上市公司治理结构对财务困境恢复影响的分析
摘要
自上世纪90年代以来,随着我国证券市场的迅猛发展,上市公司数量逐年增多、规模日益增大、结构逐步优化、运作不断规范,上市公司逐渐成为推动我国国民经济增长的中流砥柱。但是,一些上市公司由于各种原因陷入财务困境,经营业绩逐年下降,使投资者、债权人遭受损失,而且影响整个社会资源配置的有效性。
近年来国内外有大量研究从不同侧面分析公司治理对公司绩效的影响,然而这些研究的前提是这些公司处于正常经营状态,而对于企业处于财务困境下,公司治理对企业的影响研究甚少,并且目前国内对公司财务困境的研究主要集中在财务困境的预警模型、财务困境成本等方面的研究上,为此,有必要研究什么样的治理结构对于企业财务困境的恢复确实存在“正向积极效应”。
本文将因财务状况异常而被特别处理(ST)作为企业陷入财务困境的标志,以陷入财务困境时的国内上市公司为研究对象,对其治理结构进行考察,选择多指标,采用多元线性回归(Logistic)分析方法,重点研究陷入财务困境上市公司治理结构对困境阶段的恢复将产生何种影响,试图揭示什么样的治理结构有助于公司摆脱财务困境,以启示公司从公司治理的角度搭建合理的治理结构,尽快实现困境恢复。
With the rapid development of the stock market in China, the listed companies grow in quantity and scale, their composition and operation getting better since the 90's. They have become mainstay of economic growth in China. However, with various reasons many listed companies plunge into financial distress, their operating achievement decrease year by year, the investors and creditors would suffer from it. Also the effectiveness of the social resources allocation would be affected.
In recent years both at home and abroad a large number of studies on the relationship of corporate governance structure and financial distress. However the premise of these researches is that these companies operate in a normal state. For companies in financial distress, this kind of studies is under-researched. And the study about companies’financial distress focused on the early warning model of financial distress, financial distress costs and other aspects of the study. It is necessary to study which kind of governace structuer could make positive effects in the recovery of financial distress.
In this paper we chooses special treatment(ST)companies because of the abnormal financial condition as the symbol of enterprises that fall into financial distress. We focuses on governance structure how to affect ST companies’recovery of financial distress, use factor logistic analysis of empirical research methods, choose comprehensive indicators to reflect governance structure how to affect financial distress. In this paper, we want to set up reasonable governance structure that can help the company get rid of financial distress as soon as possible.
近年来国内外有大量研究从不同侧面分析公司治理对公司绩效的影响,然而这些研究的前提是这些公司处于正常经营状态,而对于企业处于财务困境下,公司治理对企业的影响研究甚少,并且目前国内对公司财务困境的研究主要集中在财务困境的预警模型、财务困境成本等方面的研究上,为此,有必要研究什么样的治理结构对于企业财务困境的恢复确实存在“正向积极效应”。
本文将因财务状况异常而被特别处理(ST)作为企业陷入财务困境的标志,以陷入财务困境时的国内上市公司为研究对象,对其治理结构进行考察,选择多指标,采用多元线性回归(Logistic)分析方法,重点研究陷入财务困境上市公司治理结构对困境阶段的恢复将产生何种影响,试图揭示什么样的治理结构有助于公司摆脱财务困境,以启示公司从公司治理的角度搭建合理的治理结构,尽快实现困境恢复。
With the rapid development of the stock market in China, the listed companies grow in quantity and scale, their composition and operation getting better since the 90's. They have become mainstay of economic growth in China. However, with various reasons many listed companies plunge into financial distress, their operating achievement decrease year by year, the investors and creditors would suffer from it. Also the effectiveness of the social resources allocation would be affected.
In recent years both at home and abroad a large number of studies on the relationship of corporate governance structure and financial distress. However the premise of these researches is that these companies operate in a normal state. For companies in financial distress, this kind of studies is under-researched. And the study about companies’financial distress focused on the early warning model of financial distress, financial distress costs and other aspects of the study. It is necessary to study which kind of governace structuer could make positive effects in the recovery of financial distress.
