国际保险监管模式比较研究
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摘要
2008年美国次贷危机的爆发下,保险监管模式研究已经成为经济学界研究的热点。归纳和总结国际保险监管模式发展演变的历史,并对保险监管模式基础概念及其金融改革理论进行分析,有利于国际保险监管模式的深入研究。当今,保险监管的模式选择必然受到经济社会和保险市场发展的直接影响,具有类似保险监管市场发展轨迹的不同国家,其保险监管制度及发展演进也具有共性特征。因此,总结和吸收国外成熟保险市场国家保险监管模式的选择和发展经验,对于我国新兴的保险市场具有十分重要的借鉴意义。
本文以国外发达国家的保险监管模式为研究对象,对其保险监管内容进行系统地分析和研究,通过对传统保险监管理论和现代保险监管理论的研究归纳,并结合国外保险监管模式现状,分析出影响保险监管模式的传导因素,创造性地提出保险监管传导机制模型,最后通过国内外保险监管优劣势的分析比较,对于如何改进和优化我国保险监管模式提出可操作性的相关建议。本论文写作是基于前人研究基础上加以创新,并具有一定的理论与实践价值。
In combination with human society and economy’s development, insurance becomes the inevitable by-products of the demand of risk diversification as well as the transfer and control mechanism of economic loss. It’s one of the indispensible departments of the society development, referred as“social stability”and“powerful engine of economy”. In order to ensure the efficient operation of insurance market and bring it into full play, not only the regulatory system against unfair competition is needed to implement microcosmic industry supervision on insurance institutions, but also macro-control and market management on is necessary to maintain market stability and achieve the national goal of economy. In addition. It’s of great importance for the emerging insurance market in China to sum up the experience of choosing insurance regulatory mode and learn from the experience of the development of mature markets abroad.
The insurance market malfunction and the special socialization of insurance industry determine the necessity of the existence of insurance supervision. In China, there is the incompleteness of insurance market due to its immatureness. Consequently, not only in the aspect of providing the credit support and saving trade cost, but also conquering the market malfunction, facilitating the insurance market functions and protecting public benefits, the insurance supervision exerts positive effects on promoting the development of Chinese insurance industry and national economy.
This article focuses on how to choose the insurance regulatory mode and its effect on achieve the goal of effective supervision. Factor analysis is utilized to find out the common choice and consultant significance of insurance regulatory patterns in different countries. There are four main questions in the article. First of all, what’s the rationality and root of insurance regulatory and regulatory pattern? This article re-sorts the insurance regulatory theories and makes them more abundantly; second, how to scientifically choose appropriate insurance regulatory pattern for our own country? How to increase the efficiency of the supervision identity and how to test and verify the efficacious of insurance regulatory system? Third, what’s the regular pattern in the process of evolution of insurance regulatory pattern in different countries? Fourth, what’s the running effect of the existing insurance regulatory system in China? Are there any problems and how to improve and optimize the existing system?
The government has played the decisive role in the process of the insurance supervision regulations’forming and developing. During the commercializes reforming years, the insurance supervision regulations reflect the contradictions and conflicts between planning regulation system and market supervision system. It leads to dynamic games among the government, the regulatory authority and the emerging diverse interest groups. This article evaluates the performance of Chinese insurance regulation system from the scale and density of insurance market, the effect of insurance in the GDP and financial market and its contribution to the social economy. Through the horizontal comparison of international insurance market, there exist significant gaps between the Chinese insurance market’s macro performance and the developed insurance market abroad. Apart from some historical and objective factors, it is because of the low development level of Chinese insurance market and the market structure and operational mechanism which are still in the process of perfection. Besides, the continuous innovation of insurance products and technologies has posed new challenges to the insurance regulation.
Through the summary of evolution of insurance regulatory system in different countries, Public Choice Theory, New institutional economics and Industrial Organization Theory are utilized to creatively construct the model of insurance regulatory transmission mechanism. Through the analysis of insurance regulation system in developed countries, it reveals that the choice of insurance market, insurance market target and insurance regulation mode are all affected by the political and economy factors to form distinct insurance regulation format. Typical insurance regulation system in the US, the UK and Japan are selected to make a comparative analysis and decomposition analysis from insurance regulation target, insurance regulation system and insurance regulation content in order to further demonstrate that the model of insurance regulatory transmission mechanism is tenable.
