网络经济时代模块化组织运行与治理机制研究
|
摘要
在知识经济与信息技术的推动下,人类的经济活动跨越空间界限与文化障碍,在全球范围内呈现一种全方位联系和互动的趋势。各国企业紧密地联系在一起,形成了全球化生产网络。模块化组织就是在上述条件下发展起来的。模块化组织是指在产品系统模块化分解的基础上,将中间产品环节分配于不同企业生产,然后再集成的整个过程所形成的企业间的网络组织。近年来,模块化生产和组织逐步成为管理学、经济学关注的一个热点问题,取得了系列的研究成果。但在以往的文献中,很少系统讨论模块化组织的运行与治理机制。本文在回顾模块化理论的基础上,结合新制度经济学、演化经济学与行为经济学,从模块化组织产生与演进着手,分析了模块化组织的信息结构及其特征,进而探讨了模块化组织内部治理与外部治理机制,最后对我国模块化组织发展现状进行了研究,并对中国制造业的优化升级提出了建议。
作为全球生产网络中一种全新的生产组织方式,模块化组织出现有其深刻的原因。一方面,模块化产品能满足个性化消费需求,另一方面,模块化组织能减少生产中的风险与不确定性,降低产品生产的复杂程度。在经济全球化时代,一些产业演变成了全球化的模块化生产网络。
模块化组织具有不同于传统生产组织的信息特征与运行机制。信息包裹使模块化组织内产生异质性的创新活动,而且可以提高创新成功的概率。系统信息同化使创新活动由各个子模块自由发挥,不仅有多样的创新可供日后选择,而且不需事先集中便可自行演化。模块化组织分散决策的信息系统结构使分工深化,并带来报酬递增。模块化组织还有自组织的特征,而且互补性会带来协同效果。
模块化组织的有效运行,需要构建一种有效的治理机制。本文从内部治理和外部治理两个方面对模块化组织的治理机制进行了比较全面的探讨。
首先,从产权与契约安排的角度讨论模块化组织的内部治理。模块化组织是在产品内分工条件下,以中间产品契约为主的柔性契约网络。模块化组织内的协调,是以系统规则制定者为主进行协调;组织内各个行为主体的地位是平等的,交易双方的资产专用性较低,交易频率比市场交易要高,但低于企业内的交易频率。模块化组织中的产权问题主要是合作剩余分配问题。模块化组织合作剩余分享的总原则是:个体所获得的合作剩余份额与个体对模块化组织合作剩余份额的影响程度呈正比。在模块化组织中,标准主要分为三种:具有私有品性质的标准,俱乐部物品性质的标准,以及公共产品性质的标准。而具有网络外部性的产品容易成为市场中事实上的标准,并使企业获取高额的利润。
其次,从社会资本与非正式约束的角度讨论模块化组织的内部治理。本文主要从三个方面进行了分析:其一,模块化组织有效运行需要遵循互惠与公平原则。它表现为一方面是同等利益的交换,另一方面是同等损害的交换。在经济全球化背景下,带有惩罚性质的强互惠对维持模块化组织的合作秩序非常重要。其二,信用机制能减少模块化组织因契约不完全带来的交易费用;同时,信用机制能扩大模块化组织合作的范围。其三,声誉近似于人力资本,一定的声誉资本拥有量可以为行为主体获取相应的回报。
再次,从市场机制和政府管制方面探讨了模块化组织的外部治理问题。本文主要讨论了组织模块化条件下的垄断与竞争及其政府管制问题。其一,模块化组织的边界是模糊的,动态发展的。一些产业中存在模块化垄断结构,其有下面特征:一个最终产品实际上是由多个企业联合生产,模块化垄断结构往往是凭借新技术、新产品、生产要素的新组合而形成的。其二,在边际成本递减时,社会福利最大化可能要求企业不以MC=MR为原则定价。但企业难以以高于MC的定价永久性地垄断市场,因为创新的涌现会导致市场结构不断演化。其三,在组织模块化条件下的竞争和以往有所不同。一方面,竞争已经深入产品内部的每个生产环节。另一方面,竞争还可能来自同一企业内部。在组织模块化条件下,市场壁垒与资产专用性降低,所以可竞争性大大增强。
基于以上对模块化组织治理的理论探讨,文章最后联系我国实际,讨论我国制造业的优化升级问题。我国制造业参与全球模块化分工程度不断提高,但参与模块化分工企业的规模小,而且企业多处于模块化价值链的低端。要提升我国制造业的国际竞争力,需要充分利用模块化组织生产方式的优势,完善其治理机制。其一,完善模块化组织内部治理来使我国制造业优化升级。①明确和提升企业在模块化组织中的定位,有社会资本和网络优势的企业应该力争成为系统整合者;有技术优势的企业要定位于自己专业化的模块,力争成为标准制造者;②注重社会资本的培育,并利用柔性契约网络寻求合作的扩展。其二,通过完善模块化组织外部治理使我国制造业优化升级。①以效率标准来看待市场集中度与垄断问题。②用模块化的方法促进竞争,使产业组织或产品模块化,以减少潜在竞争者的进入壁垒与退出障碍;用模块化促进我国自然垄断产业的竞争。③重点扶持模块化价值链两端企业,提高高技术制造业投资额占整个制造业投资额的比重;加大创业风险投资发展;鼓励企业间专利联盟的发展。
Promoted by knowledge economy and information technology, the economic and social life of human beings is leaping over the regional and cultural obstacles, presenting a global trend towards connection, exchange and interaction in all directions and aspects. Enterprises all over the world now bound with each other, thus form global production network. It is under such conditions that modularized organization comes into being. Modularized organization can be defined as: on the basis of modular decomposition of product system, different intermediate products are assigned to different enterprises and then integrated, thus form a network among enterprises which we call modularized organization. In recently years, research on modularized organization and production has gradually become a hot issue in management and economics studies, and made a series of research achievements. But in previous literature, few were discussed on mechanism of modularized organization’s operation and governance. On the basis of reviewing the previous theory on modularization, concerning with New Institutional Economics, Evolutionary Economics and Behavioral Economics, this paper studies: 1) The emergence and evolution of modularized organization, 2) Mechanism of internal and external governance of modularized organization, 3) China's development of modularized organization, and finally gives suggestions on the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry.
Modular organization is a new model of organization in the global network of production, and there are deep reasons lies for its emergence. On the one hand, modularized products cater to personalized consumption demands; on the other hand, it can reduce the risk, uncertainty as well as the complexity of production. In the economic globalization age, some industries have developed into a system of global network of modularized production.
Modularized Organization has its own information features and operational mechanism that different from traditional organization. Information encapsulation enhances heterogeneity innovation activities within modularized organizations, and also increases the possibility of successful innovation. The assimilation of system information advances the free play of innovation activities of each sub-modular, which not only provides a variety of innovative options in the future, but also makes self-evolution possible without concentration beforehand. In modularized organization, decentralized decision-making information structure stimulates labor division and brings increasing returns. Self-organization is one of the features of modularized organization and complementary can bring synergistic effect.
For the successful operation of modularized organization, it is needed to construct an effective mechanism of governance. In this paper, comprehensive studies are made on the governance of modularized organization from both aspects of internal and external control.
Firstly, the paper discusses the internal governance of modularized organization from the perspective of property rights and contractual arrangements. Modularized organization forms a flexible contract network under the condition of intra-product specialization. Coordination among modularized organizations is mainly led by the rule-maker. Various parties in the organization are equal in status; the asset specificity of two parties is low, while the transaction frequency is higher than that of the market transactions, but lower than the frequency within the enterprise itself. The main point of modularized organization’s property rights is the distribution of cooperation residual. The principle of the cooperation residual distribution is: an individual’s share of cooperative residual is proportional to its influence. Standards can be divided into three categories: standard of private goods nature, standard of clubs item nature and standard of public product nature. However, products with network externality are easily to become the de facto standard in the market, and access to the high level of corporate profits.
Secondly, the internal governance of modularized organization is discussed from the aspects of social capital and informal constraints. Mainly analyses from these three areas:1) The effective operation of modular organization needs to follow the principle of fairness and reciprocity. It is not only the exchange of equal interests but also the exchange of equal damages. In economic globalization age, strong reciprocity of the punitive nature is vitally important to maintain the cooperative order of modularized organization. 2) Credit mechanism can reduce transaction costs caused by the incompletion of the contract; in the meantime, credit mechanism can also expand the scope of cooperation among modularized organizations. 3) While reputation is similar to the human capital, a certain possession of reputation capital can gain its owner corresponding returns.
Thirdly, the paper studies the external governance of modularized organization through market mechanism and government regulation. It looks into competition and monopoly, and government regulation under modularized organization. It stands that: 1) The border of modularized organization is developing dynamically. Some industries have a modularized monopoly structure, which features as: a final product is actually produced by a number of joint enterprises; new technologies, new products, and new combination of essential production factors are often the cause of the formation of modularized monopoly structure. 2) While the marginal costs is on the decrease, the maximization of social welfare may require the enterprises not to follow the pricing principle of MR = MC. However, it is difficult for enterprises to monopolize the market permanently at the price higher than MC, because innovations will lead to constant evolution of market structure. 3) The competitions in modularized organization are different from that of the past. Not only has competition reached every chain of production, but also comes from the same enterprise. In modularized organization age, the barriers in market and the asset specificity have decreased while the contestability has greatly increased.
Based on the above analysis on the theory of modularized organization’s governance, together with China's present environment, this paper finally discussed the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. The participation of China's manufacturing industry in the global modularized labor division is increasing, but we should also be aware of it that the scale of Chinese enterprises is rather small and usually at the lower end of the modularized value chain. To enhance the international competitiveness of manufacturing sector, China needs to make full use of its advantages of modularized production methods and improve the governance mechanisms. Suggestions are: 1) Improving the internal control of modularized organization to make the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. a) Specifying and upgrading enterprise’s position in the modular organization system. Enterprises with social capital and network advantages should strive to become the system integrator; enterprises with technology advantages should stand in its own specialized module, and endeavor to become a standard-maker; b) Emphasizing on the cultivation of social capital, and use flexible contract networks to expand cooperation. 2) Improving the external governance of modularized organization. a) Viewing market concentration and monopoly from the aspect of efficiency. b) Using modular approach to enhance competition, modularizing industry organization or products, in order to reduce enter or exit barriers to potential competitors, and promoting competition in China's natural monopoly industry as well. c) Supporting enterprises at both ends of the value chain, increasing investments in high-tech manufacturing industry accounted for the entire amount of investment proportion; increasing risk investment and encourage patent pool among enterprises.
