V.,Ziemba,W.T.,(Eds.) Finance,Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science[M].Amsterdam:North Holland,1995,9:385-410.
[30]De Long,J.B.,Shleifer,A.,Summers,L.H.,et al.,Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(4):703-738.
[31]Deaux,K,Emswiller,T.,Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked Tasks:What is Skill for the Male is Luck for the Female[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1974,29(1):80-85.
[32]Doukas,J.A.,Petmezas,D.,Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias[J].European Financial Management,2007,13(3):531-577.
[33]Dyer,D.,Kagel,J.H.,Levin,D.,A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions:A Laboratory Analysis[J].The Economic Journal,1989,99(394):108-115.
[34]El-Sehity,T.,Haumer,H.,Helmenstein,C.,et al.,Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude within the Context of Experimental Asset Markets[J]. Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2002, 3(4):22-235.
[35] Epstein, S., Testing Principal-Agent Theory[J]. Research in Experimental Economics, 1992, 5: 35-60.
[36] Fellner, G, Maciejovsky, B., Risk Attitude and Market Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets[J]. Journal of Economic Psychology,2007, 28(3): 338-350.
[37] Fischbacher, U., Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments[J]. Experimental Economics, 2007, 10(2): 171-178.
[38] Fischhoff, B., Debiasing.[A]. Kahneman, D. Slovic, P., Tversky, A., (Eds.) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press, 1982: 422-444.
[39] Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Knowing With Certainty.The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence[J]. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1977, 3(4): 552 -564.
[40] Friedman, D., Sunder, S., Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economics[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
[41] G(?)chter, S., Kessler, E., K(?)nigstein, M., Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of Voluntary Cooperation[J]. Working Paper, http://www.isu.unizh.ch/emap/docs/2006/poek/Koenigstein02.pdf, 2006.
[42] Garcia, D., Sangiorgi, F., Urosevic, B., Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents[J]. Economic Theory, 2007, 30(2),313-339.
[43] Gervais, S., Heaton, J. B., Odean, T., The Positive Role of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy[J]. Working Paper, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/pdfs/seminars/023f-gervais-5star.pdf, 2002.
[44] Ghosh, M., John, G., Experimental Evidence for Agency Models of Salesforce Compensation[J]. Marketing Science, 2000, 19(4): 348-365.
[45] Goel, A. M., Thakor, A. V., Do Overconfident Managers Make Better Leaders?[J]. Working Paper, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/～agoel/papers/leader.pdf, 2002.
[46] Goel, A. M., Thakor, A. V., Rationality, Overconfidence, and Leadership[J] Working Paper, http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/～rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf University of Michigan Business School, 2002.
[47] Griffin, D., Tversky, A., The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence[J]. Cognitive Psychology, 1992, 24(33): 411-435.
[48] Grossman, S. Hart, O., An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem[J].Economica, 1983, 1(51): 7-45.
[49] Guth, W., Krahnen, J. P. and Rieck, C, Financial Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Pilot Study Focusing on Insider Advantages[J].Journal of Economic Psychology, 1997, 18(2): 235-257.
[50] Gysler, M., Kruse, J. B. and Schubert, R., Ambiguity and Gender Differences in Financial Decision Making: An Experimental Examination of Competence and Confidence Effects[J]. Working Paper,http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/wp_02_23_paper.pdf, 2002.
[51] Hausch, D. B., Ziemba, W. T. and Rubinstein, M., Efficiency of the Market for Racetrack Betting[J]. Management Science, 1981, 27(12): 1435-1452.
[52] Heaton, J. B., Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance[J]. Financial Management, 2002, 31(2): 33-45.
[53] Hoelzl, E., Rustichini, A., Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money on it?[J] The Economic Journal, 2005, 115(4): 305-318.
[54] Hogarth, R. M., Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics[J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1981, 90(2):197-217.
[55] Hogarth, R. M., Reder, M. W., The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory[M]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986.
[56] Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[57] Holmstrom, B., Moral Hazard and Observability[J].The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(1): 74-91.
[58] Hvide, H. K., Pragmatic Beliefs and Overconfidence[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2002, 48(1): 15-28.
[59] Irlenbusch, B., Sliwka, D., Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2005, 56(3): 383-403.
[60] Jianakoplos, N. A. and Bernasek, A., Are Women More Risk Averse?[J].Economic Inquiry, 1998, 36(4): 620-630.
