控股股东性质对上市公司多元化经营及其业绩影响的实证分析
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摘要
上市公司的多元化绎营一直是理论界与实务界研究的一个热点问题。上市公司的多元化决策对于公司未来的发展前景及其经营业绩的好坏都起着至关重要的作用。那么,上市公司为什么会实施多元化?不同上市公司在进行多元化决策时是否有所区别,其多元化实施的效果又是否存在差异?对以上问题的思考引导着我们从公司治理结构的角度对上市公司的多元化行为进行更深入的探讨。
而在中国,上市公司“一股独大”的典型股权结构特征,意味着控股股东几乎可以在关于上市公司的每一件事情上都说了算。遵照“公司治理影响经营决策,经营决策影响公司业绩”的思路,控股股东对上市公司经营决策的这一重大影响力必然在公司多元化经营及其业绩上有所反映。因此,本文从控股股东性质上区分不同类型的上市公司,并根据其特点分析上市公司的多元化行为差异及其对公司业绩产生的影响。这一研究为有关多元化经营问题提供了新的思路,对进一步深化多元化经营的理论与实证研究都具有一定的学术价值,其对多元化动机与效益的分析在指导上市公司多元化经营策略的选择上也具有一定的现实意义。
本文在运用剩余资源、委托代理、资产组合及政府干预等理论对控股股东性质影响上市公司多元化经营及其业绩的问题进行分析后,得出了以下结论:(1)从资源剩余理论进行分析可知,地方控股上市公司在剩余资源上最具优势,非相关多元化投资的机会也最多;(2)从委托代理理论进行分析可知,个人控股上市公司非相关多元化动机最强,中央控股上市公司外部监管对多元化投资的阻碍最大,地方控股上市公司受政府干预影响,多元化的倾向也较强;(3)从资产组合理论进行分析可知,个人控股上市公司基于分散风险实施非相关多元化的动机最强。(4)相关多元化所具有的协同效应将为上市公司带来范围经济的优势,而由于过度投资、委托代理成本增加、跨行业补贴以及资本配置低效率等现象的存在,非相关多元化将对上司公司业绩产生负面影响。
同时,通过对沪市上市公司2007年年报数据的实证检验,本文得出以下结果:(1)中央控股的上市公司非相关多元化程度显著低于地方控股与个人控股的上市公司,而地方控股的上市公司非相关多元化程度与个人控股的上市公司无显著差异;(2)上市公司非相关多元化程度与公司业绩显著负相关,而上市公司相关多元化程度与公司业绩正相关,但关系并不显著;(3)虽然不同性质控股股东控制下的上市公司非相关多元化程度均与公司业绩显著负相关,但地方控股上市公司非相关多元化对公司业绩的负面影响效果最显著,而中央控股上市公司非相关多元化导致公司业绩降低的程度最高。
正文共分为五个部分,具体结构如下:第一部分为引言,主要介绍了研究背景与意义,研究方法与思路以及本文的基本框架;第二部分为文献综述,主要分“多元化概念及相关理论”与“多元化经营对上市公司业绩的影响”两个部分总结回顾了国内外学者的研究状况,并对这些研究文献进行了评价;第三部分为理论分析与研究假设,主要从控股股东性质影响多元化经营策略及其对上市公司业绩的影响效果两个方面进行分析,并层层递进提出理论假说;第四部分为实证分析。这一部分对理论部分所提出假设分别进行了检验,包括样本选取与数据来源、变量定义与描述、以及利用样本数据进行描述性统计与多元线性回归分析所得到的研究结果;最后一个部分为研究结论及建议。这一部分是在上文理论与实证研究结果的基础上总结提炼出本文的结论,提出相关建议并指出本文的不足与未来研究方向。
The diversification strategy of listed companies has always been one of the academic hot topics for a long time. The future development and operating performance of a company is directly determined by its diversification strategy. So, what is the motivation of corporate diversification? Does the strategy of diversification various among different types of listed companies, and how does it influence the corporate performance? These questions above have led us to make a deeper investigation into diversification strategy of listed companies, from the perspective of corporate governance.
