股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护问题的探析
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摘要
我国资本市场成立之初,政府为了保证国有资产的控股地位和不被二级市场的流通所稀释,规定占股市份额约三分之二的国有股和法人股暂不上市交易。这一特殊的制度安排就造成了“一股独大”的畸形股权结构,直接导致了同股不同权的结果,使流通股股东特别是中小股东的合法权益遭受损害。
国有资本应该投入到宏观层次急需发展的领域,让有限的国有资本最大限度地发挥主导作用。减持国有股实际上是国有经济战略性改组中国有资本退出的问题。大量国有资本不能上市场流通,是国有资本战略性转移的主要限制。只有解决证券市场股权割裂,才能消除高市盈率,使股价回归到理性水平。股权分置改革势在必行。
从国有股减持到股权分置改革已历时几年。在这场资本市场制度改革接近尾声的时候,总结股权分置改革当中的成败得失,将为市场在后股权分置时代进一步开放实现全流通提供依据,具有较高的理论价值。本文以规范研究方法为主。在研究过程中,运用到审计、财管、经济、会计学以及经济法等原理,融合了多学科领域的理论和知识,从多角度剖析和阐述股权分置改革的相关问题。另外,大量阅读国内外相关领域的文献,在借鉴前人宝贵经验的基础上,得出了自己的一些认识。
本文试图在前人研究的基础上,结合自身的理解和认识,从股权分置对中小股东利益的影响及股权分置改革前后中小股东权益保护的状况、存在的问题和存在问题的原因这些方面着手进行系统而深入的思考和研究,为全面、深入了解股权分置改革问题提供参考;同时借鉴国内外先进经验,结合我国国情,为如何在股权分置改革的实施过程中及后股权分置时代进一步完善中小股东利益保障机制提供具有实际操作性的对策建议。
除引言外,论文从逻辑上分四章对股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护问题进行研究。第一章描述股权分置改革的概述:第二章阐述中小股东权益保护的状况、存在的问题及原因;第三章叙述国外中小股东利益保护的经验与启示;第四章提出完善中小股东利益保护机制的对策建议。具体地说,论文的结构安排如下:
第一章描述了股权分置改革的概述。首先阐述中小股东的权益的内涵,其次介绍股权分置改革的历史沿革,包括股权分置形成的历史背景和股权分置改革的步骤。根据委托代理理论分析大股东对中小股东利益侵占的行为,并揭示了中小股东权益保护的意义。
第二章叙述了中小股东权益保护的状况以及存在问题和原因。首先阐述了中小股东权益保护的状况。然后揭示股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护存在的一些问题,包括信息披露不完备、机构投资者独立性不强、中小股东的知情权被剥脱、大股东与高管的侵权行为等。最后揭示中小股东权益保护存在问题的原因,包括所有者缺位成为内部人控制的温床、控股股东没有肩负诚信义务、法律对中小股东权益保护不完善、缺乏有效的市场监督等诸多问题。
第三章通过介绍国外在保护中小股东权益方面的经验,再结合中国国情,得出国外保护中小股东权益经验对我国的启示。国外保护中小股东权益的经验主要包括:强调股东的平等待遇、充分发挥董事会职能、信息透明性与及时性较强。最后得出国外保护中小股东权益经验对中国的启示,包括:强调所有权结构的透明性、强调对中小股东权利的尊重、提高信息披露的可信度、拓宽董事会运作的瓶颈。
第四章将理论运用于实践之中,提出了完善中小股东权益保护机制的对策建议:一是加大信息披露的责任与义务;二是完善公司制度设计,包括建立累积投票制度、完善表决权代理行使制度与建立有效的独立董事制度;三是大力发展机构投资者:四是从公司、政府和社会三个方面分析如何加强监管力度,保护中小股东权益;五是强化控股股东对中小股东的诚信义务,包括禁止控股股东滥用股东权力、重建市场信用秩序和引入公司法人人格否认制度。
Beginning our country capital market was established, and in order to guarantee the holding status of the state-owned capital and ensure that the state-owned asset is not diluted by secondary market's circulation, about two-thirds of the state-owned shares and legal person shares have been prohibited from trading temporarily by the government. This particular institutional arrangement has brought about a "due to the dominance" of the abnormal shareholding structure which lead directly to the results of the same shares with different weights and caused the circulation shareholders suffering the harm.
