S公司房地产私募股权基金融资模式研究
|
摘要
2007年,美国房地产次贷风波引发全球性金融危机最终导致全球经济陷入衰退,这场全球性金融危机对中国经济尤其房地产行业产生了巨大影响。随后,中国政府出台一系列针对宏观经济运行及房地产行业的调控政策,房地产开发企业普遍遭遇市场销售下滑、开发资金紧张,企业融资问题日益突出。在这样的背景下,研究房地产私募股权基金融资模式对S公司具有十分重要的意义。
西方学者对现代融资理论体系MM理论、权衡理论、优序融资理论和金融成长周期理论等主要代表学派观点进行研究总结,并结合大量的实证研究成果,指出现代融资理论为企业提供从不同角度分析资本结构问题和融资决策影响因素的理论依据。值得注意的是,尽管现代融资理论观点在西方发达国家已经得到大量实验验证,但是在发展中国家由于融资环境发生改变而未必完全符合现代融资理论观点,因此,本文考虑到中国的政治经济、市场体制等影响因素,研究更为适应国内房地产开发企业解决融资问题的融资模式。根据现代融资理论和国内外实证研究,本文以S公司为研究对象,分析S公司房地产业务的开发现状及融资情况,并深入分析S公司房地产现有融资模式存在的问题及原因等,提出引进私募股权基金是解决S公司房地产融资问题的最佳途径。在比较研究了私募股权基金几种组织形式的优缺点后,融合信托制和有限合伙制各自的优点设计出“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式。随后,针对这种联合融资模式的实施提出相应的实施要点和保障措施,从运营框架、组织结构和风险应对策略考虑,组建有限合伙制的基金管理团队、构造矩阵组织结构并借鉴柔性管理、股票期权激励计划和团队双层报酬激励方案等,使这种联合融资模式达到理想的运营效果。
本文结合信托制和有限合伙制设计了“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式,这种联合融资模式融合了两种组织形式的优势。在此基础上,进一步研究这种联合融资模式的可操作性,设计实施要点和保障措施,通过构建更加理想的运营框架、优化组织结构并提出积极的风险应对策略等,使这种联合融资模式更具有实用性。本文运用相关理论工具和案例研究设计房地产融资模式,对其他房地产开发企业拓展直接融资渠道和探讨私募股权基金融资模式提供了研究借鉴。
2007年,美国房地产次贷风波引发全球性金融危机最终导致全球经济陷入衰退,这场全球性金融危机对中国经济尤其房地产行业产生了巨大影响。随后,中国政府出台一系列针对宏观经济运行及房地产行业的调控政策,房地产开发企业普遍遭遇市场销售下滑、开发资金紧张,企业融资问题日益突出。在这样的背景下,研究房地产私募股权基金融资模式对S公司具有十分重要的意义。
西方学者对现代融资理论体系MM理论、权衡理论、优序融资理论和金融成长周期理论等主要代表学派观点进行研究总结,并结合大量的实证研究成果,指出现代融资理论为企业提供从不同角度分析资本结构问题和融资决策影响因素的理论依据。值得注意的是,尽管现代融资理论观点在西方发达国家已经得到大量实验验证,但是在发展中国家由于融资环境发生改变而未必完全符合现代融资理论观点,因此,本文考虑到中国的政治经济、市场体制等影响因素,研究更为适应国内房地产开发企业解决融资问题的融资模式。根据现代融资理论和国内外实证研究,本文以S公司为研究对象,分析S公司房地产业务的开发现状及融资情况,并深入分析S公司房地产现有融资模式存在的问题及原因等,提出引进私募股权基金是解决S公司房地产融资问题的最佳途径。在比较研究了私募股权基金几种组织形式的优缺点后,融合信托制和有限合伙制各自的优点设计出“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式。随后,针对这种联合融资模式的实施提出相应的实施要点和保障措施,从运营框架、组织结构和风险应对策略考虑,组建有限合伙制的基金管理团队、构造矩阵组织结构并借鉴柔性管理、股票期权激励计划和团队双层报酬激励方案等,使这种联合融资模式达到理想的运营效果。
本文结合信托制和有限合伙制设计了“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式,这种联合融资模式融合了两种组织形式的优势。在此基础上,进一步研究这种联合融资模式的可操作性,设计实施要点和保障措施,通过构建更加理想的运营框架、优化组织结构并提出积极的风险应对策略等,使这种联合融资模式更具有实用性。本文运用相关理论工具和案例研究设计房地产融资模式,对其他房地产开发企业拓展直接融资渠道和探讨私募股权基金融资模式提供了研究借鉴。
In 2007, American real estate sub-prime mortgage raised a global financial crisis and finally led to global economic fell into recession, then, the global financial crisis has thrown huge impact to Chinese economic especially the domestic real estate industry. Subsequently, Chinese government issued a series of policies and regulations to control macroeconomic and housing market, the domestic real estate developers generally encountered the housing sales dropping, development capital straining, and developer financing issue become more outstanding than before. In this context, to study real estate private equity fund financing mode is very significance to S company.
Western researchers studied Modern Financing Theories system ranging over the MM theory, Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Financial Growth Cycle Theory, also involved some primary theoretical standpoints summarizing from a mass of empirical results, they pointed out that the Modern Financial Theories offer theoretical foundation for enterprise to analyze the capital structure issues and the influence factors of financing decision-making from different aspects. But attention should be paid, although the important thoughts of Modern Financing Theories have been tested and verified for many years, however, due to the different financing environment, it is really not very suitable in developing countries. So, this paper considers impact factors of Chinese political system, economy running and market mechanism, etc. to study and find a more suitable financing mode for domestic real estate developers. Based on the Modern Financing Theories and empirical results from abroad and domestic, S company as the study body, this paper first analyzes the real estate business and financing situation, forward to discuss the existing problems and traces the origin reasons of the present financing mode, then this paper proves the optimum financing channel that introducing abroad private equity fund to settle the real estate financing issues of S company. The following to the core sections, after studied and compared with the strengths and weaknesses of company system, limited partnership system and trust system, this paper takes advantage of trust system and limited partnership system respective merits, based on which to focus on designing the Co-financing mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management, then this paper also draws up a set of the implementation keypoints and safeguards for the Co-financing Mode, considering from the aspects of operational framework, organization structure and some measures to deal with potential risks, this paper further proposes to set up the fund management team in limited partnership, constructs the matrix organization based on project teams and introduces flexibility management concept, stock options incentive plan and team double-reward incentive scheme and so forth, aiming to reach a optimal implement effect.
