终极控股权与利益输送关系的实证研究
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摘要
由于股权集中度较高,在保护中小股东利益的法律体系不完善的情况下,导致终极控股股东通过利益输送行为掏空上市公司,转移上市公司利润和占用上市公司的资源,从而侵害了少数股东的利益。在金字塔控股结构下,终极控股股东所有权和控制权的分离诱使了更为严重的利益输送行为。随着公司治理、财务理论的不断发展,“终极股东行为方式及其后果”,也日益成为国际研究的焦点。我国当前的宏观经济环境以及上市公司特殊的股权结构,也为这一领域的研究提供了难得的机会。本文从终极控股股东的控股权、控制权、两权分离度出发,研究了上市公司利益输送行为。
本文首先对终极控股股股东及特征、利益输送相关概念、LLSV模型、利益输送的度量进行了理论阐述,深入分析了终极控股股东进行利益输送的动因及方式。其次,在理论分析的基础上,以2005～2007年沪深两市493家A股公司作为样本,对样本总体终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度、利益输送相关变量进行描述性统计分析,运用分组样本差异性检验方法,研究了终极控制人的终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度与各利益输送(转移利润)的相关性,此外,还以现金股利作为衡量终极控制人与全体股东共享收益行为的变量,通过比较终极控制人损益相关交易和现金股利在不同组别之间的差异性,考察终极控制人对利润转移和共享收益行为的选择。
最后得出了以下结论：(1)终极控股权比例越低,关联交易、资产转让、非经营性资金占用等利益输送行为发生或存在的可能性均较高,终极控制人派发现金股利就越少。(2)控制权比例较高的上市公司,关联交易、资产转让、占用非经营性资金等各利益输送的的发生额就越高,发放现金股利的额度就越低。(3)控制层级复杂的上市公司,其发生关联交易、资产转让发生额显著高于控制层级较简单组的上市公司。(4)国有控制上市公司在关联交易、非经营性资金占用上发生额发生的可能性都大于非国有控制上是公司,而在发放现金股利则相反。(5)两权分离度越高,关联交易越易发生,但是,资产转让交易与两权分离度不存在显著的差异。两权分离度较小的上市公司,越易发放现金股利。
The legal system for minority shareholders benefits protection is imperfect, because of the high degree of ownership concentration, which leads the ultimate controlling shareholders to tunnel listed companies by profit transfer. This behavior transfers listed company interest and occupying resources, thus to vialate minority shareholders'benefits. Under pyramidal share structure, the separation of ultimate controlling shareholders'ownership from control right entices them into severer profit transfer. With the development of corporate governance and financial theories, the study on ultimate controlling shareholder behaviors and results has increasingly been worldwide. China's macro economic environment and unique share strucure of listed companies provide valuable opportunities to these researches as well. This article, based on ultimate controlling shareholders'ownership, control right, and rights separation degree, was studying profit transfer in listed companies.
First of all, the article described characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholders, profit transfer and relevant concepts, LLSV model, and theory of profit transfer measurement, with deep analysis on motivation and methods of ultimate controlling shareholders tunnelling. Furthermore, based on theoretical analysis, the article took 439 listed companies in a-share of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market as sample to carry out descriptive statistic analysis on ultimate ownship, controlling right, both rights separation degree, and profit transfer relevant variables, applying diversity test for group sample to investigate their correlation. In addition, using cash dividend as the variable to measure ultimate controllers and whole shareholders shared profits, by compared ultimate controllers profits relative businesses and cash dividend in different groups, reviewed ultimate controllers'selection of profit transfer and shared profits.
The conclusions are:1, The lower level of ultimate control right is, the higher possibility for related transaction, resources transfer, non-operational capital occupation, and other profit
transfer behaviors exists, the less cash dividend ultimate controllers pay.2, The higher level of ultimate control right is in listed company, the more profit transfer occurs, the less cash dividend are paid.3, The complicated control structure listed companies occur remarkable amount of profit transfer behaviors.4, State-control listed companies has higher possibility to exist non-operational capital occupation than non-state, but opposite result in cash dividend distribution.5, The higher separation degree is, the easier related transactions exist, however, the resource transfer has no noticed diversity to separation degree.