[61] Johnson, J. E. V. and Powell, P. L., Decision Making, Risk and Gender:Are Managers Different?[J]. British Journal of Management, 1994, 5(2):123-138.
[62] Kahneman, D., Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective[J].In. Tietz. R., Albers. W., Selten. R., (Eds). Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets[M]. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988:11-18.
[63] Kahneman, D., Lovallo, D., Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: a Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking [J]. Management Science, 1993, 39(11): 17-31.
[64] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgement under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[65] Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979,47(2): 263-291.
[66] Keiber, K. L., Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence[J].EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=302416,2002.
[67] Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B. and Weber, M., Framing Effects on Asset Markets: An Experimental Analysis[J]. Working Paper,http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-373-papers/2001 -17/PDF/17.pdf, 2001.
[68] Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B.Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence:Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets[J]. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2002, 25(1): 65-85.
[69] Klayman, J., Soil, J. B., Gonzalez-Vallejo, C. et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask[J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1999, 79(3): 216-247.
[70] Kogan, N., Wallach, M. A., Risk Taking, A Study in Cognition and Personality[M]. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.
[71] Kotlyar, L., Karakowsky, L., The Positive Side of Negative Framing: Examining a Case of Overconfidence among Decision Makers in a Hospital Merger[J]. Management Decision, 2007, 45(6): 968 - 981.
[72] Krahnen, J. P., Rieck, C. and Theissen, E., Inferring Risk Attitudes from Certainty Equivalents: Some Lessons from an Experimental Study[J] Journal of Economic Psychology, 1997, 18(5): 469-486.
[73] Kunda, Z., Motivated Inference: Self- Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1987,53(4):636-647.
[74] Langer, E., Roth, J., Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32 (6): 951-955.
[75] Larwood, L., Whittaker, W., Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in-Organizational Planning[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1977, 62(2):194-198.
[76] Leland, H. E., LBOs and Taxes: No One to Blame but Ourselves?[J].California Management Review, 1989,76(29): 19-29.
[77] Lenney, E., Women's Self-Confidence in Achievement Settings[J].Psychological Bulletin, 1977, 84(1): 1-13.
[78] LeRoy, S. F., Porter, R. D., The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds[J]. Econometrica, 1981, 49(3): 555-574.
[79] Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., Phillip, L. D., Calibration of Probabilities:The State of the Art to 1980[J]. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A.,(Eds.) Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982: 306-334.
[80] Lundeberg, M. A., Paul, W. F., and Punccohar, J., Highly Confident but Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments[J].Journal of Educational Psychology, 1994, 86(1), 114-121.
[81] MacCrimmon, K. R. and Wehrung, D. A., Characteristics of Risk Taking Executives[J]. Management Science, 1990, 36(4): 422-435.
[82] MacCrimmon, K. R. and Wehrung, D. A., Taking Risks: The Management of Uncertainty[M]. Free Press, New York, 1986.
[83] Malmendier, U., Tate, G., CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005, 60(6): 2661-2770.
[84] Malmendier, U., Tate, G, Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited[J]. European Financial Management, 2005, 11(5): 649-659.
[85] Malmendier, U., Tate, G, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=601115, 2004.
[86] Manove, M., Entrepreneurs, Optimism and the Competitive Edge[J].Working Paper, http://128.197.27.168/econ/workingpapers/papers/Michael%20Manove/opt.pdf, 2000.
[87] Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists[J].RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30(2): 324-350.
[88] March, J. G., Shapira, Z., Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking[J]. Management Science, 1987, 33(11): 1404-1418.
[89] Meehan, A. M., Overton, W. F., Gender Differences in Expectancies for Success and Performance on Piagetian Spatial Tasks[J]. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1986, 32(4): 427-441.
[90] Mestelman, S., Feeny, D., Does Ideology Matter?: Anecdotal Experimental Evidence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods[J]. Public Choice,1988,57:281-286.
[91] Milburn, M.A. Sources of Bias in the Prediction of Future Events[J].Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1978, 21: 17-26.
[92] Miller, D., Ross, M., Self-serving Biases in Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?[J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82(2): 213-225.
[93] Monhen, A., Manthei, K., Reference Dependency and Loss Aversion in Employer- Employee-Relationships: A Real Effort Experiment on the Incentive Impact of the Fixed Wage[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=641542, 2004.
[94] Moore, D., Cain, D. M., Overconfidence and Underconfidence: When and Why People Underestimate (and Overestimate) the Competition[J].Organizational Behavior &Human Decision Processes, 2007, 103(2):197-213.
