民营企业经理人行为倾向及公司治理研究
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摘要
民营企业所有者与经理人关系的研究一直受到学术界的关注,管理学与经济学围绕职业经理人是自利的“代理人(Agent)”还是成就驱动型的“管家(Stewardship)”争论不休。本研究认为目前民营企业所聘请的经理人其实处于代理人与管家角色的或然性状态依存,这种或然性状态依存对制定经理人的激励政策上具有非常明显的作用。
经理人的行为选择不仅取决于自身的心理和情境因素的影响,还受到委托人行为以及企业管理哲学、企业文化的影响。在管家关系的情境下,经理人会选择管家行为,在代理关系的情境下,经理人会选择代理行为;同时伴随着企业规模的增大,企业的情景一般来说会从管家式情景转变为代理式情景,经理人的行为选择也会随着企业情境的转变而转变。
由于代理理论与管家理论各自的局限性,单一的治理模式并不能有效地提升企业绩效,需要将这两种理论融合起来。本文构造了经理人角色定位的或然性模型,并辅以243家民营上市公司的相关数据加以验证,发现:管家主义倾向更有利于提升企业价值,而随着企业规模的扩大,经理人行为倾向逐渐由管家主义向代理主义过渡。
所以,在制定民营企业内部和外部治理政策时要动态地去权衡和考量经理人控制与合作两种机制设计,达到激励与约束的相容,动态地判断和界定董事会与经理人的关系:当公司处于发展阶段,获得高速成长之前,董事会应该借鉴管家理论与总经理发展一种相互合作、彼此信任的工作关系;而当公司得到较大发展,规模扩大到一定程度以后,董事会则应该借鉴代理理论思想对总经理可能出现的自负心态及机会主义行为实施严格控制。
Research on relationship between possessors and managers of private enterprise has drawn wide attention among scholars. An argument between Management and economics on managers as self-profit agents or success-propelled stewardship has long existed. Our research finds that the probability has still existed that managers hired by a private enterprise are treated as agent and stewardship in the meantime nowadays. This probability has brought in obvious effect on the establishment of the incentive policy for managers.
The behavior choice of managers is not only influenced by such factors as mentality and circumstance, but also the behavior of trustor, enterprise management philosophy and enterprise culture. Under the context of stewardship relationship, managers will behave as stewards; on the other hand, managers will behave as agents under the circumstance of agent relationship. The context for an enterprise will change from stewardship mode to agent mode as the enterprise is expanding. As a result, the behavior choice of managers will be changed.
The agent theory and the stewardship theory have their own limitation, so administering enterprise by adopting one simple agent or stewardship mode can't effectively improve enterprise's performance. We need to combine these two theories. The dissertation set up a probability model for the positioning of managers. Also, we use the experiential data of 243 private listed enterprises to verify our conclusion. We find out that the stewardship mode has played a more active role in benefiting the enterprise. Following the enterprise's development, a transition from stewardship to agent mode has been strengthened in the behavior of managers.
As a result, when establishing the external and internal governance policy, we should flexibly evaluate and consider the devising of the two mechanisms for control and cooperation of private business managers. We need to combine restriction with incentive policy, judging and defining the relationship between board of directors and managers. Following the stewardship theory, while an enterprise is at its fledging stage, the board of directors should build a relationship based on mutual trust and cooperation with managers. However, according to the agent theory, board of directors should strictly control the overconfident mentality and opportunistic behavior of managers while the enterprise has been expanded.
经理人的行为选择不仅取决于自身的心理和情境因素的影响,还受到委托人行为以及企业管理哲学、企业文化的影响。在管家关系的情境下,经理人会选择管家行为,在代理关系的情境下,经理人会选择代理行为;同时伴随着企业规模的增大,企业的情景一般来说会从管家式情景转变为代理式情景,经理人的行为选择也会随着企业情境的转变而转变。
由于代理理论与管家理论各自的局限性,单一的治理模式并不能有效地提升企业绩效,需要将这两种理论融合起来。本文构造了经理人角色定位的或然性模型,并辅以243家民营上市公司的相关数据加以验证,发现:管家主义倾向更有利于提升企业价值,而随着企业规模的扩大,经理人行为倾向逐渐由管家主义向代理主义过渡。
所以,在制定民营企业内部和外部治理政策时要动态地去权衡和考量经理人控制与合作两种机制设计,达到激励与约束的相容,动态地判断和界定董事会与经理人的关系:当公司处于发展阶段,获得高速成长之前,董事会应该借鉴管家理论与总经理发展一种相互合作、彼此信任的工作关系;而当公司得到较大发展,规模扩大到一定程度以后,董事会则应该借鉴代理理论思想对总经理可能出现的自负心态及机会主义行为实施严格控制。
Research on relationship between possessors and managers of private enterprise has drawn wide attention among scholars. An argument between Management and economics on managers as self-profit agents or success-propelled stewardship has long existed. Our research finds that the probability has still existed that managers hired by a private enterprise are treated as agent and stewardship in the meantime nowadays. This probability has brought in obvious effect on the establishment of the incentive policy for managers.