The State-owned capital should be invested to the areas where are in urgent need of developing in macro-level, so that the limited state-owned capital can maximize the leading role. Actually, the reduction of the state-owned shares is a progress that the state-owned capital was withdrawn in the strategic reorganization of the state-owned economy. A large number of state-owned capital have been prohibited from trading on the market, is the major limitation in the strategic shift of the state-owned capital. Only by solving the rights' separating on securities market, the high price-earnings ratio can be eliminated and the stock prices can return to a rational level. The reform of non-tradable shares is imperative.
From the reduction of the state-owned shares to the share-trading reform has lasted for several years. Near the end of this capital market reform, summing up the success or failure of the share-trading reform will achieve further market liberalization in the post-split share structure era and provide a high historical value. This paper mainly research in regulative method. In the course of the study, I applied the principle of auditing, financial management, economics, accounting, and economic laws and integrated the multi-disciplinary field of theory and knowledge and analyzed the related . issues of the reform from different perspectives. In addition, after reading a large number of related domestic or foreign literature, and in profits from the valuable experience of the predecessor, I have obtained some own understandings.
On the basis of previous studies, combining with their own understanding and awareness, this paper attempts to provide the information for studying the reform of non-tradable shares from the effect of splitting share structure and the state of interest protection before and after the reform and the reasons for the problems in these aspects. At the same time, learning the advanced experience at home and abroad, and combining with national conditions, this paper provide the operational measures and proposals for improving the mechanism of the interests protection.
Besides the introduction, the paper was logically divided into four chapters to research the interest protection after the reform. The first chapter described an overview of the split-share structure reform; the second chapter explained the state and problems of interest protection and the reasons for the problems in these aspects; the third chapter narrated the foreign experience and enlightenment in protection of small shareholders' interests; the fourth chapter gave the countermeasures and proposals of improving the protection mechanisms. To be specific, he paper is structured as follows:
The first chapter described an overview of the split-share structure reform. Firstly, it elaborated the content of the small shareholder's rights and interests. Followed by introducing the history of the split-share structure reform, it includes the historical background and the reform steps. According to principal-agent theory, it analyzed the behavior that the major shareholders invaded the small shareholders' benefit, and revealed the significance of protecting the interests of small shareholders.
The second chapter narrated the state and problems of interest protection and the reasons for the problems in these aspects. Firstly, it elaborated the condition of the rights and interests protection. After then, it reveled some questions existed after the split-share structure reform, including the incomplete information disclosure, the institutional investor without independence, the rights to get related information have been stripped, the violations of large shareholders and executives, etc. Finally, it reveled the reason of these existed questions in interest protection, including a big problem of internal control caused by the vacancy of the owner, the controlling shareholders didn't shoulder the duty of good faith, the imperfect law protecting for the interests of small shareholders, the lack of effective market surveillances, and many other issues.
The third chapter narrated the foreign experience and enlightenment in. protection of small shareholders' interests. The protection experience in the overseas mainly includes: Stressing shareholders' equal treatment, full displaying the board's function, the transparent and timely information. In the end, it obtained the enlightenment through the protection experience in the overseas, including: stressing the transparency of the ownership structure, the emphasis to the respect for the rights of small shareholders, to enhance the credibility of information disclosure, to broaden the bottleneck of the board's operation.