[95] Moore, D., Healy, P. J., The Trouble with Overconfidence[J]. Workimg Paper, http://cbdr.cmu.edu/papers/pdfs/cdr576.pdf, 2007.
[96] Nash, J., Two-person Cooperative Games[J]. Econometrica, 1953, 21(1):128-140.
[97] Olen, R. A. and Cox, C. M., The Influence of Gender on the Perception and the Response to Investment Risk: The Case of Professional Investors[J].Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2001,2(1), 29-36.
[98] Palomino, F., Sadrieh, A., Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=423991, 2003.
[99] Payne, J. W., Laughhann, D. J. and Crum, R. L., Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Effects in Risky Choice Behavior[J]. Management Science,1980,26(10): 1039-1060.
[100] Pennings, J. M. E. and Smidts, A., Assessing the Construct Validity of Risk Attitude[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(10): 1337-1348.
[101] Plott, C. R., A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule[J]. The American Economic Review, 1967, 57(4): 787-806.
[102] Plott, C. R., Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics[J] Journal of Economic Literature, 1982, 20(4): 1485-1527.
[103] Plott, C. R., S. Sunder, Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets[J]. Econometrica,1988,56(5): 1085-1118.
[104] Plott, C. R., Smith, V. L., An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1978,45(1): 133-153.
[105] Pious, S., The Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making[M]. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
[106] Rapoport, A., Individual Strategies in a Market-Entry Game[J]. Group Decision and Negotiation, 1995,4(2): 117-133.
[107] Roth, A. E., Malouf, M., Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining[J]. Psychological Review, 1979, 86(6): 574-594.
[108] Roth, A. E., Murninghan, J. K., The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study[J]. Econometrica, 1982,50(5): 1123-1142.
[109] Roth, A. E., Schoumaker, E, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining:An Experimental Study[J]. The American Economic Review, 1983, 73(3):362-372.
[110] Russo, J. E., Schoemaker, P. J. H., Managing Overconfidence[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1992, 33(2): 7-17.
[111] Santos-Pinto, L., Sobel, J., A Model of Positive Self-image in Subjective Assessments[J]. American Economic Review, 2005, 95(5): 1386-1402.
[112] Schoemaker, P. J. H., Determinants of Risk-taking: Behavioral and Economic Views[J]. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1993, 6(1): 49-73.
[113] Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M. and Brachinger, H. W., Financial Decision Making: Are Women Really More Risk-averse?[J]. American Economic Review, 1999, 89(2): 381-385.
[114] Shefrin, H., Behavioral Corporate Finance[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2001, 14(3): 113-124.
[115] Siegel, S., Fouraker, L. E., Bargaining and Group Decision Making[M].New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
[116] Slovic, P., Assessment of Risk Taking Behavior[J]. Psychological Bulletin,1964, 61(3): 330-333.
[117] Smith, V. L., Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory[J].American Economic Review, 1976, 66(2): 274-279.
[118] Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G. L., Williams A. W., Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets[J].Econometrica, 1988,56(5): 1119-1151.
[119] Smith, V. L., Walker, J. M., Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics[J]. Economic Inquiry, 1993, 31(2): 245-261.
[120] Smith, V. L., An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behaviour[J].JournaL of Political Economy, 1962,70(2): 111-137.
[121] Statman, M., Thorley, S., Vorkink, K., Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2006, 19(4), 1531-1565.
[122] Svenson, O., Are We all Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?[J]. Acta Psychologica, 1981,47(4): 143-148.
[123] Taylor, S. E., Brown, J. D., Illusion and Weil-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health[J].Psychological Bulletin,1988,103(2):193-210.
[124]Thaler,R.H.and Johnson,E.J.,Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even:Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice[J].Management Science,1990,36(6):643-660.
[125]Umanath,N.S.,Ray,M.R.,Campbell,T.L.,The Impact of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and Perceived Agent Effectiveness on the Composition of Compensation Contracts[J].Management Science,1993(39):32-45.
[126]Warneryd,K.-E.Risk Attitudes and Risky Behavior[J].Journal of Economic Psychology,1996,17(6):749-770.
[127]Weinstein,N.D.,Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1980,39(5):806-820.
[128]Wu,B.,and Knott A.M.Entrepreneurial Risk and market entry[J].Working paper,University of Pennsylvania,2005.