The behavior choice of managers is not only influenced by such factors as mentality and circumstance, but also the behavior of trustor, enterprise management philosophy and enterprise culture. Under the context of stewardship relationship, managers will behave as stewards; on the other hand, managers will behave as agents under the circumstance of agent relationship. The context for an enterprise will change from stewardship mode to agent mode as the enterprise is expanding. As a result, the behavior choice of managers will be changed.
The agent theory and the stewardship theory have their own limitation, so administering enterprise by adopting one simple agent or stewardship mode can't effectively improve enterprise's performance. We need to combine these two theories. The dissertation set up a probability model for the positioning of managers. Also, we use the experiential data of 243 private listed enterprises to verify our conclusion. We find out that the stewardship mode has played a more active role in benefiting the enterprise. Following the enterprise's development, a transition from stewardship to agent mode has been strengthened in the behavior of managers.
As a result, when establishing the external and internal governance policy, we should flexibly evaluate and consider the devising of the two mechanisms for control and cooperation of private business managers. We need to combine restriction with incentive policy, judging and defining the relationship between board of directors and managers. Following the stewardship theory, while an enterprise is at its fledging stage, the board of directors should build a relationship based on mutual trust and cooperation with managers. However, according to the agent theory, board of directors should strictly control the overconfident mentality and opportunistic behavior of managers while the enterprise has been expanded.
引文
1摘自2006年2月28日《中华工商时报》。
2具体的讨论参见 Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
3参见 钟乃雄,权力、制度与柔性管理--民营企业内控的一个分析框架[J].改革,2005,(2).
4经理人角色的研究多从定性的角度展开,储小平等(2005)通过问卷调查的数据对经理人心理所有权方面做了探索性研究,但通过上市公司数据库进行规范的经济学实证的研究还未见到,本文做了初步尝试。
1具体论述请参见:Jensen,Michael.and Meclding,William.Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-360,1976.
2管家理论的经典论述可以参考Donaldson,Lex and Davis,James H.Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory:CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns[J].Australian Journal of Management,16,49-64,1991.以及 Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
3但当管家理论和资源依赖理论相结合的时候实证结果更加显著。
4具体指标的选取和界定请参见:Fox,Mark A.and Hamilton,Robert T.Ownership and Diversification:Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory[J].Journal of Management Studies,31,69-81,1994.
5具体分析可以参考:肖世明.经济学与管理学研究方法比较[J].亚太经济,2004(4)
6具体分析可以参考:肖世明.经济学与管理学研究方法比较[J].亚太经济,2004(4)以及罗仲伟.管理学方法与经济学方法的借鉴、融合[J].中国工业经济,2005(9)
7在这里企业是由所有者控制是指企业有一个主要的大股东,而企业由经理人控制是指企业没有一个主要的大股东。
8代理理论的观点可以参考Albanese,Robert,Dacin,M.Tina and Harris Ira C.Agent as Stewards[J].Academy of Management Review,22,609-611,1997.
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3具体的讨论内容请参见:MayeL Roger C.,Davis,James H.and Schoorman,F-David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
4转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
5具体的讨论内容请参见:Mayer,Roger C.,Davis,James n.and Schoonnan,E David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
6转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
7转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
8具体的讨论内容请参见:Mayer,Roger C.,Davis,James H.and Schoorman,F.David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
9转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
10代理思想和管家思想的历史渊源不是本文的研究重点,所以这一问题在这里不做进一步的详细说明。
1也有学者运用经验数据验证代理理论和管家理论情景下的绩效差异,代表性的研究参见:Muth,Melinda M.and Donaldson,Lex.Stewardship Theory and Board Structure:A Contigency Approach[J].Scholarly Research And Theory Papers,6,5-28,1998.他们对代理理论和管家理论的提炼对本文的标准建立有借鉴意义。
2参见:Child,J.,Managerial and Organizational Factors Associated with Company Performance,Academy of Management Journal,Vol.20,No.1,42-56,1974.以及 Wiersema,M.,and Bantel,K.,Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change,Academy of Management Journal,35,91-121,1992.