Finally, considering our nation conditions, some forward-looking and operable suggestions and countermeasures are proposed. The government should clarify the insurance regulation target and boundary to boost regional reasonable distribution and balanced development of insurance market. It should also enhance cooperation and coordination not only among different regulators but also among different countries to break up monopolies and narrow the legal gap so as to build a good development environment for the insurance industry. As to enterprises, it is necessary to perfect the efficient insurance institution information disclosure requirements, establish and improve objective and fair insurance rating system, bring in the dynamic solvency regulation system, actualize good insurance enterprises governance, strengthen the benefit perspective, consummate the check and balance of powers mechanism among stockholders’meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors and management layers along with establish regulations to protect related benefit. As to consumers, it is vital to boost education to insurance agent and consumers, let media to play an important role on supervising and ultimately lead the media to be a positive public opinion in order to maintain fair competition and healthy development of insurance industry. Finally, it’s noteworthy that in this article, the word“insurance”only involves commercial insurance, therefore,“insurance”in the article equals to commercial insurance
本文以国外发达国家的保险监管模式为研究对象,对其保险监管内容进行系统地分析和研究,通过对传统保险监管理论和现代保险监管理论的研究归纳,并结合国外保险监管模式现状,分析出影响保险监管模式的传导因素,创造性地提出保险监管传导机制模型,最后通过国内外保险监管优劣势的分析比较,对于如何改进和优化我国保险监管模式提出可操作性的相关建议。本论文写作是基于前人研究基础上加以创新,并具有一定的理论与实践价值。
In combination with human society and economy’s development, insurance becomes the inevitable by-products of the demand of risk diversification as well as the transfer and control mechanism of economic loss. It’s one of the indispensible departments of the society development, referred as“social stability”and“powerful engine of economy”. In order to ensure the efficient operation of insurance market and bring it into full play, not only the regulatory system against unfair competition is needed to implement microcosmic industry supervision on insurance institutions, but also macro-control and market management on is necessary to maintain market stability and achieve the national goal of economy. In addition. It’s of great importance for the emerging insurance market in China to sum up the experience of choosing insurance regulatory mode and learn from the experience of the development of mature markets abroad.
The insurance market malfunction and the special socialization of insurance industry determine the necessity of the existence of insurance supervision. In China, there is the incompleteness of insurance market due to its immatureness. Consequently, not only in the aspect of providing the credit support and saving trade cost, but also conquering the market malfunction, facilitating the insurance market functions and protecting public benefits, the insurance supervision exerts positive effects on promoting the development of Chinese insurance industry and national economy.
This article focuses on how to choose the insurance regulatory mode and its effect on achieve the goal of effective supervision. Factor analysis is utilized to find out the common choice and consultant significance of insurance regulatory patterns in different countries. There are four main questions in the article. First of all, what’s the rationality and root of insurance regulatory and regulatory pattern? This article re-sorts the insurance regulatory theories and makes them more abundantly; second, how to scientifically choose appropriate insurance regulatory pattern for our own country? How to increase the efficiency of the supervision identity and how to test and verify the efficacious of insurance regulatory system? Third, what’s the regular pattern in the process of evolution of insurance regulatory pattern in different countries? Fourth, what’s the running effect of the existing insurance regulatory system in China? Are there any problems and how to improve and optimize the existing system?
The government has played the decisive role in the process of the insurance supervision regulations’forming and developing. During the commercializes reforming years, the insurance supervision regulations reflect the contradictions and conflicts between planning regulation system and market supervision system. It leads to dynamic games among the government, the regulatory authority and the emerging diverse interest groups. This article evaluates the performance of Chinese insurance regulation system from the scale and density of insurance market, the effect of insurance in the GDP and financial market and its contribution to the social economy. Through the horizontal comparison of international insurance market, there exist significant gaps between the Chinese insurance market’s macro performance and the developed insurance market abroad. Apart from some historical and objective factors, it is because of the low development level of Chinese insurance market and the market structure and operational mechanism which are still in the process of perfection. Besides, the continuous innovation of insurance products and technologies has posed new challenges to the insurance regulation.