The fourth chapter gave the countermeasures and proposals of improving the protection mechanisms. First, stressing the responsibilities and obligations of the information disclosure. The second is to improve the company's system design, including: to establish the cumulative voting system, to improve the agency system of the right to vote Small shareholders and refine the exercise of remedies law. The third is to develop the institutional investor vigorously. Fourth, it should strengthen the supervision dynamics to protect the small shareholders' rights and interests, including: strengthening the supervision to the major stockholder, strengthening the supervision of senior executives and the securities market. The fifth is to establish an effective system of independent directors. The sixth is to consummate the compensation system of the holding shareholders. Seventh, it should strengthen the good faith duty that the holding shareholders to the small shareholders, including forbidding the control shareholders to abuse their authority, restoring the credible market order and introducing the personality denial system of corporate legal person.
国有资本应该投入到宏观层次急需发展的领域,让有限的国有资本最大限度地发挥主导作用。减持国有股实际上是国有经济战略性改组中国有资本退出的问题。大量国有资本不能上市场流通,是国有资本战略性转移的主要限制。只有解决证券市场股权割裂,才能消除高市盈率,使股价回归到理性水平。股权分置改革势在必行。
从国有股减持到股权分置改革已历时几年。在这场资本市场制度改革接近尾声的时候,总结股权分置改革当中的成败得失,将为市场在后股权分置时代进一步开放实现全流通提供依据,具有较高的理论价值。本文以规范研究方法为主。在研究过程中,运用到审计、财管、经济、会计学以及经济法等原理,融合了多学科领域的理论和知识,从多角度剖析和阐述股权分置改革的相关问题。另外,大量阅读国内外相关领域的文献,在借鉴前人宝贵经验的基础上,得出了自己的一些认识。
本文试图在前人研究的基础上,结合自身的理解和认识,从股权分置对中小股东利益的影响及股权分置改革前后中小股东权益保护的状况、存在的问题和存在问题的原因这些方面着手进行系统而深入的思考和研究,为全面、深入了解股权分置改革问题提供参考;同时借鉴国内外先进经验,结合我国国情,为如何在股权分置改革的实施过程中及后股权分置时代进一步完善中小股东利益保障机制提供具有实际操作性的对策建议。
除引言外,论文从逻辑上分四章对股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护问题进行研究。第一章描述股权分置改革的概述:第二章阐述中小股东权益保护的状况、存在的问题及原因;第三章叙述国外中小股东利益保护的经验与启示;第四章提出完善中小股东利益保护机制的对策建议。具体地说,论文的结构安排如下:
第一章描述了股权分置改革的概述。首先阐述中小股东的权益的内涵,其次介绍股权分置改革的历史沿革,包括股权分置形成的历史背景和股权分置改革的步骤。根据委托代理理论分析大股东对中小股东利益侵占的行为,并揭示了中小股东权益保护的意义。
第二章叙述了中小股东权益保护的状况以及存在问题和原因。首先阐述了中小股东权益保护的状况。然后揭示股权分置改革后中小股东权益保护存在的一些问题,包括信息披露不完备、机构投资者独立性不强、中小股东的知情权被剥脱、大股东与高管的侵权行为等。最后揭示中小股东权益保护存在问题的原因,包括所有者缺位成为内部人控制的温床、控股股东没有肩负诚信义务、法律对中小股东权益保护不完善、缺乏有效的市场监督等诸多问题。
第三章通过介绍国外在保护中小股东权益方面的经验,再结合中国国情,得出国外保护中小股东权益经验对我国的启示。国外保护中小股东权益的经验主要包括:强调股东的平等待遇、充分发挥董事会职能、信息透明性与及时性较强。最后得出国外保护中小股东权益经验对中国的启示,包括:强调所有权结构的透明性、强调对中小股东权利的尊重、提高信息披露的可信度、拓宽董事会运作的瓶颈。
第四章将理论运用于实践之中,提出了完善中小股东权益保护机制的对策建议:一是加大信息披露的责任与义务;二是完善公司制度设计,包括建立累积投票制度、完善表决权代理行使制度与建立有效的独立董事制度;三是大力发展机构投资者:四是从公司、政府和社会三个方面分析如何加强监管力度,保护中小股东权益;五是强化控股股东对中小股东的诚信义务,包括禁止控股股东滥用股东权力、重建市场信用秩序和引入公司法人人格否认制度。
Beginning our country capital market was established, and in order to guarantee the holding status of the state-owned capital and ensure that the state-owned asset is not diluted by secondary market's circulation, about two-thirds of the state-owned shares and legal person shares have been prohibited from trading temporarily by the government. This particular institutional arrangement has brought about a "due to the dominance" of the abnormal shareholding structure which lead directly to the results of the same shares with different weights and caused the circulation shareholders suffering the harm.