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4详见:Daboub,A.,Rasheed,A.,Priem,R.,and Gray,D.,Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal Activity,Academy of Management Journal,Vol.20,No.1,138-170,1995.
5详见:Daily,C.,and Dalton,D.,Separate,But Not Independent:Board Leadership Structure in Large Corporations,Academy of Management Proceedings,22-26,1994.
6详见:James,J.,A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction,American Sociological Review,16,474-477,1951.
7参见:Shaw,M.,Group Dynamics:The Psychology of Small Group Behaviour,McGraw-Hill,Sydney,1981.O'Reilly,C.,Caldwell,D.,Bamett,W.,Work Group Demography,Social Integration and Turnover,Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.34,21-37,1989.Goodstein,J.,Gautam,K.,and Boeker,W.,The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.15,214-250,1994.
8详见:Bantel,K.,and Jackson,S.,Top Management and Innovations in Banking:Does the Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference? Strategic Management Journal,Vol.10,107-124,1989. 西喷施宝公司职业经理王惟尊因揭露企业主做假账,而他自己又被老板以职务侵占和商业受贿罪加以控告,并被拘留8个月之久才被取保候审(储小平,2002);创维集团,创维电视2000年11月的时候出现了震惊业界的“创维兵变”,职业经理人陆华强带着队伍离开创维,等等。这些案例凸现了经理人治理的必要性和现实性。
2张建琦.经理人背叛的机理与雇主的对策取向[J].管理世界,2000(5)
3同上1
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卢福财、胡大立.21世纪民营企业发展方略[M].经济管理出版社,2003。所谓“泛家族”是指对于家族成员的认定不再只是局限具有血亲关系的狭义的家族圈子内,而是基于长期利益关系将非家族成员(尤其是职业经理)纳人家族的范畴。这样,职业经理在一定程度上被“泛家化”了,这些“外人”中有相当一部分已成为企业主的亲信,不仅降低了代理成本,还可以在一定程度上缓解家族成员与“泛家族成员”--职业经理之间的矛盾。
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8所谓“一股独大”一般在上市公司股本结构中,某个股东能够绝对控制公司运作,它的表现形式包括:占据50%的绝对控股份额;不占绝对控股地位,只是相对于其他股东股权比例高(Shleifer＆Vishny,界定为20%,但其他股东持股分散,而且联合困难,使该股东仍然可以控制公司运作。对于民营上市公司的“一股独大”现象,目前有两种观点:一种是将家族企业的“一股独大”视为洪水猛兽,认为民营企业的股权结构和公司治理结构存在着严重的问题,应该提高民营企业上市的“门槛”,从政策上限制民营上市企业的股权结构,甚至以此为由,认为我国目前还不具备设立创业板的条件。另一种观点则认为“一股独大”是我国民营企业发展中的一个必经阶段和现实选择,将民营企业推向资本市场更有助于问题的解决。本文倾向于后一种的观点。
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14莫兰德(Moedand.1995)对世界公司治理模式给出了“二分法”:一是以美、英和加拿大等国家为代表的市场导向型(market-oriented)模式,二是以德、日等国为代表的网络导向型(network-oriented)模式。网络导向型模式的特征是公司的股权相对集中,持股集团成员对公司行为具有决定作用:银行往融资和企业监控方面起到重要作用:董事会对经营管理者的监督约束作用相对商接和突出:内部经理人员流动具有独特作用。网络导向型的优点
29竞争发展论的第一个主要论点是生存竞争筛选论。竞争把高效率的企业筛选出来,让其发展:同时又把低效率的企业清出市场。第二个主要论点是企业发展论。竞争强化了效益对企业发展的直接影响,使得高效率的企业不断发展市场,扩大规模。如果没有竞争,高效益企业不会发展,低效益企业也不会被清出,结果失掉了提高效益的动机:竞争激发论则阐明决定企业竞争的因素有三:(1)企业目标利益的对抗性;(2)短期违约利益大于长期合作利益;(3)企业之间的非对称;竞争信息完善论指出在信息不对称的情况下,比较信息有利于信息完善。