[129]陈其安,杨秀苔.,过度自信条件下的金融市场委托代理合同[J].系统工程,2005,23(4):19-27.
[130]陈其安,杨秀苔.,基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(1):110-116.
[131]陈其安,杨秀苔.,基于过度自信的金融市场委托-代理模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(z1):252-256.
[132]程兵,梁衡义.,过度自信、过度悲观与均衡资产定价[J].管理评论,2004,16(11):23-27.
[133]高鸿祯.,实验经济学导论[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2003.
[134]葛新权,王国成.,实验经济学引论:原理、方法、应用[M].北京:社会科学文献,2006.
[135]金雪军,杨晓兰.,实验经济学[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006.
[136]李丽,王明好.,基金经理过度自信对基金收益与风险的影响研究[J].运筹与管理,2005,14(1):95-98.
[137]李增泉.,激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[138]林嘉永.,资本市场的实验研究[D].厦门:厦门大学,2004.
[139]林树.,中国投资者行为的实验与实证研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2006.
[140]罗伯特,J.希勒.,非理性繁荣[M].廖理、施红敏译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001(4):122-123.
[141]阮青松,狄瑶.,中国企业经理人是自利和理性的吗?--一个实验经济学研究[J].上海管理科学,2008(1):47-50.
[142]萨缪尔森,诺德豪斯.,经济学(第16版)[M].萧琛等译,北京:华夏出版社,1999.
[143]魏刚.,高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[144]亚当,斯密.,国富论[M].杨敬年译,西安:陕西人民出版社,2001.
[145]杨晓兰.,证券市场泡沫问题的实验经济学研究[D].杭州:浙江大学,2005.
[146]张维迎.,博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996.
[147]张耀辉.,实验经济学教程[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[148]周嘉南,黄登仕.,过度自信对经理业绩分享系数与风险之间关系的影响[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(3):269-274.
[1] Alicke, M. D., Global Self-Evaluation as Determined by the Desirability and Controllability of Trait Adjectives[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1985,49(6): 1621-1630.
[2] Alicke, M. D., Klotz, M. L., Bretenbecher. D. L., et al. Personal Contact,Individuation, and the Better-than-Average Effect[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1995, 68(5): 804-825.
[3] Allen, W. D., Evans, D. A., Bidding and Overconfidence in Experimental Financial Markets[J]. The Journal of Behavioral Finance, 2005, 6(3):108-120.
[4] Alpert, M., Raiffa, H. A., Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors[A]. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[5] Anderhub, V., G(?)chter, S., K(?)nigstein, M., Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment[J]. Experimental Economics,2002, 5(1): 5-27.
[6] Ando, M., Overconfidence in Economic Contests[J]. Working Paper,http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.23374.1080724530.pdf, 2004.
[7] Ang, J. S. and Schwarz, T., Risk Aversion and Information Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets[J].Journal of Finance, 1985,40(3): 825-844.
[8] Barber, B. M., Odean, T, The Courage of Misguided Convictions[J].Financial Analysts Journal, 1999, 55(6): 41-55.
[9] Barber, B. M., Odean, T., Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001,116(1): 261-292.
[10] Basu, A. K., Lal, R., Srinivasan, V., Staelin, R., Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective[J]. Marketing Science, 1985, 4(4):267-291.
[11] Bazerman, M. H., Judgment in Managerial Decision Making[M]. 5~(th) ed.Hoboken NJ: John Wiley&Sons, 2002.
[12] Berg, J. E., Daley, L. A., Dickhaut, J. W., et al. Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101(1): 281-306.
[13] Berg, J. E., Daley, L. A., Dickhaut, J. W., et al. Moral Hazard and Risk Sharing: Experimental Evidence[J]. Research in Experimental Economics,1992(5): 1-34.
[14] Beyer, S., Bowden, E., Gender Differences in self-Perceptions: Convergent Evidence from Three Measures of Accuracy and Bias[J]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1997, 23(2): 157-172.
[15] Beyer, S., Gender Differences in the Accuracy of Self-Evaluations and Performance[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1990, 59,960-970.
[16] Binmore, K., Why Experiment in Economics?[J]. The Economic Journal,1999, 109(453): 16-24.
[17] Bolton, P., Scheinkman, J., Xiong, W., Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2006, 73(3): 577-610.
[18] Brav, A., Inference in Long-Horizon Event Studies: A Bayesian Approach with Application to Initial Public Offerings[J]. The Journal of Finance,2000(5): 1979-2016.
