所有制结构、公司治理与国企改革研究
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摘要
本文结合公司治理相关的研究理论和成果，简要介绍了西方发达国家以及国内在公司治理研究方面的进展。在此理论和文献基础上，本文主要运用制度经济学、信息经济学、公司治理理论等相关经济学说，以2001-2010年深、沪交易所的上市公司数据为样本，从所有制结构、股权集中度、资本结构、经理人市场及薪酬契约与代理成本的维度研究对公司治理绩效的影响，全文主要包括以下内容：
第一章为导论，阐明研究此问题的理论和实践意义，明确进一步研究此问题的空间、可能的创新点及难点，并据此提出研究此问题的基本思路、框架和方法等。
第二章为文献综述，主要是阐述不同所有制的上市公司治理的绩效和企业成长中股权结构、资本结构、股权集中度、经理人代理成本等问题的提出，以及总结与回顾相关的国内外公司治理问题研究进展的研究成果和现状。
第三、四、五、六章是全文的主干部分，在理论研究的基础上分别厘清了不同的所有制结构、不同的股权集中度、不同的资本结构以及经理人代理成本与公司治理综合绩效之间关系，并进行实证检验。以我国沪、深A股上市公司作为样本，第三章从公司绩效和社会福利两个方面对不同所有制形式的公司进行比较分析；第四章比较了不同股权集中度的公司的绩效。第五章在考虑股权结构对资本结构及公司绩效的影响基础上检验资本结构对公司绩效的影响，再反过来检验公司绩效是否会对资本结构产生影响，并且这种影响对不同的资本结构类型是否相同；第六章从国有企业及非国有企业、职业经理人及非职业经理人等不同角度研究非生产性管理费用是否受到股权激励、薪酬高低以及经理人市场的竞争状况等因素的影响。
第七章对全文做出总结，并提出国有企业改革建议与对策。
论文得出以下主要的研究结论和政策含义：
1、从公司绩效和社会福利两个方面对2010年国有、混合（同时有国有和私人持股，或第一大股东为国有但比重不大）和私有（私人持股或国有民营化）公司进行分析，发现国有企业主要集中于采掘业、电力煤气及水的生产和供应业和交通运输仓储等行业，非国有企业主要集中制造业、信息技术业和农林牧渔业等行业；在社会福利指标上，大部分行业中国有企业均大于私有企业，说明国有企业和混合企业更加关注社会福利和责任；通过OLS回归发现，国有企业的经营收入、资产和市场份额都要高于私有企业，如以盈利能力来衡量企业绩效时则国有企业和混合企业相对于私有企业会降低企业的绩效，说明私有企业更加关注绩效。
2、从2002-2010年国内深、沪A股上市公司的稳定样本中股权集中度在50%的公司所占比例最大，其中显著性检验结果显示股权集中度在30%—50%的公司组合绩效最好，股权集中度最低的组合绩效最差；调整后样本的显著性检验结果显示所有权集中度最高的组合表现最差，股权分散程度最高的组合表现最好，股权集中度最高的公司表现与另两个组合的公司存在显著差异，说明公司治理表现的显著差异可能不是由所有权结构差异造成的，我国公司的股权结构越来越偏向高股权集中度，尤其我国的国有企业普遍具有高股权集中度，没有向更高效的方向进行，也不是最有效的制度安排，即国有企业改革中应该重视股权结构改革的问题。
3、选择2007年以前已上市的公司，且2008-2010年A股市场的低成长型（纺织行业、机械行业）以及高成长性的信息技术行业，在考虑股权结构的情况下研究公司绩效与公司资本结构的关系，发现在三个行业中杠杆率和绩效都呈显著的倒U型关系，与代理成本理论一致，即杠杆率较低时，杠杆率升高，公司绩效升高，当杠杆率过高时，则杠杆率升高公司绩效降低；信息技术行业股权集中度最高的组合的股权集中度系数显著为负，符合“堑壕防御效应”假说；机械行业公司绩效对杠杆率有显著正向影响，即公司绩效越高公司的杠杆率越高，支持效率—风险假说，即风险影响占主导地位，效率更高的公司比效率低的公司具有更高的收益率。
4、对2004-2010年国内深、沪A股上市公司数据进行分析，从实证检验方面，研究了经理人市场、薪酬契约对经理人侵占动机的影响，发现（非）国有企业外部经理人相对于（非）国有企业内部经理人、非国有企业外部经理人相对于国有企业外部经理人以及非国有企业内部经理人相对于国有企业内部经理人能够更加有效的降低企业的非生产性支出，降低企业的代理成本；薪酬激励和股权激励在一定程度下可以减少代理成本，而且非国有企业相对于国有企业、外部经理人相对于内部经理人能更有效地降低代理成本。
Combining with the corporate governance theory and achievements of research,this paper briefly introduced the progress of governance research in westerndeveloped nation. Based on the resources and theory, this paper use the samples basedon Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange listed companies in2010(eliminate ST and PT,financial insurance and the income of zero of the company) and those samples in past10years of data from the ownership structure，the equity concentration ratio, and thecapital structure, managers market, compensation contracts and agency cost of thecorporate governance performance of dimension research, using of institutionaleconomics, information economics, corporate governance e theory and relatedeconomic theory, the method combined with theory and practice, descriptive statisticsby the governance data of listed company from twelve industry, using the variablesof EVIEWS panel data model, and the research on equity (ROE), total return onassets (ROA), returns on Sales (ROS), net income (NI), unit staff turnover, Sales ofassets, unit staff assets, and the equity concentration ratio (OWNER), actualcontroller in nature (SOE), the company scale (SIZE), fixed assets ratio (TANG),intangible assets ratio (INTG), income GROWTH rate (GROWTH), employeeexpenses (PAYSTAFF), Sales revenue per unit of assets, executive pay (CEOPAY),the company set up time (FIRMAGE) and the relationship of corporate governanceperformance (profitability PR) between with those variables.