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33所谓控制权市场机制,是指投资者通过收集股权和投票代理权取得对公司的控制权以达到接管公司和更换不良管理层的目的的一种制度设计。根据Jensen and Ruback 1983)的定义,认为公司控制权市场等于接管市场,所谓公司控制权市场是不同的管理队伍以现金或债务购买其它公司股票。或以代理权争夺管理公司资源权利的场所。公司控制权市场交易行为包括合并、善意/敌意收购和代理权争夺(Jarrd,Breckley and Netter,1988)。所谓“接管”就是“转让企业所有权的交易”(Hirshlieifer,1992),是一种交易行为,Jensen and Ruback所说的“接管市场”就是以这种交易行为的标的物命名的市场,如买卖市场、租赁市场等;而个公司控制权市场是以交易的标的物命名的市场,与产品市场、要素市场属同一分类,但这两种市场的划分方式并不矛盾,其内涵与外延应该是基本一致的。
34公司控制权市场的作用主要表现为:①控制权市场的激烈竞争置任何公司于接管、收购兼并的危险中,公司的经理人员面临被取代的职业风险,因而为了自己的利益,经理人员会较好地考虑广大股东的利益。②收购兼并的出现能够通过替换业绩不好或是机会主义行为的经理人员,从而使被收购兼并公司的管理活动走上正轨。在控制权市场上出现的收购兼并活动具有一种惩罚效应,这是对经理人员滥用权力,形成对内部人控制的一种很好的外部制约机制。③控制权市场是考评公司经理人员业绩的重要手段,使控制权市场成为管理人才市场的一个组成部分。
35刘巨钦、荣海军.论中国家族企业外部治理机制的优化[J].经济与管理,2006(11)
36利益相关者有狭义和广义的定义。广义上是指影响企业活动或被企业活动所影响的人或团体,包括股东、债权人、雇员、供应商、消费者、政府部门、相关的社会组织和社会团体、周边的社会成员等等;狭义上是指只有在企业中下了“赌注”的人或团体才是利益相关者,用经济学的语言重新表述,就是凡是在企业中投入了专用性资产的人或团体才是利益相关者,该定义排了政府部门、社会组织及社会团体、社会成员等。由于利益相关者的范围很广,因此本文仅研究利益相关者中比较重要的债权人、雇员和消费者在公司治理中的作用。
37机构投资者有广义和狭义之分。狭义的机构投资者土要有各种证券中介机构、证券投资基金、养老基金、社会保险基金及保险公司。广义的机构投资者不仅包括这些,而且还包括各种私人捐款的基金会、社会慈善机构甚至教堂宗教组织等。在OECD国家中,机构投资者群体庞大,包括共同基金、对冲基金、养老基金、保险公司、开放式基金、封闭式基金、投资银行、商业银行、金融财团、证券公司以及各类捐赠基金等。
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2具体的讨论参见 Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
3参见 钟乃雄,权力、制度与柔性管理--民营企业内控的一个分析框架[J].改革,2005,(2).
4经理人角色的研究多从定性的角度展开,储小平等(2005)通过问卷调查的数据对经理人心理所有权方面做了探索性研究,但通过上市公司数据库进行规范的经济学实证的研究还未见到,本文做了初步尝试。
1具体论述请参见:Jensen,Michael.and Meclding,William.Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-360,1976.
2管家理论的经典论述可以参考Donaldson,Lex and Davis,James H.Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory:CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns[J].Australian Journal of Management,16,49-64,1991.以及 Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
3但当管家理论和资源依赖理论相结合的时候实证结果更加显著。
4具体指标的选取和界定请参见:Fox,Mark A.and Hamilton,Robert T.Ownership and Diversification:Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory[J].Journal of Management Studies,31,69-81,1994.
5具体分析可以参考:肖世明.经济学与管理学研究方法比较[J].亚太经济,2004(4)
6具体分析可以参考:肖世明.经济学与管理学研究方法比较[J].亚太经济,2004(4)以及罗仲伟.管理学方法与经济学方法的借鉴、融合[J].中国工业经济,2005(9)
7在这里企业是由所有者控制是指企业有一个主要的大股东,而企业由经理人控制是指企业没有一个主要的大股东。
8代理理论的观点可以参考Albanese,Robert,Dacin,M.Tina and Harris Ira C.Agent as Stewards[J].Academy of Management Review,22,609-611,1997.
1具体分析请参见:Hackman,J.R.and Oldham,G R.Motivation Through the Design ofWork:Test ofATheory[J].Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,15,250-279,1976.
2具体分析请参见:Porter.L.W.,Steers,R.M.,Mowday,R.T and Boulian,P.V Organizational Commitment,Job Satisfaction,and Turnover among Psychiatric Technicians[J].Journal of Applied Psychology,5,603-609,1974.