In this paper we chooses special treatment(ST)companies because of the abnormal financial condition as the symbol of enterprises that fall into financial distress. We focuses on governance structure how to affect ST companies’recovery of financial distress, use factor logistic analysis of empirical research methods, choose comprehensive indicators to reflect governance structure how to affect financial distress. In this paper, we want to set up reasonable governance structure that can help the company get rid of financial distress as soon as possible.
引文
白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.2005.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,(2):81-90.
陈工孟,芮萌,许庆胜. 2006.现代企业财务困境预测[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社.
陈良华,孙健.2005.公司治理与财务困境:来自上海股票市场的证据[J].东南大学学报,9: 27-33
陈静.1999.上市公司财务恶化预测的实证研究[J].会计研究,(4):31-38.
陈小悦、徐晓东.2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,(11):3-11.
陈晓,陈治鸿.2000.中国上市公司的财务困境预测[J].中国会计与财务研究,2(3):31-36.
陈燕,廖冠民. 2006.大股东行为公司治理与财务危机[J].当代财经,(5):111-115.
杜莹、刘立国.2002.股权结构与公司治理效率:中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,(11):34-39
谷祺,刘淑莲.1999.财务危机企业投资行为分析与对策[J].会计研究,(10):28-31.
李秉成.2003.企业财务困境概念内涵的探讨[J].山西财经大学学报,25(6):109-112.
吕长江,徐丽莉,周琳.2004.上市公司财务困境与财务破产的比较分析.经济研究, 8:64-73.
吕长江,韩慧博.2004.财务困境、财务困境间接成本与公司业绩[J].南开管理评论,(3):80-85
青木昌彦.1995.转轨经济中的公司治理结构[M].北京:中国经济出版社,18.
廖冠民,卢闯,陈勇.2006.股权结构、财务困境成本与困境公司绩效[J].南开管理评论,(6):68-73.
廖冠民,陈燕.2007.国有产权、公司特征与困境公司绩效[J].会计研究,(3):33-41.
孙永祥、黄祖辉.1999.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J],.经济研究, (12):25-30.
王震,刘力,陈超.中国上市公司财务困境、所有权与公司治理[J].Petroleum Science,2004,(1):56-62.
江向才、林玓.2006.公司治理于财务困难公司效果之研究[J].南开管理评论,9(6):69-73.
姜秀华,孙铮.2001.治理弱化与财务危机:一个预测模型[J].南开管理论,6(5):19-25.
吴世农,卢贤义. 2001.我国上市公司财务困境的预测模型研究[J].经济研究,(6):44-55.
吴世农.2006.财务困境成本理论和实证研究综述[J].会计研究,(5):73-80.
谢军.2007.第一大股东持股和公司价值:激励效应和防御效应[J].南开管理论,(1):21-25.
徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.2006.股权集中度和股权制衡极其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,(1):90-100.
章之旺,吴世农.2005.经济困境、财务困境与公司业绩一基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,31(5):112-122.
章之旺.2004.上市公司财务困境成本的定量分析-基于1998—2002年度ST公司的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,25(131):70-73.
赵爱玲.2000.企业财务失败的识别与对策[J].财务理论与实践,21(108):69-72.
Altman E., Haldeman R., Narayanan P..1977. Zeta Analysis-a New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance. l: l2-23.
Altman,E.I.1984.A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question[J]. Journal of Finance. 39 : 1067-1089.
Beaver.W. 1966. Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure[J].Supplement to Journal of Accounting Research. 77-111.
Berle, A.and G.Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York: Macmillan.
Carmichael, D.R. 1972. The Auditors Reporting Obligation.Auditing Research Monograph No.1 (New York:AICPA). 94-107.
Claessens , S. , S. , Djankov , J . P. H. Fan , L. H. P. , Lang. 2002. Disentangling The Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding[J]. The Journal of Finance 57 : 2741-2771.
Denis D J, Denis D K.1995. Firm performance changes following top management dismissals[J]. Jounal of Finance,50:1029-1057.
Fathi Elloumi, Jean-Pierre Gueyie. 2001.Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empifical Analysis[J]. Corporate Govemance, 1(1):15-23
Friedman E, Johnson S, Mitton T. 2003. Popping and tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (31): 732-750.
