中印财政分权的经济增长效应研究
|
摘要
发展中国家广泛的财政分权实践和相应快速的经济增长使人们开始关注财政分权的经济增长效应。但是目前理论与实证研究得到的结论充满了不确定性和矛盾。本文分析了其中存在问题的原因,并在此基础上实证研究了中印财政分权的经济增长效应,为发展中国家的财政分权实践提出了相关建议。
首先,将财政分权与经济增长的作用机制归纳为财政支出分权的资源配置效应和财政收入分权的制度环境效应。其中,前者是指将政府作为社会生产的重要部门,由于中央和地方在提供不同公共服务时的财政支出效率存在差异,将资源在中央和地方之间进行重新配置会影响到经济增长。后者是指由于财政收入分权形成的政府间税收竞争改变了政府部门的行为,从而影响到私人部门的产出以及经济增长。接着以此为基础建立了可以反映财政分权与经济增长作用机制的二维实证研究基础模型。
其次,分析认为实证研究文献结论差异的主要原因在于样本选择的不同。通过引入最优财政分权度,认为财政分权的经济增长效应取决于实际财政分权度与最优财政分权度的比较关系。同时,研究认为最优财政分权度还具有变动性。这样,当样本期间内最优财政分权度发生变化,就会使实证研究结果产生严重偏差。因此,本文提出了一些实证研究样本选择的限制性条件和检验最优财政分权度是否发生严重变化的方法,并指出实证研究结果仅能说明样本期内财政分权对经济增长的暂时性影响。
然后,本文研究了中印财政分权制度、经济发展模式等方面的差异,这些差异分别影响到财政分权指标的设定和实证研究控制变量的选择。中国的财政分权存在于各级政府,需要考虑中央和省、以及省级以下政府的财政分权,而印度的财政分权存在于中央和邦之间,仅需考虑中央和邦之间的财政分权。中国的经济主要靠制造业及对外留易推动,而印度基础设施建设落后,主要依赖服务业和高新技术产业的发展,因此,本文选择进出口贸易、中等职业教育以及高等教育的发展水平来反映两国经济发展模式的差异。
最后,实证研究了中印财政分权的经济增长效应。使用中国各省1995～2006年以及印度20个样本邦1996～2004年的面板数据进行回归分析。结果显示,中国的财政支出分权促进了经济增长而财政收入分权阻碍了经济增长,印度的财政支出分权和财政收入分权都促进了经济增长。中印财政支出分权经济增长效应的相似性在很大程度上表明发展中国家财政支出分权对经济增长促进作用的普遍性,同时,财政收入分权经济增长效应的差异表明财政收入分权与经济增长的关系容易受民主、法治基础以及市场经济条件的制约。并据此指出了中印两国财政分权改革的方向,提出了其他发展中国家进行财政分权改革时应该注意的问题。
Recently, policy makers and scholars begin to focus on economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization with widely fiscal decentralization practice and corresponding rapid economic growth in developing countries. Theoretical and empirical literatures have gained some conclusions, but these are full of uncertainty and contradiction. This dissertation analyses the reasons of the problems, and based on which analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India by empirical approach. The conclusions provide experience to developing countries.
First, theoretical and empirical literatures don't clearly know the mechanism between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The dissertation summarizes it to the allocation effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization and the institute environment effect of fiscal revenue decentralization. The allocation effect is direct approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Since the central government and the local government have different fiscal expenditure efficiency when providing different public services, allocating the public resources between the central government and the local government by fiscal expenditure decentralization will affect economic growth. The institute environment effect is indirect approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Fiscal revenue decentralization will induce governments' tax competition and change the governments' behavior, which consequently affect private department's output and economic growth. Based on above research, the dissertation establishes two dimensional empirical models to research the economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization.
Second, by analyzing the reasons for the differential conclusions of empirical studies, the dissertation finds that the main reason is sample differentia. By introducing the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, it argues that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth depends on the comparison between the actual degree and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. When the former is less than the latter, fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth, and on the contrarily, it will hinder economic growth. Further research finds the optimal degree is dynamic. When the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization changes, the sample will include two kinds' data and make the result deviate. Therefore the dissertation argues some restrict conditions for sample choice and the method to check up whether the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization seriously changes. It also makes point that the results only explain the temporality effect of fiscal decentralization to economic growth in sample period.