3具体的讨论内容请参见:MayeL Roger C.,Davis,James H.and Schoorman,F-David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
4转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
5具体的讨论内容请参见:Mayer,Roger C.,Davis,James n.and Schoonnan,E David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
6转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
7转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,E David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
8具体的讨论内容请参见:Mayer,Roger C.,Davis,James H.and Schoorman,F.David An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust[J].Academy of Management Review,20,709-734,1995.
9转引自:Davis,James H.,Schoorman,F.David and Donaldson,Lex.Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management[J].Academy of Management Review,22,20-47,1997.
10代理思想和管家思想的历史渊源不是本文的研究重点,所以这一问题在这里不做进一步的详细说明。
1也有学者运用经验数据验证代理理论和管家理论情景下的绩效差异,代表性的研究参见:Muth,Melinda M.and Donaldson,Lex.Stewardship Theory and Board Structure:A Contigency Approach[J].Scholarly Research And Theory Papers,6,5-28,1998.他们对代理理论和管家理论的提炼对本文的标准建立有借鉴意义。
2参见:Child,J.,Managerial and Organizational Factors Associated with Company Performance,Academy of Management Journal,Vol.20,No.1,42-56,1974.以及 Wiersema,M.,and Bantel,K.,Top Management Team Demography and Corporate Strategic Change,Academy of Management Journal,35,91-121,1992.
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4详见:Daboub,A.,Rasheed,A.,Priem,R.,and Gray,D.,Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal Activity,Academy of Management Journal,Vol.20,No.1,138-170,1995.
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6详见:James,J.,A Preliminary Study of the Size Determinant in Small Group Interaction,American Sociological Review,16,474-477,1951.
7参见:Shaw,M.,Group Dynamics:The Psychology of Small Group Behaviour,McGraw-Hill,Sydney,1981.O'Reilly,C.,Caldwell,D.,Bamett,W.,Work Group Demography,Social Integration and Turnover,Administrative Science Quarterly,Vol.34,21-37,1989.Goodstein,J.,Gautam,K.,and Boeker,W.,The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change,Strategic Management Journal,Vol.15,214-250,1994.
8详见:Bantel,K.,and Jackson,S.,Top Management and Innovations in Banking:Does the Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference? Strategic Management Journal,Vol.10,107-124,1989. 西喷施宝公司职业经理王惟尊因揭露企业主做假账,而他自己又被老板以职务侵占和商业受贿罪加以控告,并被拘留8个月之久才被取保候审(储小平,2002);创维集团,创维电视2000年11月的时候出现了震惊业界的“创维兵变”,职业经理人陆华强带着队伍离开创维,等等。这些案例凸现了经理人治理的必要性和现实性。
2张建琦.经理人背叛的机理与雇主的对策取向[J].管理世界,2000(5)
3同上1
4周学锋、巫绪芬.浅析中小民营企业的生存和发展[J].安徽广播电视大学学报,2003(1)