This paper integrates Trust System and Limited Partnership System to design the Co-financing Mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management; this Co-financing Mode can fully utilize the strengths of the two organizations. On that basis, this paper further research on the operability of the Co-financing Mode, working out the implementation keypoints and safeguards, in which it formulates the more perfect operational framework, optimizes organization structure for project team and takes some positive steps coping with potential risks, to make the Co-financing Mode more practical. In this paper, studying and designing the real estate financing mode based on the related theories and case analysis, which provides the valuable reference for other real estate developers to expand direct financing channel and explore the private equity fund financing mode.
In 2007, American real estate sub-prime mortgage raised a global financial crisis and finally led to global economic fell into recession, then, the global financial crisis has thrown huge impact to Chinese economic especially the domestic real estate industry. Subsequently, Chinese government issued a series of policies and regulations to control macroeconomic and housing market, the domestic real estate developers generally encountered the housing sales dropping, development capital straining, and developer financing issue become more outstanding than before. In this context, to study real estate private equity fund financing mode is very significance to S company.
Western researchers studied Modern Financing Theories system ranging over the MM theory, Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Financial Growth Cycle Theory, also involved some primary theoretical standpoints summarizing from a mass of empirical results, they pointed out that the Modern Financial Theories offer theoretical foundation for enterprise to analyze the capital structure issues and the influence factors of financing decision-making from different aspects. But attention should be paid, although the important thoughts of Modern Financing Theories have been tested and verified for many years, however, due to the different financing environment, it is really not very suitable in developing countries. So, this paper considers impact factors of Chinese political system, economy running and market mechanism, etc. to study and find a more suitable financing mode for domestic real estate developers. Based on the Modern Financing Theories and empirical results from abroad and domestic, S company as the study body, this paper first analyzes the real estate business and financing situation, forward to discuss the existing problems and traces the origin reasons of the present financing mode, then this paper proves the optimum financing channel that introducing abroad private equity fund to settle the real estate financing issues of S company. The following to the core sections, after studied and compared with the strengths and weaknesses of company system, limited partnership system and trust system, this paper takes advantage of trust system and limited partnership system respective merits, based on which to focus on designing the Co-financing mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management, then this paper also draws up a set of the implementation keypoints and safeguards for the Co-financing Mode, considering from the aspects of operational framework, organization structure and some measures to deal with potential risks, this paper further proposes to set up the fund management team in limited partnership, constructs the matrix organization based on project teams and introduces flexibility management concept, stock options incentive plan and team double-reward incentive scheme and so forth, aiming to reach a optimal implement effect.
This paper integrates Trust System and Limited Partnership System to design the Co-financing Mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management; this Co-financing Mode can fully utilize the strengths of the two organizations. On that basis, this paper further research on the operability of the Co-financing Mode, working out the implementation keypoints and safeguards, in which it formulates the more perfect operational framework, optimizes organization structure for project team and takes some positive steps coping with potential risks, to make the Co-financing Mode more practical. In this paper, studying and designing the real estate financing mode based on the related theories and case analysis, which provides the valuable reference for other real estate developers to expand direct financing channel and explore the private equity fund financing mode.
西方学者对现代融资理论体系MM理论、权衡理论、优序融资理论和金融成长周期理论等主要代表学派观点进行研究总结,并结合大量的实证研究成果,指出现代融资理论为企业提供从不同角度分析资本结构问题和融资决策影响因素的理论依据。值得注意的是,尽管现代融资理论观点在西方发达国家已经得到大量实验验证,但是在发展中国家由于融资环境发生改变而未必完全符合现代融资理论观点,因此,本文考虑到中国的政治经济、市场体制等影响因素,研究更为适应国内房地产开发企业解决融资问题的融资模式。根据现代融资理论和国内外实证研究,本文以S公司为研究对象,分析S公司房地产业务的开发现状及融资情况,并深入分析S公司房地产现有融资模式存在的问题及原因等,提出引进私募股权基金是解决S公司房地产融资问题的最佳途径。在比较研究了私募股权基金几种组织形式的优缺点后,融合信托制和有限合伙制各自的优点设计出“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式。随后,针对这种联合融资模式的实施提出相应的实施要点和保障措施,从运营框架、组织结构和风险应对策略考虑,组建有限合伙制的基金管理团队、构造矩阵组织结构并借鉴柔性管理、股票期权激励计划和团队双层报酬激励方案等,使这种联合融资模式达到理想的运营效果。
本文结合信托制和有限合伙制设计了“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式,这种联合融资模式融合了两种组织形式的优势。在此基础上,进一步研究这种联合融资模式的可操作性,设计实施要点和保障措施,通过构建更加理想的运营框架、优化组织结构并提出积极的风险应对策略等,使这种联合融资模式更具有实用性。本文运用相关理论工具和案例研究设计房地产融资模式,对其他房地产开发企业拓展直接融资渠道和探讨私募股权基金融资模式提供了研究借鉴。
2007年,美国房地产次贷风波引发全球性金融危机最终导致全球经济陷入衰退,这场全球性金融危机对中国经济尤其房地产行业产生了巨大影响。随后,中国政府出台一系列针对宏观经济运行及房地产行业的调控政策,房地产开发企业普遍遭遇市场销售下滑、开发资金紧张,企业融资问题日益突出。在这样的背景下,研究房地产私募股权基金融资模式对S公司具有十分重要的意义。
西方学者对现代融资理论体系MM理论、权衡理论、优序融资理论和金融成长周期理论等主要代表学派观点进行研究总结,并结合大量的实证研究成果,指出现代融资理论为企业提供从不同角度分析资本结构问题和融资决策影响因素的理论依据。值得注意的是,尽管现代融资理论观点在西方发达国家已经得到大量实验验证,但是在发展中国家由于融资环境发生改变而未必完全符合现代融资理论观点,因此,本文考虑到中国的政治经济、市场体制等影响因素,研究更为适应国内房地产开发企业解决融资问题的融资模式。根据现代融资理论和国内外实证研究,本文以S公司为研究对象,分析S公司房地产业务的开发现状及融资情况,并深入分析S公司房地产现有融资模式存在的问题及原因等,提出引进私募股权基金是解决S公司房地产融资问题的最佳途径。在比较研究了私募股权基金几种组织形式的优缺点后,融合信托制和有限合伙制各自的优点设计出“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式。随后,针对这种联合融资模式的实施提出相应的实施要点和保障措施,从运营框架、组织结构和风险应对策略考虑,组建有限合伙制的基金管理团队、构造矩阵组织结构并借鉴柔性管理、股票期权激励计划和团队双层报酬激励方案等,使这种联合融资模式达到理想的运营效果。
本文结合信托制和有限合伙制设计了“信托募资+有限合伙管理”联合融资模式,这种联合融资模式融合了两种组织形式的优势。在此基础上,进一步研究这种联合融资模式的可操作性,设计实施要点和保障措施,通过构建更加理想的运营框架、优化组织结构并提出积极的风险应对策略等,使这种联合融资模式更具有实用性。本文运用相关理论工具和案例研究设计房地产融资模式,对其他房地产开发企业拓展直接融资渠道和探讨私募股权基金融资模式提供了研究借鉴。
In 2007, American real estate sub-prime mortgage raised a global financial crisis and finally led to global economic fell into recession, then, the global financial crisis has thrown huge impact to Chinese economic especially the domestic real estate industry. Subsequently, Chinese government issued a series of policies and regulations to control macroeconomic and housing market, the domestic real estate developers generally encountered the housing sales dropping, development capital straining, and developer financing issue become more outstanding than before. In this context, to study real estate private equity fund financing mode is very significance to S company.