Third, the dissertation studies fiscal decentralization system and the pattern of economic development of China and India. These differences will affect fiscal decentralization index setting and the choice of control variable. It must review the fiscal decentralization below the provincial government for China, but only studies the fiscal decentralization between federal government and state government for India. China's economic development mainly depends on manufacturing and foreign trade, while India mainly depends on service and high-tech industry due to its behindhand infrastructure. Therefore the dissertation chooses international trade, the development of secondary vocational education and higher education to reflect the difference patterns of economic development between China and India.
Finally, the dissertation studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India. According to two dimensional empirical models and panel data of China (1995～2006) and India's 20 states (1996～2004), the empirical study find that, fiscal expenditure decentralization has promoted the economic growth while fiscal revenue decentralization has hindered the economic growth for China. Both fiscal expenditure decentralization and fiscal revenue decentralization have promoted the economic growth for India. The common grounds in fiscal expenditure decentralization show the promoting effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization is prevalent. The difference in fiscal revenue decentralization show the relationship between fiscal revenue decentralization and economic growth suffer democracy conditions and market economy development. Then the dissertation proposes a guideline of fiscal decentralization reformation for China and India, and some critical suggestions for other developing countries.
首先,将财政分权与经济增长的作用机制归纳为财政支出分权的资源配置效应和财政收入分权的制度环境效应。其中,前者是指将政府作为社会生产的重要部门,由于中央和地方在提供不同公共服务时的财政支出效率存在差异,将资源在中央和地方之间进行重新配置会影响到经济增长。后者是指由于财政收入分权形成的政府间税收竞争改变了政府部门的行为,从而影响到私人部门的产出以及经济增长。接着以此为基础建立了可以反映财政分权与经济增长作用机制的二维实证研究基础模型。
其次,分析认为实证研究文献结论差异的主要原因在于样本选择的不同。通过引入最优财政分权度,认为财政分权的经济增长效应取决于实际财政分权度与最优财政分权度的比较关系。同时,研究认为最优财政分权度还具有变动性。这样,当样本期间内最优财政分权度发生变化,就会使实证研究结果产生严重偏差。因此,本文提出了一些实证研究样本选择的限制性条件和检验最优财政分权度是否发生严重变化的方法,并指出实证研究结果仅能说明样本期内财政分权对经济增长的暂时性影响。
然后,本文研究了中印财政分权制度、经济发展模式等方面的差异,这些差异分别影响到财政分权指标的设定和实证研究控制变量的选择。中国的财政分权存在于各级政府,需要考虑中央和省、以及省级以下政府的财政分权,而印度的财政分权存在于中央和邦之间,仅需考虑中央和邦之间的财政分权。中国的经济主要靠制造业及对外留易推动,而印度基础设施建设落后,主要依赖服务业和高新技术产业的发展,因此,本文选择进出口贸易、中等职业教育以及高等教育的发展水平来反映两国经济发展模式的差异。
最后,实证研究了中印财政分权的经济增长效应。使用中国各省1995～2006年以及印度20个样本邦1996～2004年的面板数据进行回归分析。结果显示,中国的财政支出分权促进了经济增长而财政收入分权阻碍了经济增长,印度的财政支出分权和财政收入分权都促进了经济增长。中印财政支出分权经济增长效应的相似性在很大程度上表明发展中国家财政支出分权对经济增长促进作用的普遍性,同时,财政收入分权经济增长效应的差异表明财政收入分权与经济增长的关系容易受民主、法治基础以及市场经济条件的制约。并据此指出了中印两国财政分权改革的方向,提出了其他发展中国家进行财政分权改革时应该注意的问题。
Recently, policy makers and scholars begin to focus on economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization with widely fiscal decentralization practice and corresponding rapid economic growth in developing countries. Theoretical and empirical literatures have gained some conclusions, but these are full of uncertainty and contradiction. This dissertation analyses the reasons of the problems, and based on which analyses the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India by empirical approach. The conclusions provide experience to developing countries.