作为全球生产网络中一种全新的生产组织方式,模块化组织出现有其深刻的原因。一方面,模块化产品能满足个性化消费需求,另一方面,模块化组织能减少生产中的风险与不确定性,降低产品生产的复杂程度。在经济全球化时代,一些产业演变成了全球化的模块化生产网络。
模块化组织具有不同于传统生产组织的信息特征与运行机制。信息包裹使模块化组织内产生异质性的创新活动,而且可以提高创新成功的概率。系统信息同化使创新活动由各个子模块自由发挥,不仅有多样的创新可供日后选择,而且不需事先集中便可自行演化。模块化组织分散决策的信息系统结构使分工深化,并带来报酬递增。模块化组织还有自组织的特征,而且互补性会带来协同效果。
模块化组织的有效运行,需要构建一种有效的治理机制。本文从内部治理和外部治理两个方面对模块化组织的治理机制进行了比较全面的探讨。
首先,从产权与契约安排的角度讨论模块化组织的内部治理。模块化组织是在产品内分工条件下,以中间产品契约为主的柔性契约网络。模块化组织内的协调,是以系统规则制定者为主进行协调;组织内各个行为主体的地位是平等的,交易双方的资产专用性较低,交易频率比市场交易要高,但低于企业内的交易频率。模块化组织中的产权问题主要是合作剩余分配问题。模块化组织合作剩余分享的总原则是:个体所获得的合作剩余份额与个体对模块化组织合作剩余份额的影响程度呈正比。在模块化组织中,标准主要分为三种:具有私有品性质的标准,俱乐部物品性质的标准,以及公共产品性质的标准。而具有网络外部性的产品容易成为市场中事实上的标准,并使企业获取高额的利润。
其次,从社会资本与非正式约束的角度讨论模块化组织的内部治理。本文主要从三个方面进行了分析:其一,模块化组织有效运行需要遵循互惠与公平原则。它表现为一方面是同等利益的交换,另一方面是同等损害的交换。在经济全球化背景下,带有惩罚性质的强互惠对维持模块化组织的合作秩序非常重要。其二,信用机制能减少模块化组织因契约不完全带来的交易费用;同时,信用机制能扩大模块化组织合作的范围。其三,声誉近似于人力资本,一定的声誉资本拥有量可以为行为主体获取相应的回报。
再次,从市场机制和政府管制方面探讨了模块化组织的外部治理问题。本文主要讨论了组织模块化条件下的垄断与竞争及其政府管制问题。其一,模块化组织的边界是模糊的,动态发展的。一些产业中存在模块化垄断结构,其有下面特征:一个最终产品实际上是由多个企业联合生产,模块化垄断结构往往是凭借新技术、新产品、生产要素的新组合而形成的。其二,在边际成本递减时,社会福利最大化可能要求企业不以MC=MR为原则定价。但企业难以以高于MC的定价永久性地垄断市场,因为创新的涌现会导致市场结构不断演化。其三,在组织模块化条件下的竞争和以往有所不同。一方面,竞争已经深入产品内部的每个生产环节。另一方面,竞争还可能来自同一企业内部。在组织模块化条件下,市场壁垒与资产专用性降低,所以可竞争性大大增强。
基于以上对模块化组织治理的理论探讨,文章最后联系我国实际,讨论我国制造业的优化升级问题。我国制造业参与全球模块化分工程度不断提高,但参与模块化分工企业的规模小,而且企业多处于模块化价值链的低端。要提升我国制造业的国际竞争力,需要充分利用模块化组织生产方式的优势,完善其治理机制。其一,完善模块化组织内部治理来使我国制造业优化升级。①明确和提升企业在模块化组织中的定位,有社会资本和网络优势的企业应该力争成为系统整合者;有技术优势的企业要定位于自己专业化的模块,力争成为标准制造者;②注重社会资本的培育,并利用柔性契约网络寻求合作的扩展。其二,通过完善模块化组织外部治理使我国制造业优化升级。①以效率标准来看待市场集中度与垄断问题。②用模块化的方法促进竞争,使产业组织或产品模块化,以减少潜在竞争者的进入壁垒与退出障碍;用模块化促进我国自然垄断产业的竞争。③重点扶持模块化价值链两端企业,提高高技术制造业投资额占整个制造业投资额的比重;加大创业风险投资发展;鼓励企业间专利联盟的发展。
Promoted by knowledge economy and information technology, the economic and social life of human beings is leaping over the regional and cultural obstacles, presenting a global trend towards connection, exchange and interaction in all directions and aspects. Enterprises all over the world now bound with each other, thus form global production network. It is under such conditions that modularized organization comes into being. Modularized organization can be defined as: on the basis of modular decomposition of product system, different intermediate products are assigned to different enterprises and then integrated, thus form a network among enterprises which we call modularized organization. In recently years, research on modularized organization and production has gradually become a hot issue in management and economics studies, and made a series of research achievements. But in previous literature, few were discussed on mechanism of modularized organization’s operation and governance. On the basis of reviewing the previous theory on modularization, concerning with New Institutional Economics, Evolutionary Economics and Behavioral Economics, this paper studies: 1) The emergence and evolution of modularized organization, 2) Mechanism of internal and external governance of modularized organization, 3) China's development of modularized organization, and finally gives suggestions on the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry.
Modular organization is a new model of organization in the global network of production, and there are deep reasons lies for its emergence. On the one hand, modularized products cater to personalized consumption demands; on the other hand, it can reduce the risk, uncertainty as well as the complexity of production. In the economic globalization age, some industries have developed into a system of global network of modularized production.
Modularized Organization has its own information features and operational mechanism that different from traditional organization. Information encapsulation enhances heterogeneity innovation activities within modularized organizations, and also increases the possibility of successful innovation. The assimilation of system information advances the free play of innovation activities of each sub-modular, which not only provides a variety of innovative options in the future, but also makes self-evolution possible without concentration beforehand. In modularized organization, decentralized decision-making information structure stimulates labor division and brings increasing returns. Self-organization is one of the features of modularized organization and complementary can bring synergistic effect.
For the successful operation of modularized organization, it is needed to construct an effective mechanism of governance. In this paper, comprehensive studies are made on the governance of modularized organization from both aspects of internal and external control.
Firstly, the paper discusses the internal governance of modularized organization from the perspective of property rights and contractual arrangements. Modularized organization forms a flexible contract network under the condition of intra-product specialization. Coordination among modularized organizations is mainly led by the rule-maker. Various parties in the organization are equal in status; the asset specificity of two parties is low, while the transaction frequency is higher than that of the market transactions, but lower than the frequency within the enterprise itself. The main point of modularized organization’s property rights is the distribution of cooperation residual. The principle of the cooperation residual distribution is: an individual’s share of cooperative residual is proportional to its influence. Standards can be divided into three categories: standard of private goods nature, standard of clubs item nature and standard of public product nature. However, products with network externality are easily to become the de facto standard in the market, and access to the high level of corporate profits.
Secondly, the internal governance of modularized organization is discussed from the aspects of social capital and informal constraints. Mainly analyses from these three areas:1) The effective operation of modular organization needs to follow the principle of fairness and reciprocity. It is not only the exchange of equal interests but also the exchange of equal damages. In economic globalization age, strong reciprocity of the punitive nature is vitally important to maintain the cooperative order of modularized organization. 2) Credit mechanism can reduce transaction costs caused by the incompletion of the contract; in the meantime, credit mechanism can also expand the scope of cooperation among modularized organizations. 3) While reputation is similar to the human capital, a certain possession of reputation capital can gain its owner corresponding returns.
Thirdly, the paper studies the external governance of modularized organization through market mechanism and government regulation. It looks into competition and monopoly, and government regulation under modularized organization. It stands that: 1) The border of modularized organization is developing dynamically. Some industries have a modularized monopoly structure, which features as: a final product is actually produced by a number of joint enterprises; new technologies, new products, and new combination of essential production factors are often the cause of the formation of modularized monopoly structure. 2) While the marginal costs is on the decrease, the maximization of social welfare may require the enterprises not to follow the pricing principle of MR = MC. However, it is difficult for enterprises to monopolize the market permanently at the price higher than MC, because innovations will lead to constant evolution of market structure. 3) The competitions in modularized organization are different from that of the past. Not only has competition reached every chain of production, but also comes from the same enterprise. In modularized organization age, the barriers in market and the asset specificity have decreased while the contestability has greatly increased.
Based on the above analysis on the theory of modularized organization’s governance, together with China's present environment, this paper finally discussed the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. The participation of China's manufacturing industry in the global modularized labor division is increasing, but we should also be aware of it that the scale of Chinese enterprises is rather small and usually at the lower end of the modularized value chain. To enhance the international competitiveness of manufacturing sector, China needs to make full use of its advantages of modularized production methods and improve the governance mechanisms. Suggestions are: 1) Improving the internal control of modularized organization to make the optimization and upgrading of China's manufacturing industry. a) Specifying and upgrading enterprise’s position in the modular organization system. Enterprises with social capital and network advantages should strive to become the system integrator; enterprises with technology advantages should stand in its own specialized module, and endeavor to become a standard-maker; b) Emphasizing on the cultivation of social capital, and use flexible contract networks to expand cooperation. 2) Improving the external governance of modularized organization. a) Viewing market concentration and monopoly from the aspect of efficiency. b) Using modular approach to enhance competition, modularizing industry organization or products, in order to reduce enter or exit barriers to potential competitors, and promoting competition in China's natural monopoly industry as well. c) Supporting enterprises at both ends of the value chain, increasing investments in high-tech manufacturing industry accounted for the entire amount of investment proportion; increasing risk investment and encourage patent pool among enterprises.
引文
[1] Friedman T.L. The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century[M]. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2005:1-496.