The whole paper consists of introduction, main body which has six chapters andconclusion. There are three parts for research distribute in the content.
The first part and second cheaper describe mainly in the different system ofownership of the governance of listed company performance and enterprise growthequity structure, capital structure, and the equity concentration ratio, cost of agencyproblems, and review and summarizes related companies about the research progressof the management of the domestic and foreign relevant problems, the researchresults and the present situation; At the same time, clarifying the significant of practice about studying the problem of theory, indenting the space of forwardstudying the problem, the probability of innovative points and difficulty, and thenpoint out the basic thought of the studying the problem, framework, and method etc.
The second part, including3,4,5,6chapters, is the main trunk of full text andthe supporting of the theoretical basis. It is trying to clarify the relationship amongcorporate governance, the equity concentration ratio, capital structure and agency costand comprehensive corporate governance performance under different ownershipwhich include its theory basis and practice analysis, trying to redesign, reconstructednew comprehensive performance evaluation system, the comprehensive evaluation ofthe existing in the economic role of state-owned enterprises, promoting the newstainable profitable model of listed company etc.
The third part, including chapter7, which is based on the theory of the researchhypotheses, design and model, descriptive analysis, panel data regression analysis andthe basis of empirical test, proposed the suggestions and countermeasures ofstate-owned enterprise reform, and summarize the sustainable development (profitratio) of corporate governance theory research and look into future practice.
Through above theoretical researching and practical analysis, we conclude andsuggest as follows:
Firstly, Analyzing state-owned, mixed and private companies in2010from twoaspects: corporate governance performance and social welfare, we found that mainbusinesses of stated owned enterprises are excavation industry, electric power, gas,water, transportation, storage etc.; main business of non stated-owned enterprises aremanufacturing, information technology industry, animal husbandry and fishery. Insocial welfare indicators, stated-owned enterprises have exceeded private company inmost industries. That means stated-owned enterprises are more focused on socialwelfare and responsibility. Through OLS regression, SALES, ASSETS andMARKET SHARE of stated owned enterprises are higher than private company; ifmeasuring the company’s performance by profitability, profitability of privatecompany is better than stated-owned and mixed company. That means privatecompany is more focused on earning.