[19] Brehmer, B., Effect of Cue Validity on Learning of Complex Rules in Probabilistic Inference Tasks[J]. Acta Psychologica, 1980(44): 201-210.
[20] Brown, M., Falk, A., Fehr, E., Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions[J]. Econometrica, 2004, 72(3): 747-780.
[21] Busenitz, L. W., Barney, J. B., Differences between Entrepreneurs and Managers in Large Organizations: Bias and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1997, 12(1): 9-30.
[22] Camerer, C., Lovallo, D., Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach[J].The American Economic Review,1999,89(1)306-318.
[23]Chow,V.K.and Riley,W.,Asset Allocation and Individual Risk Aversion[J].Financial Analysts Journal,1992,48(6):32-37.
[24]Cooper,A.C.,Dunkelberg,W.C.,Woo.C.Y.,Entrepreneurs Perceived Chances for Success[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1988,3(2):97-108.
[25]Cutler,D.M.,Poterba,J.M.,and Summers,L.H.,Speculative Dynamics[J]Review of Economic Studies,1991,58:529-546.
[26]Daniel,K.D.,Hirshleifer,D.,Subrahmanyam,A.,Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Overreaction[J].The Journal of Finance,1998,53(6):1839-1885.
[27]Daniel,K.D.,Hirshleifer,D.,Subrahmanyam,A.,Overconfidence,Arbitrage,and Equilibrium Asset Pricing[J].The Journal of Finance,2001,56(3):921-965.
[28]Davis,D.D.,Holt,C.A.,Experimental Economics[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,1993.
[29]De Bondt,W.F.M.,Thaler,R.H.,Financial Decision-Making in Markets and Firms:A Behavioral Perspective[J].In Jarrow,R.A.,Maksimovic,V.,Ziemba,W.T.,(Eds.) Finance,Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science[M].Amsterdam:North Holland,1995,9:385-410.
[30]De Long,J.B.,Shleifer,A.,Summers,L.H.,et al.,Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(4):703-738.
[31]Deaux,K,Emswiller,T.,Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked Tasks:What is Skill for the Male is Luck for the Female[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1974,29(1):80-85.
[32]Doukas,J.A.,Petmezas,D.,Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias[J].European Financial Management,2007,13(3):531-577.
[33]Dyer,D.,Kagel,J.H.,Levin,D.,A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions:A Laboratory Analysis[J].The Economic Journal,1989,99(394):108-115.
[34]El-Sehity,T.,Haumer,H.,Helmenstein,C.,et al.,Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude within the Context of Experimental Asset Markets[J]. Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2002, 3(4):22-235.
[35] Epstein, S., Testing Principal-Agent Theory[J]. Research in Experimental Economics, 1992, 5: 35-60.
[36] Fellner, G, Maciejovsky, B., Risk Attitude and Market Behavior: Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets[J]. Journal of Economic Psychology,2007, 28(3): 338-350.
[37] Fischbacher, U., Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments[J]. Experimental Economics, 2007, 10(2): 171-178.
[38] Fischhoff, B., Debiasing.[A]. Kahneman, D. Slovic, P., Tversky, A., (Eds.) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press, 1982: 422-444.
[39] Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., Knowing With Certainty.The Appropriateness of Extreme Confidence[J]. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1977, 3(4): 552 -564.
[40] Friedman, D., Sunder, S., Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economics[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
[41] G(?)chter, S., Kessler, E., K(?)nigstein, M., Performance Incentives and the Dynamics of Voluntary Cooperation[J]. Working Paper, http://www.isu.unizh.ch/emap/docs/2006/poek/Koenigstein02.pdf, 2006.
[42] Garcia, D., Sangiorgi, F., Urosevic, B., Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents[J]. Economic Theory, 2007, 30(2),313-339.
[43] Gervais, S., Heaton, J. B., Odean, T., The Positive Role of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy[J]. Working Paper, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/fin/pdfs/seminars/023f-gervais-5star.pdf, 2002.
[44] Ghosh, M., John, G., Experimental Evidence for Agency Models of Salesforce Compensation[J]. Marketing Science, 2000, 19(4): 348-365.
[45] Goel, A. M., Thakor, A. V., Do Overconfident Managers Make Better Leaders?[J]. Working Paper, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/～agoel/papers/leader.pdf, 2002.