George Foster.1986. Financial Statement Analysis, 2nd ed,Prentice2Hall, Eag1evood Cliffs, NJ. Gilson Stuson. 1989. Management turnover and financial distress[J]. Journal Economics, (25): 241-262.
Gomes , A. . 2000. Going Public Without Governance : Managerial Reputation Effects[J]. The Journal of Finance , 55 : 615-646
Gomes, Armando and Walter Novaes. 2001. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Govemance Hermalin. B. E. &M. S. Weisbaeh. 1988. The Determinants of Board Composition[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 19:589—606.
Hoshi, T. , A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1990 . The role of banks in reducing the role of financial distress in Japanp[J]. Joumal of Financial Economics, 27:67-88.
Jensen M, Ruback R S.1983. The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics.11: 5-50.
Jensen, M. and W . Meckling. 1976. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Joumal of Financial Economics, 3: 301-361.
Jensen,Michael C.&Warner,Jerold B.1988.The distribution ofpower among corporate managers,shareholders,and directors[J].Journal of Financial Economics. Elsevier, 20: 3-24
Jensen, M. C. 1986. The agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers[J]. American Economics Review, 7:323-329.
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De.Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 90(2): 22—27.
Kornai,Janos. 1980. Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Lipton. M.Lorsch J A. 1992. Modem proposal for improving corporate governance [J]. Business Lawyer, 55-80.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(2): 293-315.
Parker S, Gary F. P'Howard E T. 2002. Corporate Governance and Corporate Failure:A Survival Analysis[J]. The International Journal of Business in Society, 2(2):4-12.
Ross. StephenA., Westerfield, Randolph W., Jaffe Jeffrey F..1999. Corporate Finance, 2nd ed. Homewood. 420-424.
Schaffer. Mark. 1989. The Credible Commitment Problem in tlle Center Enterprise Relationship. Journal of Comparative Economics. 13: 59—82.
Warner J. 1977.Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence[J].Journal of Finance.(32):337-348.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1986: Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy, volume 94, issue 3, part 1, 461-488.
Morck , R. , A. , Shleifer , R. W. , Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation : An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 20 : 293-315
陈工孟,芮萌,许庆胜. 2006.现代企业财务困境预测[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社.
陈良华,孙健.2005.公司治理与财务困境:来自上海股票市场的证据[J].东南大学学报,9: 27-33
陈静.1999.上市公司财务恶化预测的实证研究[J].会计研究,(4):31-38.
陈小悦、徐晓东.2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,(11):3-11.
陈晓,陈治鸿.2000.中国上市公司的财务困境预测[J].中国会计与财务研究,2(3):31-36.
陈燕,廖冠民. 2006.大股东行为公司治理与财务危机[J].当代财经,(5):111-115.
杜莹、刘立国.2002.股权结构与公司治理效率:中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界,(11):34-39
谷祺,刘淑莲.1999.财务危机企业投资行为分析与对策[J].会计研究,(10):28-31.
李秉成.2003.企业财务困境概念内涵的探讨[J].山西财经大学学报,25(6):109-112.
吕长江,徐丽莉,周琳.2004.上市公司财务困境与财务破产的比较分析.经济研究, 8:64-73.
吕长江,韩慧博.2004.财务困境、财务困境间接成本与公司业绩[J].南开管理评论,(3):80-85
青木昌彦.1995.转轨经济中的公司治理结构[M].北京:中国经济出版社,18.
廖冠民,卢闯,陈勇.2006.股权结构、财务困境成本与困境公司绩效[J].南开管理评论,(6):68-73.
廖冠民,陈燕.2007.国有产权、公司特征与困境公司绩效[J].会计研究,(3):33-41.
孙永祥、黄祖辉.1999.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J],.经济研究, (12):25-30.
王震,刘力,陈超.中国上市公司财务困境、所有权与公司治理[J].Petroleum Science,2004,(1):56-62.
江向才、林玓.2006.公司治理于财务困难公司效果之研究[J].南开管理评论,9(6):69-73.
姜秀华,孙铮.2001.治理弱化与财务危机:一个预测模型[J].南开管理论,6(5):19-25.