Secondly, According to stable samples of2002-2010listed companies, the company with50%equity concentration has the largest proportion; and results ofsignificance test shows that the performance of company with30-50%equityconcentration is the best, and company with the lowest equity concentration has aworst performance. Results of significance test of adjusted sample shows that theperformance of company with a highest equity concentration is the worst, and theperformance of company with a highest degree of equity separation. There is asignificant deference between the company with the highest equity concentration andanother two. We found the deference may not caused by ownership structure. Ourcompany’s ownership structure increasingly seem to has a high equity concentration,especially the stated-owned enterprises which are not efficient and have no the mosteffective institutional arrangements, so the stated-owned enterprises should beattention to the ownership structure in the reform.
Thirdly, For example, low growth(textile industry, machinery industry) and highgrowth (information technology industry) listed companies(2008-2010) in A sharemarket before2007, study the relationship between performance and capital structurebased on ownership structure, we found that Leverage and performance wassignificantly inverted u-shaped relationship in three industries, and consistent withthe agency cost theory. As leverage is low, the relation between the leverage and theperformance is positive; as leverage is too high, the relation between the leverage andthe performance is negative. In information technology industry, the company withhighest equity concentration has a significant negative concentration that meets“entrenchment” theory. In machinery industry, there is positive relation betweenperformance and leverage. That is the higher the performance of the company has thehigher the leverage ratio which support the efficiency-risk hypothesis which risk isthe dominant influence, the company more efficient than the low efficiency companyhas higher profit ration.
Finally, Based on the data analysis of the listed company in2004-2010, theresearch from the manager market aspects of empirical test, the influence ofinnovation from compensation contracts to managers, found that external managers ofstate-owned enterprise relative to the state-owned enterprise managers, internalexternal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relative to the external managers of state-owned enterprise and internal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relativeto the internal managers of state-owned enterprise, can more effective to reduce theenterprise of unproductive spending, reduce enterprise agency cost; Compensationincentive and stockholder's rights drive production can reduce agency cost in thecertain extent and non-state-owned enterprises is more effective than state-ownedenterprises, the external managers is more effective than internal managers.
第一章为导论，阐明研究此问题的理论和实践意义，明确进一步研究此问题的空间、可能的创新点及难点，并据此提出研究此问题的基本思路、框架和方法等。
第二章为文献综述，主要是阐述不同所有制的上市公司治理的绩效和企业成长中股权结构、资本结构、股权集中度、经理人代理成本等问题的提出，以及总结与回顾相关的国内外公司治理问题研究进展的研究成果和现状。
