企业所有权共享理论及应用研究
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摘要
企业所有权安排是指企业的剩余索取权和控制权在企业不同要素产权主体间的配置。企业所有权安排状况直接影响着企业要素主体价值创造的积极性,可以这样说,它是企业提高自身竞争力的“基因”。同时,企业所有权安排状况也是整个社会分配状况的重要影响因素之一。所以,以研究企业所有权安排规律的企业理论是最近30年来国内外学术界最为活跃的研究领域之一,但是对于企业所有权如何安排,学术界仍存在较大分歧,至今仍没有形成一套公认的、具有普适性和现实解释力的理论体系。
就目前而言,占主导地位的企业所有权安排理论依然是以企业的交易性本质作为立论的基石和逻辑起点。因此,把降低交易费用作为企业存在以及企业内部制度安排的唯一标准,进而企业所有权安排研究主要是从对风险和机会主义的防范以及如何降低由于代理问题而带来较高交易费用的视角进行的,即研究的视角是降低交易费用。
本文认为企业的本质是价值创造团队,是一个创新实体,具有生产性、异质性和交易性,其中生产性(价值创造)是其本质属性,异质性和交易性都源于其生产性并服务于生产性。因此,企业所有权安排的理论框架应该建立在企业是价值创造团队的本质之上,从企业价值创造的视角切入分析企业内部制度结构,只有把价值创造主体与企业所有权主体对称配置的制度安排才是最有效的。
因此,本文企业所有权共享理论的逻辑思路是:企业的本质是价值创造,企业所有权安排的实质是企业内部权利的分配,是对价值创造主体的贡献的认可,其基本功能就是对价值创造的激励,因此企业所有权配置的原则只能是价值贡献原则,而企业中的人力资本和物质资本都是企业价值创造主体,所以说,企业所有权的合理安排必定是人力资本和物质资本共享。
按照这一逻辑思路,论文首先在对已有企业本质的观点重新审视的基础上,界定了企业的价值创造本质,提出企业是一个具有独立、明确产权的生产要素(人力资本和非人力资本)基于价值(财富)创造而形成具有生产性、交易性和异质性的团队组织。接着对企业的构成要素物质资本和人力资本及其产权特征给与阐述,并明确界定企业所有权包括企业剩余索取权和控制权,同时对企业所有权与财产所有权的区别和联系给与阐释,以进一步明确企业所有权的内涵。在阐述企业所有权安排的实质和意义的基础上,提出企业所有权坚持按价值贡献配置的原则,实现企业所有权动态对称配置。
论文在详细比较西方经济学效用价值论和马克思的劳动价值理论的基础上,提出价值实体的“一元论”和价值创造的“多元论”的新思想,在企业中表现为人力资本和非人力资本都是价值的创造主体,并进一步论述了财产、产权与价值创造的内在关系,明确了它们本质上的一致性,为本文构建基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论奠定了基础。
论文在详细阐述利益相关者共享企业所有权理论并对其进行评析的基础上,分析了基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论的内在逻辑,并对其实现方式进行探讨,提出“动态虚拟股权制”是企业人力资本分享企业剩余的方式,同时构建出基于价值创造的企业共同治理结构。论文在对企业要素的价值贡献进行规范性分析的同时,构建了企业人力资本的价值贡献度的计量模型。
论文最后对我国国有企业所有权安排进行了实证分析,指出当前国有企业所有权安排的缺陷在于坚持物质资本独享企业所有权,而没有从产权上承认人力资本的地位,进而导致国有企业委托—代理成本的极高,这正是国有企业效益低下的根本原因。依据基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论构建“利益共享、权力共使、风险共担”的国有企业所有权共享制度是当前国有企业走出困境的有效途径。
The arrangement of enterprise ownership means the residual claim and the control right of enterprises which allocation in different owner of factor property rights. The state of enterprise ownership impact directly on the initiative of an enterprise factor owner’value creation, it can be said, which is“the gene”to improve the enterprise competitiveness. At the same time, the arrangement of enterprise ownership is one of the important factors which impact situation of distribution of the whole social. So it is one of the active academic theory research areas to study the ownership arrangement laws in the last 30 years. But how to arrange the enterprise ownership, there is a big difference in the academic, these is still not a recognized, universal and practical explanation theoretical system.
At present, the transactional nature of firm is still regarded as the theory footstone and logic starting point. of the dominant theory of arrangement of enterprise ownership.So reducing transaction cost is regarded as only criterion of the firm’being and inner system arrangement, namely the study on arrangement of enterprise ownership is from angle of view of reducing transaction cost, which mostly include how to keep away risk and opportunism and how to reduce higher transaction cost that is resulted from the agent.. In this paper, the value creation nature of firm is proposed, which is the team with the productive, transaction and heterogeneity characters, thereinto the productive is essence, the transaction and heterogeneity characters are rooted from the productive and serve the productive. So the theory frame of arrangement of enterprise ownership is based on the value creation team nature of firm, and the inner system structure of the enterprise is analyzed from the enterprise value creation angle of view, The most effective system arrangement is proposed, which make the enterprise ownership allocated symmetry to the value creator.