[2] Williamson O. E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[M]. New York: Free Press, 1985:1-468.
[3] Baldwin C.Y., Clark, K.B. Managing in an Age of Modularity[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1997, (5):84-93.
[4] Baldwin C.Y., Clark, K.B. Design Rules: The Power of Modularity (Vol.1.) [M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000:1-483.
[5] 青木昌彦, 安藤晴彦. 模块时代:新产业结构的本质[M]. 周国荣,译. 上海:上海远东出版社,2003:3-118.
[6] 杨小凯, 黄有光. 专业化与经济组织[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 1999:1-17
[7] Coase R. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica, 1937, (4):386-405.
[8] Alchian A., Demsetz H. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization[J]. American Economic Review, 1972, 62 (5):777-795.
[9] Cheung S. The Contractual Nature of the Firm[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26):1-21.
[10] 杨小凯.经济学——新兴古典与新古典框架[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2003:1-46.
[11] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒. 战略与结构[M]. 孟昕,译. 昆明:云南人民出版社, 2002:1-390.
[12] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒.看得见的手——美国企业的管理革命[M].重武,王铁生,译.北京:商务印书馆, 1987:1-591.
[13] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒.规模与范围——工业资本主义的原动力[M]. 张逸人,陆钦炎等,译. 北京:华夏出版社, 2006:1-728.
[14] Porter M. Competitive Strategy[M]. New York: Free Press, 1980:1-397.
[15] Porter M. Competitive Advantage[M]. New York: Free Press, 1985:1-592.
[16] Porter M. The Competitive Advantage of Nations[M]. New York: Free Press, 1990:1-896.
[17] Alchian A. Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1950,(58):211-222.
[18] North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance[M].Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:1-159.
[19] 青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M]. 周黎安,译. 上海:上海远东出版社,2001:61-387.
[20] 弗 兰 克 ?H. 奈 特 . 风 险 不 确 定 性 与 利 润 [M]. 安 佳 , 译 . 北 京 : 商 务 印 书馆,2006:139-337.
[21] Nelson R., Winter S. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982:1-454.
[22] 贾根良. 理解演化经济学[J]. 中国社会科学, 2004,(2):33-41.
[23] Hodgson G.M. Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics and the Evolution of Economics[M]. Mass: Edward Elgar, 1999:127-154.
[24] 杰克?J·弗罗门.经济演化——探究新制度经济学的理论基础[M]. 李振明, 刘社建, 齐柳明,译. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2003:1-281.
[25] Aoki M, Takizawa H. Modularity: Its Relevance to Industrial Architecture[R]. The Saint-Gobain Centre for Economic Research 5th Conference: Organizational Innovation within Firms, 2002:7-8.
[26] Langlois R.N. Modularity in Technology and Organization[J]. Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 2000, (49):19-37.
[27] Simon Herbert A. The Architecture of Complexity[J]. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1962, (106): 467-482.
[28] Crémer J. Common Knowledge and the Co-ordination of Economic Activities[A]. Aoki M., Gustafsson B., Williamson O.E. (eds). The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties[C]. London: Sage, 1990:53-76.
[29] Ali k., Kamarani Sa Ed M., Salhieh. Product Design for Modularity [M]. London:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002:1-44.
[30] 芮明杰 , 刘明宇 , 任江波 . 论产业链整合 [M]. 上海 :复旦大学出版社 , 2006:86-128.
[31] PineⅡ B. J. Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition [M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992:1-264.
[32] Hoogeweegen M., Vervest P. How Much Business Modularity? In Smart Business Networks(Section 4)[M]. NJ: Springer-Verlag New York, 2004:339-348.
[33] 朱瑞博 . 价值模块的虚拟再整合 : 以 IC 产业为例 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2004,(1):28-35.
[34] 骆品亮, 潘忠. 自由软件开发的模块化理论解释与启示[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(11):75-82.
[35] 孙晓峰. 模块化技术与模块化生产方式——以计算机产业为例[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(6):60-66.
[36] 汪涛, 徐建平. 模块化的产品创新:基于价值创造网络的思考[J]. 科研管理, 2005,(9):11-18.
[37] 陈劲, 桂彬旺, 陈钰芬. 基于模块化开发的复杂产品系统创新案例研究[J]. 科研管理, 2006,(6):1-8.
[38] Caminati M. Knowledge Growth, Complexity and the Returns to R&D[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2006,(16):207–229.
[39] 胡 晓 鹏 . 从 分 工 到 模 块 化 : 经 济 系 统 演 进 的 思 考 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2004,(9):5-11.
[40] 陈向东. 模块化在制造企业知识管理战略设计中的应用[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(1):36-42.
[41] 范爱军, 杨丽. 模块化对分工演进的影响——基于贝克尔—墨菲模型的解释[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(12):67-73.
[42] 钱书法, 李辉, 肖宁. 不同网络分工组织的效率比较[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2006,(7):49-52.
[43] Pine Ⅱ B.J., Gilmore J.H. The Experience Economy[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999:1-254.
[44] 胡晓鹏. 价值系统的模块化与价值转移[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(11):68-74.
[45] Ogrady P. The Age of Modularity:Using the New World of Modular Products to Revolutionize Your Corporation[M]. Lowa City:Adam and Steede Publishers, 2001:1-256.
[46] 徐宏玲. 模块化组织研究[M]. 成都:西南财经大学出版社, 2006:1-245.
[47] 李平, 狄辉. 产业价值链模块化重构的价值决定研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(9):71-77.
[48] Sturgeon T. Industry Co-evolution and the Rise of a Shared Supply-base for Electronics Manufacturing[R]. Paper Presented at the Nelson and Winter Conference, 2001:9.
[49] Sanchez R., Mahoney J.T. Modularity, Flexibility and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization Design[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1996, (17):63–76.
[50] Brusoni S., Prencipe A. Unpacking the Black Box of Modularity: Technologies, Products and Organizations[J]. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2001,10 (1):179-205.
[51] Brusoni S., Sgalari G. New Combinations in Old Industries: the Introduction of Radical Innovations in Tire Manufacturing[J]. Journal of EvolutionaryEconomics, 2006, (16):25–43.
[52] 郝斌, 任浩, Anne-Marie Guerin.组织模块化设计:基本原理与理论架构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(6):80-87.
[53] 童时中 . 模块化原理在生产系统布局设计中的运用 [J]. 标准化报道 , 2000,(5):20-22.
[54] Brown S.L., Eisenhardt K.M. The Art of Continuous Change: Linking Complexity Theory and Time Paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997, (42):1-34.
[55] Newcomb P. J., Bras B., Rosen D. W. Implication of Modularity on Product Design for the Life Cycle[J]. Journal of Mechanical Design, 1998,120(3):483- 291.
[56] Novak S., Eppinger S.D. Sourcing by Design: Product Complexity and the Supply Chain[J]. Management Science, 2001,47(1):189- 204.
[57] 郭岚, 张祥建. 基于网络外部性的价值模块整合与兼容性选择[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(4):103-110.
[58] 罗珉, 冯俭. 组织新论:网络经济条件下的组织管理新范式[M]. 成都:西南财经大学出版社, 2005:117-191
[59] 纪雪洪, 陈荣秋, 唐中君. PC 行业的模块化与整合研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(10):91-96.
[60] 邓龙安, 徐玖平. 模块化网络运营对竞争性市场效率的影响—兼析网络规则与市场规则下市场效率的变化[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(8):83-89.
[61] Ulrich K., Ellison D. Beyond Make-buy: Internalization and Integration of Design and Production[J]. Management Science, 1999, 49(5): 640-658.
[62] Krikke H, Blanc I, Velde S.V. Product Modularity and the Design of Closed-loop Supply Chains[J]. California Management Review, 2004, 46(2):23- 40.
[63] 雷如桥, 陈继祥, 刘芹. 基于模块化的组织模式及其效率比较研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(10):83-90.
[64] 张治栋, 荣兆梓. 基于契约结构的模块化设计及其演进[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(9):62-70.
[65] Clark K.B. Project Scope and Project Performance: the Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement in Product Development[J]. Management Science, 1989,35(10): 1247-1263.
[66] Clark K.B., Fujimoto T. Product Development Performance, Strategy, Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991:1-30.
[67] 曾楚宏, 林丹明. 论企业边界的两重性[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(10):73-80.
[68] 曾 楚 宏 , 吴 能 全 . 企 业 模 块 化 思 想 研 究 述 评 [J]. 科 技 管 理 研 究 , 2006,(7):110-113.
[69] 余东华, 芮明杰. 模块化、企业价值网络与企业边界变动[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(10):88-95.
[70] 胡 晓 鹏 . 企 业 模 块 化 的 边 界 及 其 经 济 效 应 研 究 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2006,(1):90-97
[71] 曹江涛 , 苗建军 . 模块化时代企业边界变动研究 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(8):85-92.
[72] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 论经济全球化时代跨国公司垄断结构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004, (9):36-43.
[73] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 信息经济时代模块化与垄断结构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005, (8):56-64.
[74] 刘茂松, 陈柏福. 论柔性契约与垄断结构企业模式[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006, (5):79-86.
[75] 侯若石, 李金珊. 资产专用性、模块化技术与企业边界[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(11):91-98
[76] 柯颖, 王述英. 模块化生产网络:一种新产业组织形态研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(8):75-82.
[77] 朱瑞博. 模块化抗产业集群内生性风险的机理分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(5):54-60.
[78] Saxenian A. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994:1-240.
[79] Sorenson L., Fleming, L. The Dangers of Modularity[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2001, (5):20-21.
[80] Chesbrough H. Open Innovation: the New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2003:1-196.
[81] Chesbrough H. Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2002, 80(3):90-99.
[82] Chesbrough H. The Sustainability of Technology Markets[J]. Journal of Management and Governance, 2004, (8):117-120.
[83] Ernst D. Limits to Modularity:A Review of the Literature and Evidence from Chip Design[J]. Industry and Innovation, 2005:1-27.
[84] Ernst D. The New Mobility of Knowledge: Digital Information Systems and Global Flagship Networks[A]. in Sassen, S.(ed.), Digital Formations in aConnected World, Published for the U.S. Social Science Research Council[C]. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004:1-40.
