制度环境、董事会行为与终极股东掏空行为
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摘要
从公司治理理论的发展过程来看,传统研究主要基于股权高度分散而导致的管理者与外部股东之间的代理问题。但近年来,许多学者的研究发现,大股东掌握集中的股权,就有足够的权力来控制上市公司,并使得上市公司的各种决策为其自身谋取私利,将上市公司的资源从小股东手中转移到自己控制的企业中。现代公司治理研究重点也从经理层损害股东的代理问题转移到控股股东侵占小股东利益的代理问题上来了。根据产权经济学的观点,产权安排和制度环境一定程度上会影响经济行为。因此,公司所有权安排作为公司最重要的治理机制,必然会对控股股东行为产生影响。在我国转型经济的制度背景下,上市公司处于终极股东超强控制状态,终极股东作为上市公司实际控制人,深刻地影响着有关控制权收益的财务行为。同时,我国上市公司终极股东为了自身利益通过自我交易从企业转移资源,如直接占用资金、债务担保和侵占公司投资机会等,甚至还可以稀释他人的股权来增加自身在企业的份额,如发行股票稀释其他股东权益。因此,基于制度环境和董事会行为的治理机制,研究终极股东对上市公司掏空行为影响的内在机理与特征,为有效抑制与降低终极股东的掏空行为,保护广大中小投资者的利益提供理论借鉴意义。
本文主要以产权性质为视角,采用分组分析的方法研究终极控制权、董事会行为和制度环境对上市公司终极股东掏空行为的影响。文章采用规范研究与实证研究的方法,从“问题提出→背景分析→模型分析→实证研究”四个层面逐步展开研究。第1章“导论”提出问题,界定了本文的研究对象、内容和贡献；第2章“文献综述”回顾了国内外掏空行为相关理论和文献,梳理了制度环境和董事会行为对掏空的影响机制,为后续研究打下经验基础；第3章“我国终极股东掏空行为的机理和特征分析’描述了我国终极股东掏空行为的实际情况,为本文的实证研究提供现实的制度与环境背景,使本文的研究能够从我国的实际情况出发,更加具有现实意义；第4章“终极股东掏空行为的理论分析与模型构建”分析了制度环境、董事会行为和所有权比例与掏空行为之间的关系,构建了基于终极股东控制权私有收益的掏空行为理论模型,形成系统的理论分析框架,为后续的研究提供理论依据；第5章“控制权、控制人变更对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”是基于2005-2010年间我国沪深两市A股上市公司的样本数据,通过实证分析方法先研究了我国上市公司终极股东控制权对掏空行为的影响；第6章“董事会行为对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”在第5章基础上,在加入董事会行为因素的基础上,研究了终极股东控制权对董事会行为的影响.进而导致通过董事会行为影响掏空行为；第7章“制度环境对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”在第5和6章的基础上,在加入制度环境因素的基础上,研究了制度环境对终极控制权和董事会行为的影响,进而导致对终极股东掏空行为的影响；进一步又结合主成份分析法研究了制度环境、董事会行为和终极控制权三个因子对掏空行为的影响程度大小,以期明确主次,对症下药；文章最后是第8章“主要结论与政策建议”,主要总结本文的研究结论,并针对研究结论提出治理我国上市公司掏空行为的政策建议,同时对本文研究中存在的局限和未来的研究方向进行了总结和展望。通过上述理论与实证研究主要得出以下结论：
(1)近年来上市公司资金占用现象仍然存在,呈现出增长的趋势。一方面,占用形式上从传统的关联购销业务向隐蔽的担保租赁业务转移；另一方面,生产经营性关联交易额逐年增长,预付账款和预收账款更容易形成资金占用现象,非经营性资金占用更加严重。
(2)理论模型研究表明,终极股东的持股比例与掏空行为成倒U型关系,意味着终极股东的行为具有“掏空”和“监督经营”两种导向。当股东持股比例低于某一极值时,随着其持股比例的增加,股东倾向于掏空上市公司；当持股比例高于某一极值时,则会产生“利益趋同效应”；不考虑其他情况时,规范的法律制度和完善的公司治理将有助于抑制控股股东掏空行为。
(3)不同产权性质的上市公司中董事会行为的差异性,影响了终极股东的掏空行为。与非政府控制公司相比,政府控制公司中董事会的独立性更差,羊群行为更显著,勤勉程度更低；进一步的,市级及以下政府控制公司董事会的独立性和勤勉度更低,羊群行为更严重,导致终极股东掏空行为最严重,省级政府控制公司次之,中央政府控制公司掏空比例最低；非政府控制公司中,资本家控制公司董事会的独立性和勤勉度最低,羊群行为最严重,掏空行为也最严重：企业家控制公司掏空行为受到的影响最小；外资控制公司指标系数的显著性都不强。
(4)终极股东的控制权特征直接影响了其掏空行为。控股股东的控制权、现金流权和超额控制更多的体现出“壕沟效应”,而现金流权的“协同效应”不显著；在政府控制公司中,政府控制级别越低,控制权特征的“壕沟效应”越强：与资本家控制的上市公司相比,企业家控制公司的控制权特征的“壕沟效应”较低；外资控制公司中控制权特征则表现为“协同效应”。
(5)董事会独立性受产权性质和控制权的影响,进而影响终极股东的掏空行为。董事会的独立性随着终极股东控制权比例的增加而降低；政府控制属性对董事会独立性产生了显著性影响,即政府控制公司中董事会的独立性较低；同时,在政府控制公司中,控制权的效应随着政府控制级别增加而作用降低；控制权在企业家控制公司作用最显著,其次为政府控制公司。
(6)董事会羊群行为也受产权性质和控制权的影响,进而也影响终极股东的掏空行为。终极股东的控制权与董事会羊群行为之间成正相关关系；政府控制属性对董事会羊群行为产生了显著性影响,即政府控制公司中董事会更容易产生羊群行为；但是,控制权对羊群行为的影响显著性不强,尤其是外资控制公司都没有通过显著性检验。
(7)董事会勤勉也与产权性质和控制权相关,并影响着终极股东的掏空行为。董事会勤勉程度与终极股东控制权之间显著性负相关；政府控制属性对董事会成员的勤勉程度产生了显著性影响,政府控制公司中董事会成员勤勉程度明显低于非政府控制公司；在政府控制公司中,控制权的效应随着政府控制级别增加而效果更显著;而非政府控制公司中,企业家控制和外资控制公司的控制权作用都较低,这也说明企业家和外资控制公司中董事会成员勤勉程度更高。
(8)制度环境对终极股东掏空行为有显著性影响。市场化程度越高、政府干预程度越小、法治水平越高,终极股东掏空行为的概率就越低；其中市场化指数的抑制作用最强,法治水平指数抑制作用最小；由于政府的政治权优势,政府控制公司受制度环境的影响小于非政府控制公司；政府控制公司中,省级政府控制公司的掏空行为受制度环境的影响最大；在非政府控制公司中,制度环境对资本家控制公司掏空行为有显著性抑制作用,市场化进程和政府干预程度对企业家控制公司有抑制作用。