Western researchers studied Modern Financing Theories system ranging over the MM theory, Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Financial Growth Cycle Theory, also involved some primary theoretical standpoints summarizing from a mass of empirical results, they pointed out that the Modern Financial Theories offer theoretical foundation for enterprise to analyze the capital structure issues and the influence factors of financing decision-making from different aspects. But attention should be paid, although the important thoughts of Modern Financing Theories have been tested and verified for many years, however, due to the different financing environment, it is really not very suitable in developing countries. So, this paper considers impact factors of Chinese political system, economy running and market mechanism, etc. to study and find a more suitable financing mode for domestic real estate developers. Based on the Modern Financing Theories and empirical results from abroad and domestic, S company as the study body, this paper first analyzes the real estate business and financing situation, forward to discuss the existing problems and traces the origin reasons of the present financing mode, then this paper proves the optimum financing channel that introducing abroad private equity fund to settle the real estate financing issues of S company. The following to the core sections, after studied and compared with the strengths and weaknesses of company system, limited partnership system and trust system, this paper takes advantage of trust system and limited partnership system respective merits, based on which to focus on designing the Co-financing mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management, then this paper also draws up a set of the implementation keypoints and safeguards for the Co-financing Mode, considering from the aspects of operational framework, organization structure and some measures to deal with potential risks, this paper further proposes to set up the fund management team in limited partnership, constructs the matrix organization based on project teams and introduces flexibility management concept, stock options incentive plan and team double-reward incentive scheme and so forth, aiming to reach a optimal implement effect.
This paper integrates Trust System and Limited Partnership System to design the Co-financing Mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management; this Co-financing Mode can fully utilize the strengths of the two organizations. On that basis, this paper further research on the operability of the Co-financing Mode, working out the implementation keypoints and safeguards, in which it formulates the more perfect operational framework, optimizes organization structure for project team and takes some positive steps coping with potential risks, to make the Co-financing Mode more practical. In this paper, studying and designing the real estate financing mode based on the related theories and case analysis, which provides the valuable reference for other real estate developers to expand direct financing channel and explore the private equity fund financing mode.
In 2007, American real estate sub-prime mortgage raised a global financial crisis and finally led to global economic fell into recession, then, the global financial crisis has thrown huge impact to Chinese economic especially the domestic real estate industry. Subsequently, Chinese government issued a series of policies and regulations to control macroeconomic and housing market, the domestic real estate developers generally encountered the housing sales dropping, development capital straining, and developer financing issue become more outstanding than before. In this context, to study real estate private equity fund financing mode is very significance to S company.
Western researchers studied Modern Financing Theories system ranging over the MM theory, Trade-off Theory, Pecking Order Theory and Financial Growth Cycle Theory, also involved some primary theoretical standpoints summarizing from a mass of empirical results, they pointed out that the Modern Financial Theories offer theoretical foundation for enterprise to analyze the capital structure issues and the influence factors of financing decision-making from different aspects. But attention should be paid, although the important thoughts of Modern Financing Theories have been tested and verified for many years, however, due to the different financing environment, it is really not very suitable in developing countries. So, this paper considers impact factors of Chinese political system, economy running and market mechanism, etc. to study and find a more suitable financing mode for domestic real estate developers. Based on the Modern Financing Theories and empirical results from abroad and domestic, S company as the study body, this paper first analyzes the real estate business and financing situation, forward to discuss the existing problems and traces the origin reasons of the present financing mode, then this paper proves the optimum financing channel that introducing abroad private equity fund to settle the real estate financing issues of S company. The following to the core sections, after studied and compared with the strengths and weaknesses of company system, limited partnership system and trust system, this paper takes advantage of trust system and limited partnership system respective merits, based on which to focus on designing the Co-financing mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management, then this paper also draws up a set of the implementation keypoints and safeguards for the Co-financing Mode, considering from the aspects of operational framework, organization structure and some measures to deal with potential risks, this paper further proposes to set up the fund management team in limited partnership, constructs the matrix organization based on project teams and introduces flexibility management concept, stock options incentive plan and team double-reward incentive scheme and so forth, aiming to reach a optimal implement effect.
This paper integrates Trust System and Limited Partnership System to design the Co-financing Mode of Trust Fundraising & Limited Partnership Management; this Co-financing Mode can fully utilize the strengths of the two organizations. On that basis, this paper further research on the operability of the Co-financing Mode, working out the implementation keypoints and safeguards, in which it formulates the more perfect operational framework, optimizes organization structure for project team and takes some positive steps coping with potential risks, to make the Co-financing Mode more practical. In this paper, studying and designing the real estate financing mode based on the related theories and case analysis, which provides the valuable reference for other real estate developers to expand direct financing channel and explore the private equity fund financing mode.
引文
1 Rose N.Lai, Robert A. Van Order.Momentum and House Price Growth in the United States:Anatomy of a Bubble. Real Estate Economics,2010, X:1-21.
2白榆.私募股权投资：地产融资案例分析.商情,2009,(1)：159-160.
3马步青.企业层级结构在知识经济中的发展.科技情报开发与经济,2005,15(5)：212-213.
4 Daniel E.Larkin, Mara L.Babin etc. Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds. Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3)229-235.
[1]Linda Schmid Kleim, Thomas J.0'Brien, etc. Debt vs. Equity and Asymmetric Information:A Review [J].The Financial Review,2002, (37):317-350.
[2]Gavin Cassar, Scott Holmes. Capital Strucutre and Financing of SMEs:Australian Evidence [J]. Accounting and Finance 43(2003)123-147.