[85] 闫星宇, 高觉民. 模块化理论的再审视:局限及适用范围[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(4):71-78.
[86] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 产业组织中的模块化理论发展动态[J]. 经济学动态, 2006, (2):74-77.
[87] 罗珉 , 何长见 . 组织间关系 : 界面规则与治理机制 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(5):87-95.
[88] 罗珉 . 价值星系 :理论解释与价值创造机制的构建 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(1):80-89.
[89] 让·波德里亚. 消费社会[M]. 刘成富,全志钢,译.南京:南京大学出版社, 2006:1-166.
[90] Varian H. Microeconomic Analysis(3rd ed)[M]. New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1992:1-171.
[91] Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., Green J.R. Microeconomic Theory[M]. Oxford University Press, 1995:1-104.
[92] 蒋殿春. 高级微观经济学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2006:40-59.
[93] 姜奇平. 异质性的经济学价值[J]. 互联网周刊, 2006,8(7):58-59.
[94] 贺京同, 那艺, 王晓岚. 个体行为研究的异质化演进[J]. 经济学动态, 2007,(2):79-83.
[95] Wang Jiang. The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Pure Exchange Economy with Heterogeneous Investors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (41):75-110.
[96] Campbell J.Y., Cochrane J.H. By Force of Habit: A Consumption-based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1999,(107):205 -251.
[97] Chan Y.L., Kogan L. Heterogeneous Preferences and the Dynamics of Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2002,(110): 1255-1285.
[98] 熊和平. 消费习惯、异质偏好与动态资产定价:纯交换经济情形[J]. 经济研究, 2005,(10):91-100.
[99] Shy O. Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995:1-488.
[100] Williamson O. E. The Mechanism of Governance[M]. Oxford University Press, 1996:1-448.
[101] 杰克?赫什莱佛. 约翰 G. 赖利.不确定性与信息分析[M]. 刘广灵, 李绍荣,译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2000:7-200.
[102] 蔡宁, 杨闩柱, 吴结兵. 企业集群风险的研究:一个基于网络的视角[J]. 中国工业经济, 2003,(4):59-64.
[103] 昝廷全.系统经济学探索[M]. 北京:科学出版社, 2004:1-178.
[104] Romano A., Passiante G., Elia V. New Sources of Clustering in the Digital Economy[J]. Journal of Small Business & Enterprise Development, 2001, 8(1): 19-27.
[105] 张纪. 产品内国际分工中的收益分配——基于笔记本电脑商品链的分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(7):36-44.
[106] 于明超, 刘志彪, 江静. 外来资本主导代工生产模式下当地企业升级困境与突破——以中国台湾笔记本电脑内地封闭式生产网络为例[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(11):108-116.
[107] 肯尼斯?阿罗. 组织的极限[M]. 万谦, 廉晓红,译. 北京:华夏出版社, 2006:25-40.
[108] Boisot M.H. Knowledge Asset: Securing Competitive Advantage in Information Economy[M]. London: Oxford University Press, 1998:1-271
[109] 刘刚. 企业的异质性假设:对企业本质和行为基础的演化论解释[J]. 中国社会科学, 2002,(2):56-68.
[110] 陈 柳 . 模 块 化 、 信 息 包 裹 与 研 发 风 险 的 分 散 [J]. 科 学 学 研 究 , 2006,(2):112-116.
[111] Kamien M.I., Schwartz N. L. Dynamic Optimization[M]. New York: Elsevier North Holland, Inc, 1981:39-45.
[112] 曹虹剑 , 罗能生 . 高新技术产业模块化集群与创新能力 [J]. 改革 , 2007,(3):34-38.
[113] 亚当?斯密. 国民财富性质和原因的研究[M]. 郭大力, 王亚南,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 1997:1-25.
[114] F.A.?冯?哈耶克. 个人主义与经济秩序[M]. 邓正来,译. 北京:三联书店, 2003:52-85.
[115] Hayek F.A. The Use of Knowledge in Society[J]. American Economic Review, 1945, (35): 519-530.
[116] 格尔兹. 文化的阐释[M]. 纳日碧力戈, 王铭铭等,译. 上海:上海人民出版社, 1999:1-528.
[117] Yang X.K., Ng S. Specialization and Division of Labor: A Survey[A]. in Arrow K., Ng Y.K., Yang X.K.(eds), Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis[C]. London: Macmillan, 1998:3-63.
[118] 苗东升. 系统科学精要[M]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2003:133-164.
[119] 普里戈金. 从存在到演化[M]. 曾庆宏, 严士健, 马本, 沈小峰,译. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2007:45-88.
[120] 约瑟夫?熊彼特 . 经 济发 展理论 [M]. 何畏 等 , 译 . 北京 : 商务 印 书馆 , 2000:1-174.
[121] 许国志, 顾基发, 车宏安. 系统科学[M]. 上海:上海科技教育出版社, 2000:173-201.
[122] 杨格. 报酬递增与经济进步[J]. 经济社会体制比较, 1996,(2):54-59.
[123] 约翰·福斯特, J.斯坦利·梅特卡夫. 演化经济学:竞争、自组织与创新政策[M]. 贾根良, 刘刚,译. 北京:高等教育出版社, 2005:1-16.
[124] Hummels D., Rapoport D., Yi K. Vertical Specialization and the Changing Nature of World Trade[J]. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 1998,4(2):79- 99.
[125] Hummels D., Ishii J., Yi, K. The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade[J]. Journal of International Economics, 2001,(54):75-96.
[126] Kohler Wilhelm. The Distributional Effects of International Fragmentation[J]. Germen Economic Review, 2003, 4 (1): 89-120.
[127] 胡昭玲 . 国际垂直专业化分工与贸易 :研究综述 [J]. 南开经济研究 , 2005,(5):12-26.
[128] 卢锋. 产品内分工[J]. 经济学季刊, 2004, 4(1):55-82.
[129] 卢锋. 当代服务外包的经济学观察:产品内分工的分析视角[J]. 世界经济, 2007, (8):22-35.
[130] Deardorff A.V. Fragmentation Across Cones[A]. in Arndt, S.W., Kierzkowski, H.(eds). Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy[C]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2001:37.
[131] Jensen M., Meckling W. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360.
[132] Grossman S., Hart O. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94 (4):691-719.
[133] Hart O., Moore J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158.
[134] Hart O. Moore J. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (1):115- 138.
[135] Maskin E., Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, (66):83-114.
[136] Tirole J. Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand[J]. Econometrica,1999,67 (4): 741-781.
[137] Coase R. The Federal Communications Commission[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1959, (2):1-40.
[138] Coase R. The Problem of Social Cost[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, (3):1-44.
[139] Demsetz H. Towards a Theory of Property Rights[J]. American Economic Review, 1967,(57): 347-359.
[140] Y. 巴泽尔. 产权的经济分析[M]. 费方域, 段毅才,译. 上海: 上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 1997:1-18.
[141] 杨 瑞 龙 , 聂 辉 华 . 不 完 全 契 约 理 论 : 一 个 综 述 [J]. 经 济 研 究 , 2006,(2):104-115.
[142] 李海舰, 魏恒. 新型产业组织分析范式构建研究——从 SCP 到 DIM[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007, (7):29-39.
[143] Adams J.S. Toward an Understanding of Inequity[J]. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 1963,(67):422-436.
[144] Adams J.S. Inequity in Social Exchange[J]. Experimental Social Psychology 1965,(2):267-299.
[145] 韦 森 . 经 济 学 与 哲 学 [M]. 上 海 : 世 纪 出 版 集 团 , 上 海 人 民 出 版 社 , 2005:12-36.
[146] Katz M.L., Shapiro C. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility [J]. American Economic Review, 1985, 75(3):424-440.
[147] Katz M. L., Shapiro C. Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(3):822-41.
[148] Katz M. L., Shapiro C. Systems Competition and Network Effects[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994,(8):93-115.
[149] Farrell J., Saloner G. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985, 16(1):70-83.
[150] Liebowitz S.J., Margolis S.E. The Fable of the Keys[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1990, (33):1-25.
[151] Economides N. Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities[J]. American Economic Review, 1989,(78):108-121.
[152] Economides N., White L.J. Networks and Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust[J]. European Economic Review, 1994,(38):651-662.
[153] Economides N. The Economics of Networks[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14(2):1-37.
[154] Shy O. The Economics of Network Industries[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001:1-330.
[155] Tirole J. The Theory of Industrial Organization[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988:1-479.
[156] Lerner J, Strojwas M., Tirole J. The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools:Empirical Evidence[R]. Working Paper of Harvard University and NBER, 2003:1-47.
[157] 李玉剑. 专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社, 2006:56-103.
[158] Coleman J. S. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1988,94(S1):95-120.
[159] Putnam R.D. The Prosperous Community——Social Capital and Public Life[J]. The American Prospect, 1993,(13):35-42.
[160] Krugman P. The Myth of Asia’s Miracle[J]. Foreign Affairs, 1994, 73(6):62-78.
[161] Lin Nan. Social Networks and Status Attainment[J]. Annual Review of Sociology, 1999, (25):467-487.
[162] 达斯古普特, 撒拉格尔丁. 社会资本:一个多角度的观点[C]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2004:1-493
[163] 汪丁丁. 制度创新的一般理论[J]. 经济研究, 1992,(5):69-80.
[164] 加里·S·贝克尔. 人类行为的经济分析[M]. 王业宇, 陈琪,译. 上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 1995:333-350.
[165] 赫伯特?西蒙. 西蒙自选集[M]. 黄涛,译. 北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社, 2002:435-449.
[166] 叶航, 汪丁丁, 罗卫东. 作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义[J]. 经济研究, 2005, (8):84-94.
[167] 亚当?斯密. 道德情操论[M]. 蒋自强, 钦北愚, 朱钟棣, 沈凯章等,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 1997:1-20.
[168] 杨春学. 利他主义经济学的追求[J]. 经济研究, 2001,(4):82-90.
[169] Fehr E., Schmidt A. Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, (14):817-868.
[170] 罗能生. 全球化、国际贸易与文化互动[M]. 北京:中国经济出版社, 2006:130-163.
[171] 姜奇平. 体验经济——来自变革前沿的报告[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2002:156-271.