So the logic of share enterprise ownership in this paper is that : the value creation is firm’s essence character, the essential of the arrangement of enterprise ownership is the allocation of firm’s inner right and the permission of the value creator’s contribution, inspiring with value creator is it’s basic function. Wherefore the enterprise ownership is only allocated according to value contribution, and the human capital and physical capital are also the value creator. Therefore the arrangement of enterprise ownership should be shared by the human capital and physical capital is logical.
According to above logic, the value creation nature of firm is defined firstly in this paper, which is based on the renewedly surveying for viewpoints on the nature of firm, which have been proposed, namely the enterprise is the team with the productive, transaction and heterogeneity characters, which is composed of factors (human capital and non-human capital) that have absolute and specific property rights. Then the enterprise inscape of physical capital, human capital and its property rights character is expatiated, and the enterprise ownership including the enterprise residual claim and the control right is well defined, at the same time, the difference and the relation is explained between the enterprise ownership and the property ownership, so the meaning of the enterprise ownership can be defined more definitely. The principle that the enterprise ownership is allocated according to value contribution is proposed based on the essence and content of the arrangement of enterprise ownership, and the enterprise ownership is allocated dynamically.
The new idea of the value entity monism and the value creation pluralistic is proposed based on the detailed compare of the west economics utility axiology and the Marx laboring axiology, which behave that the human capital and non-human capital are also the value creator in the enterprise, and particular discuss the internality relation of the property, property right and the value creation, then is defined as coherence in essence, which lay a foundation for constructing the theory of share enterprise ownership based on value creation.
In this paper, the internality logic of the share enterprise ownership theory based on the value creation is analyzed, which is based on the expatiation and comment on the theory of stakehold sharing the enterprise ownership, and its realization is discussed, the dummy dynamic stock system that the enterprise human capital share the enterprise residual is proposed, and at the same time the enterprise co-governmance is constructed based on the value creation. The value contribution of the enterprise factor is normatively analyzed in the paper and the measure model of the value contribution degree of enterprise human capital is constructed.
At last, the positive analysis is done in the paper for the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership, it pointed out that the shortcoming of the current of the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership is in that the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership that is shared by physical capital’owner alone is still insisted on, and the human capital property right can not be admitted , which result in so high cost of the principal-agence that the state-owned enterprise low efficient. The efficient approach about the pile out the jam is that the system of the share state-owned enterprise ownership of co-shared benefit, co-used power, and co-beared risk is constructed according to the share theory of enterprise ownership based on the value creation.
就目前而言,占主导地位的企业所有权安排理论依然是以企业的交易性本质作为立论的基石和逻辑起点。因此,把降低交易费用作为企业存在以及企业内部制度安排的唯一标准,进而企业所有权安排研究主要是从对风险和机会主义的防范以及如何降低由于代理问题而带来较高交易费用的视角进行的,即研究的视角是降低交易费用。
本文认为企业的本质是价值创造团队,是一个创新实体,具有生产性、异质性和交易性,其中生产性(价值创造)是其本质属性,异质性和交易性都源于其生产性并服务于生产性。因此,企业所有权安排的理论框架应该建立在企业是价值创造团队的本质之上,从企业价值创造的视角切入分析企业内部制度结构,只有把价值创造主体与企业所有权主体对称配置的制度安排才是最有效的。
因此,本文企业所有权共享理论的逻辑思路是:企业的本质是价值创造,企业所有权安排的实质是企业内部权利的分配,是对价值创造主体的贡献的认可,其基本功能就是对价值创造的激励,因此企业所有权配置的原则只能是价值贡献原则,而企业中的人力资本和物质资本都是企业价值创造主体,所以说,企业所有权的合理安排必定是人力资本和物质资本共享。
按照这一逻辑思路,论文首先在对已有企业本质的观点重新审视的基础上,界定了企业的价值创造本质,提出企业是一个具有独立、明确产权的生产要素(人力资本和非人力资本)基于价值(财富)创造而形成具有生产性、交易性和异质性的团队组织。接着对企业的构成要素物质资本和人力资本及其产权特征给与阐述,并明确界定企业所有权包括企业剩余索取权和控制权,同时对企业所有权与财产所有权的区别和联系给与阐释,以进一步明确企业所有权的内涵。在阐述企业所有权安排的实质和意义的基础上,提出企业所有权坚持按价值贡献配置的原则,实现企业所有权动态对称配置。
论文在详细比较西方经济学效用价值论和马克思的劳动价值理论的基础上,提出价值实体的“一元论”和价值创造的“多元论”的新思想,在企业中表现为人力资本和非人力资本都是价值的创造主体,并进一步论述了财产、产权与价值创造的内在关系,明确了它们本质上的一致性,为本文构建基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论奠定了基础。
论文在详细阐述利益相关者共享企业所有权理论并对其进行评析的基础上,分析了基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论的内在逻辑,并对其实现方式进行探讨,提出“动态虚拟股权制”是企业人力资本分享企业剩余的方式,同时构建出基于价值创造的企业共同治理结构。论文在对企业要素的价值贡献进行规范性分析的同时,构建了企业人力资本的价值贡献度的计量模型。
论文最后对我国国有企业所有权安排进行了实证分析,指出当前国有企业所有权安排的缺陷在于坚持物质资本独享企业所有权,而没有从产权上承认人力资本的地位,进而导致国有企业委托—代理成本的极高,这正是国有企业效益低下的根本原因。依据基于价值创造的企业所有权共享理论构建“利益共享、权力共使、风险共担”的国有企业所有权共享制度是当前国有企业走出困境的有效途径。