本文首先对终极控股股股东及特征、利益输送相关概念、LLSV模型、利益输送的度量进行了理论阐述,深入分析了终极控股股东进行利益输送的动因及方式。其次,在理论分析的基础上,以2005～2007年沪深两市493家A股公司作为样本,对样本总体终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度、利益输送相关变量进行描述性统计分析,运用分组样本差异性检验方法,研究了终极控制人的终极控股权、控制权、两权分离度与各利益输送(转移利润)的相关性,此外,还以现金股利作为衡量终极控制人与全体股东共享收益行为的变量,通过比较终极控制人损益相关交易和现金股利在不同组别之间的差异性,考察终极控制人对利润转移和共享收益行为的选择。
最后得出了以下结论：(1)终极控股权比例越低,关联交易、资产转让、非经营性资金占用等利益输送行为发生或存在的可能性均较高,终极控制人派发现金股利就越少。(2)控制权比例较高的上市公司,关联交易、资产转让、占用非经营性资金等各利益输送的的发生额就越高,发放现金股利的额度就越低。(3)控制层级复杂的上市公司,其发生关联交易、资产转让发生额显著高于控制层级较简单组的上市公司。(4)国有控制上市公司在关联交易、非经营性资金占用上发生额发生的可能性都大于非国有控制上是公司,而在发放现金股利则相反。(5)两权分离度越高,关联交易越易发生,但是,资产转让交易与两权分离度不存在显著的差异。两权分离度较小的上市公司,越易发放现金股利。
The legal system for minority shareholders benefits protection is imperfect, because of the high degree of ownership concentration, which leads the ultimate controlling shareholders to tunnel listed companies by profit transfer. This behavior transfers listed company interest and occupying resources, thus to vialate minority shareholders'benefits. Under pyramidal share structure, the separation of ultimate controlling shareholders'ownership from control right entices them into severer profit transfer. With the development of corporate governance and financial theories, the study on ultimate controlling shareholder behaviors and results has increasingly been worldwide. China's macro economic environment and unique share strucure of listed companies provide valuable opportunities to these researches as well. This article, based on ultimate controlling shareholders'ownership, control right, and rights separation degree, was studying profit transfer in listed companies.
First of all, the article described characteristics of ultimate controlling shareholders, profit transfer and relevant concepts, LLSV model, and theory of profit transfer measurement, with deep analysis on motivation and methods of ultimate controlling shareholders tunnelling. Furthermore, based on theoretical analysis, the article took 439 listed companies in a-share of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange market as sample to carry out descriptive statistic analysis on ultimate ownship, controlling right, both rights separation degree, and profit transfer relevant variables, applying diversity test for group sample to investigate their correlation. In addition, using cash dividend as the variable to measure ultimate controllers and whole shareholders shared profits, by compared ultimate controllers profits relative businesses and cash dividend in different groups, reviewed ultimate controllers'selection of profit transfer and shared profits.
The conclusions are:1, The lower level of ultimate control right is, the higher possibility for related transaction, resources transfer, non-operational capital occupation, and other profit
transfer behaviors exists, the less cash dividend ultimate controllers pay.2, The higher level of ultimate control right is in listed company, the more profit transfer occurs, the less cash dividend are paid.3, The complicated control structure listed companies occur remarkable amount of profit transfer behaviors.4, State-control listed companies has higher possibility to exist non-operational capital occupation than non-state, but opposite result in cash dividend distribution.5, The higher separation degree is, the easier related transactions exist, however, the resource transfer has no noticed diversity to separation degree.
引文
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[2]王保树.投资者利益保护[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2003：86-88.