[172] Bowles S., Gintis H. Walrasian Economics in Retrospect[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(4):1411-1439.
[173] Bowles S., Gintis H. The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations[J]. Theoretical Population Biology, 2004, (65):17-28
[174] Thaler R. The Ultimatum Game[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2(4): 195-206.
[175] Guth W., Tietz R. Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results[J]. Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990, (11):417-449.
[176] Henrich J. Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R. In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Simple Societies[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91(2):73-78.
[177] Christophe A.M., Camerer C.F. Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-receiver Signaling Games[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2000,(16):689-718.
[178] Fehr E., G?chter S. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good Experiments[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4):980-994.
[179] Gintis H. Solving The Puzzle of Prosociality[J]. Rationality and Society, 2003, 15(2):155-187.
[180] Bowles S., Gintis H. Social Capital and Community Governance[J]. The Economic Journal, 2002, 112 (9):419-436.
[181] Fama E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980,(88):288-307.
[182] Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problems——A Dynamic Perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999,66(1):169-182.
[183] 王永钦. 声誉、承诺与组织形式——一个比较制度分析[M]. 上海:上海人民出版社, 2005:51-59.
[184] Akerlof G, Kranton R. Economics and Identity[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(3):715–753.
[185] Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making Under Risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979, (2):261-293.
[186] Tversky A., Kahneman D. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, (106):1039-1061.
[187] 董志勇. 行为经济学原理[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2006:34-89.
[188] Bowles S., Gintis H. The Moral Economy of Communities: Structured Populations and the Evolution of Pro-social Norms[J]. Evolution and Human Behavior, 1998, 19(1):3-25.
[189] 萨缪?鲍尔斯. 微观经济学: 行为、制度与演化[M]. 江艇,洪福海,周业安等,译. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2006:42-68.
[190] 罗伯特?阿克塞尔罗德. 合作的进化[M]. 吴坚忠,译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2007:3-152.
[191] 吕政, 曹建海. 竞争总是有效率的吗——兼论过度竞争的理论基础[J]. 中国社会科学, 2000,(6):4-14.
[192] Shapiro C., Varian H. Information Rules[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999:1-352.
[193] Shapiro C. Competition Policy in the Information Economy[R]. Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley, August, 1999:1.
[194] Pindyck R.S., Rubinfeld D. L. Microeconomics (5th edition)[M]. NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000:203-250.
[195] 乌家培. 网络经济及其对经济理论的影响[J]. 学术研究, 2000,(1):5-11.
[196] 李海舰, 原磊. 论无边界企业[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005, (4):94-102.
[197] 约瑟夫?熊彼特. 资本主义、社会主义与民主[M]. 吴良健,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 2002:172.
[198] Stiglitz J.E. Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare[J]. American Economic Review, 1981, (71):184-189.
[199] Caroli E., Reenen J.V. Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence From A Panel of British And French Establishments[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(4):1449-1492.
[200] 王文平, 孔炜, 陈娟. 复杂产品设计系统模块化模式对顾客动态需求的适应性研究[J]. 管理学报, 2006, (4):395-399.
[201] Brynjolfsson E., Hitt L.M. Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000,14(4):23-48.
[202] 王珺, 侯广辉. 有限外部化:技术进步对企业边界的影响[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(9):81-87.
[203] Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(3):1231-1294.
[204] 汪丁丁. 海的寓言[M]. 北京:中信出版社, 2003:29-33.
[205] 梅特卡夫. 演化经济学与创造性毁灭[M]. 冯健,译. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2007:49-88.
[206] Baumol W.J. Contestable Market: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure[J]. American Economic Review, 1982,(72):1-15.
[207] 夏大慰. 产业组织与公共政策:可竞争市场理论[J]. 外国经济与管理, 1999,(11):9-11.
[208] 朱彤.可竞争市场理论述评[J]. 教学与研究,2000,(11):59-64.
[209] 罗伯特?D?维利希. 可竞争市场理论.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷)[G]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 1996:669-673.
[210] 乔治?J?施蒂格勒. 产业组织[M]. 王永钦, 薛峰,译. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社, 2006:87-91.
[211] Weizsacker V.C.C. A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, (11):399- 420
[212] 徐康宁, 王剑. 要素禀赋、地理因素与新国际分工[J]. 中国社会科学, 2006,(6):65-77.
[213] 路江涌, 陶志刚. 中国制造业区域聚集及国际比较[R]. 清华大学中国与世界经济研究中心工作论文, 2006:1-21.
[214] Ellison G., Glaeser E.L. Geographic Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997,105(5): 889-927.
[215] Devereux M.P., Griffith R. et al. The Geographic Distribution of Production Activity in the UK[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2004,34(5): 533-564.
[216] Maurel F., Sedillot B. A Measure of the Geographic Concentration in French Manufacturing Industries[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1999, 29(5): 575-604.
[217] 罗勇, 曹丽莉. 中国制造业集聚程度变动趋势实证研究[J]. 经济研究, 2005,(8):106-115.
[218] 张燕生, 刘旭, 平新乔. 中美贸易顺差结构分析与对策[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2006:39-86.
[219] 关志雄. 微笑曲线向谁微笑[R]. 日本经济产业研究所(RIETI)工作论文, 2004:1-2.
[220] 李珂. 我国 IC 产业:制造业快速增长,设计业挑战严峻[N]. 中国电子报, 2008-02-28:1.
[221] Acemoglu D., Aghion P., Zilibotti F. Distance to Frontier, Selection, andEconomic Growth[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2006, 4(1):37-74.
[222] Gereffi G., Humphrey J., Sturgeon T. The Governance of Global Value Chains[J]. Review of International Political Economy, 2005, (12):78-104.
[223] Becker G., Murphy K. The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs and Knowledge[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992,(107):1137-1160.
[224] 黄少安. 经济学研究重心的转移与合作经济学构想——对创建中国经济学的思考[J]. 经济研究, 2000,(5):60-67.
[225] 王益民. 基于共同演化视角的跨国公司战略与产业集群互动研究[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2007:178-182.
[226] 人 民 邮 电 报 . 2007 华 为 移 动 改 写 全 球 市 场 格 局 [N]. 人 民 邮 电 报 , 2008-01-09:1.
[227] 薛兆丰. 反垄断法拓宽寻租之门[N]. 经济观察报, 2007-09-10:1.
[228] 哈罗德·德姆塞茨. 中国竞争政策与反垄断法[J]. 比较, 2007,(34):21-30.
[229] 夏 大 慰 . 产 业 组 织 与 公 共 政 策 : 芝 加 哥 学 派 [J]. 外 国 经 济 与 管 理 , 1999,(9):3-6.
[230] Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, 21(2):297-326.
[231] Kitch E.W. The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago: 1932-1970[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26):163-234.
[232] 钱颖一. 硅谷的故事[J]. 经济社会体制比较, 2000, (1):28-35.
[233] 明叔亮, 欧阳长征. 3G 之上[J]. 财经, 2008, (4):63-73.
[234] Birke D., Swann G.M.P. Network Effects and the Choice of Mobile Phone Operator[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2006, (16):65-84.
[235] 陈平. 文明分岔、经济混沌和演化经济动力学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2004:179-248.
[236] 苟 昂 , 廖 飞 . 基 于 组 织 模 块 化 的 价 值 网 研 究 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2005,(2):66-72.
[237] 赖明勇, 张新, 彭水军, 包群. 经济增长的源泉:人力资本、研究开发与技术外溢[J]. 中国社会科学, 2005,(2):32-46.
[238] 李怀斌. 客户化企业范式的双模块结构假说与实证[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(3):58-67.
[239] 李维安等. 网络组织:组织发展的新趋势[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2003:1-526.
[240] 罗能生. 产权的伦理维度[M]. 北京:人民出版社, 2004:1-273.
[241] 罗能生, 洪联英. 新贸易理论与现代企业理论的融合与拓展[J]. 经济学动态, 2006,(9):62-65.
[242] 薛求知. 当代跨国公司新理论[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社, 2007:1-409.
[243] 杰弗里?霍奇逊. 制度与演化经济学现代文选:关键性概念[M]. 贾根良, 徐尚,王晓蓉等,译. 北京:高等教育出版社, 2007:1-327.
[244] 赫伯特?金迪斯, 萨缪·鲍尔斯等. 人类的趋社会性及其研究:一个超越经济学的经济分析[M]. 汪丁丁,叶航,罗卫东,主编.上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2006:1-215.
[245] 赫伯特?金迪斯, 萨缪·鲍尔斯等. 走向统一的社会科学:来自桑塔费学派的看法[M]. 汪丁丁, 叶航, 罗卫东,主编. 上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2005:1-195.
[246] 伊迪丝?彭罗斯. 企业成长理论[M]. 赵晓,译.上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 2007:1-307.
[247] Arrow K.J. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1962, (29):155-173.
[248] Baumol W.J., Panzar J.C., Willig R.D. Contestable Market: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure:Reply[J]. American Economic Review, 1984,(73):491-496.
[249] Becker G., Gibbons R., Murphy K. Relational Contracts and The Theory of Firm[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,(117): 39-84.
[250] David P.A. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY[J]. American Economic Review, 1985, 75 (2):332-337.
[251] Hirst P., Jonathan Zeitlin. Flexible Specialization Versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence and Political Implication[J]. Economy and Society, 1991, (20):1-57.
[252] Kovacic W. E., Shapiro C. Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, 14(1):43-60.
[253] Sabel C. F., Zeitlin J. Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-firm Collaboration in the New Economy[J]. Enterprise Society, 2004, (5): 388-403.
[2] Williamson O. E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[M]. New York: Free Press, 1985:1-468.
[3] Baldwin C.Y., Clark, K.B. Managing in an Age of Modularity[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1997, (5):84-93.
[4] Baldwin C.Y., Clark, K.B. Design Rules: The Power of Modularity (Vol.1.) [M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000:1-483.
[5] 青木昌彦, 安藤晴彦. 模块时代:新产业结构的本质[M]. 周国荣,译. 上海:上海远东出版社,2003:3-118.
[6] 杨小凯, 黄有光. 专业化与经济组织[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 1999:1-17
[7] Coase R. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica, 1937, (4):386-405.
