福多的心语假说
摘要
本论文讨论福多的心语假说,the Language of Thought Hypothesis,也叫Mentalese Hypothesis。概括地说,它假设了一种内部语言的存在,这种内部语言由具有句法和语义的心理表征构成,在大脑中得到物理的实现。我们的思想和思考过程都发生在这种内部语言中。作为思想的介质,这种语言区别于所有后天习得的自然语言,是天赋的。基于心语的假设,思想就被理解为心理表征的标记,而思考过程则被解释为基于心理表征之间句法转换的句法驱动装置。
心语假说旨在为思想和思考过程——即我们的心智——提供解释,思想在自然语言中得到表达,因此对心语的构想很大程度上参照了自然语言的语法规则。可以说,心语假说聚焦的正是语言和思想以及二者之间关系的问题。思想是否依赖语言?先有思想还是先有语言?我们是否必须用语言来思想,还是说思想另有一个专有媒介?这些问题是困扰哲学家和认知科学家的根本问题,长久以来争议不断。
福多是系统阐述心语假说的第一人,从1975年迄今的三十余年间福多围绕心语假说展开了持久而深入的研究。紧随福多的原始进路,本文试图展现心语假说的构想出自怎样的困惑,基于什么样的本体论承诺和基本哲学主张,在哪些论据的支持下,如何一步步搭建而成。勾勒出福多的基本框架以后,本文将讨论福多在构建心语假说之初,针对心语假说的潜在反对者(主要是维特根斯坦主义者)为自己做出的辩护。在质疑与回应的过程中,心语假说的构想得到进一步的细化。心语语义理论为心语假说的成立提供了基础性支持,而它恰恰是心语假说中最难处理也最薄弱的环节。福多后期的工作重点都集中于此,因此,本文还将着重讨论他在这方面的具体策略和相关主张。
在完成对福多的心语假说的介绍之后,本文尝试指出暗含于其中的可疑之处。通过对心语假说所倚重的重要论据的考察,本文质疑了福多的自然主义进路,并揭示福多关于心语的设想从根本上取了意义的指称论的思路。跟随后期维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中的洞见,本文对意义的指称论进行了批判,并试图表明维特根斯坦提供了另一条可能的、也是更为可信的进路来讨论语言与思想、语言与世界的关系。作为结论,本文将证明福多对心语的设立是没有必要的,语言和思想之间无需中介,自然语言就是思想的典型介质。
The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH), or called Mentalese Hypothesis, postulates a certain inner mental language. This inner language consists of a system of mental representations which has language-like syntax and semantics and is physically realized in our brain. Our thought and thinking take place in this mental language. As the media of thought and thinking this language is innate, which is fundamentally distinguished from all the natural languages that are learned. According to LOTH, thought is interpreted as the tokening of a mental representation. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over such representations.
LOTH traces back to the ancient interest in the relationship between language and thought: Does thought rely on language? Which is prior? Do we must think in a language? Or is there a proprietary media for thought and thinking? This is a fundamental topic which has agitated much controversies in philosophy and in cognitive science.
Fodor is the first philosopher and cognitive scientist to elaborate on LOTH. He has devoted himself to consistent studies on this topic ever since 1975, when his monograph The Language of Thought was released. This essay is going to present and discuss about Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis.
Following the original approaches that Fodor takes, this essay intends to demonstrate how the hypothesis of language of thought is conceived, from what kind of questions it stems, which arguments are introduced to support it. After a sketch of Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, the essay proceeds to deal with two themes in particular in the hypothesis. One of them has to do with potential Wittgensteinnian criticisms against LOTH. In his response to these possible criticisms Fodor tops up and refines his hypothesis of language of thought. The other theme is the semantics of language of thought. To a great extent, whether LOTH is feasible or not depends upon how Fodor accounts for the semantics of language of thought. Nevertheless, this is the most difficult part for Fodor. Therefore, we will discuss in full about Fodor's strategy and argumentations for it.
With all this introductive work done, the essay strives to point out some doubtful points implicit in Fodor's argument for LOTH. Through careful investigations upon essential arguments that LOTH relies on, I will raise doubt about Fodor's naturalistic approach, and try to argue that the various problems of LOTH lie in its hidden commitment to the referential theory of meaning. Inspired by the crystal insights that Wittgenstein develops in his PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN, I try to show and argue for an alternative way to study the mind and the relationship between language and thought, a more prospective way in my view. As a conclusion, I hold that LOTH is otiose, for we need no media to mediate language and thought exactly because natural language itself is that in which we think and understand.