Through the summary of evolution of insurance regulatory system in different countries, Public Choice Theory, New institutional economics and Industrial Organization Theory are utilized to creatively construct the model of insurance regulatory transmission mechanism. Through the analysis of insurance regulation system in developed countries, it reveals that the choice of insurance market, insurance market target and insurance regulation mode are all affected by the political and economy factors to form distinct insurance regulation format. Typical insurance regulation system in the US, the UK and Japan are selected to make a comparative analysis and decomposition analysis from insurance regulation target, insurance regulation system and insurance regulation content in order to further demonstrate that the model of insurance regulatory transmission mechanism is tenable.
Finally, considering our nation conditions, some forward-looking and operable suggestions and countermeasures are proposed. The government should clarify the insurance regulation target and boundary to boost regional reasonable distribution and balanced development of insurance market. It should also enhance cooperation and coordination not only among different regulators but also among different countries to break up monopolies and narrow the legal gap so as to build a good development environment for the insurance industry. As to enterprises, it is necessary to perfect the efficient insurance institution information disclosure requirements, establish and improve objective and fair insurance rating system, bring in the dynamic solvency regulation system, actualize good insurance enterprises governance, strengthen the benefit perspective, consummate the check and balance of powers mechanism among stockholders’meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors and management layers along with establish regulations to protect related benefit. As to consumers, it is vital to boost education to insurance agent and consumers, let media to play an important role on supervising and ultimately lead the media to be a positive public opinion in order to maintain fair competition and healthy development of insurance industry. Finally, it’s noteworthy that in this article, the word“insurance”only involves commercial insurance, therefore,“insurance”in the article equals to commercial insurance
引文
[1]Harrington, Scott E.A Note on the Impact of the Auto Insurance Rate Regulation [J]. Review of Economic and Statistics, 1987:69.
[2]Hayalawa, Hiroshi, Paul S.Fischebeck, and Baruch Fischhoff.The Japanese Automobile Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 2000:18.
[3]John M.Belth.Financial Management of Insurance Companies [M].America: American Management Association Publishing, 1993.
[4]Julian R.Franks,Stifen M.Schaefer,Michael D.Staunton.The direct and compliance cost of financial regulation[J].Journal of Economics and Business, 1999(51):33-47.
[5]M.A.Crew and C.K.Rowiey.Deregulation as an instrument in Industrial Policy [J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1986:142.
[6]Moe, T.M.Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story [J].Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996:6.
[7]Norma L.Nielson, Carol E.Brown.Application of Expert Systems in Insurance Regulation [J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 1996.
[8]Peltzman, S.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation[J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1976:19.
[9]Robert W.Cooper, Mark S.Dorfman.Mordernzing U.S.Insurance Regulation: What Be Learned from the European Union[J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 2004(40:22.
[10]Spencer L.Kimball.Sketches from a comparative study of American and European insurance regulation [J].Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2003(5):195-210.
[11]Stigler. The Theory of Economics Regulation [J].Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971(2):3-21.
[12]Ambrose,J.Allen Seward. Best Ratings Financial Ratios and Prior Probabilities In Insolvency Prediction[J].Journal of Risk and insurance,1988(55):229-244.
[13]B.M.Mitniek.The Political Economy of Regulation[M].Columbia University Press,1980.
[14]Barrese,James.Asseessing the Financial Condition of insurers[J].CPCU journal,1990(43):37-46.
[15]Brockett , Patrick L , William W.CooPer, Linda L.Golden, Utai Pitaktong.A Neural Network Method for Obtaining and Early Warning of Insurer Insolvency,Journal of Risk and Insurance,1994(61):402-424.
[16]Browne,M.J,J.M.Carson, R.E.Hoyt.Eeonomic and Market Predictors of InsolvenciesIn the Life-Health Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1999(64):643-659.
[17]Browne , MarkJ,Robert E.Hoyt.Economic and Market Predictors of insolvencies in the Property Liability Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1995(62):309-327.
[18]Cummins, Sommer.Capital and Risk in Property-liability Insurance markets [J].Journal of banking&Finance, 1996(20):1069-1092.
[19]Cummins. Risk-based Premiums for insurance guaranty funds[J].Journal of finance,1988(43):823-839.
[20]Ehrlich, Becker.Market Insurance Self-Insurance and Self-Protection [J].Journal of political Economy, 1972(80):623.
[21]Albrechts, KleuPPilberg, C.Mikoseh.Modeling External Evensl for Insurance And Finance[M],1997(34):105-121.
[22]艾伦·加特著,蔡玲译.管制、放松与重新管制[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[23]埃米特·沃恩.危险原理与保险[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[24]奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海三联书店,1995.