[3]Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, etc. Effect of Diversification on Cpaital Structure [J]. Accounting and Finance,2009, (49):799-826.
[4]Dan Dhaliwal, Shane Heitzman etc. Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(9):691-723.
[5]BRAV,0. Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm [J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):263-308.
[6]Viet A. Dang. Leverage, Debt Maturity and Firm Investment:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2010,0306-686X:1-34.
[7]Robert Watson, Nick Wilson. Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing:A Note on some of the Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2002,29(3):557-578.
[8]Ciaran mac, Bhaird. The Modigliani-Miller Proposition after Fifty Years and Its Relation to Entrepreneurial Finance [J]. Wiley Interscience (Strategic Change), 2010,19:9-28.
[9]Abe de Jong, Marno Verbeek, etc. the Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory[J]. Financial Management,2010, summer:733-756.
[10]Kuang-Cheng A.Wang, Chun-Hung A. Lin. Pecking-Order Theory Revisited:the Role of Agency Cost [J].The Manchester School,2010,78(5):395-411.
[11]Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc. Pecking Order Behavior in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2010,1-31.
[12]Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, etc. Formal versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(8):3048-3097.
[13]Soku Byoun. How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structure toward Targets? [J]. the Journal of Finance,2008, LXIII (6):3069-3096.
[14]Vivien Beattie, Alan Goodacre etc. Corporate Financing Decisions:UK Survey Evidence [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2006,33(9) & (10):1402-1434.
[15]童勇.资本结构的动态调整和影响因素[J].财经研究,2004,30(10)：96-104.
[16]王志强,洪艺殉.中国上市公司资本结构的长期动态调整[J].会计研究,2009,(6)：50-58.
[17]王鲁平,马建民.控制效度因子与优序融资理论模型修正[J].西安交通大学学报,2008,42(6)：760-764.
[18]陈晓红,刘剑.我国中小企业融资结构与融资方式演进研究[J].中国软科学,2003, (12)：61-67.
[19]陈晓红,刘剑.不同成长阶段下中小企业融资方式选择研究[J].管理工程学报,2006,20(1)：1-6.
[20]喻小军,金希.中、美中小企业金融成长周期的融资结构比较[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,27(6)：107-109.
[21]苏坤,杨淑娥.现金流权、控制权与资本结构决策---来自我国民营上市公司的证据[J].预测,2009,28(6)：18-23.
[22]赵冬青、朱武祥等.宏观调控与房地产上市公司资本结构调整[J].金融研究,2008,(10)：78-92.
[23]Daniel E. Larkin, Mara L.Babin, etc. Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds [J].Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3):229-235.
[24]Steven N.Kaplan, Antolnette Schoar. Private Equity Performance:Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows [J].the Journal of Finance,2005, LX (4):1791-1823.
[25]Christian Diller and Chirstoph Kaserer. What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows, Skilled GPs, and/or Risk? [J].European Financial Management, 2009,15(3):643-675.
[26]Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming, etc. Style Drift in Private Equity[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2009,36(5) & (6):645-678.
[27]李颖琦,卢荣.论通过私募股权资本优化资本市场结构之道[J].现代财经---天津财经大学学报,2009,29(8)：9-12.
[28]Ralf Muller, J. Rodney Turner. The Impact of Principal-agent Relationship and Contract Type on Communication between Project Owner and Manager[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2005,23:398-403.
[29]Manfred Konigstein, Judit Kovacs,etc. Fairness in a One-Pricipal-Two-Agents Game-a Post-experimental Questionnaire Analysis [J]. Journal of Economic Psychology,2003,24(2):491-503.
[30]Martin F. Hellwig. The Role of Boundary Solutions in Principal-agent Problem of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type [J]. Joural of Economic Theory,2007,136(1):446-475.
[31]Yuliy Sannikov. A Continious-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem[J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2008,75:957-984.
[32]Veikko Thiele. Task-specific Abilities in Multi-task Principal-agent Relationships [J]. Labour Economic,2010,17(4):690-698.
[33]Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model[J]. Scand. J. of Economics,2004,106(3):453-474.
[34]Philip Bond, Armando Gomes. Multitask Principal-agent Problems:Optimal Contracts, Fragility, and Effort Misallocation[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009,144:175-211.
[35]李富强、李斌.委托代理模型与激励机制分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,20(9)：29-33.
[36]徐玖平,陈书建.不对称信息理风险投资的委托代理模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,(1)：19-24.
[37]潘安娥.经理股票期权激励机制探析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2007,29(3)：128-130.
[38]雷勇、薄勇健.委托／代理下人力资源有效激励模式与退出机制设计[J].管理工程学报,2006,(1)：46-49
[39]乔桂明,卜亚.风险投资中委托代理问题与制度安排[J].科研管理,2004,25(1)：118-122.
[40]王雪霞.将持股比例引入风险投资三方委托代理模型的研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,(2)：121-126.
[41]陈晓红,李玉环等.管理层激励与中小上市公司成长性实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,(7)：134-140.
[42]郑君君,谭旭等.基于委托-代理理论的股权激励模型的研究[J].管理科学学报,2005,(2)：24-29
[43]赵瑾璐,崔顺全.有限合伙制的组织优势分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(4)：33-35.
[44]张新立,陈辉.有限合伙制条件下基金管理人的业绩报酬机制分析[J].科学技术与工程,2005,5(9)：624-628.
[45]姚佐文,陈晓剑等.有限合伙风险投资模式下的委托代理关系分析[J].预测,2003,22(2)：59-61.
[46]孙昌群,汪应洛.有限合伙契约的柔性激励机制设计[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2)：27-29.
[47]和金生,李军坡.基于委托代理理论的企业内部激励有效性分析[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,9(1)：117-120.
[48]郭明杉,杨波等.风险投资有限合伙制激励约束机制研究[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：63-67.
[49]刘远亮.从公司制到有限合伙制的公司治理研究[J].价值工程,2008,(7)：156-159.
[50]姚玲珍,韩国栋.新形势下中国房地产股权融资的新选择[J].华中科技大学学报(城市科学版),2010,(3)：27-30
[51]宋晓燕.私募股权投资基金组织模式分析---一个治理角度的视角[J].上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,10(5)：41-48.
[52]程兴华.信托私募融资与中小民营企业可持续发展---以浙江为例[J].经济管理,2007,29(1)：88-92.
[53]杨郁.私募股权投资基金的规制探析[J].经济管理,2010,32(6)：129-134.
