有效治理结构与激励性规制的互动研究
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摘要
将银行作为外生变量，通过债权约束来实现企业治理结构的完善，已不适用于现代社会对国有商业银行公司治理的要求。公司治理的动态演进中，其内容及公司治理模式趋同。商业银行的负债经营特性，导致了其治理结构与一般国有企业不同，考虑到行业特征，其重点在于如何加强风险管理与内部控制，从而保护存款人的利益。
在股权分散情况下，我国国有商业银行的产权属性使内部治理机制难以有效发挥作用，但股权集中又不可避免带来大股东侵害中小股东和其他利益相关者权益的问题。债权人参与公司治理的效率取决于法律制度和破产制度的有效性。同样作为外部治理机制的市场竞争环境，其有效发挥功能的前提是各要素市场达到充分竞争水平。在商业银行的公司治理中，债权人缺乏对股东监督的激励，股东与债权人之间的利益冲突成为公司治理中的主要问题。商业银行的信用创造功能导致的挤提，使得存款保险制度和最后贷款制度设计和存在是必要的。同时银行与客户之间建立的长期客户关系本身就成为借贷市场上同业竞争的壁垒。部分准备金与央行最后贷款人制度，使债权人比股东更希望加强规制。事实上，政府规制与银行治理结构之间存在累积循环的正反馈作用机制，既相互促进又相互制约。仅依靠传统的研究方法将其中一方零维度处理，而探讨另一方的优化，无益于解决二者相互作用下产生的行业问题与社会经济问题。因此本文将以国有商业银行有效银行治理结构与激励性规制之间的互动关系为主要研究对象，建立一种不对称信息下的显示与信息甄别机制，将金融机构的内部管理和市场约束纳入规制范畴，通过二者的动态合作以实现规制目标，共同推动金融创新。在实施有效规制时，将金融机构的经营管理目标融合进规制目标中，充分发挥这两者的作用，使规制者的目标函数与被规制者的目标函数达到最大程度上的一致性，实现规制过程中各行为主体的激励相容，形成金融机构有效控制风险的激励和激励性规制的硬约束机制，从而完善金融机构的治理结构。
Taking bank as exogenous variable, by creditor's right restriction, to achieve perfect enterprise governance is not suitable for the requirement of corporate governance to state-owned commercial bank in modern society. In the dynamic evolution process of corporate governance, its content and corporate governance pattern converged. The liability running characteristic of the commercial bank results in the difference with the ordinary state-owned enterprises, consider its trade property, the key component lies in risk management and internal control, thereby protect the depositor's interest.
Under decentralized stock right situation, internal governance is difficult to play effective role due to the property right nature of our state-owned commercial bank, and the centralized stock right inevitable cause the problem that strong stock holder encroach on small-medium stock holder and other relevance's interest. The efficiency of creditor involved in corporate governance rely on an effective statute and bankruptcy system, and also being external governance, the market competition environment efficiently play its role relying on the prerequisite that is competitive degree of factor market. Creditor lack stimulates to supervise stock holders in commercial bank corporate governance. The interest conflict between stock holder and creditor become the principle problem in corporate governance. The credit creation function of the commercial bank cause a run on a bank, made the deposit insurance and lender of last resort system necessary. The long-term customer relationship between bank and customer is barrier in trade competition in lending and borrowing market itself. Partial reserve fund and lender of last resort system made creditors desire strengthen governance very much than stock holders. There exist an accumulate circulating positive feed back mechanism between government regulation and bank corporate governance. They promote and restrict each other. It's not good for solve the relevant trade problem and social economic problem, relying only on convention research method, handing one part zero dimension and probe into other part optimize.
Therefore, this article will take the inter-dynamic relationship between effective state-owned commercial bank corporate governance and stimulus governance as main study object, construct an information discrimination and distinctive mechanism, bring the inner management and market restriction of the financial organization into regulation scope, achieve regulation goal through dynamic cooperation, impel financial innovation, merge the business operating goal into regulation goal, make object function the maximum level coinciding between regulator and regulated, achieve stimulant consistency in every behavioral part as the regulation proceeding, construct a stimulus that financial risk control mechanism running efficiently, a hard stimulant regulation restriction mechanism, to perfect financial mechanism governance.