The State-owned capital should be invested to the areas where are in urgent need of developing in macro-level, so that the limited state-owned capital can maximize the leading role. Actually, the reduction of the state-owned shares is a progress that the state-owned capital was withdrawn in the strategic reorganization of the state-owned economy. A large number of state-owned capital have been prohibited from trading on the market, is the major limitation in the strategic shift of the state-owned capital. Only by solving the rights' separating on securities market, the high price-earnings ratio can be eliminated and the stock prices can return to a rational level. The reform of non-tradable shares is imperative.
From the reduction of the state-owned shares to the share-trading reform has lasted for several years. Near the end of this capital market reform, summing up the success or failure of the share-trading reform will achieve further market liberalization in the post-split share structure era and provide a high historical value. This paper mainly research in regulative method. In the course of the study, I applied the principle of auditing, financial management, economics, accounting, and economic laws and integrated the multi-disciplinary field of theory and knowledge and analyzed the related . issues of the reform from different perspectives. In addition, after reading a large number of related domestic or foreign literature, and in profits from the valuable experience of the predecessor, I have obtained some own understandings.
On the basis of previous studies, combining with their own understanding and awareness, this paper attempts to provide the information for studying the reform of non-tradable shares from the effect of splitting share structure and the state of interest protection before and after the reform and the reasons for the problems in these aspects. At the same time, learning the advanced experience at home and abroad, and combining with national conditions, this paper provide the operational measures and proposals for improving the mechanism of the interests protection.
Besides the introduction, the paper was logically divided into four chapters to research the interest protection after the reform. The first chapter described an overview of the split-share structure reform; the second chapter explained the state and problems of interest protection and the reasons for the problems in these aspects; the third chapter narrated the foreign experience and enlightenment in protection of small shareholders' interests; the fourth chapter gave the countermeasures and proposals of improving the protection mechanisms. To be specific, he paper is structured as follows:
The first chapter described an overview of the split-share structure reform. Firstly, it elaborated the content of the small shareholder's rights and interests. Followed by introducing the history of the split-share structure reform, it includes the historical background and the reform steps. According to principal-agent theory, it analyzed the behavior that the major shareholders invaded the small shareholders' benefit, and revealed the significance of protecting the interests of small shareholders.
The second chapter narrated the state and problems of interest protection and the reasons for the problems in these aspects. Firstly, it elaborated the condition of the rights and interests protection. After then, it reveled some questions existed after the split-share structure reform, including the incomplete information disclosure, the institutional investor without independence, the rights to get related information have been stripped, the violations of large shareholders and executives, etc. Finally, it reveled the reason of these existed questions in interest protection, including a big problem of internal control caused by the vacancy of the owner, the controlling shareholders didn't shoulder the duty of good faith, the imperfect law protecting for the interests of small shareholders, the lack of effective market surveillances, and many other issues.
