基于行为学视角的注册会计师审计舞弊研究
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摘要
随着世界经济快速的发展,公司财务舞弊、注册会计师审计舞弊案件层出不穷,舞弊已成为全球性公认的焦点问题。对全球经济影响范围之广,冲击程度之深,已到了令人发指的地步。公司财务舞弊大多数是经营层为了展现出自己良好的业绩或者是为了在证券市场上争取更多融资等原因,但是作为经济警察的注册会计师进行审计舞弊,不仅影响社会公众对注册会计师行业职业的公信力,而且在一定程度上扰乱了社会正常的经济秩序,给债权人和广大的股东造成了严重的损失。本文主要从注册会计师行为视角入手对注册会计师审计舞弊的产生进行分析,揭示注册会计师审计舞弊方面存在独立性缺失、监管效率低下与惩罚力度及其不足、注册会计师遵守职业操守情况不好、注册会计师与委托人的博弈制度不完善等问题。本文运用舞弊风险因子理论、道德心里模型理论、预期理论和博弈理论较深入地分析了注册会计师审计舞弊的成因,认为主要由以下几方面的成因引起的：需要动机引发注册会计师独立性缺失、低发现率与轻处罚率对审计舞弊行为选择起到了“示范”作用、逆向道德价值观为审计舞弊提供了环境等。本文针对以上提出的问题和原因认为应采取以下对策：优化事务所规模、严控准入条件、遏制政府的权利寻租行为、严格规范会计师事务所管理咨询与审计服务和引入第四方关系人来全面提高注册会计师的独立性；强化行政领导明确职责任务、建立同业监督检查制度、有关部门联合执法加大对审计舞弊的查处力度和惩罚力度；以加强注册会计师职业道德规范体系及监督、建立注册会计师诚信档案、开展注册会计师诚信道德教育健全注册会计师职业道德规范体系和提高他们的诚信水平。总之,规范注册会计师审计舞弊行为是我国注册会计师行业行为规范中的一个长期而又艰巨的任务,注册会计师职业界要提升职业道德和专业执业水平,努力消除注册会计师审计舞弊行为,净化审计环境。
With the rapid development of global economy, there have occurred more and more audit frauds involved in corporative finance. The vile cheating by the certificated public accountants, which is an internationally acknowledged social concern, has had a deep effect on the global economy. Personally, I think the corporative finance is brought about by the upper management for two reasons:first to show its economic achievement; second to win more capitals from the security markets. However, as a so-called economic policeman, if he, a certificated public accountant, is involved in audit frauds, it will not only spoil his public honesty, but also causes great losses to the interests of the numerous share-holders and lawful creditors. This paper mainly analyses the causes of corporative finance audit frauds from the outlook of the behavior of the accountants, thus disclosing a series of social issues associated with corruption. I firmly hold a view that a great number of factors have contributed to the frauds:lack of independence; poor efficiency of supervision; bad virtues of financial personals; inadequate rewards and penalties of justice; and poor game system between accountants and clients. Appalling the theory of reasons, mode of morality, theory of expectation and game theory, this article provides a detailed analysis of the causes and strategies dealing with audit frauds. I think it is necessary and high time for our concerned authorities to take practical measures to quit this phenomenon going from bad to worse. The below may play a role in the campaign:optimizing the size of the firm; Strictly controlling the entrance; Discouraging the rent behavior from the local governments; Severely regulating the service consultation by the firm; introducing the fourth side to improve the independence of the accounting; Strengthening the duties of the administrators. Improving the leadership of the concerned administrators; Establishing the supervisory system on the same level; Encouraging a system of rewards and penalties; Recording the files of the honesty of the certificated accountants. In a word, it is a tough and long-lasting task to specify professional practice of the certificated accountants. At the same time, we should make great effort to improve the professional ethics and professional practice standards. Finally we should do what we can to eliminate fraudulent audits and have a clean audit environment.