[54]何叶,李鑫.团队激励薪酬模式研究[J].软科学(经济论坛),2004,18(6)：39-47.
[55]王艳梅,赵希男.团队协作最优激励模型分析[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2007,28(9)：1346-1349.
[1]Linda Schmid Kleim, Thomas J. O'Brien, etc.Debt vs.Equity and Asymmetric Information:A Review [J].The Financial Review,2002, (37):317-350.
[2]Gavin Cassar, Scott Holmes. Capital Strucutre and Financing of SMEs:Australian Evidence [J].Accounting and Finance 43(2003)123-147.
[3]Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, etc.Effect of Diversification on Cpaital Structure [J].Accounting and Finance,2009, (49):799-826.
[4]Dan Dhaliwal, Shane Heitzman etc.Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J] Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(9):691-723.
[5]BRAV, O. Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm [J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):263-308.
[6]Viet A.Dang.Leverage,Debt Maturity and Firm Investment:An Empirical Analysis [J] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2010,0306-686X:1-34.
[7]Robert Watson,Nick Wilson.Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing:A Note on some of the Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2002,29(3):557-578.
[8]Ciaran mac, Bhaird.The Modigliani-Miller Proposition after Fifty Years and Its Relation to Entrepreneurial Finance [J].Wiley Interscience (Strategic Change),2010,19:9-28.
[9]Abe de Jong, Marno Verbeek,etc. the Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory[J].Financial Management,2010, summer:733-756.
[10]Kuang-Cheng A.Wang, Chun-Hung A.Lin.Pecking-Order Theory Revisited:the Role of Agency Cost [J].The Manchester School,2010,78(5):395-411.
[11]Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc.Pecking Order Behavior in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2010,1-31.
[12]Meghana Ayyagari,Asli Demirguc-Kunt,etc.Formal versus Informal Finance:Evidence from China [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(8):3048-3097.
[13]Soku Byoun. How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structure toward Targets?[J].the Journal of Finance,2008, LXIII (6):3069-3096.
[14]Vivien Beattie,Alan Goodacre etc.Corporate Financing Decisions:UK Survey Evidence [J] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2006,33(9) & (10):1402-1434.
[15]Tong Yong.Dynamiv Adjustment of Capital Structure and the Determinants [J]. Journal of Finance and Economics,2004,30(10):96-104.
[16]Wang Zhiqiang, Hong Yixun. Empirical Research on the Long-term Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Capital Structure in China [J].Accounting Research,2009, (6):50-58.
[17]Wang Luping, Ma Jianmin.Control Efficiency Factor and Amending on the Pecking Order Theory Model [J].Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University,2008,42(6):760-764.
[18]Chen Xiao-hong,Liu Jian.Finance Structure and Finance Mode Evolvement of Small and Medium Enterprises of Our Country [J].China Soft Science,2003,(12):61-67.
[19]Chen Xiao-hong,Liu Jian.the Research on the Finance Structure and Models of Small and Medium Enterprises in the Different Growing Periods[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2006,20(1):1-6.
[20]Yu Xiao-jun, Jin Xi.Comparison the Financing Structure of Financial Growth Cycle between China and America [J] Journal of Wuhan University of Technology,2005,27(6):107-109.
[21]Su Kun, Yang Shu-e.Cash Flow Rights, Controlling Rights and Capital Structure Policies: Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies [J]. Forecasting,2009,28(6):18-23.
[22]Zhao Dongqing, Zhu wuxiang, etc. Macroeconomic Control and the Capital Structure Adjustment of Listed Real Estate Firms in China [J] Journal of Financial Research,2008, (10):78-92.
[23]Daniel E.Larkin, Mara L.Babin, etc.Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds [J].Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3):229-235.
[24]Steven N.Kaplan,Antolnette Schoar.Private Equity Performance:Returns,Persistence,and Capital Flows [J].the Journal of Finance,2005, LX (4):1791-1823.
[25]Christian Diller and Chirstoph Kaserer.What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows, Skilled GPs, and/or Risk? [J].European Financial Management,2009,15(3):643-675.
[26]Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming,etc.Style Drift in Private Equity[J].Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2009,36(5)&(6):645-678.
[27]Li Yingqi, Lu Rong. The Path of by Through Private Equity the Stockholder's Rights Optimization Capital Market Structure [J] Journal of Tianjin University of Finance & Economics (Modern Financing Economics),2009,29(8):9-12.
[28]Ralf Muller,J.Rodney Turner.The Impact of Principal-agent Relationship and Contract Type on Communication between Project Owner and Manager [J]. International Journal of Project Management,2005,23:398-403.
[29]Manfred Konigstein,Judit Kovacs,etc.Fairness in a One-Pricipal-Two-Agents Game-A Post-experimental Questionnaire Analysis [J].Journal of Economic Psychology,2003,24(2): 491-503.
[30]Martin F.Hellwig.The Role of Boundary Solutions in Principal-agent Problem of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type [J].Joural of Economic Theory,2007,136(1):446-475.
[31]Yuliy Sannikov.A Continious-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2008,75:957-984.
[32]Veikko Thiele.Task-specific Abilities in Multi-task Principal-agent Relationships [J].Labour Economic,2010,17(4):690-698.
[33]Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model [J]. Scand.J.of Economics,2004,106(3):453-474.
[34]Philip Bond, Armando Gomes.Multitask Principal-agent Problems:Optimal Contracts,Fragility, and Effort Misallocation[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144:175-211.
[35]Li Fuqiang, Li Bin. Principal-Agent model and Incentive Mechanism Analysis [J] Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics,2003,20(9):29-33.
[36]Xu Jiu-ping, Chen Shu-jian. The study of Venture Capital's Principal-agent Model based on Asymmetric Information [J].Systems Engineering-theory & Practice,2004,(1):19-24.
[37]Pan An-e.Analysis of Executive Stock Option Plan [J] Journal of WUT (Information &Management Engineering),2007,29(3):128-130.
[38]Lei Yong,Pu Yong-jian.Mechanism Design of Incentive Pattern and Efficient Layoff for Human Resource under the Principal-Agent [J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and EngneeringManagement,2006(1):46-49.
[39]Qiao Gui-ming,Bo Ya.the Principal-agent Problem on Venture Capital Market and Institution Arrangement [J].Science Research Management,2004,25(1):118-122.
[40]Wang Xue-xia.A study on the Principal-agent Model of Three Sides in Venture Capital with Their Stocks proportionate [J].Quantitative & Technica Economics,2005,(2):121-126.
[41]Chen Xiaohong, Li Yuhuan, etc. An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Management Incentive and the Growth of SMEs [J]. Science of Science and Mangement of S & T.,2007, (7):134-140.