The third chapter narrated the foreign experience and enlightenment in. protection of small shareholders' interests. The protection experience in the overseas mainly includes: Stressing shareholders' equal treatment, full displaying the board's function, the transparent and timely information. In the end, it obtained the enlightenment through the protection experience in the overseas, including: stressing the transparency of the ownership structure, the emphasis to the respect for the rights of small shareholders, to enhance the credibility of information disclosure, to broaden the bottleneck of the board's operation.
The fourth chapter gave the countermeasures and proposals of improving the protection mechanisms. First, stressing the responsibilities and obligations of the information disclosure. The second is to improve the company's system design, including: to establish the cumulative voting system, to improve the agency system of the right to vote Small shareholders and refine the exercise of remedies law. The third is to develop the institutional investor vigorously. Fourth, it should strengthen the supervision dynamics to protect the small shareholders' rights and interests, including: strengthening the supervision to the major stockholder, strengthening the supervision of senior executives and the securities market. The fifth is to establish an effective system of independent directors. The sixth is to consummate the compensation system of the holding shareholders. Seventh, it should strengthen the good faith duty that the holding shareholders to the small shareholders, including forbidding the control shareholders to abuse their authority, restoring the credible market order and introducing the personality denial system of corporate legal person.
引文
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[8]罗党论,唐清泉.大股东利益输送与投资者保护-一个分析框架,管理科学,2005,10,(5),75-79.
[9]李福样.上市公司股权分置改革理论与实务[M].兰州:兰州大学出版社.2005
[10]林靖峰.股权分置改革后中国上市公司控制权私有收益研究.华东师范大学图书馆,2008年2月.
[11]李明辉.简论中小股东利益的保护[J].当代经济研究.2001,(8):68、69.
[12]李雪.股权分置与中小股东权益保护.四川大学图书馆,2006年4月.
[13]刘星.股权分置改革前后投资者保护问题研究.厦门大学图书馆,2007年5月.
[14]李志君.证券市场政府监管论[M].长春:吉林人民出版社.2005
[15]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999年第12期.
[16]唐国正,熊德华.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性.金融研究,2005年,(9):137-154.
[17]魏军峰.非流通股对股票市场和上市公司的影响.经济学,2004,1,(2):475-491.
[18]魏建华.股权分置改革方案中的对价分析.经济理论与经济管理,2005年,(8):27-31.
[19]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[20]谢百三,王巍.中国股市股权分置问题的冷思考[J].价格理论与实践,2005,4.
[21]徐二明,王智慧.我国上市公司治理结构与战略绩效的相关性研究[J].南开经济评论,2000,4:4-14.
[22]许小年,王燕.中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理.选自《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,粱能主编.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[23]袁东.论中国公司股权结构与股票市场机制[J].财经贸易,1999,4.
[24]袁方,杨昊.全流通时候投资者关系管理面临五大挑战[N].上海证券报.2007,9,6.
[25]姚长辉.国家股流通和我国股票市场的规范化[J],证券市场导报,1997,2.
[26]禹刚,尚福林.定调股改基本完成[N].上海证券报.2006,12,27.
[27]张维.股权分置改革中的道德风险及其防范措施.Special Zone Economy,2005年12月:71-72.
[28]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001,(12):66-72.
[29]张育军.后股权分置时代监管、创新与市场发展.证券市场导报,2006,7:22-34.
[30]张宗新,郭来生,朱伟骅,etc.全流通背景下证券市场内幕操纵行为与甄别研究,2007,3,16:1-4.
[31]Clasessens,Simeon Djankov,Joseph P.H.Fan,et al.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].journal of finance,2002,57:2741-2771.
[32]Claessens,Stijn,Simeon Djankov,Larry Lang.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):81-112.
[33]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,The Structure of Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J],Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177.
[34]Eugen Fama & Michael Jensen."Separation of Ownership and Control".The Journal of Law and Economics.V.26,June 1983.pp301-325.
[35]Faccio Mara,Lang Larry H.P,Young Leslie.Dividends and exp rop riation[J].American Economy Review,2001,(91):54-78.