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6(美)SCOTT E.FRIEDMAN著.汤北骅、刘彬彬译.钱袋里的亲人一家族企业成功之路[M].中国商业出版社,2002;
卢福财、胡大立.21世纪民营企业发展方略[M].经济管理出版社,2003。所谓“泛家族”是指对于家族成员的认定不再只是局限具有血亲关系的狭义的家族圈子内,而是基于长期利益关系将非家族成员(尤其是职业经理)纳人家族的范畴。这样,职业经理在一定程度上被“泛家化”了,这些“外人”中有相当一部分已成为企业主的亲信,不仅降低了代理成本,还可以在一定程度上缓解家族成员与“泛家族成员”--职业经理之间的矛盾。
7陈佳贵、黄群慧.我国不同所有制企业治理结构的比较与改善[J].中国工业经济,2001(7)
8所谓“一股独大”一般在上市公司股本结构中,某个股东能够绝对控制公司运作,它的表现形式包括:占据50%的绝对控股份额;不占绝对控股地位,只是相对于其他股东股权比例高(Shleifer＆Vishny,界定为20%,但其他股东持股分散,而且联合困难,使该股东仍然可以控制公司运作。对于民营上市公司的“一股独大”现象,目前有两种观点:一种是将家族企业的“一股独大”视为洪水猛兽,认为民营企业的股权结构和公司治理结构存在着严重的问题,应该提高民营企业上市的“门槛”,从政策上限制民营上市企业的股权结构,甚至以此为由,认为我国目前还不具备设立创业板的条件。另一种观点则认为“一股独大”是我国民营企业发展中的一个必经阶段和现实选择,将民营企业推向资本市场更有助于问题的解决。本文倾向于后一种的观点。
9战颂、秦丽娜.我国民营企业公司治理存在的问题及对策研究[J].中国经济评论,2005(9)
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13孙建国.公司治理、信任和民营企业的绩效关系研究[J].福建论坛(人文社会科学),2006(9)
14莫兰德(Moedand.1995)对世界公司治理模式给出了“二分法”:一是以美、英和加拿大等国家为代表的市场导向型(market-oriented)模式,二是以德、日等国为代表的网络导向型(network-oriented)模式。网络导向型模式的特征是公司的股权相对集中,持股集团成员对公司行为具有决定作用:银行往融资和企业监控方面起到重要作用:董事会对经营管理者的监督约束作用相对商接和突出:内部经理人员流动具有独特作用。网络导向型的优点
29竞争发展论的第一个主要论点是生存竞争筛选论。竞争把高效率的企业筛选出来,让其发展:同时又把低效率的企业清出市场。第二个主要论点是企业发展论。竞争强化了效益对企业发展的直接影响,使得高效率的企业不断发展市场,扩大规模。如果没有竞争,高效益企业不会发展,低效益企业也不会被清出,结果失掉了提高效益的动机:竞争激发论则阐明决定企业竞争的因素有三:(1)企业目标利益的对抗性;(2)短期违约利益大于长期合作利益;(3)企业之间的非对称;竞争信息完善论指出在信息不对称的情况下,比较信息有利于信息完善。
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33所谓控制权市场机制,是指投资者通过收集股权和投票代理权取得对公司的控制权以达到接管公司和更换不良管理层的目的的一种制度设计。根据Jensen and Ruback 1983)的定义,认为公司控制权市场等于接管市场,所谓公司控制权市场是不同的管理队伍以现金或债务购买其它公司股票。或以代理权争夺管理公司资源权利的场所。公司控制权市场交易行为包括合并、善意/敌意收购和代理权争夺(Jarrd,Breckley and Netter,1988)。所谓“接管”就是“转让企业所有权的交易”(Hirshlieifer,1992),是一种交易行为,Jensen and Ruback所说的“接管市场”就是以这种交易行为的标的物命名的市场,如买卖市场、租赁市场等;而个公司控制权市场是以交易的标的物命名的市场,与产品市场、要素市场属同一分类,但这两种市场的划分方式并不矛盾,其内涵与外延应该是基本一致的。
34公司控制权市场的作用主要表现为:①控制权市场的激烈竞争置任何公司于接管、收购兼并的危险中,公司的经理人员面临被取代的职业风险,因而为了自己的利益,经理人员会较好地考虑广大股东的利益。②收购兼并的出现能够通过替换业绩不好或是机会主义行为的经理人员,从而使被收购兼并公司的管理活动走上正轨。在控制权市场上出现的收购兼并活动具有一种惩罚效应,这是对经理人员滥用权力,形成对内部人控制的一种很好的外部制约机制。③控制权市场是考评公司经理人员业绩的重要手段,使控制权市场成为管理人才市场的一个组成部分。
35刘巨钦、荣海军.论中国家族企业外部治理机制的优化[J].经济与管理,2006(11)
36利益相关者有狭义和广义的定义。广义上是指影响企业活动或被企业活动所影响的人或团体,包括股东、债权人、雇员、供应商、消费者、政府部门、相关的社会组织和社会团体、周边的社会成员等等;狭义上是指只有在企业中下了“赌注”的人或团体才是利益相关者,用经济学的语言重新表述,就是凡是在企业中投入了专用性资产的人或团体才是利益相关者,该定义排了政府部门、社会组织及社会团体、社会成员等。由于利益相关者的范围很广,因此本文仅研究利益相关者中比较重要的债权人、雇员和消费者在公司治理中的作用。
37机构投资者有广义和狭义之分。狭义的机构投资者土要有各种证券中介机构、证券投资基金、养老基金、社会保险基金及保险公司。广义的机构投资者不仅包括这些,而且还包括各种私人捐款的基金会、社会慈善机构甚至教堂宗教组织等。在OECD国家中,机构投资者群体庞大,包括共同基金、对冲基金、养老基金、保险公司、开放式基金、封闭式基金、投资银行、商业银行、金融财团、证券公司以及各类捐赠基金等。
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