心语假说旨在为思想和思考过程——即我们的心智——提供解释,思想在自然语言中得到表达,因此对心语的构想很大程度上参照了自然语言的语法规则。可以说,心语假说聚焦的正是语言和思想以及二者之间关系的问题。思想是否依赖语言?先有思想还是先有语言?我们是否必须用语言来思想,还是说思想另有一个专有媒介?这些问题是困扰哲学家和认知科学家的根本问题,长久以来争议不断。
福多是系统阐述心语假说的第一人,从1975年迄今的三十余年间福多围绕心语假说展开了持久而深入的研究。紧随福多的原始进路,本文试图展现心语假说的构想出自怎样的困惑,基于什么样的本体论承诺和基本哲学主张,在哪些论据的支持下,如何一步步搭建而成。勾勒出福多的基本框架以后,本文将讨论福多在构建心语假说之初,针对心语假说的潜在反对者(主要是维特根斯坦主义者)为自己做出的辩护。在质疑与回应的过程中,心语假说的构想得到进一步的细化。心语语义理论为心语假说的成立提供了基础性支持,而它恰恰是心语假说中最难处理也最薄弱的环节。福多后期的工作重点都集中于此,因此,本文还将着重讨论他在这方面的具体策略和相关主张。
在完成对福多的心语假说的介绍之后,本文尝试指出暗含于其中的可疑之处。通过对心语假说所倚重的重要论据的考察,本文质疑了福多的自然主义进路,并揭示福多关于心语的设想从根本上取了意义的指称论的思路。跟随后期维特根斯坦在《哲学研究》中的洞见,本文对意义的指称论进行了批判,并试图表明维特根斯坦提供了另一条可能的、也是更为可信的进路来讨论语言与思想、语言与世界的关系。作为结论,本文将证明福多对心语的设立是没有必要的,语言和思想之间无需中介,自然语言就是思想的典型介质。
The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH), or called Mentalese Hypothesis, postulates a certain inner mental language. This inner language consists of a system of mental representations which has language-like syntax and semantics and is physically realized in our brain. Our thought and thinking take place in this mental language. As the media of thought and thinking this language is innate, which is fundamentally distinguished from all the natural languages that are learned. According to LOTH, thought is interpreted as the tokening of a mental representation. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over such representations.
LOTH traces back to the ancient interest in the relationship between language and thought: Does thought rely on language? Which is prior? Do we must think in a language? Or is there a proprietary media for thought and thinking? This is a fundamental topic which has agitated much controversies in philosophy and in cognitive science.
Fodor is the first philosopher and cognitive scientist to elaborate on LOTH. He has devoted himself to consistent studies on this topic ever since 1975, when his monograph The Language of Thought was released. This essay is going to present and discuss about Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis.
Following the original approaches that Fodor takes, this essay intends to demonstrate how the hypothesis of language of thought is conceived, from what kind of questions it stems, which arguments are introduced to support it. After a sketch of Fodor's language of thought hypothesis, the essay proceeds to deal with two themes in particular in the hypothesis. One of them has to do with potential Wittgensteinnian criticisms against LOTH. In his response to these possible criticisms Fodor tops up and refines his hypothesis of language of thought. The other theme is the semantics of language of thought. To a great extent, whether LOTH is feasible or not depends upon how Fodor accounts for the semantics of language of thought. Nevertheless, this is the most difficult part for Fodor. Therefore, we will discuss in full about Fodor's strategy and argumentations for it.
With all this introductive work done, the essay strives to point out some doubtful points implicit in Fodor's argument for LOTH. Through careful investigations upon essential arguments that LOTH relies on, I will raise doubt about Fodor's naturalistic approach, and try to argue that the various problems of LOTH lie in its hidden commitment to the referential theory of meaning. Inspired by the crystal insights that Wittgenstein develops in his PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN, I try to show and argue for an alternative way to study the mind and the relationship between language and thought, a more prospective way in my view. As a conclusion, I hold that LOTH is otiose, for we need no media to mediate language and thought exactly because natural language itself is that in which we think and understand.
引文
5 转引自《当代心灵哲学导论》,John Heil著,高新民等译,中国人民大学出版社,2006：P61。
6 转引自《心灵的建构》,高新民等著,中国社会科学出版社,2005：P116。
7 《当代心灵哲学导论》,2005：P97
8 Steven Stich《联结主义、取消主义与民问心理学的未来》,载自高新民、储昭华主编：《心灵哲学》,商务印书馆2002年版,P1064.
27 转引自高新民,2005：P250-251。
29 Fodor J. A.(1991):A Modal Argument For Narrow Content, in C. and G. Macdonald et al (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, p.207转引自高新民,2008：P230.