[42]Zheng Jun-jun, Tan Xu,etc. An Incentive Model with Stocks based on Principal-agent Theory [J] Journal of Management Sciences in China,2005, (2):24-29.
[43]Zhao Jin-lu, Cui Shun-quan. The Advantages of Limited Partnership [J] Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition),2005,7(4):33-35.
[44]Zhang Xinli,Chen Hui. An Analysis of Perfornance Reward Mechanism of Fund Manager under Limited Partnerships [J].Science Technoligy and Engineering,2005,5(9):624-628.
[45]Yao Zuo-wen, Chen Xiao-jian, etc.An Analysis of Principal-agent Relationships under Venture Capital Partnership [J].Forecasting,2003,22(2):59-61.
[46]Sun Chang-qun, Wang Ying-luo.Design of Flexible Stimulation Mechanism for Limited Partnership Contracts [J] Journal of Industrial Engneering and Engneering Management,2005, 19(2):27-29.
[47]He Jin-sheng,Li Jun-bo. Study on the Effectiveness of Incentive in the Firm Based on Principal-agent Theory [J] Journal of HIT(Social Science Edition),2007,9(1):117-120.
[48]Guo Ming-shan, Yang Bo,etc.The Incentive Mechanism and Constraint Mechanism of Venture Capital in Limited Partnership [J].Commercial Research,2008,(2):63-67.
[49]Liu Yuanliang.to Study on Corporate Governance Efficiency from Corporation to Limited Partnership [J].Value Engineering,2008,(7):156-159.
[50]Yao Ling-zhen, Han Guo-dong.New Choice of China Real Estate Equity Financing in the New Circumstance))) Limited Partnership [J] Journal of HUST.(Urban Science Edition),2010, (3):27-30.
[51]Song Xiao-yan. An Analysis on Organization Models of Private Equity Fund from a Perspective of Governance Strcture [J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,2008,10(5):41-48.
[52]Cheng Xing-hua.Trust Private Replacement and Continuous Development of Zhejiang Privately Owned Enterprises of Small and Middle Size [J]. Economic Management in China, 2007,29(1):88-92.
[53]Yang Yu. Study of Legal Regulation of Private Equity [J].Economic Management,2010, 32(6):129-134.
[54]He Ye, Li Xin.The Study on the Team Incentive Compensation Mode [J].Soft Science (Economic Forum),2004,18(6):39-47.
[55]Wang Yan-mei, Zhao Xi-nan. Analysis of Optimal Incentive Model for Team Cooperation [J].Journal of Northeastern University (Natural Science),2007,28(9):1346-1349.
2白榆.私募股权投资：地产融资案例分析.商情,2009,(1)：159-160.
3马步青.企业层级结构在知识经济中的发展.科技情报开发与经济,2005,15(5)：212-213.
4 Daniel E.Larkin, Mara L.Babin etc. Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds. Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3)229-235.
[1]Linda Schmid Kleim, Thomas J.0'Brien, etc. Debt vs. Equity and Asymmetric Information:A Review [J].The Financial Review,2002, (37):317-350.
[2]Gavin Cassar, Scott Holmes. Capital Strucutre and Financing of SMEs:Australian Evidence [J]. Accounting and Finance 43(2003)123-147.
[3]Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, etc. Effect of Diversification on Cpaital Structure [J]. Accounting and Finance,2009, (49):799-826.
[4]Dan Dhaliwal, Shane Heitzman etc. Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(9):691-723.
[5]BRAV,0. Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm [J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):263-308.
[6]Viet A. Dang. Leverage, Debt Maturity and Firm Investment:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2010,0306-686X:1-34.
[7]Robert Watson, Nick Wilson. Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing:A Note on some of the Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2002,29(3):557-578.
[8]Ciaran mac, Bhaird. The Modigliani-Miller Proposition after Fifty Years and Its Relation to Entrepreneurial Finance [J]. Wiley Interscience (Strategic Change), 2010,19:9-28.
[9]Abe de Jong, Marno Verbeek, etc. the Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory[J]. Financial Management,2010, summer:733-756.
[10]Kuang-Cheng A.Wang, Chun-Hung A. Lin. Pecking-Order Theory Revisited:the Role of Agency Cost [J].The Manchester School,2010,78(5):395-411.
[11]Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc. Pecking Order Behavior in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2010,1-31.
[12]Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, etc. Formal versus Informal Finance: Evidence from China[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(8):3048-3097.
[13]Soku Byoun. How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structure toward Targets? [J]. the Journal of Finance,2008, LXIII (6):3069-3096.
[14]Vivien Beattie, Alan Goodacre etc. Corporate Financing Decisions:UK Survey Evidence [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2006,33(9) & (10):1402-1434.
[15]童勇.资本结构的动态调整和影响因素[J].财经研究,2004,30(10)：96-104.
[16]王志强,洪艺殉.中国上市公司资本结构的长期动态调整[J].会计研究,2009,(6)：50-58.
[17]王鲁平,马建民.控制效度因子与优序融资理论模型修正[J].西安交通大学学报,2008,42(6)：760-764.
[18]陈晓红,刘剑.我国中小企业融资结构与融资方式演进研究[J].中国软科学,2003, (12)：61-67.
[19]陈晓红,刘剑.不同成长阶段下中小企业融资方式选择研究[J].管理工程学报,2006,20(1)：1-6.
[20]喻小军,金希.中、美中小企业金融成长周期的融资结构比较[J].武汉理工大学学报,2005,27(6)：107-109.
[21]苏坤,杨淑娥.现金流权、控制权与资本结构决策---来自我国民营上市公司的证据[J].预测,2009,28(6)：18-23.
[22]赵冬青、朱武祥等.宏观调控与房地产上市公司资本结构调整[J].金融研究,2008,(10)：78-92.
[23]Daniel E. Larkin, Mara L.Babin, etc. Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds [J].Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3):229-235.
[24]Steven N.Kaplan, Antolnette Schoar. Private Equity Performance:Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows [J].the Journal of Finance,2005, LX (4):1791-1823.
[25]Christian Diller and Chirstoph Kaserer. What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows, Skilled GPs, and/or Risk? [J].European Financial Management, 2009,15(3):643-675.
[26]Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming, etc. Style Drift in Private Equity[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2009,36(5) & (6):645-678.
[27]李颖琦,卢荣.论通过私募股权资本优化资本市场结构之道[J].现代财经---天津财经大学学报,2009,29(8)：9-12.