在股权分散情况下，我国国有商业银行的产权属性使内部治理机制难以有效发挥作用，但股权集中又不可避免带来大股东侵害中小股东和其他利益相关者权益的问题。债权人参与公司治理的效率取决于法律制度和破产制度的有效性。同样作为外部治理机制的市场竞争环境，其有效发挥功能的前提是各要素市场达到充分竞争水平。在商业银行的公司治理中，债权人缺乏对股东监督的激励，股东与债权人之间的利益冲突成为公司治理中的主要问题。商业银行的信用创造功能导致的挤提，使得存款保险制度和最后贷款制度设计和存在是必要的。同时银行与客户之间建立的长期客户关系本身就成为借贷市场上同业竞争的壁垒。部分准备金与央行最后贷款人制度，使债权人比股东更希望加强规制。事实上，政府规制与银行治理结构之间存在累积循环的正反馈作用机制，既相互促进又相互制约。仅依靠传统的研究方法将其中一方零维度处理，而探讨另一方的优化，无益于解决二者相互作用下产生的行业问题与社会经济问题。因此本文将以国有商业银行有效银行治理结构与激励性规制之间的互动关系为主要研究对象，建立一种不对称信息下的显示与信息甄别机制，将金融机构的内部管理和市场约束纳入规制范畴，通过二者的动态合作以实现规制目标，共同推动金融创新。在实施有效规制时，将金融机构的经营管理目标融合进规制目标中，充分发挥这两者的作用，使规制者的目标函数与被规制者的目标函数达到最大程度上的一致性，实现规制过程中各行为主体的激励相容，形成金融机构有效控制风险的激励和激励性规制的硬约束机制，从而完善金融机构的治理结构。
Taking bank as exogenous variable, by creditor's right restriction, to achieve perfect enterprise governance is not suitable for the requirement of corporate governance to state-owned commercial bank in modern society. In the dynamic evolution process of corporate governance, its content and corporate governance pattern converged. The liability running characteristic of the commercial bank results in the difference with the ordinary state-owned enterprises, consider its trade property, the key component lies in risk management and internal control, thereby protect the depositor's interest.
Under decentralized stock right situation, internal governance is difficult to play effective role due to the property right nature of our state-owned commercial bank, and the centralized stock right inevitable cause the problem that strong stock holder encroach on small-medium stock holder and other relevance's interest. The efficiency of creditor involved in corporate governance rely on an effective statute and bankruptcy system, and also being external governance, the market competition environment efficiently play its role relying on the prerequisite that is competitive degree of factor market. Creditor lack stimulates to supervise stock holders in commercial bank corporate governance. The interest conflict between stock holder and creditor become the principle problem in corporate governance. The credit creation function of the commercial bank cause a run on a bank, made the deposit insurance and lender of last resort system necessary. The long-term customer relationship between bank and customer is barrier in trade competition in lending and borrowing market itself. Partial reserve fund and lender of last resort system made creditors desire strengthen governance very much than stock holders. There exist an accumulate circulating positive feed back mechanism between government regulation and bank corporate governance. They promote and restrict each other. It's not good for solve the relevant trade problem and social economic problem, relying only on convention research method, handing one part zero dimension and probe into other part optimize.
Therefore, this article will take the inter-dynamic relationship between effective state-owned commercial bank corporate governance and stimulus governance as main study object, construct an information discrimination and distinctive mechanism, bring the inner management and market restriction of the financial organization into regulation scope, achieve regulation goal through dynamic cooperation, impel financial innovation, merge the business operating goal into regulation goal, make object function the maximum level coinciding between regulator and regulated, achieve stimulant consistency in every behavioral part as the regulation proceeding, construct a stimulus that financial risk control mechanism running efficiently, a hard stimulant regulation restriction mechanism, to perfect financial mechanism governance.
引文
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[2]宋玮：《商业银行治理模式的国际比较研究》，《成人高教学刊》，2003年第2期。
[3]凌亢、赵旭、张彦伟、吴九红：《银行体系稳定性和效率关系的模型分析》，《金融研究》，2000年第12期。
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[11]张明霞、韩克勇：《论国有商业银行法人治理结构的建设》，《经济问题》，2004年第12期。
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[13]宋泓均、朱楚珠：《国有商业银行的公司化治理》，《金融研究》，2003年第2期。
[14]刘东：《中国金融改革面对的产权问题思考》，《金融研究》，2003年第8期。
[15]熊继洲：《公司治理：国有银行亟待解决的重要问题》，金融时报，2003年10月27日。
[16]王书文：《对国有商业银行公司治理结构问题的思考》，《经济师》2006年第1期。
[17]郑志刚：《公司治理机制理论研究文献综述》，《南开经济研究》，2004年第4期。
[18]张绍岩，薛波：《国有商业银行公司治理重构中的隐性契约》，《南开经济研究》，2005年第2期。
[19]李维安，曹廷求：《商业银行公司治理：理论模式与我国的选择》，《南开学报》(哲学社会科学版)，2003年第1期。
[20]王志文、吴雅玲：《浅析国有商业银行的公司治理机制》，《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》，2006年第2期。
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