(9)不同制度环境下,终极股东的控制权也具有差异性。市场化程度较高的地区,造成较多资本进入上市公司,一定程度上稀释终极股东控制权,也致使终极控股股东的行为更多的暴露在“阳光”下,从而约束“掏空”行为；政府干预程度较高的地区,政府进入上市公司股权的可能性增大,导致上市公司控制权相对较集中,进而加剧掏空行为；法治水平高的地区上市公司的股权和控制权也相对较高,但是上市公司非经营性资金占用率较低,即掏空程度较小。
(10)不同制度环境下,董事会行为具有显著性差异。市场化程度较高的地区,政府干预程度低,经理人市场相对发达,法治水平较高,董事会独立性相对较强,羊群行为较低,董事会更加努力工作,因此,终极股东掏空行为概率越低。
(11)制度环境、董事会行为和终极控制权对掏空行为的影响具有差别。制度环境、董事会独立性和董事会勤勉三个因子对掏空行为都具有制约作用,并且从抑制作用来看,制度环境是最有效的,其次为董事会勤勉程度,而董事会的独立性效果最差；终极控制权则加剧了掏空行为。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下四方面：(1)目前对我国上市公司掏空行为的研究文献,主要集中于股权分置改革之前,而对后股权分置时期的经验研究却很少,本文的研究正好弥补了这一空白；(2)本文将上市公司更加完美地分成中央政府控制、省级政府控制、市级及以下政府控制、企业家控制、资本家控制和外资控制等六类,比起以往研究,更具有全面性和综合性,减少了可能的内生性问题,具有一定进步：(3)采用间接法来计算非经营性资金占用,区别于以往学者的直接法计算资金占用,更加关注了隐蔽的关联交易行为；(4)区别于传统的董事会特征等结构性因素的经验研究,从董事会独立性、羊群行为和勤勉等角度来刻画董事会行为,具有一定新颖性和现实意义。
由于能力和客观条件的限制,本文尚存在一定的局限：(1)没有深入研究控制权、董事会行为和市场化进程之间的交互作用,更好地揭示掏空行为的影响因素；(2)随着资本市场和控制权市场的发展,关联担保已经上升为最重大的关联交易,增加了关联企业之间的财务风险,没有对关联担保进行相关研究；(3)对董事会羊群行为的指标的选择,由于董事会决议公告的限制,没有能找到更加合适的衡量指标,对研究结果具有一定的影响；(4)研究对象有待进一步拓展,如加入譬如高管政治关系、董事会网络格局等；以上局限将在今后研究中继续深入探讨。
With the development of the corporate governance theory, traditional research is mainly based on the equity in the highly fragmented which leads to the agency problems between lead managers and outside shareholders. But in recent years, many scholars found large-shareholders concentrated ownership, and they have enough power to control the listed companies in order to make the various decisions for their own interests, transfer the resources from small-shareholders of listed companies to their owner company. The focus of agency problem of modern corporate governance research shift from manager damage shareholder to the control shareholder occupies the interests of minority shareholders. According to the point of view of property economics, ownership arrangements and institutional environment will affect the economic behavior in some extent. Therefore, the ownership arrangement as the company's most important governance mechanism is bound to affect behavior of control shareholders. Under the background of transitional economy in China, the listed companies are in the status of the super-control of large-shareholders. The ultimate shareholders as the actual controllers of listed company have a profound impact on the financial decision related with the benefit of control rights. At the same time, the ultimate shareholders of listed companies transfer resource from company through self-transactions, such as direct occupation of funds, debt guarantees, and misappropriation of company investment opportunities, even can dilute the sharehold of others to increase their equity, such as share issue dilution of other shareholders'rights and interests. Therefore, based on the governance mechanisms of institutional environment and board behavior, the study of ultimate shareholders affected internal mechanisms and properties of listed companies tunneling, can effectively inhibit and reduce the ultimate shareholders tunnelling, and protect the interests of most medium and small investors.