[8] Alchian A., Demsetz H. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization[J]. American Economic Review, 1972, 62 (5):777-795.
[9] Cheung S. The Contractual Nature of the Firm[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26):1-21.
[10] 杨小凯.经济学——新兴古典与新古典框架[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2003:1-46.
[11] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒. 战略与结构[M]. 孟昕,译. 昆明:云南人民出版社, 2002:1-390.
[12] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒.看得见的手——美国企业的管理革命[M].重武,王铁生,译.北京:商务印书馆, 1987:1-591.
[13] 小艾尔弗雷德?D?钱德勒.规模与范围——工业资本主义的原动力[M]. 张逸人,陆钦炎等,译. 北京:华夏出版社, 2006:1-728.
[14] Porter M. Competitive Strategy[M]. New York: Free Press, 1980:1-397.
[15] Porter M. Competitive Advantage[M]. New York: Free Press, 1985:1-592.
[16] Porter M. The Competitive Advantage of Nations[M]. New York: Free Press, 1990:1-896.
[17] Alchian A. Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1950,(58):211-222.
[18] North D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance[M].Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:1-159.
[19] 青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M]. 周黎安,译. 上海:上海远东出版社,2001:61-387.
[20] 弗 兰 克 ?H. 奈 特 . 风 险 不 确 定 性 与 利 润 [M]. 安 佳 , 译 . 北 京 : 商 务 印 书馆,2006:139-337.
[21] Nelson R., Winter S. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982:1-454.
[22] 贾根良. 理解演化经济学[J]. 中国社会科学, 2004,(2):33-41.
[23] Hodgson G.M. Evolution and Institutions: On Evolutionary Economics and the Evolution of Economics[M]. Mass: Edward Elgar, 1999:127-154.
[24] 杰克?J·弗罗门.经济演化——探究新制度经济学的理论基础[M]. 李振明, 刘社建, 齐柳明,译. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2003:1-281.
[25] Aoki M, Takizawa H. Modularity: Its Relevance to Industrial Architecture[R]. The Saint-Gobain Centre for Economic Research 5th Conference: Organizational Innovation within Firms, 2002:7-8.
[26] Langlois R.N. Modularity in Technology and Organization[J]. Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization, 2000, (49):19-37.
[27] Simon Herbert A. The Architecture of Complexity[J]. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1962, (106): 467-482.
[28] Crémer J. Common Knowledge and the Co-ordination of Economic Activities[A]. Aoki M., Gustafsson B., Williamson O.E. (eds). The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties[C]. London: Sage, 1990:53-76.
[29] Ali k., Kamarani Sa Ed M., Salhieh. Product Design for Modularity [M]. London:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002:1-44.
[30] 芮明杰 , 刘明宇 , 任江波 . 论产业链整合 [M]. 上海 :复旦大学出版社 , 2006:86-128.
[31] PineⅡ B. J. Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition [M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992:1-264.
[32] Hoogeweegen M., Vervest P. How Much Business Modularity? In Smart Business Networks(Section 4)[M]. NJ: Springer-Verlag New York, 2004:339-348.
[33] 朱瑞博 . 价值模块的虚拟再整合 : 以 IC 产业为例 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2004,(1):28-35.
[34] 骆品亮, 潘忠. 自由软件开发的模块化理论解释与启示[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(11):75-82.
[35] 孙晓峰. 模块化技术与模块化生产方式——以计算机产业为例[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(6):60-66.
[36] 汪涛, 徐建平. 模块化的产品创新:基于价值创造网络的思考[J]. 科研管理, 2005,(9):11-18.
[37] 陈劲, 桂彬旺, 陈钰芬. 基于模块化开发的复杂产品系统创新案例研究[J]. 科研管理, 2006,(6):1-8.
[38] Caminati M. Knowledge Growth, Complexity and the Returns to R&D[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2006,(16):207–229.
[39] 胡 晓 鹏 . 从 分 工 到 模 块 化 : 经 济 系 统 演 进 的 思 考 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2004,(9):5-11.
[40] 陈向东. 模块化在制造企业知识管理战略设计中的应用[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(1):36-42.
[41] 范爱军, 杨丽. 模块化对分工演进的影响——基于贝克尔—墨菲模型的解释[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(12):67-73.
[42] 钱书法, 李辉, 肖宁. 不同网络分工组织的效率比较[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2006,(7):49-52.
[43] Pine Ⅱ B.J., Gilmore J.H. The Experience Economy[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999:1-254.
[44] 胡晓鹏. 价值系统的模块化与价值转移[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(11):68-74.
[45] Ogrady P. The Age of Modularity:Using the New World of Modular Products to Revolutionize Your Corporation[M]. Lowa City:Adam and Steede Publishers, 2001:1-256.
[46] 徐宏玲. 模块化组织研究[M]. 成都:西南财经大学出版社, 2006:1-245.
[47] 李平, 狄辉. 产业价值链模块化重构的价值决定研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(9):71-77.
[48] Sturgeon T. Industry Co-evolution and the Rise of a Shared Supply-base for Electronics Manufacturing[R]. Paper Presented at the Nelson and Winter Conference, 2001:9.
[49] Sanchez R., Mahoney J.T. Modularity, Flexibility and Knowledge Management in Product and Organization Design[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1996, (17):63–76.
[50] Brusoni S., Prencipe A. Unpacking the Black Box of Modularity: Technologies, Products and Organizations[J]. Industrial and Corporate Change, 2001,10 (1):179-205.
[51] Brusoni S., Sgalari G. New Combinations in Old Industries: the Introduction of Radical Innovations in Tire Manufacturing[J]. Journal of EvolutionaryEconomics, 2006, (16):25–43.
[52] 郝斌, 任浩, Anne-Marie Guerin.组织模块化设计:基本原理与理论架构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(6):80-87.
[53] 童时中 . 模块化原理在生产系统布局设计中的运用 [J]. 标准化报道 , 2000,(5):20-22.
[54] Brown S.L., Eisenhardt K.M. The Art of Continuous Change: Linking Complexity Theory and Time Paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997, (42):1-34.
[55] Newcomb P. J., Bras B., Rosen D. W. Implication of Modularity on Product Design for the Life Cycle[J]. Journal of Mechanical Design, 1998,120(3):483- 291.
[56] Novak S., Eppinger S.D. Sourcing by Design: Product Complexity and the Supply Chain[J]. Management Science, 2001,47(1):189- 204.
[57] 郭岚, 张祥建. 基于网络外部性的价值模块整合与兼容性选择[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(4):103-110.
[58] 罗珉, 冯俭. 组织新论:网络经济条件下的组织管理新范式[M]. 成都:西南财经大学出版社, 2005:117-191
[59] 纪雪洪, 陈荣秋, 唐中君. PC 行业的模块化与整合研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(10):91-96.
[60] 邓龙安, 徐玖平. 模块化网络运营对竞争性市场效率的影响—兼析网络规则与市场规则下市场效率的变化[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(8):83-89.
[61] Ulrich K., Ellison D. Beyond Make-buy: Internalization and Integration of Design and Production[J]. Management Science, 1999, 49(5): 640-658.
[62] Krikke H, Blanc I, Velde S.V. Product Modularity and the Design of Closed-loop Supply Chains[J]. California Management Review, 2004, 46(2):23- 40.
[63] 雷如桥, 陈继祥, 刘芹. 基于模块化的组织模式及其效率比较研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(10):83-90.
[64] 张治栋, 荣兆梓. 基于契约结构的模块化设计及其演进[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(9):62-70.
[65] Clark K.B. Project Scope and Project Performance: the Effect of Parts Strategy and Supplier Involvement in Product Development[J]. Management Science, 1989,35(10): 1247-1263.
[66] Clark K.B., Fujimoto T. Product Development Performance, Strategy, Organization, and Management in the World Auto Industry[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1991:1-30.
[67] 曾楚宏, 林丹明. 论企业边界的两重性[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(10):73-80.
[68] 曾 楚 宏 , 吴 能 全 . 企 业 模 块 化 思 想 研 究 述 评 [J]. 科 技 管 理 研 究 , 2006,(7):110-113.
[69] 余东华, 芮明杰. 模块化、企业价值网络与企业边界变动[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(10):88-95.
[70] 胡 晓 鹏 . 企 业 模 块 化 的 边 界 及 其 经 济 效 应 研 究 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2006,(1):90-97
[71] 曹江涛 , 苗建军 . 模块化时代企业边界变动研究 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(8):85-92.
[72] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 论经济全球化时代跨国公司垄断结构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004, (9):36-43.
[73] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 信息经济时代模块化与垄断结构[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005, (8):56-64.
[74] 刘茂松, 陈柏福. 论柔性契约与垄断结构企业模式[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006, (5):79-86.
[75] 侯若石, 李金珊. 资产专用性、模块化技术与企业边界[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(11):91-98
[76] 柯颖, 王述英. 模块化生产网络:一种新产业组织形态研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(8):75-82.
[77] 朱瑞博. 模块化抗产业集群内生性风险的机理分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004,(5):54-60.
[78] Saxenian A. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128[M]. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994:1-240.
[79] Sorenson L., Fleming, L. The Dangers of Modularity[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2001, (5):20-21.
[80] Chesbrough H. Open Innovation: the New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2003:1-196.
[81] Chesbrough H. Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital[J]. Harvard Business Review, 2002, 80(3):90-99.
[82] Chesbrough H. The Sustainability of Technology Markets[J]. Journal of Management and Governance, 2004, (8):117-120.
[83] Ernst D. Limits to Modularity:A Review of the Literature and Evidence from Chip Design[J]. Industry and Innovation, 2005:1-27.
[84] Ernst D. The New Mobility of Knowledge: Digital Information Systems and Global Flagship Networks[A]. in Sassen, S.(ed.), Digital Formations in aConnected World, Published for the U.S. Social Science Research Council[C]. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004:1-40.
[85] 闫星宇, 高觉民. 模块化理论的再审视:局限及适用范围[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007,(4):71-78.
[86] 刘茂松, 曹虹剑. 产业组织中的模块化理论发展动态[J]. 经济学动态, 2006, (2):74-77.
[87] 罗珉 , 何长见 . 组织间关系 : 界面规则与治理机制 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(5):87-95.