While in China, the typical characteristics of ownership structure shows that most of the listed companies are controlled by large shareholders, which means controlling shareholders have the final say on almost every decision in listed companies. As we can see from the history and logic of corporate governance, corporate performance is determined by corporate governance and equity structure is the base of corporate governance. Based on this mechanism described above, we explored the motive of diversification and its impact on corporate performance respectively by distinguishing listed companies by the characteristics of its controlling shareholder. This work has raised a new insight for further studies on diversification, and may be of great significance in both academic and practical fields.
In this paper, diverse theories had been used to analyze the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and conclusions had been reached as follows: (1) From the theoretical analysis of Remaining Resources, the listed companies controlled by local government are most advantageous in holding the remaining resources, thus enjoy the greatest opportunity to implement unrelated diversification. (2) From the analysis of Principal-agent Theory, personal-hold listed companies possess the strongest motive for unrelated diversification, while the central government-controlled listed companies meet the largest obstacles from external regulations. Also, subject to government intervention, local government-controlled listed companies have a tendency to implement unrelated diversification. (3) Analyzed by Portfolio Theory, personal-hold listed companies are most inclined to implement unrelated diversification. (4) Related diversification strategy brings the economics of Scope due to the effect of synergy, while unrelated diversification strategy has a negative impact on corporate performance, because of the phenomena such as excessive investment, principal-agent costs, cross-subsidies and low efficiency of capital allocation, etc.
In addition, this paper conducted an empirical test using the data from the 2007 annual reports of companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange, and came to a conclusion as follows: (1) The degree of unrelated diversification in central government-controlled listed companies is significantly lower than the other two, while that in local government-controlled listed companies is just the opposite. (2) The degree of unrelated diversification has significant negative impact on corporate performance, while the degree of related diversification has a positive impact on corporate performance, but lack of significance. (3) The negative impact on corporate performance due to the unrelated diversification strategy is most significant in local government-controlled listed companies, while the unrelated diversification strategy in central government-controlled listed companies leads to the highest degree of reduction in corporate performance.
This paper was divided into five parts, each part is as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction, summarizing the purpose, significance, the logical thought, methodology and the frame of this paper. Chapter 2 is consisted of the concepts and relative theories of diversification, as well as the domestic and foreign literature review. Chapter 3 analyzes theoretically the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and puts forward the research hypothesis. Chapter 4 analyzes empirically the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and tests the research hypothesis put forward in Chapter 3 using methods as descriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression analysis. Chapter 5 sums up the conclusions of this paper, brings up relevant policy-related suggestions, and finally points out the inadequateness as well as future research directions.
而在中国,上市公司“一股独大”的典型股权结构特征,意味着控股股东几乎可以在关于上市公司的每一件事情上都说了算。遵照“公司治理影响经营决策,经营决策影响公司业绩”的思路,控股股东对上市公司经营决策的这一重大影响力必然在公司多元化经营及其业绩上有所反映。因此,本文从控股股东性质上区分不同类型的上市公司,并根据其特点分析上市公司的多元化行为差异及其对公司业绩产生的影响。这一研究为有关多元化经营问题提供了新的思路,对进一步深化多元化经营的理论与实证研究都具有一定的学术价值,其对多元化动机与效益的分析在指导上市公司多元化经营策略的选择上也具有一定的现实意义。
本文在运用剩余资源、委托代理、资产组合及政府干预等理论对控股股东性质影响上市公司多元化经营及其业绩的问题进行分析后,得出了以下结论:(1)从资源剩余理论进行分析可知,地方控股上市公司在剩余资源上最具优势,非相关多元化投资的机会也最多;(2)从委托代理理论进行分析可知,个人控股上市公司非相关多元化动机最强,中央控股上市公司外部监管对多元化投资的阻碍最大,地方控股上市公司受政府干预影响,多元化的倾向也较强;(3)从资产组合理论进行分析可知,个人控股上市公司基于分散风险实施非相关多元化的动机最强。(4)相关多元化所具有的协同效应将为上市公司带来范围经济的优势,而由于过度投资、委托代理成本增加、跨行业补贴以及资本配置低效率等现象的存在,非相关多元化将对上司公司业绩产生负面影响。
同时,通过对沪市上市公司2007年年报数据的实证检验,本文得出以下结果:(1)中央控股的上市公司非相关多元化程度显著低于地方控股与个人控股的上市公司,而地方控股的上市公司非相关多元化程度与个人控股的上市公司无显著差异;(2)上市公司非相关多元化程度与公司业绩显著负相关,而上市公司相关多元化程度与公司业绩正相关,但关系并不显著;(3)虽然不同性质控股股东控制下的上市公司非相关多元化程度均与公司业绩显著负相关,但地方控股上市公司非相关多元化对公司业绩的负面影响效果最显著,而中央控股上市公司非相关多元化导致公司业绩降低的程度最高。