[46] Goel, A. M., Thakor, A. V., Rationality, Overconfidence, and Leadership[J] Working Paper, http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/～rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf University of Michigan Business School, 2002.
[47] Griffin, D., Tversky, A., The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence[J]. Cognitive Psychology, 1992, 24(33): 411-435.
[48] Grossman, S. Hart, O., An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem[J].Economica, 1983, 1(51): 7-45.
[49] Guth, W., Krahnen, J. P. and Rieck, C, Financial Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Pilot Study Focusing on Insider Advantages[J].Journal of Economic Psychology, 1997, 18(2): 235-257.
[50] Gysler, M., Kruse, J. B. and Schubert, R., Ambiguity and Gender Differences in Financial Decision Making: An Experimental Examination of Competence and Confidence Effects[J]. Working Paper,http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/wp_02_23_paper.pdf, 2002.
[51] Hausch, D. B., Ziemba, W. T. and Rubinstein, M., Efficiency of the Market for Racetrack Betting[J]. Management Science, 1981, 27(12): 1435-1452.
[52] Heaton, J. B., Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance[J]. Financial Management, 2002, 31(2): 33-45.
[53] Hoelzl, E., Rustichini, A., Overconfident: Do You Put Your Money on it?[J] The Economic Journal, 2005, 115(4): 305-318.
[54] Hogarth, R. M., Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental Heuristics[J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1981, 90(2):197-217.
[55] Hogarth, R. M., Reder, M. W., The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory[M]. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986.
[56] Holmstrom, B., Milgrom, P., Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[57] Holmstrom, B., Moral Hazard and Observability[J].The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10(1): 74-91.
[58] Hvide, H. K., Pragmatic Beliefs and Overconfidence[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2002, 48(1): 15-28.
[59] Irlenbusch, B., Sliwka, D., Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2005, 56(3): 383-403.
[60] Jianakoplos, N. A. and Bernasek, A., Are Women More Risk Averse?[J].Economic Inquiry, 1998, 36(4): 620-630.
[61] Johnson, J. E. V. and Powell, P. L., Decision Making, Risk and Gender:Are Managers Different?[J]. British Journal of Management, 1994, 5(2):123-138.
[62] Kahneman, D., Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective[J].In. Tietz. R., Albers. W., Selten. R., (Eds). Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets[M]. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988:11-18.
[63] Kahneman, D., Lovallo, D., Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: a Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking [J]. Management Science, 1993, 39(11): 17-31.
[64] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A., Judgement under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
[65] Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979,47(2): 263-291.
[66] Keiber, K. L., Managerial Compensation Contracts and Overconfidence[J].EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Discussion Paper, http://ssrn.com/abstract=302416,2002.
[67] Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B. and Weber, M., Framing Effects on Asset Markets: An Experimental Analysis[J]. Working Paper,http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/series/sfb-373-papers/2001 -17/PDF/17.pdf, 2001.
[68] Kirchler, E., Maciejovsky, B.Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence:Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets[J]. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2002, 25(1): 65-85.
[69] Klayman, J., Soil, J. B., Gonzalez-Vallejo, C. et al., Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask[J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 1999, 79(3): 216-247.
[70] Kogan, N., Wallach, M. A., Risk Taking, A Study in Cognition and Personality[M]. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.
[71] Kotlyar, L., Karakowsky, L., The Positive Side of Negative Framing: Examining a Case of Overconfidence among Decision Makers in a Hospital Merger[J]. Management Decision, 2007, 45(6): 968 - 981.
[72] Krahnen, J. P., Rieck, C. and Theissen, E., Inferring Risk Attitudes from Certainty Equivalents: Some Lessons from an Experimental Study[J] Journal of Economic Psychology, 1997, 18(5): 469-486.
[73] Kunda, Z., Motivated Inference: Self- Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1987,53(4):636-647.
[74] Langer, E., Roth, J., Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32 (6): 951-955.
[75] Larwood, L., Whittaker, W., Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in-Organizational Planning[J]. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1977, 62(2):194-198.
[76] Leland, H. E., LBOs and Taxes: No One to Blame but Ourselves?[J].California Management Review, 1989,76(29): 19-29.
[77] Lenney, E., Women's Self-Confidence in Achievement Settings[J].Psychological Bulletin, 1977, 84(1): 1-13.
[78] LeRoy, S. F., Porter, R. D., The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds[J]. Econometrica, 1981, 49(3): 555-574.