[88] 罗珉 . 价值星系 :理论解释与价值创造机制的构建 [J]. 中国工业经济 , 2006,(1):80-89.
[89] 让·波德里亚. 消费社会[M]. 刘成富,全志钢,译.南京:南京大学出版社, 2006:1-166.
[90] Varian H. Microeconomic Analysis(3rd ed)[M]. New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1992:1-171.
[91] Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., Green J.R. Microeconomic Theory[M]. Oxford University Press, 1995:1-104.
[92] 蒋殿春. 高级微观经济学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2006:40-59.
[93] 姜奇平. 异质性的经济学价值[J]. 互联网周刊, 2006,8(7):58-59.
[94] 贺京同, 那艺, 王晓岚. 个体行为研究的异质化演进[J]. 经济学动态, 2007,(2):79-83.
[95] Wang Jiang. The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Pure Exchange Economy with Heterogeneous Investors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, (41):75-110.
[96] Campbell J.Y., Cochrane J.H. By Force of Habit: A Consumption-based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1999,(107):205 -251.
[97] Chan Y.L., Kogan L. Heterogeneous Preferences and the Dynamics of Asset Prices[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2002,(110): 1255-1285.
[98] 熊和平. 消费习惯、异质偏好与动态资产定价:纯交换经济情形[J]. 经济研究, 2005,(10):91-100.
[99] Shy O. Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995:1-488.
[100] Williamson O. E. The Mechanism of Governance[M]. Oxford University Press, 1996:1-448.
[101] 杰克?赫什莱佛. 约翰 G. 赖利.不确定性与信息分析[M]. 刘广灵, 李绍荣,译. 北京:中国社会科学出版社, 2000:7-200.
[102] 蔡宁, 杨闩柱, 吴结兵. 企业集群风险的研究:一个基于网络的视角[J]. 中国工业经济, 2003,(4):59-64.
[103] 昝廷全.系统经济学探索[M]. 北京:科学出版社, 2004:1-178.
[104] Romano A., Passiante G., Elia V. New Sources of Clustering in the Digital Economy[J]. Journal of Small Business & Enterprise Development, 2001, 8(1): 19-27.
[105] 张纪. 产品内国际分工中的收益分配——基于笔记本电脑商品链的分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(7):36-44.
[106] 于明超, 刘志彪, 江静. 外来资本主导代工生产模式下当地企业升级困境与突破——以中国台湾笔记本电脑内地封闭式生产网络为例[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006,(11):108-116.
[107] 肯尼斯?阿罗. 组织的极限[M]. 万谦, 廉晓红,译. 北京:华夏出版社, 2006:25-40.
[108] Boisot M.H. Knowledge Asset: Securing Competitive Advantage in Information Economy[M]. London: Oxford University Press, 1998:1-271
[109] 刘刚. 企业的异质性假设:对企业本质和行为基础的演化论解释[J]. 中国社会科学, 2002,(2):56-68.
[110] 陈 柳 . 模 块 化 、 信 息 包 裹 与 研 发 风 险 的 分 散 [J]. 科 学 学 研 究 , 2006,(2):112-116.
[111] Kamien M.I., Schwartz N. L. Dynamic Optimization[M]. New York: Elsevier North Holland, Inc, 1981:39-45.
[112] 曹虹剑 , 罗能生 . 高新技术产业模块化集群与创新能力 [J]. 改革 , 2007,(3):34-38.
[113] 亚当?斯密. 国民财富性质和原因的研究[M]. 郭大力, 王亚南,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 1997:1-25.
[114] F.A.?冯?哈耶克. 个人主义与经济秩序[M]. 邓正来,译. 北京:三联书店, 2003:52-85.
[115] Hayek F.A. The Use of Knowledge in Society[J]. American Economic Review, 1945, (35): 519-530.
[116] 格尔兹. 文化的阐释[M]. 纳日碧力戈, 王铭铭等,译. 上海:上海人民出版社, 1999:1-528.
[117] Yang X.K., Ng S. Specialization and Division of Labor: A Survey[A]. in Arrow K., Ng Y.K., Yang X.K.(eds), Increasing Returns and Economic Analysis[C]. London: Macmillan, 1998:3-63.
[118] 苗东升. 系统科学精要[M]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2003:133-164.
[119] 普里戈金. 从存在到演化[M]. 曾庆宏, 严士健, 马本, 沈小峰,译. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2007:45-88.
[120] 约瑟夫?熊彼特 . 经 济发 展理论 [M]. 何畏 等 , 译 . 北京 : 商务 印 书馆 , 2000:1-174.
[121] 许国志, 顾基发, 车宏安. 系统科学[M]. 上海:上海科技教育出版社, 2000:173-201.
[122] 杨格. 报酬递增与经济进步[J]. 经济社会体制比较, 1996,(2):54-59.
[123] 约翰·福斯特, J.斯坦利·梅特卡夫. 演化经济学:竞争、自组织与创新政策[M]. 贾根良, 刘刚,译. 北京:高等教育出版社, 2005:1-16.
[124] Hummels D., Rapoport D., Yi K. Vertical Specialization and the Changing Nature of World Trade[J]. FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 1998,4(2):79- 99.
[125] Hummels D., Ishii J., Yi, K. The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade[J]. Journal of International Economics, 2001,(54):75-96.
[126] Kohler Wilhelm. The Distributional Effects of International Fragmentation[J]. Germen Economic Review, 2003, 4 (1): 89-120.
[127] 胡昭玲 . 国际垂直专业化分工与贸易 :研究综述 [J]. 南开经济研究 , 2005,(5):12-26.
[128] 卢锋. 产品内分工[J]. 经济学季刊, 2004, 4(1):55-82.
[129] 卢锋. 当代服务外包的经济学观察:产品内分工的分析视角[J]. 世界经济, 2007, (8):22-35.
[130] Deardorff A.V. Fragmentation Across Cones[A]. in Arndt, S.W., Kierzkowski, H.(eds). Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy[C]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2001:37.
[131] Jensen M., Meckling W. Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360.
[132] Grossman S., Hart O. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94 (4):691-719.
[133] Hart O., Moore J. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158.
[134] Hart O. Moore J. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (1):115- 138.
[135] Maskin E., Tirole J. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, (66):83-114.
[136] Tirole J. Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand[J]. Econometrica,1999,67 (4): 741-781.
[137] Coase R. The Federal Communications Commission[J]. Journal of Law and Economics,1959, (2):1-40.
[138] Coase R. The Problem of Social Cost[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1960, (3):1-44.
[139] Demsetz H. Towards a Theory of Property Rights[J]. American Economic Review, 1967,(57): 347-359.
[140] Y. 巴泽尔. 产权的经济分析[M]. 费方域, 段毅才,译. 上海: 上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 1997:1-18.
[141] 杨 瑞 龙 , 聂 辉 华 . 不 完 全 契 约 理 论 : 一 个 综 述 [J]. 经 济 研 究 , 2006,(2):104-115.
[142] 李海舰, 魏恒. 新型产业组织分析范式构建研究——从 SCP 到 DIM[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007, (7):29-39.
[143] Adams J.S. Toward an Understanding of Inequity[J]. Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 1963,(67):422-436.
[144] Adams J.S. Inequity in Social Exchange[J]. Experimental Social Psychology 1965,(2):267-299.
[145] 韦 森 . 经 济 学 与 哲 学 [M]. 上 海 : 世 纪 出 版 集 团 , 上 海 人 民 出 版 社 , 2005:12-36.
[146] Katz M.L., Shapiro C. Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility [J]. American Economic Review, 1985, 75(3):424-440.
[147] Katz M. L., Shapiro C. Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(3):822-41.
[148] Katz M. L., Shapiro C. Systems Competition and Network Effects[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994,(8):93-115.
[149] Farrell J., Saloner G. Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985, 16(1):70-83.
[150] Liebowitz S.J., Margolis S.E. The Fable of the Keys[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1990, (33):1-25.
[151] Economides N. Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities[J]. American Economic Review, 1989,(78):108-121.
[152] Economides N., White L.J. Networks and Compatibility: Implications for Antitrust[J]. European Economic Review, 1994,(38):651-662.
[153] Economides N. The Economics of Networks[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1996, 14(2):1-37.
[154] Shy O. The Economics of Network Industries[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001:1-330.
[155] Tirole J. The Theory of Industrial Organization[M]. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988:1-479.
[156] Lerner J, Strojwas M., Tirole J. The Structure and Performance of Patent Pools:Empirical Evidence[R]. Working Paper of Harvard University and NBER, 2003:1-47.
[157] 李玉剑. 专利联盟:战略联盟研究的新领域[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社, 2006:56-103.
[158] Coleman J. S. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1988,94(S1):95-120.
[159] Putnam R.D. The Prosperous Community——Social Capital and Public Life[J]. The American Prospect, 1993,(13):35-42.
[160] Krugman P. The Myth of Asia’s Miracle[J]. Foreign Affairs, 1994, 73(6):62-78.
[161] Lin Nan. Social Networks and Status Attainment[J]. Annual Review of Sociology, 1999, (25):467-487.
[162] 达斯古普特, 撒拉格尔丁. 社会资本:一个多角度的观点[C]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2004:1-493
[163] 汪丁丁. 制度创新的一般理论[J]. 经济研究, 1992,(5):69-80.
[164] 加里·S·贝克尔. 人类行为的经济分析[M]. 王业宇, 陈琪,译. 上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 1995:333-350.
[165] 赫伯特?西蒙. 西蒙自选集[M]. 黄涛,译. 北京:首都经济贸易大学出版社, 2002:435-449.
[166] 叶航, 汪丁丁, 罗卫东. 作为内生偏好的利他行为及其经济学意义[J]. 经济研究, 2005, (8):84-94.
[167] 亚当?斯密. 道德情操论[M]. 蒋自强, 钦北愚, 朱钟棣, 沈凯章等,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 1997:1-20.
[168] 杨春学. 利他主义经济学的追求[J]. 经济研究, 2001,(4):82-90.
[169] Fehr E., Schmidt A. Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, (14):817-868.
[170] 罗能生. 全球化、国际贸易与文化互动[M]. 北京:中国经济出版社, 2006:130-163.