吴世农,卢贤义. 2001.我国上市公司财务困境的预测模型研究[J].经济研究,(6):44-55.
吴世农.2006.财务困境成本理论和实证研究综述[J].会计研究,(5):73-80.
谢军.2007.第一大股东持股和公司价值:激励效应和防御效应[J].南开管理论,(1):21-25.
徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.2006.股权集中度和股权制衡极其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,(1):90-100.
章之旺,吴世农.2005.经济困境、财务困境与公司业绩一基于A股上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,31(5):112-122.
章之旺.2004.上市公司财务困境成本的定量分析-基于1998—2002年度ST公司的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,25(131):70-73.
赵爱玲.2000.企业财务失败的识别与对策[J].财务理论与实践,21(108):69-72.
Altman E., Haldeman R., Narayanan P..1977. Zeta Analysis-a New Model to Identify Bankruptcy Risk of Corporations[J]. Journal of Banking&Finance. l: l2-23.
Altman,E.I.1984.A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question[J]. Journal of Finance. 39 : 1067-1089.
Beaver.W. 1966. Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure[J].Supplement to Journal of Accounting Research. 77-111.
Berle, A.and G.Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property[M]. New York: Macmillan.
Carmichael, D.R. 1972. The Auditors Reporting Obligation.Auditing Research Monograph No.1 (New York:AICPA). 94-107.
Claessens , S. , S. , Djankov , J . P. H. Fan , L. H. P. , Lang. 2002. Disentangling The Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholding[J]. The Journal of Finance 57 : 2741-2771.
Denis D J, Denis D K.1995. Firm performance changes following top management dismissals[J]. Jounal of Finance,50:1029-1057.
Fathi Elloumi, Jean-Pierre Gueyie. 2001.Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empifical Analysis[J]. Corporate Govemance, 1(1):15-23
Friedman E, Johnson S, Mitton T. 2003. Popping and tunneling[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (31): 732-750.
George Foster.1986. Financial Statement Analysis, 2nd ed,Prentice2Hall, Eag1evood Cliffs, NJ. Gilson Stuson. 1989. Management turnover and financial distress[J]. Journal Economics, (25): 241-262.
Gomes , A. . 2000. Going Public Without Governance : Managerial Reputation Effects[J]. The Journal of Finance , 55 : 615-646
Gomes, Armando and Walter Novaes. 2001. Sharing of Control as a Corporate Govemance Hermalin. B. E. &M. S. Weisbaeh. 1988. The Determinants of Board Composition[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 19:589—606.
Hoshi, T. , A. Kashyap, and D. Scharfstein. 1990 . The role of banks in reducing the role of financial distress in Japanp[J]. Joumal of Financial Economics, 27:67-88.
Jensen M, Ruback R S.1983. The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics.11: 5-50.
Jensen, M. and W . Meckling. 1976. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Joumal of Financial Economics, 3: 301-361.
Jensen,Michael C.&Warner,Jerold B.1988.The distribution ofpower among corporate managers,shareholders,and directors[J].Journal of Financial Economics. Elsevier, 20: 3-24
Jensen, M. C. 1986. The agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers[J]. American Economics Review, 7:323-329.
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De.Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2000. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 90(2): 22—27.
Kornai,Janos. 1980. Economics of Shortage. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Lipton. M.Lorsch J A. 1992. Modem proposal for improving corporate governance [J]. Business Lawyer, 55-80.
Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(2): 293-315.
Parker S, Gary F. P'Howard E T. 2002. Corporate Governance and Corporate Failure:A Survival Analysis[J]. The International Journal of Business in Society, 2(2):4-12.
Ross. StephenA., Westerfield, Randolph W., Jaffe Jeffrey F..1999. Corporate Finance, 2nd ed. Homewood. 420-424.
Schaffer. Mark. 1989. The Credible Commitment Problem in tlle Center Enterprise Relationship. Journal of Comparative Economics. 13: 59—82.
Warner J. 1977.Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence[J].Journal of Finance.(32):337-348.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1986: Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy, volume 94, issue 3, part 1, 461-488.
Morck , R. , A. , Shleifer , R. W. , Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation : An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 20 : 293-315