[25]查尔斯·沃尔夫著,谢旭译.市场与政府[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1994.
[26]丹尼尔·史铺博著,余晖译.管制与市场[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1999.
[27]方福前.公共选择理论-政治的经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[28]侯家勇.政府干预理论研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,1996.
[29]江生忠.中国保险产业组织优化研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003.
[30]马明哲.挑战竞争-论中国民族保险业的改革与发展[M].上海:商务印书馆,1999.
[31]孟昭亿.中国保险监管制度研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[32]裴光.中国保险业竞争力研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002.
[33]郭宏彬.论保险监管的理论根源[J].中国政法大学学报,2004(4).
[34]胡坚,高飞.保险监管制度的国际比较及其对中国的借鉴[J].山西财经大学学报,2004(2).
[35]黄绥彪,张瑞纲.保险监管的博弈分析[J].广西大学学报,2004(6).
[36]薛生强、何风隽.保险监管的理论分析[J].宁夏大学学报,2004(3):98-101.
[37]高西有.保险监管的成本收益分析[D].北京:北京大学,2003.
[38]郭杨.保险监管的经济分析-中国内地与香港保险监管制度研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2003.
[39]吴九红.中国商业保险监管研究[D].南京:河海大学,2005.
[40]熊舒翼,韦娜,孙岚.保险监管目标的国际比较分析[J].金卡工程·经济与法,2009(12):230-231.
[41]刘志华.保险监管模式国际对比研究及其对我的启示[D].山东:山东大学,2008.
[42]文珊.论全面开放条件下中国保险监管制度的完善[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005.
[43]蒲华冀.美国保险公司偿付能力额度监管及其借鉴[D].成都:西南财经大学,2004.
[44]李爱琴,张存荣.保险监管的国际比较[J].中国保险,1998(4):44-45.
[45]冷煜.保险监管国际比较及发展趋势研究[J].保险监管,2009(3):89-94.
[46]刘新鹏.美日保险监管制度的比较与借鉴[J].金融教学与研究,2004(2):63-64.
[47]李雅珍,张洪涛.美日保险监管制度比较研究[J].世界经济,2001(12):48-54.
[48]张哲.西方保险监管制度的比较及其启示[J].华北金融,2006(1):64-65.
[49]郭宏彬.保险监管体制比较研究[J].生产力研究,2007(7):194-201.
[50]毕姝晨,安洪军.美日保险管制模式改革的比较与借鉴[J].现代日本经济,2004(3):60—64.
[51]郭旭红.席小炎.不同发展水平国家和地区保险监管制度[J].圈中人,2008
[52]许闲.金融危机下德国保险监管的应对与借鉴[J].中国金融,2010(1):17-18
[53]徐徐.新《保险法》对我国保险公司治理监管的影响[J].商业时代,2010(2):48-49
[54]中国保险监督管理委员会官方网站:www.circ.gov.cn.
[2]Hayalawa, Hiroshi, Paul S.Fischebeck, and Baruch Fischhoff.The Japanese Automobile Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 2000:18.
[3]John M.Belth.Financial Management of Insurance Companies [M].America: American Management Association Publishing, 1993.
[4]Julian R.Franks,Stifen M.Schaefer,Michael D.Staunton.The direct and compliance cost of financial regulation[J].Journal of Economics and Business, 1999(51):33-47.
[5]M.A.Crew and C.K.Rowiey.Deregulation as an instrument in Industrial Policy [J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1986:142.
[6]Moe, T.M.Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story [J].Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996:6.
[7]Norma L.Nielson, Carol E.Brown.Application of Expert Systems in Insurance Regulation [J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 1996.
[8]Peltzman, S.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation[J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1976:19.
[9]Robert W.Cooper, Mark S.Dorfman.Mordernzing U.S.Insurance Regulation: What Be Learned from the European Union[J].Journal of Insurance Regulation, 2004(40:22.
[10]Spencer L.Kimball.Sketches from a comparative study of American and European insurance regulation [J].Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2003(5):195-210.
[11]Stigler. The Theory of Economics Regulation [J].Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1971(2):3-21.
[12]Ambrose,J.Allen Seward. Best Ratings Financial Ratios and Prior Probabilities In Insolvency Prediction[J].Journal of Risk and insurance,1988(55):229-244.
[13]B.M.Mitniek.The Political Economy of Regulation[M].Columbia University Press,1980.