[3]郎咸平.公司治理北京[M].北京：社会科学出版社,2004.
[4]Grossman, S.&Hart, O. One-share-one-vote and the Market for Corporate ControlJournal of Financial Economies,1988(20):203-236.
[5]Shleifer Vishny and Wolfenzon Daniel. Investor Protection and Equity Markets [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002(66):3-27
[6]La Porta, RaVel, Florencio, L.S.et al. Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation [J] Journal of Finance,2002(57):1147-1170.
[7]Claessens, S, Djallkov, S, Fan, J.P.H.etal. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effeets of Large Share holdings [J]. Journal of Finance,2002(57)2741-2771.
[8]Bertrand, M., Mehta, P.&Mullainathan, S. Ferreting out Tunneling:an Application and Business Groups [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economies,2002(1):21-148.
[9]Morek, R., Shleifer, A.&Vishny, R. Management Owner ship and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economies,1988(20):293-31.
[10]Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R.&Stouraitis. A.Tunneling, ProPPingan ExProPriation:Evidence fromConneetedPartyTransaetionsinHongKon [J]. Journal of Financial Economies,2004(86): 343-386.
[11]Almeida, H.& Wolfenzon, D. A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Fam Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance,2006(61):2637-2680.
[12]DyckAlex and Luigi Zingales. Private Benefits of Control:An InternationalComparison [J]. The Jouranl of Finance, April 2004, Vol. Lix, No.2:537-600.
[13]Kee-Hong bae, Jun-Kookang, Jin-Mokim, Tunneling or Value Added?Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002(6):2695-2738.
[14]Juliet, D.S.William, M.& Robert, N. The Effects of Changes in Corporate Govemance and Restrueturings on Operating Performance:Evidence from Privations [DB/OL]. http: //www. ssrn.com,2006.
[15]Yeh, Y.H., Ko, C.&Su, Y.H. Ultimate Control and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: New Evidence from Taiwan [DB/OL]. Academia Economic papers,2003(31):263-299.
[16]Attig, N., Fong, W., Gadhoum, Y.et al. Effects of Large Shareholding on Information Assmmetry and Stoek Liquidity [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,2006(30):2875-2892.
[17]Atanasov, V., Ciccotello, S.& Gyoshev, S. How Does Law Affect Finance? An EmPirical
Examination of Tunnelinginan Emerging Market. Working paper, http://www. ssrn.com,2004.
[18]Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R.&Stouraitis. A.Tunneling, ProPPingan ExProPriation:Evidence fromConneetedPartyTransaetionsinHongKon [J]. Journal of Finaneial Eeonomies,2006(86): 343-386.
[19]苏启林.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究.2003(08)：4-15.
[20]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择[J].中国会计评论,2004.
[21]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].2005(01)：63-86.
[22]Jian, M.&Wong, T.J. Earnings Management and Tunneling Thlough Related Party Transaetions Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups [J]. Working Paper Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity, 2003.
[23]陈晓,王馄.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005(4)：77-56.
[24]江伟.我国上市公司控制性股东掏空与支持行为的实证分析[J].经济科学,2005(2)：77-85.
[25]裴红卫,柯大钢.大股东掏空行为的市场识别检验：来自沪深股市的经验证据[J]2005(09)：89-97.
[26]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].2005(10)：45-56.
[27]葛家澎,林志军.现代西方会计理论[M].厦门：厦门大学出版社,2001.
[28]苏聋.控股股东类型、股权集中度与上市公司经营分析[M].广州：中山大学出版社,2005：56-78.
[29]叶勇,胡培,何伟.上市公司终极控制权、股权结构及公司绩效[J].管理科学,2005(4)：58-59.
[30]张蕾.股东终极控制权与公司绩效的实证分析[D].对外经济贸易大学硕士学位论文,2006,4.
[31]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006(1)：45-49.
[32]刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论、股权结构与公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003(4)：51-61.
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