First, theoretical and empirical literatures don't clearly know the mechanism between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. The dissertation summarizes it to the allocation effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization and the institute environment effect of fiscal revenue decentralization. The allocation effect is direct approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Since the central government and the local government have different fiscal expenditure efficiency when providing different public services, allocating the public resources between the central government and the local government by fiscal expenditure decentralization will affect economic growth. The institute environment effect is indirect approach for fiscal decentralization affecting economic growth. Fiscal revenue decentralization will induce governments' tax competition and change the governments' behavior, which consequently affect private department's output and economic growth. Based on above research, the dissertation establishes two dimensional empirical models to research the economic growth effects of fiscal decentralization.
Second, by analyzing the reasons for the differential conclusions of empirical studies, the dissertation finds that the main reason is sample differentia. By introducing the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, it argues that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth depends on the comparison between the actual degree and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization. When the former is less than the latter, fiscal decentralization will promote economic growth, and on the contrarily, it will hinder economic growth. Further research finds the optimal degree is dynamic. When the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization changes, the sample will include two kinds' data and make the result deviate. Therefore the dissertation argues some restrict conditions for sample choice and the method to check up whether the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization seriously changes. It also makes point that the results only explain the temporality effect of fiscal decentralization to economic growth in sample period.
Third, the dissertation studies fiscal decentralization system and the pattern of economic development of China and India. These differences will affect fiscal decentralization index setting and the choice of control variable. It must review the fiscal decentralization below the provincial government for China, but only studies the fiscal decentralization between federal government and state government for India. China's economic development mainly depends on manufacturing and foreign trade, while India mainly depends on service and high-tech industry due to its behindhand infrastructure. Therefore the dissertation chooses international trade, the development of secondary vocational education and higher education to reflect the difference patterns of economic development between China and India.
Finally, the dissertation studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth for China and India. According to two dimensional empirical models and panel data of China (1995～2006) and India's 20 states (1996～2004), the empirical study find that, fiscal expenditure decentralization has promoted the economic growth while fiscal revenue decentralization has hindered the economic growth for China. Both fiscal expenditure decentralization and fiscal revenue decentralization have promoted the economic growth for India. The common grounds in fiscal expenditure decentralization show the promoting effect of fiscal expenditure decentralization is prevalent. The difference in fiscal revenue decentralization show the relationship between fiscal revenue decentralization and economic growth suffer democracy conditions and market economy development. Then the dissertation proposes a guideline of fiscal decentralization reformation for China and India, and some critical suggestions for other developing countries.
引文
[1] Agarwala, R. China: reforming intergovernment fiscal relations. World Bank Discussion Paper Series No. 178, Washington, DC, 1992.
[2] Akai, N. and Sakata, M. Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 2002, (52):93-108.
[3] Arrow, K.J. and Kurz, M. Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy. The John Hopkins Press, Baitimore, 1970.
[4] Atsushi Iimi. Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note. Journal of Urban Economics, 2005, (57): 449-461.
[5] Bah1, Roy W. and Linn, Johannes F. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, New York:Oxford University Press, 1992.
[6] Barro, Robert J. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, (98): S103-S125.
[7] Blanchard, Olivier., Shleifer, Andrei. Federalism with and Without Political Centralization: China versus Russia. NBER Working Paper 7616, 2000.
[8] Brennan, G, Buchanan, James M. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1980.
[9] Chelliah, R. J. Intergovernment fiscal relations and macroeconomic management in India. Mimeo,The World Bank, 1990.
[10] Davoodi, Hamid., Zou, Heng-fu. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study. Journal of Urban Economics, 1998, (43): 244-257.
[11] Devarajan, D. et al. The Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1996,(37): 313-344.
[12] Devarajan, Shantayanan., Swaroop, Vinaya. and Zou, Heng-fu. The Composition of Public Expenditures and Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1996, (37): 313-344.
[13] Engel, Kirsten H. State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"? Hastings Law Journal, 1997, (48): 271-398.
[14] Fisman, Raymond., Gatti, Reberta. Decentralization and Corruption: evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 2002, (83): 325-345.
[15] Jin, Hehui., Qian, Yingyi., Weingast, Barry R. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics, 2005, (89): 1719-1742.
[16] Jin, Jing., Zou, Heng-fu. How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size? Journal of Urban Economics, 2002, (52), No.2: 270-293.
[17] King, R.G. and Rebelo, S. Public Policy and Economic Growth: Developing Neoclassical Implications. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, (98): S126-151.
[18] M. Govinda Rao. Fiscal decentralization in China and India: a comparative perspective. Asia-Pacific Development Journal, 2003, (10), No. 1:25-45.