With the rapid development of global economy, there have occurred more and more audit frauds involved in corporative finance. The vile cheating by the certificated public accountants, which is an internationally acknowledged social concern, has had a deep effect on the global economy. Personally, I think the corporative finance is brought about by the upper management for two reasons:first to show its economic achievement; second to win more capitals from the security markets. However, as a so-called economic policeman, if he, a certificated public accountant, is involved in audit frauds, it will not only spoil his public honesty, but also causes great losses to the interests of the numerous share-holders and lawful creditors. This paper mainly analyses the causes of corporative finance audit frauds from the outlook of the behavior of the accountants, thus disclosing a series of social issues associated with corruption. I firmly hold a view that a great number of factors have contributed to the frauds:lack of independence; poor efficiency of supervision; bad virtues of financial personals; inadequate rewards and penalties of justice; and poor game system between accountants and clients. Appalling the theory of reasons, mode of morality, theory of expectation and game theory, this article provides a detailed analysis of the causes and strategies dealing with audit frauds. I think it is necessary and high time for our concerned authorities to take practical measures to quit this phenomenon going from bad to worse. The below may play a role in the campaign:optimizing the size of the firm; Strictly controlling the entrance; Discouraging the rent behavior from the local governments; Severely regulating the service consultation by the firm; introducing the fourth side to improve the independence of the accounting; Strengthening the duties of the administrators. Improving the leadership of the concerned administrators; Establishing the supervisory system on the same level; Encouraging a system of rewards and penalties; Recording the files of the honesty of the certificated accountants. In a word, it is a tough and long-lasting task to specify professional practice of the certificated accountants. At the same time, we should make great effort to improve the professional ethics and professional practice standards. Finally we should do what we can to eliminate fraudulent audits and have a clean audit environment.
引文
①Zs表示舞弊给注册会计师带来的声誉效用损失
②Fw表示欺诈给委托人带来的声誉损失,如在“经理人市场上”的声誉受到影响,从而导致其丧失未来收益机会
③Jw表示委托人由于被勤勉的注册会计师发现舞弊而遭受的经济损失,如受到的经济触犯、丧失虚报业绩带来的报酬和侵占的收益等
④Gz表示委托人可能更换注册会计师、压低审计费用或者拖欠审计费用使注册会计师遭受的损失
⑤△A表示委托人舞弊带来的额外收益,如虚报业绩来来的额外奖金、无偿的现金流支持、侵占股东的财产收益等