正文共分为五个部分,具体结构如下:第一部分为引言,主要介绍了研究背景与意义,研究方法与思路以及本文的基本框架;第二部分为文献综述,主要分“多元化概念及相关理论”与“多元化经营对上市公司业绩的影响”两个部分总结回顾了国内外学者的研究状况,并对这些研究文献进行了评价;第三部分为理论分析与研究假设,主要从控股股东性质影响多元化经营策略及其对上市公司业绩的影响效果两个方面进行分析,并层层递进提出理论假说;第四部分为实证分析。这一部分对理论部分所提出假设分别进行了检验,包括样本选取与数据来源、变量定义与描述、以及利用样本数据进行描述性统计与多元线性回归分析所得到的研究结果;最后一个部分为研究结论及建议。这一部分是在上文理论与实证研究结果的基础上总结提炼出本文的结论,提出相关建议并指出本文的不足与未来研究方向。
The diversification strategy of listed companies has always been one of the academic hot topics for a long time. The future development and operating performance of a company is directly determined by its diversification strategy. So, what is the motivation of corporate diversification? Does the strategy of diversification various among different types of listed companies, and how does it influence the corporate performance? These questions above have led us to make a deeper investigation into diversification strategy of listed companies, from the perspective of corporate governance.
While in China, the typical characteristics of ownership structure shows that most of the listed companies are controlled by large shareholders, which means controlling shareholders have the final say on almost every decision in listed companies. As we can see from the history and logic of corporate governance, corporate performance is determined by corporate governance and equity structure is the base of corporate governance. Based on this mechanism described above, we explored the motive of diversification and its impact on corporate performance respectively by distinguishing listed companies by the characteristics of its controlling shareholder. This work has raised a new insight for further studies on diversification, and may be of great significance in both academic and practical fields.
In this paper, diverse theories had been used to analyze the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and conclusions had been reached as follows: (1) From the theoretical analysis of Remaining Resources, the listed companies controlled by local government are most advantageous in holding the remaining resources, thus enjoy the greatest opportunity to implement unrelated diversification. (2) From the analysis of Principal-agent Theory, personal-hold listed companies possess the strongest motive for unrelated diversification, while the central government-controlled listed companies meet the largest obstacles from external regulations. Also, subject to government intervention, local government-controlled listed companies have a tendency to implement unrelated diversification. (3) Analyzed by Portfolio Theory, personal-hold listed companies are most inclined to implement unrelated diversification. (4) Related diversification strategy brings the economics of Scope due to the effect of synergy, while unrelated diversification strategy has a negative impact on corporate performance, because of the phenomena such as excessive investment, principal-agent costs, cross-subsidies and low efficiency of capital allocation, etc.
In addition, this paper conducted an empirical test using the data from the 2007 annual reports of companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange, and came to a conclusion as follows: (1) The degree of unrelated diversification in central government-controlled listed companies is significantly lower than the other two, while that in local government-controlled listed companies is just the opposite. (2) The degree of unrelated diversification has significant negative impact on corporate performance, while the degree of related diversification has a positive impact on corporate performance, but lack of significance. (3) The negative impact on corporate performance due to the unrelated diversification strategy is most significant in local government-controlled listed companies, while the unrelated diversification strategy in central government-controlled listed companies leads to the highest degree of reduction in corporate performance.
This paper was divided into five parts, each part is as follows: Chapter 1 is the introduction, summarizing the purpose, significance, the logical thought, methodology and the frame of this paper. Chapter 2 is consisted of the concepts and relative theories of diversification, as well as the domestic and foreign literature review. Chapter 3 analyzes theoretically the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and puts forward the research hypothesis. Chapter 4 analyzes empirically the impact of controlling shareholder's characteristics to corporate diversification and its performance in listed companies, and tests the research hypothesis put forward in Chapter 3 using methods as descriptive statistics and multivariate linear regression analysis. Chapter 5 sums up the conclusions of this paper, brings up relevant policy-related suggestions, and finally points out the inadequateness as well as future research directions.
引文
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