[19] Martinez-Vazquez, J., Mcnab, Robert M. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth. World Development, 2003, (31),No.9: 1597-1616.
[20] Martinez-Vazquez, J., Mcnab, Robert M. Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth and Democratic Governance. Working Paper 97-7, International Studies Program, Georgia State University, 1997.
[21] Mauro, P. Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, (110), No.3:691-712.
[22] Mauro, P. The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure. IMF Working Paper 96/98. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1996.
[23] McGuire, Martin. Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions . Journal of Political Economy,1974, (82), No.1: 112-132.
[24] McKinnon, R. Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American Monetary Union. In B. Mairo,& T. Ter-Minassian (Eds.), Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance. New York: Routledge,1997, 73-93.
[25] Musgrave, Richard. Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, (11),No.4: 65-72.
[26] Musgrave, Richard. Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. McGraw, New York,1959.
[27] Oates, W. A reconsideration of environmental federalism. Working Paper. Resources for the Future.Washington,D.C, 2001.
[28] Oates, W. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, (37): 1120-1149.
[29] Oates, W. Estimating the demand for public goods: the collective choice and contingent valuation approaches. The Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources, Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar, 1996.
[30] Oates, W. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal, 1993, (46),No.2: 237-243.
[31] Oates, W. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972.
[32] Oates. W. Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Analysis. American Economic Review, 1985,(75).
[33] Panizza, Ugo. Politicals and Macroeconomic Institutions: A Study of Fiscal Centralization and the Links Between Income Distribution and Long-run Growth. John Hopkins University, PH.D.Dissertation, 1998.
[34] Phillips, Kerk. L., and Woller, Gary. "Does Fiscal Decentralization lead to Economic Growth?",Brigham Young University, http://fhss, byu. edu., 1997.
[35] Prud'Homme, Remy. Comment on "conflicts and dilemmas of decentralization" by Rudolf Hommes. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, Washington, DC:World Bank, 1995b.
[36] Prud'Homme, Remy. On the Danger of Decentralization. World Bank Economic Review 9, 1995a.
[37] Qian, Weingast, B. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, (11).
[38] Qian, Yingyi., Roland, Gerard. Federalism and the soft budget constraint. American Economic Review, 1998, (88),No.5: 1143-1162.
[39] Qian, Yingyi., Weingast, B. R. China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform, 1996, (1): 149-185.
[40] Rao, G. Intergovernment fiscal relations in a planned economy: the Indian case. Mimeo, Australian National University, 1997.
[41] Rao, G, & Sen, T. K. Fiscal federalism in India: theory and practice. India: Macmillan, 1996.
[42] Sewell, David. The Danger of Decentralization According to Prud Homme: Some Further Aspects.World Bank Research Observer, 1996, (11): 143-150.
[43] Shah, A. The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Emerging Market Economies. Policy Research Series Paper 23, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994.
[44] Singh, N. Issues in local government reform in India. Mimeo, University of California, Santa Cruz,1997.
[45]Stiglers.G.Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government.Washing,D.C,1957.
[46]Strumpf,K.Does government decentralization increase policy innovation? Department of Economics Working Paper.Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina,1999.
[47]Tanzi,V.Fiscal federalism and decentralization:a review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects.Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995,Washington,DC:World Bank,1995.
[48]Tiebout,Charles.A pure theory of local expenditures.Journal of Political Economy,1956,(64):416-424.
[49]Ulrich Thiessen.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in High-income OECD Countries.Fiscal Studies,2003,24(3):237-274.
[50]Wildasin,David E.Externalities and Bailouts:Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations.Mimeo,Vanderbilt University,1997.
[51]Xie,Dangyang.,Zou,Heng-fu.and Davoodi,Hamid.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in the United States.Journal of Urban Economics,1999,(45):228-239.
[52]Zhang,Tao,Zou,Heng-fu.The growth impact of intersectoral and intergovernmental allocation of public expenditure:With applications to China and India.China Economic Review,2001,(12):58-81.
[53]Zhang,Tao.,Zou,Heng-fu.Fiscal decentralization,public spending,and economic growth in China.Journal of Public Economics,1998,(67):221-240.
[54]Zhuravskaya,E.Incentives to provide local public goods:fiscal federalism Russian style.Journal of Public Economics,2000,(76):337-368.