[79] Lichtenstein, S., Fischhoff, B., Phillip, L. D., Calibration of Probabilities:The State of the Art to 1980[J]. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A.,(Eds.) Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982: 306-334.
[80] Lundeberg, M. A., Paul, W. F., and Punccohar, J., Highly Confident but Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments[J].Journal of Educational Psychology, 1994, 86(1), 114-121.
[81] MacCrimmon, K. R. and Wehrung, D. A., Characteristics of Risk Taking Executives[J]. Management Science, 1990, 36(4): 422-435.
[82] MacCrimmon, K. R. and Wehrung, D. A., Taking Risks: The Management of Uncertainty[M]. Free Press, New York, 1986.
[83] Malmendier, U., Tate, G., CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005, 60(6): 2661-2770.
[84] Malmendier, U., Tate, G, Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited[J]. European Financial Management, 2005, 11(5): 649-659.
[85] Malmendier, U., Tate, G, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=601115, 2004.
[86] Manove, M., Entrepreneurs, Optimism and the Competitive Edge[J].Working Paper, http://128.197.27.168/econ/workingpapers/papers/Michael%20Manove/opt.pdf, 2000.
[87] Manove, M., Padilla, A. J., Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists[J].RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30(2): 324-350.
[88] March, J. G., Shapira, Z., Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking[J]. Management Science, 1987, 33(11): 1404-1418.
[89] Meehan, A. M., Overton, W. F., Gender Differences in Expectancies for Success and Performance on Piagetian Spatial Tasks[J]. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1986, 32(4): 427-441.
[90] Mestelman, S., Feeny, D., Does Ideology Matter?: Anecdotal Experimental Evidence on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods[J]. Public Choice,1988,57:281-286.
[91] Milburn, M.A. Sources of Bias in the Prediction of Future Events[J].Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1978, 21: 17-26.
[92] Miller, D., Ross, M., Self-serving Biases in Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?[J]. Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82(2): 213-225.
[93] Monhen, A., Manthei, K., Reference Dependency and Loss Aversion in Employer- Employee-Relationships: A Real Effort Experiment on the Incentive Impact of the Fixed Wage[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=641542, 2004.
[94] Moore, D., Cain, D. M., Overconfidence and Underconfidence: When and Why People Underestimate (and Overestimate) the Competition[J].Organizational Behavior &Human Decision Processes, 2007, 103(2):197-213.
[95] Moore, D., Healy, P. J., The Trouble with Overconfidence[J]. Workimg Paper, http://cbdr.cmu.edu/papers/pdfs/cdr576.pdf, 2007.
[96] Nash, J., Two-person Cooperative Games[J]. Econometrica, 1953, 21(1):128-140.
[97] Olen, R. A. and Cox, C. M., The Influence of Gender on the Perception and the Response to Investment Risk: The Case of Professional Investors[J].Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 2001,2(1), 29-36.
[98] Palomino, F., Sadrieh, A., Overconfidence and Delegated Portfolio Management[J]. Working Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=423991, 2003.
[99] Payne, J. W., Laughhann, D. J. and Crum, R. L., Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Effects in Risky Choice Behavior[J]. Management Science,1980,26(10): 1039-1060.
[100] Pennings, J. M. E. and Smidts, A., Assessing the Construct Validity of Risk Attitude[J]. Management Science, 2000, 46(10): 1337-1348.
[101] Plott, C. R., A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule[J]. The American Economic Review, 1967, 57(4): 787-806.
[102] Plott, C. R., Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics[J] Journal of Economic Literature, 1982, 20(4): 1485-1527.
[103] Plott, C. R., S. Sunder, Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets[J]. Econometrica,1988,56(5): 1085-1118.
[104] Plott, C. R., Smith, V. L., An Experimental Examination of Two Exchange Institutions[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1978,45(1): 133-153.
[105] Pious, S., The Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making[M]. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
[106] Rapoport, A., Individual Strategies in a Market-Entry Game[J]. Group Decision and Negotiation, 1995,4(2): 117-133.
[107] Roth, A. E., Malouf, M., Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining[J]. Psychological Review, 1979, 86(6): 574-594.
[108] Roth, A. E., Murninghan, J. K., The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study[J]. Econometrica, 1982,50(5): 1123-1142.
[109] Roth, A. E., Schoumaker, E, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining:An Experimental Study[J]. The American Economic Review, 1983, 73(3):362-372.
[110] Russo, J. E., Schoemaker, P. J. H., Managing Overconfidence[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1992, 33(2): 7-17.