[28]Ralf Muller, J. Rodney Turner. The Impact of Principal-agent Relationship and Contract Type on Communication between Project Owner and Manager[J]. International Journal of Project Management,2005,23:398-403.
[29]Manfred Konigstein, Judit Kovacs,etc. Fairness in a One-Pricipal-Two-Agents Game-a Post-experimental Questionnaire Analysis [J]. Journal of Economic Psychology,2003,24(2):491-503.
[30]Martin F. Hellwig. The Role of Boundary Solutions in Principal-agent Problem of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type [J]. Joural of Economic Theory,2007,136(1):446-475.
[31]Yuliy Sannikov. A Continious-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem[J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2008,75:957-984.
[32]Veikko Thiele. Task-specific Abilities in Multi-task Principal-agent Relationships [J]. Labour Economic,2010,17(4):690-698.
[33]Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model[J]. Scand. J. of Economics,2004,106(3):453-474.
[34]Philip Bond, Armando Gomes. Multitask Principal-agent Problems:Optimal Contracts, Fragility, and Effort Misallocation[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2009,144:175-211.
[35]李富强、李斌.委托代理模型与激励机制分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003,20(9)：29-33.
[36]徐玖平,陈书建.不对称信息理风险投资的委托代理模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,(1)：19-24.
[37]潘安娥.经理股票期权激励机制探析[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2007,29(3)：128-130.
[38]雷勇、薄勇健.委托／代理下人力资源有效激励模式与退出机制设计[J].管理工程学报,2006,(1)：46-49
[39]乔桂明,卜亚.风险投资中委托代理问题与制度安排[J].科研管理,2004,25(1)：118-122.
[40]王雪霞.将持股比例引入风险投资三方委托代理模型的研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,(2)：121-126.
[41]陈晓红,李玉环等.管理层激励与中小上市公司成长性实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,(7)：134-140.
[42]郑君君,谭旭等.基于委托-代理理论的股权激励模型的研究[J].管理科学学报,2005,(2)：24-29
[43]赵瑾璐,崔顺全.有限合伙制的组织优势分析[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(4)：33-35.
[44]张新立,陈辉.有限合伙制条件下基金管理人的业绩报酬机制分析[J].科学技术与工程,2005,5(9)：624-628.
[45]姚佐文,陈晓剑等.有限合伙风险投资模式下的委托代理关系分析[J].预测,2003,22(2)：59-61.
[46]孙昌群,汪应洛.有限合伙契约的柔性激励机制设计[J].管理工程学报,2005,19(2)：27-29.
[47]和金生,李军坡.基于委托代理理论的企业内部激励有效性分析[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,9(1)：117-120.
[48]郭明杉,杨波等.风险投资有限合伙制激励约束机制研究[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：63-67.
[49]刘远亮.从公司制到有限合伙制的公司治理研究[J].价值工程,2008,(7)：156-159.
[50]姚玲珍,韩国栋.新形势下中国房地产股权融资的新选择[J].华中科技大学学报(城市科学版),2010,(3)：27-30
[51]宋晓燕.私募股权投资基金组织模式分析---一个治理角度的视角[J].上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008,10(5)：41-48.
[52]程兴华.信托私募融资与中小民营企业可持续发展---以浙江为例[J].经济管理,2007,29(1)：88-92.
[53]杨郁.私募股权投资基金的规制探析[J].经济管理,2010,32(6)：129-134.
[54]何叶,李鑫.团队激励薪酬模式研究[J].软科学(经济论坛),2004,18(6)：39-47.
[55]王艳梅,赵希男.团队协作最优激励模型分析[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2007,28(9)：1346-1349.
[1]Linda Schmid Kleim, Thomas J. O'Brien, etc.Debt vs.Equity and Asymmetric Information:A Review [J].The Financial Review,2002, (37):317-350.
[2]Gavin Cassar, Scott Holmes. Capital Strucutre and Financing of SMEs:Australian Evidence [J].Accounting and Finance 43(2003)123-147.
[3]Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, etc.Effect of Diversification on Cpaital Structure [J].Accounting and Finance,2009, (49):799-826.
[4]Dan Dhaliwal, Shane Heitzman etc.Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity Capital [J] Journal of Accounting Research,2006,44(9):691-723.
[5]BRAV, O. Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm [J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(1):263-308.
[6]Viet A.Dang.Leverage,Debt Maturity and Firm Investment:An Empirical Analysis [J] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2010,0306-686X:1-34.
[7]Robert Watson,Nick Wilson.Small and Medium Size Enterprise Financing:A Note on some of the Empirical Implications of a Pecking Order [J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2002,29(3):557-578.
[8]Ciaran mac, Bhaird.The Modigliani-Miller Proposition after Fifty Years and Its Relation to Entrepreneurial Finance [J].Wiley Interscience (Strategic Change),2010,19:9-28.
[9]Abe de Jong, Marno Verbeek,etc. the Impact of Financing Surpluses and Large Financing Deficits on Tests of the Pecking Order Theory[J].Financial Management,2010, summer:733-756.
[10]Kuang-Cheng A.Wang, Chun-Hung A.Lin.Pecking-Order Theory Revisited:the Role of Agency Cost [J].The Manchester School,2010,78(5):395-411.
[11]Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc.Pecking Order Behavior in Emerging Markets [J]. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,2010,1-31.
[12]Meghana Ayyagari,Asli Demirguc-Kunt,etc.Formal versus Informal Finance:Evidence from China [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(8):3048-3097.
[13]Soku Byoun. How and When Do Firms Adjust Their Capital Structure toward Targets?[J].the Journal of Finance,2008, LXIII (6):3069-3096.
[14]Vivien Beattie,Alan Goodacre etc.Corporate Financing Decisions:UK Survey Evidence [J] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2006,33(9) & (10):1402-1434.
[15]Tong Yong.Dynamiv Adjustment of Capital Structure and the Determinants [J]. Journal of Finance and Economics,2004,30(10):96-104.
[16]Wang Zhiqiang, Hong Yixun. Empirical Research on the Long-term Dynamic Adjustment of Corporate Capital Structure in China [J].Accounting Research,2009, (6):50-58.
[17]Wang Luping, Ma Jianmin.Control Efficiency Factor and Amending on the Pecking Order Theory Model [J].Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University,2008,42(6):760-764.
[18]Chen Xiao-hong,Liu Jian.Finance Structure and Finance Mode Evolvement of Small and Medium Enterprises of Our Country [J].China Soft Science,2003,(12):61-67.
[19]Chen Xiao-hong,Liu Jian.the Research on the Finance Structure and Models of Small and Medium Enterprises in the Different Growing Periods[J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management,2006,20(1):1-6.