[36]Fama."Agency problems and the theory of firm".Journal of Political Economy.V.88.1980 pp288-307.
[37]Franks Julian,Mayer Colin.Ownership and control of German corporations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2001,(14):943-952.
[38]Holderness,C.and Sheehan,D.,The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:an Exploratory Analysis[J],Jovurnal of Financial Economics,1988,20:317-346.
[39]Johnson,Simon,Peter Boone,Alasdair Breach,Eric Friedman.Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis,1997-1998[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (58): 141 -186.
[40]Kic Han,David Y.Suk,The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Additional Evidence[J],Review of Financial Economics,1998,7(2):143-155.
[41]La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al. Legal Determinants of External Finance[J] Journal of Finance,1997,23:1131-1150.
[42]Leland,Hayne,David Pyle,Information Assymetries,Financial Structure.and Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance[J],1997,32:371-387.
[43]McConnell,J.,and Servas,Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporty Value[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:595-612.
[44]Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.W.,Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1998,20:293-315.
[45] Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J] Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[2]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,The Structure of Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J],Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177.
[3]Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J],Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[1]Johnson,Simon,Peter Boone,Alasdair Breach,Eric Friedman.Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis,1997-1998[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):141-186.
[2]Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.W.,Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1998,20:293-315.
[3]罗党论,唐清泉.大股东利益输送与投资者保护-一个分析框架,管理科学,2005,10,(5),75-79.
[1]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999年第12期.上市公司国有股占有最大的比例,而其他股东全部都占很小比例,也称为一股独霸。
[2]高敬一.股权分置改革财富再分配效应研究.吉林大学图书馆,2007年4月.
[2]宫玉松.论股权结构与控股权[J],经济学家,1998.2.
[4]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[1]袁东.论中国公司股权结构与股票市场机制[J].财经贸易,1999,4.
[1]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[1]张维.股权分置改革中的道德风险及其防范措施.Special Zone Economy,2005年12月:71-72
[2]禹刚,尚福林.定调股改基本完成[N].上海证券报.2006,12,27.
[1]张育军.后股权分置时代监管、创新与市场发展.证券市场导报,2006,7:22-34.
[1]冯玉华.全流通时代上市公司高管行为及监管对策研究[N].上海证券报.2006,9,27.用脚投票,最早由美国经济学家蒂伯特(Charles Tiebout)提出的,来源于股市,卖掉其持有的公司股票,从而选择离开或者放弃。
[2]魏军峰.非流通股对股票市场和上市公司的影响.经济学,2004,1,(2):475-491.
[1]魏军峰.非流通股对股票市场和上市公司的影响.经济学,2004,1,(2):475-491.
[1]李雪.股权分置与中小股东权益保护.四川大学图书馆,2006年4月.
[2]何金耿.从国际经验看股东权益与公司治理.现代经济探讨,2002,(2):59-61.
[1]唐国正,熊德华.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性.金融研究,2005年,(9):137-154.
[2]李志君.证券市场政府监管论[M].长春:吉林人民出版社.2005
[1]巴曙松.启动股权分置问题试点中国股市转型的制度基础[J].中国金融,2005,(9),60-61.
[2]陈晓,江东.股权多元化,公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000,(8):28-35.
[3]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001,36(11):3-11.
[4]冯玉华.全流通时代上市公司高管行为及监管对策研究[N].上海证券报.2006,9,27.
[5]高敬一.股权分置改革财富再分配效应研究.吉林大学图书馆,2007年4月.
[6]宫玉松.论股权结构与控股权[J],经济学家,1998,2.
[7]何金耿.从国际经验看股东权益与公司治理.现代经济探讨,2002,(2):59-61.
[8]罗党论,唐清泉.大股东利益输送与投资者保护-一个分析框架,管理科学,2005,10,(5),75-79.
[9]李福样.上市公司股权分置改革理论与实务[M].兰州:兰州大学出版社.2005
[10]林靖峰.股权分置改革后中国上市公司控制权私有收益研究.华东师范大学图书馆,2008年2月.