[171] 姜奇平. 体验经济——来自变革前沿的报告[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2002:156-271.
[172] Bowles S., Gintis H. Walrasian Economics in Retrospect[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(4):1411-1439.
[173] Bowles S., Gintis H. The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations[J]. Theoretical Population Biology, 2004, (65):17-28
[174] Thaler R. The Ultimatum Game[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1988, 2(4): 195-206.
[175] Guth W., Tietz R. Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results[J]. Journal of Economic Psychology, 1990, (11):417-449.
[176] Henrich J. Boyd R., Bowles S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R. In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Simple Societies[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91(2):73-78.
[177] Christophe A.M., Camerer C.F. Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-receiver Signaling Games[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2000,(16):689-718.
[178] Fehr E., G?chter S. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good Experiments[J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90(4):980-994.
[179] Gintis H. Solving The Puzzle of Prosociality[J]. Rationality and Society, 2003, 15(2):155-187.
[180] Bowles S., Gintis H. Social Capital and Community Governance[J]. The Economic Journal, 2002, 112 (9):419-436.
[181] Fama E. F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1980,(88):288-307.
[182] Holmstrom B. Managerial Incentive Problems——A Dynamic Perspective[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999,66(1):169-182.
[183] 王永钦. 声誉、承诺与组织形式——一个比较制度分析[M]. 上海:上海人民出版社, 2005:51-59.
[184] Akerlof G, Kranton R. Economics and Identity[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, 115(3):715–753.
[185] Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making Under Risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979, (2):261-293.
[186] Tversky A., Kahneman D. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991, (106):1039-1061.
[187] 董志勇. 行为经济学原理[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2006:34-89.
[188] Bowles S., Gintis H. The Moral Economy of Communities: Structured Populations and the Evolution of Pro-social Norms[J]. Evolution and Human Behavior, 1998, 19(1):3-25.
[189] 萨缪?鲍尔斯. 微观经济学: 行为、制度与演化[M]. 江艇,洪福海,周业安等,译. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2006:42-68.
[190] 罗伯特?阿克塞尔罗德. 合作的进化[M]. 吴坚忠,译. 上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2007:3-152.
[191] 吕政, 曹建海. 竞争总是有效率的吗——兼论过度竞争的理论基础[J]. 中国社会科学, 2000,(6):4-14.
[192] Shapiro C., Varian H. Information Rules[M]. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999:1-352.
[193] Shapiro C. Competition Policy in the Information Economy[R]. Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley, August, 1999:1.
[194] Pindyck R.S., Rubinfeld D. L. Microeconomics (5th edition)[M]. NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000:203-250.
[195] 乌家培. 网络经济及其对经济理论的影响[J]. 学术研究, 2000,(1):5-11.
[196] 李海舰, 原磊. 论无边界企业[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005, (4):94-102.
[197] 约瑟夫?熊彼特. 资本主义、社会主义与民主[M]. 吴良健,译. 北京:商务印书馆, 2002:172.
[198] Stiglitz J.E. Potential Competition May Reduce Welfare[J]. American Economic Review, 1981, (71):184-189.
[199] Caroli E., Reenen J.V. Skill-Biased Organizational Change? Evidence From A Panel of British And French Establishments[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116(4):1449-1492.
[200] 王文平, 孔炜, 陈娟. 复杂产品设计系统模块化模式对顾客动态需求的适应性研究[J]. 管理学报, 2006, (4):395-399.
[201] Brynjolfsson E., Hitt L.M. Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000,14(4):23-48.
[202] 王珺, 侯广辉. 有限外部化:技术进步对企业边界的影响[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(9):81-87.
[203] Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 117(3):1231-1294.
[204] 汪丁丁. 海的寓言[M]. 北京:中信出版社, 2003:29-33.
[205] 梅特卡夫. 演化经济学与创造性毁灭[M]. 冯健,译. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2007:49-88.
[206] Baumol W.J. Contestable Market: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure[J]. American Economic Review, 1982,(72):1-15.
[207] 夏大慰. 产业组织与公共政策:可竞争市场理论[J]. 外国经济与管理, 1999,(11):9-11.
[208] 朱彤.可竞争市场理论述评[J]. 教学与研究,2000,(11):59-64.
[209] 罗伯特?D?维利希. 可竞争市场理论.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典(第一卷)[G]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 1996:669-673.
[210] 乔治?J?施蒂格勒. 产业组织[M]. 王永钦, 薛峰,译. 上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社, 2006:87-91.
[211] Weizsacker V.C.C. A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1980, (11):399- 420
[212] 徐康宁, 王剑. 要素禀赋、地理因素与新国际分工[J]. 中国社会科学, 2006,(6):65-77.
[213] 路江涌, 陶志刚. 中国制造业区域聚集及国际比较[R]. 清华大学中国与世界经济研究中心工作论文, 2006:1-21.
[214] Ellison G., Glaeser E.L. Geographic Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997,105(5): 889-927.
[215] Devereux M.P., Griffith R. et al. The Geographic Distribution of Production Activity in the UK[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2004,34(5): 533-564.
[216] Maurel F., Sedillot B. A Measure of the Geographic Concentration in French Manufacturing Industries[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1999, 29(5): 575-604.
[217] 罗勇, 曹丽莉. 中国制造业集聚程度变动趋势实证研究[J]. 经济研究, 2005,(8):106-115.
[218] 张燕生, 刘旭, 平新乔. 中美贸易顺差结构分析与对策[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2006:39-86.
[219] 关志雄. 微笑曲线向谁微笑[R]. 日本经济产业研究所(RIETI)工作论文, 2004:1-2.
[220] 李珂. 我国 IC 产业:制造业快速增长,设计业挑战严峻[N]. 中国电子报, 2008-02-28:1.
[221] Acemoglu D., Aghion P., Zilibotti F. Distance to Frontier, Selection, andEconomic Growth[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2006, 4(1):37-74.
[222] Gereffi G., Humphrey J., Sturgeon T. The Governance of Global Value Chains[J]. Review of International Political Economy, 2005, (12):78-104.
[223] Becker G., Murphy K. The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs and Knowledge[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992,(107):1137-1160.
[224] 黄少安. 经济学研究重心的转移与合作经济学构想——对创建中国经济学的思考[J]. 经济研究, 2000,(5):60-67.
[225] 王益民. 基于共同演化视角的跨国公司战略与产业集群互动研究[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2007:178-182.
[226] 人 民 邮 电 报 . 2007 华 为 移 动 改 写 全 球 市 场 格 局 [N]. 人 民 邮 电 报 , 2008-01-09:1.
[227] 薛兆丰. 反垄断法拓宽寻租之门[N]. 经济观察报, 2007-09-10:1.
[228] 哈罗德·德姆塞茨. 中国竞争政策与反垄断法[J]. 比较, 2007,(34):21-30.
[229] 夏 大 慰 . 产 业 组 织 与 公 共 政 策 : 芝 加 哥 学 派 [J]. 外 国 经 济 与 管 理 , 1999,(9):3-6.
[230] Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1978, 21(2):297-326.
[231] Kitch E.W. The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Econ at Chicago: 1932-1970[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, (26):163-234.
[232] 钱颖一. 硅谷的故事[J]. 经济社会体制比较, 2000, (1):28-35.
[233] 明叔亮, 欧阳长征. 3G 之上[J]. 财经, 2008, (4):63-73.
[234] Birke D., Swann G.M.P. Network Effects and the Choice of Mobile Phone Operator[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2006, (16):65-84.
[235] 陈平. 文明分岔、经济混沌和演化经济动力学[M]. 北京:北京大学出版社, 2004:179-248.
[236] 苟 昂 , 廖 飞 . 基 于 组 织 模 块 化 的 价 值 网 研 究 [J]. 中 国 工 业 经 济 , 2005,(2):66-72.
[237] 赖明勇, 张新, 彭水军, 包群. 经济增长的源泉:人力资本、研究开发与技术外溢[J]. 中国社会科学, 2005,(2):32-46.
[238] 李怀斌. 客户化企业范式的双模块结构假说与实证[J]. 中国工业经济, 2005,(3):58-67.
[239] 李维安等. 网络组织:组织发展的新趋势[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社, 2003:1-526.
[240] 罗能生. 产权的伦理维度[M]. 北京:人民出版社, 2004:1-273.
[241] 罗能生, 洪联英. 新贸易理论与现代企业理论的融合与拓展[J]. 经济学动态, 2006,(9):62-65.
[242] 薛求知. 当代跨国公司新理论[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社, 2007:1-409.
[243] 杰弗里?霍奇逊. 制度与演化经济学现代文选:关键性概念[M]. 贾根良, 徐尚,王晓蓉等,译. 北京:高等教育出版社, 2007:1-327.
[244] 赫伯特?金迪斯, 萨缪·鲍尔斯等. 人类的趋社会性及其研究:一个超越经济学的经济分析[M]. 汪丁丁,叶航,罗卫东,主编.上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2006:1-215.
[245] 赫伯特?金迪斯, 萨缪·鲍尔斯等. 走向统一的社会科学:来自桑塔费学派的看法[M]. 汪丁丁, 叶航, 罗卫东,主编. 上海:上海世纪出版集团, 2005:1-195.
[246] 伊迪丝?彭罗斯. 企业成长理论[M]. 赵晓,译.上海:上海三联书店, 上海人民出版社, 2007:1-307.
[247] Arrow K.J. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1962, (29):155-173.
[248] Baumol W.J., Panzar J.C., Willig R.D. Contestable Market: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structure:Reply[J]. American Economic Review, 1984,(73):491-496.
[249] Becker G., Gibbons R., Murphy K. Relational Contracts and The Theory of Firm[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,(117): 39-84.
[250] David P.A. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY[J]. American Economic Review, 1985, 75 (2):332-337.
[251] Hirst P., Jonathan Zeitlin. Flexible Specialization Versus Post-Fordism: Theory, Evidence and Political Implication[J]. Economy and Society, 1991, (20):1-57.
[252] Kovacic W. E., Shapiro C. Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2000, 14(1):43-60.
[253] Sabel C. F., Zeitlin J. Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-firm Collaboration in the New Economy[J]. Enterprise Society, 2004, (5): 388-403.