⑥L表示合谋被发现的概率
⑦△B表示欺诈给注册会计师带来的额外报酬
⑧Jz表示由于合谋被发现给注册会计师带来的经济利益的损失
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②Fw表示欺诈给委托人带来的声誉损失,如在“经理人市场上”的声誉受到影响,从而导致其丧失未来收益机会
③Jw表示委托人由于被勤勉的注册会计师发现舞弊而遭受的经济损失,如受到的经济触犯、丧失虚报业绩带来的报酬和侵占的收益等
④Gz表示委托人可能更换注册会计师、压低审计费用或者拖欠审计费用使注册会计师遭受的损失
⑤△A表示委托人舞弊带来的额外收益,如虚报业绩来来的额外奖金、无偿的现金流支持、侵占股东的财产收益等
⑥L表示合谋被发现的概率
⑦△B表示欺诈给注册会计师带来的额外报酬
⑧Jz表示由于合谋被发现给注册会计师带来的经济利益的损失
[1]邹晶,陈莉,刘慧明.舞弊审计失败的原因分析[J],2007(2)：28-29,36
[2]何晓红.伦理学的会计造假：[厦门大学硕士学位论文].厦门：厦门大学,2006
[3]刘文丽.注册会计师审计合谋的经济学分析[J],求索,2007(3)：26-28
[4]赵保卿,刘晓嫱.注册会计师审计舞弊成因的行为学分析[J],会计之友,2007(4)：94-95
[5]刘文艳.审计舞弊中的博弈现象及其规避策略[J],现代财经,2008(6)：50-52,71
[6]李嘉明,朱世兵.注册会计师与被审计对象合谋行为分析[J],财会通讯,2007(1)：74-77
[7]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊：共生与治理[J],管理世界,2004(2)：97-116
[8]梁芬莲.浅议治理注册会计师造假的主观与客观环境对策[J],2006(4)：10-11
[9]陈春霞.行为经济学和行为决策分析：一个综述[J],经济问题探索,2008(1)
[10]刘华.审计案例研究.1.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2009.2,21-54,105-153
[11]叶雪芳.舞弊审计.1.北京：经济科学出版社,2008.6,61-86
[12]赵华,田娟,宋士杰.独立审计行为异化的成因与对策[J],财会月刊(综合),2008(1)：62-64
[13]苏孜,蒋秀中.CPA审计舞弊的产生及其治理[J],财会与会计,2008(1)：55-56
[14]陈念东,邹丽云,刘飞翔.审计失败的博弈分析与防范措施[J],科技和产业,2006(7)：50-52
[15]徐慧.审计合谋的动态博弈分析[J],时代经贸,2007(4)：40-42
[16]华会堂,刑莉萍.注册会计师合谋舞弊问题浅析[J],现代审计与经济,2006(5)：30-31
[17]张薇,刘冬荣.会计报表审计：福利博弈的阐释[J],财会月刊(理论),2006(98)：33-35
[18]高伟清.浅析舞弊和舞弊审计[J],煤矿现代化,2008(4)：102-103
[19]张武民.浅谈审计失败的原因与对策[J],山西经济管理干部学院学报,2007
(2)：58-60,66
[20]黎四龙.会计舞弊动因理论述评[J],当代经济,2007(5)：118-119
[21]黄芳.用舞弊三角理论求解审计舞弊[J],审计月刊,2006(2)：23-24
[22]王海燕.论舞弊行为的审计侧率——基于行为经济学视角[J],财会通讯,2008(5)：69-71
[23]陈玉清,肖峰等.强制、社会规范和会计诚信确实的行为分析及启示[J],财会通讯,2006(9)：56-58
[24]陈华友.审计中博弈模型的扩展分析[J],大学数学,2004(2)：1-5
[25]管惠荣.从经济学观点分析审计人员诚信的成本与收益[J],价值工程,2007(3)：166-168
[26]陈志娟,李学军、邱思.浅析我国注册会计师的职业道德[J],企业管理,2008(8),81-83
[27]陈杰.我国注册会计师职业道德的现状及对策探讨[J],福建农林大学学报,2008,11(3)：74-77
[28]周新运.注册会计师职业道德问题探讨[J],河北企业,2008(9)：11-12
[29]课题组.注册会计师行业信誉机制研究——论独立审计委托人[J],经济论坛,2007(5)：132-133
[30]段文婷,江光荣.计划行为理论述评[J],心理科学进展,2008,16(2)
[31]陈景,陈苏广.CPA审计导致会计信息舞弊的因果分析及对策研究[J],山东省农业管理干部学院学报,2007(23)：78-79
[32]朱萍.舞弊审计责任：成因与应对[J],财会研究,2008(14)：66-68
[33]邢小玲.从审计关系角度分析我国注册会计师独立性问题.温州职业技术学院学报,2006,3：26-28
[34]刘安兵.试析舞弊专门审计[J].财会月刊,2007,11：45-49
[35]杨永淼,胡继连,吴金波.注册会计师行业低价揽业行为的实证研究.财会通讯,2006(10)
[36]崔宏.低价揽客与压价竞争：对审计独立性的影响与管制对策.广东金融学院学报,2008,3
[37]雷光勇,李淑君.审计师聘任机制改革与审计独立性保持.审计与经济研究,2005(3)
[38]谢识予.经济博弈论.上海：复旦大学出版社,2002
[39]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海：上海人民出版社,2004
[40]谢玉瑞.中国政府对注册会计师监管问题研究：[西北大学硕士学位论文].陕西：西北大学公共管理学院,2007,6：3-75
[41]赵国涛.审计模式及其在我国应用研究：[东北师范大学博士学位论文].沈阳：东北师范大学,2006,78-80
[42]Jon S.Davis:J.2003.Social Behaviors,Enforcement,and Tax Compliance Dynamics.The accounying review.39-69
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