[11]李明辉.简论中小股东利益的保护[J].当代经济研究.2001,(8):68、69.
[12]李雪.股权分置与中小股东权益保护.四川大学图书馆,2006年4月.
[13]刘星.股权分置改革前后投资者保护问题研究.厦门大学图书馆,2007年5月.
[14]李志君.证券市场政府监管论[M].长春:吉林人民出版社.2005
[15]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999年第12期.
[16]唐国正,熊德华.股权分置改革中的投资者保护与投资者理性.金融研究,2005年,(9):137-154.
[17]魏军峰.非流通股对股票市场和上市公司的影响.经济学,2004,1,(2):475-491.
[18]魏建华.股权分置改革方案中的对价分析.经济理论与经济管理,2005年,(8):27-31.
[19]吴晓求.中国上市公司:资本结构与公司治理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004.
[20]谢百三,王巍.中国股市股权分置问题的冷思考[J].价格理论与实践,2005,4.
[21]徐二明,王智慧.我国上市公司治理结构与战略绩效的相关性研究[J].南开经济评论,2000,4:4-14.
[22]许小年,王燕.中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理.选自《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,粱能主编.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[23]袁东.论中国公司股权结构与股票市场机制[J].财经贸易,1999,4.
[24]袁方,杨昊.全流通时候投资者关系管理面临五大挑战[N].上海证券报.2007,9,6.
[25]姚长辉.国家股流通和我国股票市场的规范化[J],证券市场导报,1997,2.
[26]禹刚,尚福林.定调股改基本完成[N].上海证券报.2006,12,27.
[27]张维.股权分置改革中的道德风险及其防范措施.Special Zone Economy,2005年12月:71-72.
[28]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001,(12):66-72.
[29]张育军.后股权分置时代监管、创新与市场发展.证券市场导报,2006,7:22-34.
[30]张宗新,郭来生,朱伟骅,etc.全流通背景下证券市场内幕操纵行为与甄别研究,2007,3,16:1-4.
[31]Clasessens,Simeon Djankov,Joseph P.H.Fan,et al.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].journal of finance,2002,57:2741-2771.
[32]Claessens,Stijn,Simeon Djankov,Larry Lang.The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,(58):81-112.
[33]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,The Structure of Ownership:Causes and Consequences[J],Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177.
[34]Eugen Fama & Michael Jensen."Separation of Ownership and Control".The Journal of Law and Economics.V.26,June 1983.pp301-325.
[35]Faccio Mara,Lang Larry H.P,Young Leslie.Dividends and exp rop riation[J].American Economy Review,2001,(91):54-78.
[36]Fama."Agency problems and the theory of firm".Journal of Political Economy.V.88.1980 pp288-307.
[37]Franks Julian,Mayer Colin.Ownership and control of German corporations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2001,(14):943-952.
[38]Holderness,C.and Sheehan,D.,The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:an Exploratory Analysis[J],Jovurnal of Financial Economics,1988,20:317-346.
[39]Johnson,Simon,Peter Boone,Alasdair Breach,Eric Friedman.Corporate governance in the Asian financial crisis,1997-1998[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, (58): 141 -186.
[40]Kic Han,David Y.Suk,The Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance: Additional Evidence[J],Review of Financial Economics,1998,7(2):143-155.
[41]La Porta,Lopez-De-Silanes,Shileifer,et al. Legal Determinants of External Finance[J] Journal of Finance,1997,23:1131-1150.
[42]Leland,Hayne,David Pyle,Information Assymetries,Financial Structure.and Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance[J],1997,32:371-387.
[43]McConnell,J.,and Servas,Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporty Value[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:595-612.
[44]Morck,R.,Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.W.,Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1998,20:293-315.
[45] Shleifer,A.,Vishny,R.W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J] Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.