[55]毕丽,危素玉.财政分权理论综述.云南财贸学院学报,2004,(20),No.3:44-48.
[56]方晓利,周业安.财政分权理论述评.教学与研究,2001,(3).
[57]龚六堂,邹恒甫.最优税率、政府转移支付与经济增长.数量经济技术经济研究,2002,(1):63-66.
[58]胡书东.经济发展中的中央与地方关系-中国财政制度变迁研究.上海:上海三联书店,2001.
[59]梁军,宋迎春.最优财政分权度初探.山东大学学报,2004,(2):95-98.
[60]列夫·弗莱克曼,普拉门·约瑟夫.俄罗斯地区预算分权及其对经济运行效果的影响.世界银行经济学家论坛.中华工商联合出版社,2002,117-122.
[61]林毅夫,刘志强.中国的财政分权与经济增长.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000,(4):5-17.
[62]刘金涛,杨君,曲晓飞.最优财政分权度与我国经济增长的关系研究.财经问题研究,2007,(6):82-85.
[63]刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政-政府问财政分工及分工方式.北京:中国城市出版社,2001.
[64]马骏.中国中央与地方财政关系模式.中国经济评论,1994,(6):105-136.
[65]钱纳里 等著,吴奇 等译.工业化和经济增长的比较研究.上海:上海三联书店,1989.
[66]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[67]乔宝云.增长与均等的取舍:中国财政分权政策研究.北京:人民出版社,2000.
[68]沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006,(6):16-26.
[69]沈坤荣,付文林.中国的财政分权制度与地区经济增长.管理世界,2005,(1):31-39.
[70]王绍光.分权的底限.北京:中国计划出版社,1997.
[71]王玮.财政分权改革与我国经济增长.社会科学辑刊,2005,(3):76-80.
[72]王玮.财政分权与经济增长关系研究.山东财政学院学报,2004,(2):24-27.
[73]温娇秀.中国的财政分权与经济增长-基于省级面板数据的实证.当代经济科学,2006,28(5):109-113.
[74]文富德.印度财政分税制的运行机制.南亚研究季刊,2000,(1):6-9.
[75]肖芸,龚六堂.财政分权框架下的财政政策和货币政策.经济研究,2003,(1).
[76]许正中 等著.财政分权:理论基础与实践.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002.
[77]严冀,陆铭.分权与区域经济发展:面向一个最优分权程度的理论.世界经济文汇,2003,(3).
[78]杨灿明,赵福军.财政分权理论及其发展述评.中南财经政法大学学报,2004,(4):3-10.
[79]杨灿明.地方政府行为与区域市场结构.经济研究,2000,(11).
[80]杨瑞龙,杨其静.阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型:再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用.经济研究,2000,(3):24-31.
[81]殷德生.最优财政分权与经济增长.世界经济,2004,(27),No.11:62-71.
[82]张晏,龚六堂.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长.经济学(季刊),2005,5(1):75-107.
[83]赵建军.论印度财政改革及对我国的启迪.南亚研究季刊,2004,(1):22-29.
[84]郑前程.印度地方财政现状探析.理论月刊,2003,(9):54-56.
[85]邹继础.中国财政制度改革之探索.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002.
[2] Akai, N. and Sakata, M. Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section Data for the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 2002, (52):93-108.
[3] Arrow, K.J. and Kurz, M. Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy. The John Hopkins Press, Baitimore, 1970.
[4] Atsushi Iimi. Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note. Journal of Urban Economics, 2005, (57): 449-461.
[5] Bah1, Roy W. and Linn, Johannes F. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries, New York:Oxford University Press, 1992.
[6] Barro, Robert J. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, (98): S103-S125.
[7] Blanchard, Olivier., Shleifer, Andrei. Federalism with and Without Political Centralization: China versus Russia. NBER Working Paper 7616, 2000.
[8] Brennan, G, Buchanan, James M. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1980.
[9] Chelliah, R. J. Intergovernment fiscal relations and macroeconomic management in India. Mimeo,The World Bank, 1990.
[10] Davoodi, Hamid., Zou, Heng-fu. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study. Journal of Urban Economics, 1998, (43): 244-257.
[11] Devarajan, D. et al. The Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1996,(37): 313-344.