This paper mainly uses the packet analysis method to study the impact of the control right, board behavior and institution environment on the tunneling from the perspective of ownership property. This article uses the methods of normative research and empirical research. The problem is posed in the first section'Introduction', in which the research object, content and contribution are clearly shown. The second sections'Literature Review" reviews the related theories and literatures of tunneling at home and abroad, analyzes the effect of institution environment and board behavior on tunneling. The third section is 'Analysis of mechanism and characteristic of ultimate shareholders tunneling', which describes the actual situation of the ultimate shareholders tunneling, which leads the research in the light of the specific conditions in our country. The forth section'Theoretical analysis and model construction of ultimate shareholders tunneling' shows the relationship between institutional environment, board behavior, percentage of ownership and tunneling, provides the theory basis for the follow-up study:The fifth section'Control rights, controller changes effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling' is based on the samples of Chinese listed companies over the period2005～2009, study the impact of control right over the tunneling through empirical analysis. The sixth section'Board behavior effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling'is based on the fifth section, joining the factors of board behavior, study the impact of control right on board behavior, which leads to impact on tunneling through board behavior; The seventh section'Institutional environment effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling' is based on the fifth section and the sixth section, joining the factors of the institutional environment. Study the impact of institutional environment on control right and board behavior, which leads to the impact on tunneling; Combined with principal component analysis method to study the impact of institutional environment, board behavior and control rights on tunneling. In the ending section'Conclusions and Policy Recommendations', conclusions are drawn and recommendations to the politics with respect to the tunneling from Chinese listed companies are put forward. At the same time, the limitation and prospect are also discussed. According to theoretical and empirical research above, we come to conclusion that:
Fisrt, the phenomenon of funds occupation of listed company still exists and shows a growth trend recently. On the one hand, the occupied formal was transferred from the traditional purchase and sale of related business to the hidden guarantees, leasing business and so on. On the other hand, the production and management related transaction volume increased year by year, prepayments and accounts receivable are easier to form the phenomenon of funds occupation.