[111] Santos-Pinto, L., Sobel, J., A Model of Positive Self-image in Subjective Assessments[J]. American Economic Review, 2005, 95(5): 1386-1402.
[112] Schoemaker, P. J. H., Determinants of Risk-taking: Behavioral and Economic Views[J]. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1993, 6(1): 49-73.
[113] Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M. and Brachinger, H. W., Financial Decision Making: Are Women Really More Risk-averse?[J]. American Economic Review, 1999, 89(2): 381-385.
[114] Shefrin, H., Behavioral Corporate Finance[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2001, 14(3): 113-124.
[115] Siegel, S., Fouraker, L. E., Bargaining and Group Decision Making[M].New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
[116] Slovic, P., Assessment of Risk Taking Behavior[J]. Psychological Bulletin,1964, 61(3): 330-333.
[117] Smith, V. L., Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory[J].American Economic Review, 1976, 66(2): 274-279.
[118] Smith, V. L., Suchanek, G. L., Williams A. W., Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets[J].Econometrica, 1988,56(5): 1119-1151.
[119] Smith, V. L., Walker, J. M., Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics[J]. Economic Inquiry, 1993, 31(2): 245-261.
[120] Smith, V. L., An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behaviour[J].JournaL of Political Economy, 1962,70(2): 111-137.
[121] Statman, M., Thorley, S., Vorkink, K., Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2006, 19(4), 1531-1565.
[122] Svenson, O., Are We all Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?[J]. Acta Psychologica, 1981,47(4): 143-148.
[123] Taylor, S. E., Brown, J. D., Illusion and Weil-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health[J].Psychological Bulletin,1988,103(2):193-210.
[124]Thaler,R.H.and Johnson,E.J.,Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even:Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice[J].Management Science,1990,36(6):643-660.
[125]Umanath,N.S.,Ray,M.R.,Campbell,T.L.,The Impact of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and Perceived Agent Effectiveness on the Composition of Compensation Contracts[J].Management Science,1993(39):32-45.
[126]Warneryd,K.-E.Risk Attitudes and Risky Behavior[J].Journal of Economic Psychology,1996,17(6):749-770.
[127]Weinstein,N.D.,Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events[J].Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1980,39(5):806-820.
[128]Wu,B.,and Knott A.M.Entrepreneurial Risk and market entry[J].Working paper,University of Pennsylvania,2005.
[129]陈其安,杨秀苔.,过度自信条件下的金融市场委托代理合同[J].系统工程,2005,23(4):19-27.
[130]陈其安,杨秀苔.,基于代理人过度自信的委托-代理关系模型研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(1):110-116.
[131]陈其安,杨秀苔.,基于过度自信的金融市场委托-代理模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2004,12(z1):252-256.
[132]程兵,梁衡义.,过度自信、过度悲观与均衡资产定价[J].管理评论,2004,16(11):23-27.
[133]高鸿祯.,实验经济学导论[M].北京:中国统计出版社,2003.
[134]葛新权,王国成.,实验经济学引论:原理、方法、应用[M].北京:社会科学文献,2006.
[135]金雪军,杨晓兰.,实验经济学[M].北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社,2006.
[136]李丽,王明好.,基金经理过度自信对基金收益与风险的影响研究[J].运筹与管理,2005,14(1):95-98.
[137]李增泉.,激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(1):24-30.
[138]林嘉永.,资本市场的实验研究[D].厦门:厦门大学,2004.
[139]林树.,中国投资者行为的实验与实证研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2006.
[140]罗伯特,J.希勒.,非理性繁荣[M].廖理、施红敏译,北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001(4):122-123.
[141]阮青松,狄瑶.,中国企业经理人是自利和理性的吗?--一个实验经济学研究[J].上海管理科学,2008(1):47-50.
[142]萨缪尔森,诺德豪斯.,经济学(第16版)[M].萧琛等译,北京:华夏出版社,1999.
[143]魏刚.,高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3):32-39.
[144]亚当,斯密.,国富论[M].杨敬年译,西安:陕西人民出版社,2001.
[145]杨晓兰.,证券市场泡沫问题的实验经济学研究[D].杭州:浙江大学,2005.
[146]张维迎.,博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1996.
[147]张耀辉.,实验经济学教程[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[148]周嘉南,黄登仕.,过度自信对经理业绩分享系数与风险之间关系的影响[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(3):269-274.