[12] Devarajan, Shantayanan., Swaroop, Vinaya. and Zou, Heng-fu. The Composition of Public Expenditures and Economic Growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 1996, (37): 313-344.
[13] Engel, Kirsten H. State Environmental Standard Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"? Hastings Law Journal, 1997, (48): 271-398.
[14] Fisman, Raymond., Gatti, Reberta. Decentralization and Corruption: evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics, 2002, (83): 325-345.
[15] Jin, Hehui., Qian, Yingyi., Weingast, Barry R. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics, 2005, (89): 1719-1742.
[16] Jin, Jing., Zou, Heng-fu. How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size? Journal of Urban Economics, 2002, (52), No.2: 270-293.
[17] King, R.G. and Rebelo, S. Public Policy and Economic Growth: Developing Neoclassical Implications. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, (98): S126-151.
[18] M. Govinda Rao. Fiscal decentralization in China and India: a comparative perspective. Asia-Pacific Development Journal, 2003, (10), No. 1:25-45.
[19] Martinez-Vazquez, J., Mcnab, Robert M. Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth. World Development, 2003, (31),No.9: 1597-1616.
[20] Martinez-Vazquez, J., Mcnab, Robert M. Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth and Democratic Governance. Working Paper 97-7, International Studies Program, Georgia State University, 1997.
[21] Mauro, P. Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, (110), No.3:691-712.
[22] Mauro, P. The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure. IMF Working Paper 96/98. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1996.
[23] McGuire, Martin. Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions . Journal of Political Economy,1974, (82), No.1: 112-132.
[24] McKinnon, R. Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American Monetary Union. In B. Mairo,& T. Ter-Minassian (Eds.), Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance. New York: Routledge,1997, 73-93.
[25] Musgrave, Richard. Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, (11),No.4: 65-72.
[26] Musgrave, Richard. Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. McGraw, New York,1959.
[27] Oates, W. A reconsideration of environmental federalism. Working Paper. Resources for the Future.Washington,D.C, 2001.
[28] Oates, W. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, (37): 1120-1149.
[29] Oates, W. Estimating the demand for public goods: the collective choice and contingent valuation approaches. The Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources, Brookfield, USA: Edward Elgar, 1996.
[30] Oates, W. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal, 1993, (46),No.2: 237-243.
[31] Oates, W. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1972.
[32] Oates. W. Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Analysis. American Economic Review, 1985,(75).
[33] Panizza, Ugo. Politicals and Macroeconomic Institutions: A Study of Fiscal Centralization and the Links Between Income Distribution and Long-run Growth. John Hopkins University, PH.D.Dissertation, 1998.
[34] Phillips, Kerk. L., and Woller, Gary. "Does Fiscal Decentralization lead to Economic Growth?",Brigham Young University, http://fhss, byu. edu., 1997.
[35] Prud'Homme, Remy. Comment on "conflicts and dilemmas of decentralization" by Rudolf Hommes. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, Washington, DC:World Bank, 1995b.
[36] Prud'Homme, Remy. On the Danger of Decentralization. World Bank Economic Review 9, 1995a.
[37] Qian, Weingast, B. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997, (11).
[38] Qian, Yingyi., Roland, Gerard. Federalism and the soft budget constraint. American Economic Review, 1998, (88),No.5: 1143-1162.
[39] Qian, Yingyi., Weingast, B. R. China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform, 1996, (1): 149-185.
[40] Rao, G. Intergovernment fiscal relations in a planned economy: the Indian case. Mimeo, Australian National University, 1997.
[41] Rao, G, & Sen, T. K. Fiscal federalism in India: theory and practice. India: Macmillan, 1996.
[42] Sewell, David. The Danger of Decentralization According to Prud Homme: Some Further Aspects.World Bank Research Observer, 1996, (11): 143-150.
[43] Shah, A. The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Developing and Emerging Market Economies. Policy Research Series Paper 23, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994.
[44] Singh, N. Issues in local government reform in India. Mimeo, University of California, Santa Cruz,1997.
[45]Stiglers.G.Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government.Washing,D.C,1957.
[46]Strumpf,K.Does government decentralization increase policy innovation? Department of Economics Working Paper.Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina,1999.
[47]Tanzi,V.Fiscal federalism and decentralization:a review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects.Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995,Washington,DC:World Bank,1995.
[48]Tiebout,Charles.A pure theory of local expenditures.Journal of Political Economy,1956,(64):416-424.