Sencond. theoretical models indicates that the relations between sharehold proportion of ultimate shareholder and tunneling is like inversed U shape, which means that sharehold proportion does tunneling and supervision. When the shareholder holds was less than some extremism, with the increase of sharehold proportion, their may take more tunneling. While shareholder is above a certainly extremism, it will produce convergence of interests' effect. Does not consider other cases, legal system and the perfection of corporate governance will contribute to the inhibition of the tunneling behavior.
Third, differences of board behavior in listed companies of different nature affect the tunneling. Compared with the non-government-controlled companies, the independence of board of government controlled companies is worse, herd behavior is more pronounced, and lower diligence. Further, the independence and diligence of board in companies of municipal government and below controlled are lower, herd behavior is more serious, resulted the most serious tunneling. The provincial government-controlled company followed, and the proportion of tunneling in central government controlled is lowest. In the non-government controlled companies, the independence and diligence of capitalists controlled companies is lowest, and herd behavior and tunneling is the most serious. The companies controlled by entrepreneurs have the least impact.
Fourth, the characteristic of ultimate shareholders'control right has a direct impact on tunneling. Control right, cash flow right and excess control more reflect the entrenchment effect, and the synergistic effect of cash flow right is not significant. In the government controlled companies, the lower of the government control level, the stronger of entrenchment effect. Compared with the listed company controlled by the capitalists, the entrenchment effect is lower in the entrepreneurs controlled companies. The foreign controlled companies don't show significant effect.
Fifth, the independence of board is affected by the ownership property and control right, thereby affecting tunneling. The independence of board decreases as the proportion of control right increases. Government control had a significant impact on the independence of board, which means the independence of board in the government-controlled companies is lower. Meanwhile, in the government-controlled companies, the effect of control right decreases as government control increases. The role of control right in entrepreneurs controlled companies is the most significant, government-controlled companies followed.
Sixth, the herd behavior of board is also influenced by the ownership property and control right, thus affecting the tunneling. A positive correlation is shown between the control right and the herd behavior of board. Government control generates a significant influence on the herd behavior, which means board behavior in government controlled companies is easier to have herd behavior. However, the impact of control right on herd behavior is not significant.
Seventh, the diligence of board is related with the ownership property and control right. and has impact on tunneling. The diligence of board is negatively related with ultimate control right. Government-controlled has a significant impact on diligence of board, and the diligence of board was lower than the non-government controlled companies; as the level of government control increases, the effect of control right is more pronounced; However, the control right of entrepreneurs control and foreign-controlled companies is not obvious. It also shows that the board members have a higher diligence.
Eighth, institutional environment have a significant impact on tunneling. As the higher degree of market, the smaller degree of government intervention, the higher level of law. the lower probability of tunneling; the strongest inhibition of the market index, and the minimum of law; Due to the advantage of government political rights, government controlled companies affected by institutional environment is less than non-government controlled; The institutional environment does the most impact on tunneling of provincial government-controlled among government controlled companies; Among non-government controlled companies, institutional environment does negative impact on tunneling of capitalists controlled companies, and the market process and government intervention do negative impact on tunneling.
Ninth, the ultimate control right does differences in different institutional environment. In higher degree of market areas, more capital joining listed companies, it will weaken the ultimate shareholder control right to some extent, and their behavior will be exposed under the sun, thus inhabited tunneling. In higher degree of government intervention areas, the possibility of government getting into listed companies will increased, which resulted in relatively centralized control right, and exacerbated tunneling; In higher rule areas of law. the equity and control right are relatively high, but the occupancy of non-operating funds is lower.
Tenth, board behavior has significant differences in different institutional environment. The higher degree of market areas, the lower of government intervention, the higher level of law, the relatively stronger of independence of board, the lower of herd behavior, the higher of board diligence, so the less of tunneling.
Eleventh, institutional environment, board behavior and ultimate control right have different impact on tunneling. Institutional environment, board independence and diligence have negative impact on tunneling, and the institutional environment is the more effective than board independence, ultimate control right in exacerbating tunneling.
The innovation is mainly reflected in following four areas:First, the literature of tunneling currently in China mainly focused on post non-tradable share reform, this study just to make up the gap of after non-tradable share reform. Second, the listed companies are more perfectly divided into six type including central government controlled, provincial government controlled, the municipal and under government controlled, entrepreneurs controlled, capitalists controlled and foreign controlled. It is more comprehensive and integrated than previous study, and reduces possible endogenous problems. Third, using the indirect method to calculate the non-operating funds, which pay more attention to the hidden related transactions than the directly method. Fourth, characterizing the board behavior from the perspective of board independence, herd behavior and diligence has a certain novelty and practical.