[14]Barrese,James.Asseessing the Financial Condition of insurers[J].CPCU journal,1990(43):37-46.
[15]Brockett , Patrick L , William W.CooPer, Linda L.Golden, Utai Pitaktong.A Neural Network Method for Obtaining and Early Warning of Insurer Insolvency,Journal of Risk and Insurance,1994(61):402-424.
[16]Browne,M.J,J.M.Carson, R.E.Hoyt.Eeonomic and Market Predictors of InsolvenciesIn the Life-Health Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1999(64):643-659.
[17]Browne , MarkJ,Robert E.Hoyt.Economic and Market Predictors of insolvencies in the Property Liability Insurance Industry[J].Journal of Risk and Insurance,1995(62):309-327.
[18]Cummins, Sommer.Capital and Risk in Property-liability Insurance markets [J].Journal of banking&Finance, 1996(20):1069-1092.
[19]Cummins. Risk-based Premiums for insurance guaranty funds[J].Journal of finance,1988(43):823-839.
[20]Ehrlich, Becker.Market Insurance Self-Insurance and Self-Protection [J].Journal of political Economy, 1972(80):623.
[21]Albrechts, KleuPPilberg, C.Mikoseh.Modeling External Evensl for Insurance And Finance[M],1997(34):105-121.
[22]艾伦·加特著,蔡玲译.管制、放松与重新管制[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[23]埃米特·沃恩.危险原理与保险[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[24]奥尔森著,陈郁译.集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海三联书店,1995.
[25]查尔斯·沃尔夫著,谢旭译.市场与政府[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1994.
[26]丹尼尔·史铺博著,余晖译.管制与市场[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1999.
[27]方福前.公共选择理论-政治的经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000.
[28]侯家勇.政府干预理论研究[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,1996.
[29]江生忠.中国保险产业组织优化研究[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2003.
[30]马明哲.挑战竞争-论中国民族保险业的改革与发展[M].上海:商务印书馆,1999.
[31]孟昭亿.中国保险监管制度研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[32]裴光.中国保险业竞争力研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002.
[33]郭宏彬.论保险监管的理论根源[J].中国政法大学学报,2004(4).
[34]胡坚,高飞.保险监管制度的国际比较及其对中国的借鉴[J].山西财经大学学报,2004(2).
[35]黄绥彪,张瑞纲.保险监管的博弈分析[J].广西大学学报,2004(6).
[36]薛生强、何风隽.保险监管的理论分析[J].宁夏大学学报,2004(3):98-101.
[37]高西有.保险监管的成本收益分析[D].北京:北京大学,2003.
[38]郭杨.保险监管的经济分析-中国内地与香港保险监管制度研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2003.
[39]吴九红.中国商业保险监管研究[D].南京:河海大学,2005.
[40]熊舒翼,韦娜,孙岚.保险监管目标的国际比较分析[J].金卡工程·经济与法,2009(12):230-231.
[41]刘志华.保险监管模式国际对比研究及其对我的启示[D].山东:山东大学,2008.
[42]文珊.论全面开放条件下中国保险监管制度的完善[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005.
[43]蒲华冀.美国保险公司偿付能力额度监管及其借鉴[D].成都:西南财经大学,2004.
[44]李爱琴,张存荣.保险监管的国际比较[J].中国保险,1998(4):44-45.
[45]冷煜.保险监管国际比较及发展趋势研究[J].保险监管,2009(3):89-94.
[46]刘新鹏.美日保险监管制度的比较与借鉴[J].金融教学与研究,2004(2):63-64.
[47]李雅珍,张洪涛.美日保险监管制度比较研究[J].世界经济,2001(12):48-54.
[48]张哲.西方保险监管制度的比较及其启示[J].华北金融,2006(1):64-65.
[49]郭宏彬.保险监管体制比较研究[J].生产力研究,2007(7):194-201.
[50]毕姝晨,安洪军.美日保险管制模式改革的比较与借鉴[J].现代日本经济,2004(3):60—64.
[51]郭旭红.席小炎.不同发展水平国家和地区保险监管制度[J].圈中人,2008
[52]许闲.金融危机下德国保险监管的应对与借鉴[J].中国金融,2010(1):17-18
[53]徐徐.新《保险法》对我国保险公司治理监管的影响[J].商业时代,2010(2):48-49
[54]中国保险监督管理委员会官方网站:www.circ.gov.cn.