[49]Ulrich Thiessen.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in High-income OECD Countries.Fiscal Studies,2003,24(3):237-274.
[50]Wildasin,David E.Externalities and Bailouts:Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Inter-governmental Fiscal Relations.Mimeo,Vanderbilt University,1997.
[51]Xie,Dangyang.,Zou,Heng-fu.and Davoodi,Hamid.Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in the United States.Journal of Urban Economics,1999,(45):228-239.
[52]Zhang,Tao,Zou,Heng-fu.The growth impact of intersectoral and intergovernmental allocation of public expenditure:With applications to China and India.China Economic Review,2001,(12):58-81.
[53]Zhang,Tao.,Zou,Heng-fu.Fiscal decentralization,public spending,and economic growth in China.Journal of Public Economics,1998,(67):221-240.
[54]Zhuravskaya,E.Incentives to provide local public goods:fiscal federalism Russian style.Journal of Public Economics,2000,(76):337-368.
[55]毕丽,危素玉.财政分权理论综述.云南财贸学院学报,2004,(20),No.3:44-48.
[56]方晓利,周业安.财政分权理论述评.教学与研究,2001,(3).
[57]龚六堂,邹恒甫.最优税率、政府转移支付与经济增长.数量经济技术经济研究,2002,(1):63-66.
[58]胡书东.经济发展中的中央与地方关系-中国财政制度变迁研究.上海:上海三联书店,2001.
[59]梁军,宋迎春.最优财政分权度初探.山东大学学报,2004,(2):95-98.
[60]列夫·弗莱克曼,普拉门·约瑟夫.俄罗斯地区预算分权及其对经济运行效果的影响.世界银行经济学家论坛.中华工商联合出版社,2002,117-122.
[61]林毅夫,刘志强.中国的财政分权与经济增长.北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000,(4):5-17.
[62]刘金涛,杨君,曲晓飞.最优财政分权度与我国经济增长的关系研究.财经问题研究,2007,(6):82-85.
[63]刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政-政府问财政分工及分工方式.北京:中国城市出版社,2001.
[64]马骏.中国中央与地方财政关系模式.中国经济评论,1994,(6):105-136.
[65]钱纳里 等著,吴奇 等译.工业化和经济增长的比较研究.上海:上海三联书店,1989.
[66]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003.
[67]乔宝云.增长与均等的取舍:中国财政分权政策研究.北京:人民出版社,2000.
[68]沈坤荣,付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006,(6):16-26.
[69]沈坤荣,付文林.中国的财政分权制度与地区经济增长.管理世界,2005,(1):31-39.
[70]王绍光.分权的底限.北京:中国计划出版社,1997.
[71]王玮.财政分权改革与我国经济增长.社会科学辑刊,2005,(3):76-80.
[72]王玮.财政分权与经济增长关系研究.山东财政学院学报,2004,(2):24-27.
[73]温娇秀.中国的财政分权与经济增长-基于省级面板数据的实证.当代经济科学,2006,28(5):109-113.
[74]文富德.印度财政分税制的运行机制.南亚研究季刊,2000,(1):6-9.
[75]肖芸,龚六堂.财政分权框架下的财政政策和货币政策.经济研究,2003,(1).
[76]许正中 等著.财政分权:理论基础与实践.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002.
[77]严冀,陆铭.分权与区域经济发展:面向一个最优分权程度的理论.世界经济文汇,2003,(3).
[78]杨灿明,赵福军.财政分权理论及其发展述评.中南财经政法大学学报,2004,(4):3-10.
[79]杨灿明.地方政府行为与区域市场结构.经济研究,2000,(11).
[80]杨瑞龙,杨其静.阶梯式的渐进制度变迁模型:再论地方政府在我国制度变迁中的作用.经济研究,2000,(3):24-31.
[81]殷德生.最优财政分权与经济增长.世界经济,2004,(27),No.11:62-71.
[82]张晏,龚六堂.分税制改革、财政分权与中国经济增长.经济学(季刊),2005,5(1):75-107.
[83]赵建军.论印度财政改革及对我国的启迪.南亚研究季刊,2004,(1):22-29.
[84]郑前程.印度地方财政现状探析.理论月刊,2003,(9):54-56.
[85]邹继础.中国财政制度改革之探索.北京:社会科学文献出版社,2002.