[20]Yu Xiao-jun, Jin Xi.Comparison the Financing Structure of Financial Growth Cycle between China and America [J] Journal of Wuhan University of Technology,2005,27(6):107-109.
[21]Su Kun, Yang Shu-e.Cash Flow Rights, Controlling Rights and Capital Structure Policies: Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies [J]. Forecasting,2009,28(6):18-23.
[22]Zhao Dongqing, Zhu wuxiang, etc. Macroeconomic Control and the Capital Structure Adjustment of Listed Real Estate Firms in China [J] Journal of Financial Research,2008, (10):78-92.
[23]Daniel E.Larkin, Mara L.Babin, etc.Structuring European Real Estate Private Equity Funds [J].Briefings in Real Estate Finance,2003,3(3):229-235.
[24]Steven N.Kaplan,Antolnette Schoar.Private Equity Performance:Returns,Persistence,and Capital Flows [J].the Journal of Finance,2005, LX (4):1791-1823.
[25]Christian Diller and Chirstoph Kaserer.What Drives Private Equity Returns?-Fund Inflows, Skilled GPs, and/or Risk? [J].European Financial Management,2009,15(3):643-675.
[26]Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming,etc.Style Drift in Private Equity[J].Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,2009,36(5)&(6):645-678.
[27]Li Yingqi, Lu Rong. The Path of by Through Private Equity the Stockholder's Rights Optimization Capital Market Structure [J] Journal of Tianjin University of Finance & Economics (Modern Financing Economics),2009,29(8):9-12.
[28]Ralf Muller,J.Rodney Turner.The Impact of Principal-agent Relationship and Contract Type on Communication between Project Owner and Manager [J]. International Journal of Project Management,2005,23:398-403.
[29]Manfred Konigstein,Judit Kovacs,etc.Fairness in a One-Pricipal-Two-Agents Game-A Post-experimental Questionnaire Analysis [J].Journal of Economic Psychology,2003,24(2): 491-503.
[30]Martin F.Hellwig.The Role of Boundary Solutions in Principal-agent Problem of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type [J].Joural of Economic Theory,2007,136(1):446-475.
[31]Yuliy Sannikov.A Continious-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,2008,75:957-984.
[32]Veikko Thiele.Task-specific Abilities in Multi-task Principal-agent Relationships [J].Labour Economic,2010,17(4):690-698.
[33]Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal-Agent Model [J]. Scand.J.of Economics,2004,106(3):453-474.
[34]Philip Bond, Armando Gomes.Multitask Principal-agent Problems:Optimal Contracts,Fragility, and Effort Misallocation[J].Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144:175-211.
[35]Li Fuqiang, Li Bin. Principal-Agent model and Incentive Mechanism Analysis [J] Journal of Quantitative & Technical Economics,2003,20(9):29-33.
[36]Xu Jiu-ping, Chen Shu-jian. The study of Venture Capital's Principal-agent Model based on Asymmetric Information [J].Systems Engineering-theory & Practice,2004,(1):19-24.
[37]Pan An-e.Analysis of Executive Stock Option Plan [J] Journal of WUT (Information &Management Engineering),2007,29(3):128-130.
[38]Lei Yong,Pu Yong-jian.Mechanism Design of Incentive Pattern and Efficient Layoff for Human Resource under the Principal-Agent [J].Journal of Industrial Engineering and EngneeringManagement,2006(1):46-49.
[39]Qiao Gui-ming,Bo Ya.the Principal-agent Problem on Venture Capital Market and Institution Arrangement [J].Science Research Management,2004,25(1):118-122.
[40]Wang Xue-xia.A study on the Principal-agent Model of Three Sides in Venture Capital with Their Stocks proportionate [J].Quantitative & Technica Economics,2005,(2):121-126.
[41]Chen Xiaohong, Li Yuhuan, etc. An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Management Incentive and the Growth of SMEs [J]. Science of Science and Mangement of S & T.,2007, (7):134-140.
[42]Zheng Jun-jun, Tan Xu,etc. An Incentive Model with Stocks based on Principal-agent Theory [J] Journal of Management Sciences in China,2005, (2):24-29.
[43]Zhao Jin-lu, Cui Shun-quan. The Advantages of Limited Partnership [J] Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition),2005,7(4):33-35.
[44]Zhang Xinli,Chen Hui. An Analysis of Perfornance Reward Mechanism of Fund Manager under Limited Partnerships [J].Science Technoligy and Engineering,2005,5(9):624-628.
[45]Yao Zuo-wen, Chen Xiao-jian, etc.An Analysis of Principal-agent Relationships under Venture Capital Partnership [J].Forecasting,2003,22(2):59-61.
[46]Sun Chang-qun, Wang Ying-luo.Design of Flexible Stimulation Mechanism for Limited Partnership Contracts [J] Journal of Industrial Engneering and Engneering Management,2005, 19(2):27-29.
[47]He Jin-sheng,Li Jun-bo. Study on the Effectiveness of Incentive in the Firm Based on Principal-agent Theory [J] Journal of HIT(Social Science Edition),2007,9(1):117-120.
[48]Guo Ming-shan, Yang Bo,etc.The Incentive Mechanism and Constraint Mechanism of Venture Capital in Limited Partnership [J].Commercial Research,2008,(2):63-67.
[49]Liu Yuanliang.to Study on Corporate Governance Efficiency from Corporation to Limited Partnership [J].Value Engineering,2008,(7):156-159.
[50]Yao Ling-zhen, Han Guo-dong.New Choice of China Real Estate Equity Financing in the New Circumstance))) Limited Partnership [J] Journal of HUST.(Urban Science Edition),2010, (3):27-30.
[51]Song Xiao-yan. An Analysis on Organization Models of Private Equity Fund from a Perspective of Governance Strcture [J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,2008,10(5):41-48.
[52]Cheng Xing-hua.Trust Private Replacement and Continuous Development of Zhejiang Privately Owned Enterprises of Small and Middle Size [J]. Economic Management in China, 2007,29(1):88-92.
[53]Yang Yu. Study of Legal Regulation of Private Equity [J].Economic Management,2010, 32(6):129-134.
[54]He Ye, Li Xin.The Study on the Team Incentive Compensation Mode [J].Soft Science (Economic Forum),2004,18(6):39-47.
[55]Wang Yan-mei, Zhao Xi-nan. Analysis of Optimal Incentive Model for Team Cooperation [J].Journal of Northeastern University (Natural Science),2007,28(9):1346-1349.