第三、四、五、六章是全文的主干部分，在理论研究的基础上分别厘清了不同的所有制结构、不同的股权集中度、不同的资本结构以及经理人代理成本与公司治理综合绩效之间关系，并进行实证检验。以我国沪、深A股上市公司作为样本，第三章从公司绩效和社会福利两个方面对不同所有制形式的公司进行比较分析；第四章比较了不同股权集中度的公司的绩效。第五章在考虑股权结构对资本结构及公司绩效的影响基础上检验资本结构对公司绩效的影响，再反过来检验公司绩效是否会对资本结构产生影响，并且这种影响对不同的资本结构类型是否相同；第六章从国有企业及非国有企业、职业经理人及非职业经理人等不同角度研究非生产性管理费用是否受到股权激励、薪酬高低以及经理人市场的竞争状况等因素的影响。
第七章对全文做出总结，并提出国有企业改革建议与对策。
论文得出以下主要的研究结论和政策含义：
1、从公司绩效和社会福利两个方面对2010年国有、混合（同时有国有和私人持股，或第一大股东为国有但比重不大）和私有（私人持股或国有民营化）公司进行分析，发现国有企业主要集中于采掘业、电力煤气及水的生产和供应业和交通运输仓储等行业，非国有企业主要集中制造业、信息技术业和农林牧渔业等行业；在社会福利指标上，大部分行业中国有企业均大于私有企业，说明国有企业和混合企业更加关注社会福利和责任；通过OLS回归发现，国有企业的经营收入、资产和市场份额都要高于私有企业，如以盈利能力来衡量企业绩效时则国有企业和混合企业相对于私有企业会降低企业的绩效，说明私有企业更加关注绩效。
2、从2002-2010年国内深、沪A股上市公司的稳定样本中股权集中度在50%的公司所占比例最大，其中显著性检验结果显示股权集中度在30%—50%的公司组合绩效最好，股权集中度最低的组合绩效最差；调整后样本的显著性检验结果显示所有权集中度最高的组合表现最差，股权分散程度最高的组合表现最好，股权集中度最高的公司表现与另两个组合的公司存在显著差异，说明公司治理表现的显著差异可能不是由所有权结构差异造成的，我国公司的股权结构越来越偏向高股权集中度，尤其我国的国有企业普遍具有高股权集中度，没有向更高效的方向进行，也不是最有效的制度安排，即国有企业改革中应该重视股权结构改革的问题。
3、选择2007年以前已上市的公司，且2008-2010年A股市场的低成长型（纺织行业、机械行业）以及高成长性的信息技术行业，在考虑股权结构的情况下研究公司绩效与公司资本结构的关系，发现在三个行业中杠杆率和绩效都呈显著的倒U型关系，与代理成本理论一致，即杠杆率较低时，杠杆率升高，公司绩效升高，当杠杆率过高时，则杠杆率升高公司绩效降低；信息技术行业股权集中度最高的组合的股权集中度系数显著为负，符合“堑壕防御效应”假说；机械行业公司绩效对杠杆率有显著正向影响，即公司绩效越高公司的杠杆率越高，支持效率—风险假说，即风险影响占主导地位，效率更高的公司比效率低的公司具有更高的收益率。
4、对2004-2010年国内深、沪A股上市公司数据进行分析，从实证检验方面，研究了经理人市场、薪酬契约对经理人侵占动机的影响，发现（非）国有企业外部经理人相对于（非）国有企业内部经理人、非国有企业外部经理人相对于国有企业外部经理人以及非国有企业内部经理人相对于国有企业内部经理人能够更加有效的降低企业的非生产性支出，降低企业的代理成本；薪酬激励和股权激励在一定程度下可以减少代理成本，而且非国有企业相对于国有企业、外部经理人相对于内部经理人能更有效地降低代理成本。
Combining with the corporate governance theory and achievements of research,this paper briefly introduced the progress of governance research in westerndeveloped nation. Based on the resources and theory, this paper use the samples basedon Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange listed companies in2010(eliminate ST and PT,financial insurance and the income of zero of the company) and those samples in past10years of data from the ownership structure，the equity concentration ratio, and thecapital structure, managers market, compensation contracts and agency cost of thecorporate governance performance of dimension research, using of institutionaleconomics, information economics, corporate governance e theory and relatedeconomic theory, the method combined with theory and practice, descriptive statisticsby the governance data of listed company from twelve industry, using the variablesof EVIEWS panel data model, and the research on equity (ROE), total return onassets (ROA), returns on Sales (ROS), net income (NI), unit staff turnover, Sales ofassets, unit staff assets, and the equity concentration ratio (OWNER), actualcontroller in nature (SOE), the company scale (SIZE), fixed assets ratio (TANG),intangible assets ratio (INTG), income GROWTH rate (GROWTH), employeeexpenses (PAYSTAFF), Sales revenue per unit of assets, executive pay (CEOPAY),the company set up time (FIRMAGE) and the relationship of corporate governanceperformance (profitability PR) between with those variables.
The whole paper consists of introduction, main body which has six chapters andconclusion. There are three parts for research distribute in the content.