In the end, I had to say there is some limitation in this thesis. First, without in-depth studying the interaction between control right, board behavior and process of marketing, it's making less understanding of the impact factors of tunneling. Second, with the development of capital market and control market, associated guarantee has risen to the most significant related transactions. There is no study on tunneling of associated guarantee. Third, due to the limitations of announcement board, it was not able to find a more appropriate indicator on herd behavior of board, and have a certain impact on study results. Fourth, the study object is to be further expanded, such as adding executives and political relations, the network structure of board. The above limitations will go to depth study in later research.
本文主要以产权性质为视角,采用分组分析的方法研究终极控制权、董事会行为和制度环境对上市公司终极股东掏空行为的影响。文章采用规范研究与实证研究的方法,从“问题提出→背景分析→模型分析→实证研究”四个层面逐步展开研究。第1章“导论”提出问题,界定了本文的研究对象、内容和贡献；第2章“文献综述”回顾了国内外掏空行为相关理论和文献,梳理了制度环境和董事会行为对掏空的影响机制,为后续研究打下经验基础；第3章“我国终极股东掏空行为的机理和特征分析’描述了我国终极股东掏空行为的实际情况,为本文的实证研究提供现实的制度与环境背景,使本文的研究能够从我国的实际情况出发,更加具有现实意义；第4章“终极股东掏空行为的理论分析与模型构建”分析了制度环境、董事会行为和所有权比例与掏空行为之间的关系,构建了基于终极股东控制权私有收益的掏空行为理论模型,形成系统的理论分析框架,为后续的研究提供理论依据；第5章“控制权、控制人变更对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”是基于2005-2010年间我国沪深两市A股上市公司的样本数据,通过实证分析方法先研究了我国上市公司终极股东控制权对掏空行为的影响；第6章“董事会行为对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”在第5章基础上,在加入董事会行为因素的基础上,研究了终极股东控制权对董事会行为的影响.进而导致通过董事会行为影响掏空行为；第7章“制度环境对终极股东掏空行为影响的实证检验”在第5和6章的基础上,在加入制度环境因素的基础上,研究了制度环境对终极控制权和董事会行为的影响,进而导致对终极股东掏空行为的影响；进一步又结合主成份分析法研究了制度环境、董事会行为和终极控制权三个因子对掏空行为的影响程度大小,以期明确主次,对症下药；文章最后是第8章“主要结论与政策建议”,主要总结本文的研究结论,并针对研究结论提出治理我国上市公司掏空行为的政策建议,同时对本文研究中存在的局限和未来的研究方向进行了总结和展望。通过上述理论与实证研究主要得出以下结论：
(1)近年来上市公司资金占用现象仍然存在,呈现出增长的趋势。一方面,占用形式上从传统的关联购销业务向隐蔽的担保租赁业务转移；另一方面,生产经营性关联交易额逐年增长,预付账款和预收账款更容易形成资金占用现象,非经营性资金占用更加严重。
(2)理论模型研究表明,终极股东的持股比例与掏空行为成倒U型关系,意味着终极股东的行为具有“掏空”和“监督经营”两种导向。当股东持股比例低于某一极值时,随着其持股比例的增加,股东倾向于掏空上市公司；当持股比例高于某一极值时,则会产生“利益趋同效应”；不考虑其他情况时,规范的法律制度和完善的公司治理将有助于抑制控股股东掏空行为。
(3)不同产权性质的上市公司中董事会行为的差异性,影响了终极股东的掏空行为。与非政府控制公司相比,政府控制公司中董事会的独立性更差,羊群行为更显著,勤勉程度更低；进一步的,市级及以下政府控制公司董事会的独立性和勤勉度更低,羊群行为更严重,导致终极股东掏空行为最严重,省级政府控制公司次之,中央政府控制公司掏空比例最低；非政府控制公司中,资本家控制公司董事会的独立性和勤勉度最低,羊群行为最严重,掏空行为也最严重：企业家控制公司掏空行为受到的影响最小；外资控制公司指标系数的显著性都不强。
(4)终极股东的控制权特征直接影响了其掏空行为。控股股东的控制权、现金流权和超额控制更多的体现出“壕沟效应”,而现金流权的“协同效应”不显著；在政府控制公司中,政府控制级别越低,控制权特征的“壕沟效应”越强：与资本家控制的上市公司相比,企业家控制公司的控制权特征的“壕沟效应”较低；外资控制公司中控制权特征则表现为“协同效应”。
(5)董事会独立性受产权性质和控制权的影响,进而影响终极股东的掏空行为。董事会的独立性随着终极股东控制权比例的增加而降低；政府控制属性对董事会独立性产生了显著性影响,即政府控制公司中董事会的独立性较低；同时,在政府控制公司中,控制权的效应随着政府控制级别增加而作用降低；控制权在企业家控制公司作用最显著,其次为政府控制公司。
(6)董事会羊群行为也受产权性质和控制权的影响,进而也影响终极股东的掏空行为。终极股东的控制权与董事会羊群行为之间成正相关关系；政府控制属性对董事会羊群行为产生了显著性影响,即政府控制公司中董事会更容易产生羊群行为；但是,控制权对羊群行为的影响显著性不强,尤其是外资控制公司都没有通过显著性检验。
(7)董事会勤勉也与产权性质和控制权相关,并影响着终极股东的掏空行为。董事会勤勉程度与终极股东控制权之间显著性负相关；政府控制属性对董事会成员的勤勉程度产生了显著性影响,政府控制公司中董事会成员勤勉程度明显低于非政府控制公司；在政府控制公司中,控制权的效应随着政府控制级别增加而效果更显著;而非政府控制公司中,企业家控制和外资控制公司的控制权作用都较低,这也说明企业家和外资控制公司中董事会成员勤勉程度更高。
(8)制度环境对终极股东掏空行为有显著性影响。市场化程度越高、政府干预程度越小、法治水平越高,终极股东掏空行为的概率就越低；其中市场化指数的抑制作用最强,法治水平指数抑制作用最小；由于政府的政治权优势,政府控制公司受制度环境的影响小于非政府控制公司；政府控制公司中,省级政府控制公司的掏空行为受制度环境的影响最大；在非政府控制公司中,制度环境对资本家控制公司掏空行为有显著性抑制作用,市场化进程和政府干预程度对企业家控制公司有抑制作用。
(9)不同制度环境下,终极股东的控制权也具有差异性。市场化程度较高的地区,造成较多资本进入上市公司,一定程度上稀释终极股东控制权,也致使终极控股股东的行为更多的暴露在“阳光”下,从而约束“掏空”行为；政府干预程度较高的地区,政府进入上市公司股权的可能性增大,导致上市公司控制权相对较集中,进而加剧掏空行为；法治水平高的地区上市公司的股权和控制权也相对较高,但是上市公司非经营性资金占用率较低,即掏空程度较小。
(10)不同制度环境下,董事会行为具有显著性差异。市场化程度较高的地区,政府干预程度低,经理人市场相对发达,法治水平较高,董事会独立性相对较强,羊群行为较低,董事会更加努力工作,因此,终极股东掏空行为概率越低。