30 Fodor J. A.(1980):Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Science, in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1991, pp.485-498参考高新民,2008.
31 J. A. Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology", in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind,1991. p.495转引自高新民,2008：P205。
J. A. Fodor, "A Modal Argument For Narrow Content", in C. and G. Macdonald et al (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, p.206转引自高新民,2008：P230。
37 参见Laurence, Stephen and Margolis. Eric (1997) "Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought". Analysis 57.1, pp.60-6.
38 参见Meredith Williams (1999):Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Towards a social conception of mind, London and New York: Routledge:P84-90。
39 同上：P87。
40 同上：P87。
41 参见本文3.4节。
42 参见Steven Pinker (1994):The Language Instinct:How the mind creates language, New York:Perennial Classics,2000版：P59-60。
43 参见Mark Alford (2000):The Language Instinct ＠http://www.physics.wustl.edu/～alford/pinker.html。
51 叶峰.：当前表征内容理论的难点与一个解决方案,外国哲学,2008,(19)：1-30。
52 参见本文4.4.3.2.2
53 参见陈嘉映,2003：P292-299
56 引自陈嘉映：语言转向之后,《江苏社会科学》,2009(5)：26-33
57 尽管福多强调自己是非还原的物理主义者,但我认为,对语义、意向性的自然化进路不可避免地会沦为物理还原主义。
58 参见陈嘉映,2003：P378-383。
59 同上：P381-382。
60 同上：382
61 同上：P382
62 引自陈嘉映,2003年：P52。
63 引自陈嘉映,2003：P196。
64 引自陈嘉映,2001：P160。
65 引自陈嘉映,2003：P208。
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92. Kaye, Lawrence J.:The Language of Thought,＠ http://host.uniromna3.it/progetti/kant/field/lot.html
93. Christopher Gauker:Language and Thought,＠ http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/lat.htm
94. Aydede, Murat:The Language of Thought Hypothesis,＠ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/language-thought/
95. David Pitt:Mental Representation,＠ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/
96. Curtis Brown:Narrow Mental Content,＠ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-narrow/
97. Pierre Jacob:Intentionality, ＠http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
6 转引自《心灵的建构》,高新民等著,中国社会科学出版社,2005：P116。
7 《当代心灵哲学导论》,2005：P97
8 Steven Stich《联结主义、取消主义与民问心理学的未来》,载自高新民、储昭华主编：《心灵哲学》,商务印书馆2002年版,P1064.
27 转引自高新民,2005：P250-251。
29 Fodor J. A.(1991):A Modal Argument For Narrow Content, in C. and G. Macdonald et al (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, p.207转引自高新民,2008：P230.
30 Fodor J. A.(1980):Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Science, in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1991, pp.485-498参考高新民,2008.
31 J. A. Fodor, "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology", in D. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind,1991. p.495转引自高新民,2008：P205。
J. A. Fodor, "A Modal Argument For Narrow Content", in C. and G. Macdonald et al (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology, p.206转引自高新民,2008：P230。
37 参见Laurence, Stephen and Margolis. Eric (1997) "Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought". Analysis 57.1, pp.60-6.
38 参见Meredith Williams (1999):Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Towards a social conception of mind, London and New York: Routledge:P84-90。
39 同上：P87。
40 同上：P87。
41 参见本文3.4节。
42 参见Steven Pinker (1994):The Language Instinct:How the mind creates language, New York:Perennial Classics,2000版：P59-60。
43 参见Mark Alford (2000):The Language Instinct ＠http://www.physics.wustl.edu/～alford/pinker.html。
51 叶峰.：当前表征内容理论的难点与一个解决方案,外国哲学,2008,(19)：1-30。
52 参见本文4.4.3.2.2
53 参见陈嘉映,2003：P292-299
56 引自陈嘉映：语言转向之后,《江苏社会科学》,2009(5)：26-33
57 尽管福多强调自己是非还原的物理主义者,但我认为,对语义、意向性的自然化进路不可避免地会沦为物理还原主义。
58 参见陈嘉映,2003：P378-383。
59 同上：P381-382。
60 同上：382
61 同上：P382
62 引自陈嘉映,2003年：P52。
63 引自陈嘉映,2003：P196。
64 引自陈嘉映,2001：P160。
65 引自陈嘉映,2003：P208。
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