The first part and second cheaper describe mainly in the different system ofownership of the governance of listed company performance and enterprise growthequity structure, capital structure, and the equity concentration ratio, cost of agencyproblems, and review and summarizes related companies about the research progressof the management of the domestic and foreign relevant problems, the researchresults and the present situation; At the same time, clarifying the significant of practice about studying the problem of theory, indenting the space of forwardstudying the problem, the probability of innovative points and difficulty, and thenpoint out the basic thought of the studying the problem, framework, and method etc.
The second part, including3,4,5,6chapters, is the main trunk of full text andthe supporting of the theoretical basis. It is trying to clarify the relationship amongcorporate governance, the equity concentration ratio, capital structure and agency costand comprehensive corporate governance performance under different ownershipwhich include its theory basis and practice analysis, trying to redesign, reconstructednew comprehensive performance evaluation system, the comprehensive evaluation ofthe existing in the economic role of state-owned enterprises, promoting the newstainable profitable model of listed company etc.
The third part, including chapter7, which is based on the theory of the researchhypotheses, design and model, descriptive analysis, panel data regression analysis andthe basis of empirical test, proposed the suggestions and countermeasures ofstate-owned enterprise reform, and summarize the sustainable development (profitratio) of corporate governance theory research and look into future practice.
Through above theoretical researching and practical analysis, we conclude andsuggest as follows:
Firstly, Analyzing state-owned, mixed and private companies in2010from twoaspects: corporate governance performance and social welfare, we found that mainbusinesses of stated owned enterprises are excavation industry, electric power, gas,water, transportation, storage etc.; main business of non stated-owned enterprises aremanufacturing, information technology industry, animal husbandry and fishery. Insocial welfare indicators, stated-owned enterprises have exceeded private company inmost industries. That means stated-owned enterprises are more focused on socialwelfare and responsibility. Through OLS regression, SALES, ASSETS andMARKET SHARE of stated owned enterprises are higher than private company; ifmeasuring the company’s performance by profitability, profitability of privatecompany is better than stated-owned and mixed company. That means privatecompany is more focused on earning.
Secondly, According to stable samples of2002-2010listed companies, the company with50%equity concentration has the largest proportion; and results ofsignificance test shows that the performance of company with30-50%equityconcentration is the best, and company with the lowest equity concentration has aworst performance. Results of significance test of adjusted sample shows that theperformance of company with a highest equity concentration is the worst, and theperformance of company with a highest degree of equity separation. There is asignificant deference between the company with the highest equity concentration andanother two. We found the deference may not caused by ownership structure. Ourcompany’s ownership structure increasingly seem to has a high equity concentration,especially the stated-owned enterprises which are not efficient and have no the mosteffective institutional arrangements, so the stated-owned enterprises should beattention to the ownership structure in the reform.
Thirdly, For example, low growth(textile industry, machinery industry) and highgrowth (information technology industry) listed companies(2008-2010) in A sharemarket before2007, study the relationship between performance and capital structurebased on ownership structure, we found that Leverage and performance wassignificantly inverted u-shaped relationship in three industries, and consistent withthe agency cost theory. As leverage is low, the relation between the leverage and theperformance is positive; as leverage is too high, the relation between the leverage andthe performance is negative. In information technology industry, the company withhighest equity concentration has a significant negative concentration that meets“entrenchment” theory. In machinery industry, there is positive relation betweenperformance and leverage. That is the higher the performance of the company has thehigher the leverage ratio which support the efficiency-risk hypothesis which risk isthe dominant influence, the company more efficient than the low efficiency companyhas higher profit ration.
Finally, Based on the data analysis of the listed company in2004-2010, theresearch from the manager market aspects of empirical test, the influence ofinnovation from compensation contracts to managers, found that external managers ofstate-owned enterprise relative to the state-owned enterprise managers, internalexternal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relative to the external managers of state-owned enterprise and internal managers of non-state-owned enterprises relativeto the internal managers of state-owned enterprise, can more effective to reduce theenterprise of unproductive spending, reduce enterprise agency cost; Compensationincentive and stockholder's rights drive production can reduce agency cost in thecertain extent and non-state-owned enterprises is more effective than state-ownedenterprises, the external managers is more effective than internal managers.
引文
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