(11)制度环境、董事会行为和终极控制权对掏空行为的影响具有差别。制度环境、董事会独立性和董事会勤勉三个因子对掏空行为都具有制约作用,并且从抑制作用来看,制度环境是最有效的,其次为董事会勤勉程度,而董事会的独立性效果最差；终极控制权则加剧了掏空行为。
本文的创新之处主要体现在以下四方面：(1)目前对我国上市公司掏空行为的研究文献,主要集中于股权分置改革之前,而对后股权分置时期的经验研究却很少,本文的研究正好弥补了这一空白；(2)本文将上市公司更加完美地分成中央政府控制、省级政府控制、市级及以下政府控制、企业家控制、资本家控制和外资控制等六类,比起以往研究,更具有全面性和综合性,减少了可能的内生性问题,具有一定进步：(3)采用间接法来计算非经营性资金占用,区别于以往学者的直接法计算资金占用,更加关注了隐蔽的关联交易行为；(4)区别于传统的董事会特征等结构性因素的经验研究,从董事会独立性、羊群行为和勤勉等角度来刻画董事会行为,具有一定新颖性和现实意义。
由于能力和客观条件的限制,本文尚存在一定的局限：(1)没有深入研究控制权、董事会行为和市场化进程之间的交互作用,更好地揭示掏空行为的影响因素；(2)随着资本市场和控制权市场的发展,关联担保已经上升为最重大的关联交易,增加了关联企业之间的财务风险,没有对关联担保进行相关研究；(3)对董事会羊群行为的指标的选择,由于董事会决议公告的限制,没有能找到更加合适的衡量指标,对研究结果具有一定的影响；(4)研究对象有待进一步拓展,如加入譬如高管政治关系、董事会网络格局等；以上局限将在今后研究中继续深入探讨。
With the development of the corporate governance theory, traditional research is mainly based on the equity in the highly fragmented which leads to the agency problems between lead managers and outside shareholders. But in recent years, many scholars found large-shareholders concentrated ownership, and they have enough power to control the listed companies in order to make the various decisions for their own interests, transfer the resources from small-shareholders of listed companies to their owner company. The focus of agency problem of modern corporate governance research shift from manager damage shareholder to the control shareholder occupies the interests of minority shareholders. According to the point of view of property economics, ownership arrangements and institutional environment will affect the economic behavior in some extent. Therefore, the ownership arrangement as the company's most important governance mechanism is bound to affect behavior of control shareholders. Under the background of transitional economy in China, the listed companies are in the status of the super-control of large-shareholders. The ultimate shareholders as the actual controllers of listed company have a profound impact on the financial decision related with the benefit of control rights. At the same time, the ultimate shareholders of listed companies transfer resource from company through self-transactions, such as direct occupation of funds, debt guarantees, and misappropriation of company investment opportunities, even can dilute the sharehold of others to increase their equity, such as share issue dilution of other shareholders'rights and interests. Therefore, based on the governance mechanisms of institutional environment and board behavior, the study of ultimate shareholders affected internal mechanisms and properties of listed companies tunneling, can effectively inhibit and reduce the ultimate shareholders tunnelling, and protect the interests of most medium and small investors.
This paper mainly uses the packet analysis method to study the impact of the control right, board behavior and institution environment on the tunneling from the perspective of ownership property. This article uses the methods of normative research and empirical research. The problem is posed in the first section'Introduction', in which the research object, content and contribution are clearly shown. The second sections'Literature Review" reviews the related theories and literatures of tunneling at home and abroad, analyzes the effect of institution environment and board behavior on tunneling. The third section is 'Analysis of mechanism and characteristic of ultimate shareholders tunneling', which describes the actual situation of the ultimate shareholders tunneling, which leads the research in the light of the specific conditions in our country. The forth