The arrangement of enterprise ownership means the residual claim and the control right of enterprises which allocation in different owner of factor property rights. The state of enterprise ownership impact directly on the initiative of an enterprise factor owner’value creation, it can be said, which is“the gene”to improve the enterprise competitiveness. At the same time, the arrangement of enterprise ownership is one of the important factors which impact situation of distribution of the whole social. So it is one of the active academic theory research areas to study the ownership arrangement laws in the last 30 years. But how to arrange the enterprise ownership, there is a big difference in the academic, these is still not a recognized, universal and practical explanation theoretical system.
At present, the transactional nature of firm is still regarded as the theory footstone and logic starting point. of the dominant theory of arrangement of enterprise ownership.So reducing transaction cost is regarded as only criterion of the firm’being and inner system arrangement, namely the study on arrangement of enterprise ownership is from angle of view of reducing transaction cost, which mostly include how to keep away risk and opportunism and how to reduce higher transaction cost that is resulted from the agent.. In this paper, the value creation nature of firm is proposed, which is the team with the productive, transaction and heterogeneity characters, thereinto the productive is essence, the transaction and heterogeneity characters are rooted from the productive and serve the productive. So the theory frame of arrangement of enterprise ownership is based on the value creation team nature of firm, and the inner system structure of the enterprise is analyzed from the enterprise value creation angle of view, The most effective system arrangement is proposed, which make the enterprise ownership allocated symmetry to the value creator.
So the logic of share enterprise ownership in this paper is that : the value creation is firm’s essence character, the essential of the arrangement of enterprise ownership is the allocation of firm’s inner right and the permission of the value creator’s contribution, inspiring with value creator is it’s basic function. Wherefore the enterprise ownership is only allocated according to value contribution, and the human capital and physical capital are also the value creator. Therefore the arrangement of enterprise ownership should be shared by the human capital and physical capital is logical.
According to above logic, the value creation nature of firm is defined firstly in this paper, which is based on the renewedly surveying for viewpoints on the nature of firm, which have been proposed, namely the enterprise is the team with the productive, transaction and heterogeneity characters, which is composed of factors (human capital and non-human capital) that have absolute and specific property rights. Then the enterprise inscape of physical capital, human capital and its property rights character is expatiated, and the enterprise ownership including the enterprise residual claim and the control right is well defined, at the same time, the difference and the relation is explained between the enterprise ownership and the property ownership, so the meaning of the enterprise ownership can be defined more definitely. The principle that the enterprise ownership is allocated according to value contribution is proposed based on the essence and content of the arrangement of enterprise ownership, and the enterprise ownership is allocated dynamically.
The new idea of the value entity monism and the value creation pluralistic is proposed based on the detailed compare of the west economics utility axiology and the Marx laboring axiology, which behave that the human capital and non-human capital are also the value creator in the enterprise, and particular discuss the internality relation of the property, property right and the value creation, then is defined as coherence in essence, which lay a foundation for constructing the theory of share enterprise ownership based on value creation.
In this paper, the internality logic of the share enterprise ownership theory based on the value creation is analyzed, which is based on the expatiation and comment on the theory of stakehold sharing the enterprise ownership, and its realization is discussed, the dummy dynamic stock system that the enterprise human capital share the enterprise residual is proposed, and at the same time the enterprise co-governmance is constructed based on the value creation. The value contribution of the enterprise factor is normatively analyzed in the paper and the measure model of the value contribution degree of enterprise human capital is constructed.
At last, the positive analysis is done in the paper for the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership, it pointed out that the shortcoming of the current of the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership is in that the arrangement of state-owned enterprise ownership that is shared by physical capital’owner alone is still insisted on, and the human capital property right can not be admitted , which result in so high cost of the principal-agence that the state-owned enterprise low efficient. The efficient approach about the pile out the jam is that the system of the share state-owned enterprise ownership of co-shared benefit, co-used power, and co-beared risk is constructed according to the share theory of enterprise ownership based on the value creation.
引文
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