section'Theoretical analysis and model construction of ultimate shareholders tunneling' shows the relationship between institutional environment, board behavior, percentage of ownership and tunneling, provides the theory basis for the follow-up study:The fifth section'Control rights, controller changes effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling' is based on the samples of Chinese listed companies over the period2005～2009, study the impact of control right over the tunneling through empirical analysis. The sixth section'Board behavior effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling'is based on the fifth section, joining the factors of board behavior, study the impact of control right on board behavior, which leads to impact on tunneling through board behavior; The seventh section'Institutional environment effect on ultimate shareholder tunneling' is based on the fifth section and the sixth section, joining the factors of the institutional environment. Study the impact of institutional environment on control right and board behavior, which leads to the impact on tunneling; Combined with principal component analysis method to study the impact of institutional environment, board behavior and control rights on tunneling. In the ending section'Conclusions and Policy Recommendations', conclusions are drawn and recommendations to the politics with respect to the tunneling from Chinese listed companies are put forward. At the same time, the limitation and prospect are also discussed. According to theoretical and empirical research above, we come to conclusion that:
Fisrt, the phenomenon of funds occupation of listed company still exists and shows a growth trend recently. On the one hand, the occupied formal was transferred from the traditional purchase and sale of related business to the hidden guarantees, leasing business and so on. On the other hand, the production and management related transaction volume increased year by year, prepayments and accounts receivable are easier to form the phenomenon of funds occupation.
Sencond. theoretical models indicates that the relations between sharehold proportion of ultimate shareholder and tunneling is like inversed U shape, which means that sharehold proportion does tunneling and supervision. When the shareholder holds was less than some extremism, with the increase of sharehold proportion, their may take more tunneling. While shareholder is above a certainly extremism, it will produce convergence of interests' effect. Does not consider other cases, legal system and the perfection of corporate governance will contribute to the inhibition of the tunneling behavior.
Third, differences of board behavior in listed companies of different nature affect the tunneling. Compared with the non-government-controlled companies, the independence of board of government controlled companies is worse, herd behavior is more pronounced, and lower diligence. Further, the independence and diligence of board in companies of municipal government and below controlled are lower, herd behavior is more serious, resulted the most serious tunneling. The provincial government-controlled company followed, and the proportion of tunneling in central government controlled is lowest. In the non-government controlled companies, the independence and diligence of capitalists controlled companies is lowest, and herd behavior and tunneling is the most serious. The companies controlled by entrepreneurs have the least impact.
Fourth, the characteristic of ultimate shareholders'control right has a direct impact on tunneling. Control right, cash flow right and excess control more reflect the entrenchment effect, and the synergistic effect of cash flow right is not significant. In the government controlled companies, the lower of the government control level, the stronger of entrenchment effect. Compared with the listed company controlled by the capitalists, the entrenchment effect is lower in the entrepreneurs controlled companies. The foreign controlled companies don't show significant effect.
Fifth, the independence of board is affected by the ownership property and control right, thereby affecting tunneling. The independence of board decreases as the proportion of control right increases. Government control had a significant impact on the independence of board, which means the independence of board in the government-controlled companies is lower. Meanwhile, in the government-controlled companies, the effect of control right decreases as government control increases. The role of control right in entrepreneurs controlled companies is the most significant, government-controlled companies followed.
Sixth, the herd behavior of board is also influenced by the ownership property and control right, thus affecting the tunneling. A positive correlation is shown between the control right and the herd behavior of board. Government control generates a significant influence on the herd behavior, which means board behavior in government controlled companies is easier to have herd behavior. However, the impact of control right on herd behavior is not significant.
Seventh, the diligence of board is related with the ownership property and control right. and has impact on tunneling. The diligence of board is negatively related with ultimate control right. Government-controlled has a significant impact on diligence of board, and the diligence of board was lower than the non-government controlled companies; as the level of government control increases, the effect of control right is more pronounced; However, the control right of entrepreneurs control and foreign-controlled companies is not obvious. It also shows that the board members have a higher diligence.
Eighth, institutional environment have a significant impact on tunneling. As the higher degree of market, the smaller degree of government intervention, the higher level of law. the lower probability of tunneling; the strongest inhibition of the market index, and the minimum of law; Due to the advantage of government political rights, government controlled companies affected by institutional environment is less than non-government controlled; The institutional environment does the most impact on tunneling of provincial government-controlled among government controlled companies; Among non-government controlled companies, institutional environment does negative impact on tunneling of capitalists controlled companies, and the market process and government intervention do negative impact on tunneling.
Ninth, the ultimate control right does differences in different institutional environment. In higher degree of market areas, more capital joining listed companies, it will weaken the ultimate shareholder control right to some extent, and their behavior will be exposed under the sun, thus inhabited tunneling. In higher degree of government intervention areas, the possibility of government getting into listed companies will increased, which resulted in relatively centralized control right, and exacerbated tunneling; In higher rule areas of law. the equity and control right are relatively high, but the occupancy of non-operating funds is lower.
Tenth, board behavior has significant differences in different institutional environment. The higher degree of market areas, the lower of government intervention, the higher level of law, the relatively stronger of independence of board, the lower of herd behavior, the higher of board diligence, so the less of tunneling.
Eleventh, institutional environment, board behavior and ultimate control right have different impact on tunneling. Institutional environment, board independence and diligence have negative impact on tunneling, and the institutional environment is the more effective than board independence, ultimate control right in exacerbating tunneling.
The innovation is mainly reflected in following four areas:First, the literature of tunneling currently in China mainly focused on post non-tradable share reform, this study just to make up the gap of after non-tradable share reform. Second, the listed companies are more perfectly divided into six type including central government controlled, provincial government controlled, the municipal and under government controlled, entrepreneurs controlled, capitalists controlled and foreign controlled. It is more comprehensive and integrated than previous study, and reduces possible endogenous problems. Third, using the indirect method to calculate the non-operating funds, which pay more attention to the hidden related transactions than the directly method. Fourth, characterizing the board behavior from the perspective of board independence, herd behavior and diligence has a certain novelty and practical.
In the end, I had to say there is some limitation in this thesis. First, without in-depth studying the interaction between control right, board behavior and process of marketing, it's making less understanding of the impact factors of tunneling. Second, with the development of capital market and control market, associated guarantee has risen to the most significant related transactions. There is no study on tunneling of associated guarantee. Third, due to the limitations of announcement board, it was not able to find a more appropriate indicator on herd behavior of board, and have a certain impact on study results. Fourth, the study object is to be further expanded, such as adding executives and political relations, the network structure of board. The above limitations will go to depth study in later research.
引文
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