科技型企业融资行为与资本结构研究
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摘要
科技型企业的发展对提升一国国际竞争力有重要作用，而科技只有实现和资本的完美结合，才能真正发挥其对经济发展的作用。科技与资本的结合涉及到两个方面问题：如何取得资金和如何利用资金。这两个问题贯穿科技型企业发展的整个过程，但在其不同发展阶段，两个问题表现特征不同，解决方案也不尽相同。科技型企业的快速发展强烈呼吁这方面的理论指导，本文正是从科技与资本结合这一角度出发，按照科技型企业发展的阶段，定量研究融资渠道的变化如何引起资本结构变化，进而如何对企业投资决策产生影响。在此基础上，提出针对各阶段问题的解决方案。
论文第二章对现代资本结构理论进行梳理，将现代资本结构理论划分为权衡理论、代理成本理论、信息不对称理论和财务契约理论四个主要分支理论，对企业资本结构的形成以及可能产生的问题分别进行述评，本章是讨论以后几章问题的理论基础。
论文第三章探讨科技型企业在初创期融资时的特征，指出当企业主要从事R&D活动时，其融资渠道主要是私人权益市场。由于R&D活动的高风险性以及双方对项目信息的不对称性，投资者出于保护自己的目的，往往过早中止投资。于是，创业者和投资者之间最主要的问题是解决企业的投资不足问题。投资者对项目能否成功的信念直接影响其投资的时间长度，为了使创业者和投资者都付出最优努力，通过长期股权合约或长期债权合约的设计，将达到缓解双边道德风险问题的目的，从而减少对R&D活动的投资不足。
论文第四章分析科技型企业在成长期的融资特征，指出在这一阶段科技型企业的首要任务是选择恰当时机进行研发成果商业化。由于企业的资本结构在这一阶段已经引入债务，由此引发了这一阶段的主要问题是投资过度。本文引入实物期权方法，将企业的研发成果商业化过程看成是企业的一个期权，定量地分析了债务对科技型企业研发成果商业化的影响，得出债务使科技型企业投资过度的结论。而通过债务契约的设计与改进，可以达到缓解投资过度的目的。
论文第五章分析科技型企业在成熟期的融资特征，这一阶段的企业的融资渠道主要是公开资本市场。由于公开资本市场投资者对企业了解程度低于内部经营者。因此，按照“柠檬市场效应”理论，市场将低估企业发行的证券价格，因此，科技型企业再一次面临投资不足问题。通过设计具有特定得益图形的证券组合可以使特定类型的企业向市场发出信号，从而缓解证券过低定价矛盾，减少投资不足。本章还考察了中国科技型企业的股利政策特征，发现股利数量并不与企业未来盈利呈正向关系。
论文第六章对中国上市科技型企业的资本结构作了实证分析，发现企业的盈利能力、固定资产规模、成长能力、非债务性税盾、管理层和内部职工持股比例、企业规模等因素都能对企业的资本结构产生影响，但影响效果和国外研究结果有所差别。
本论文是以科技与资本的如何实现良性结合为出发点的，详细考察了科技型企业在其各个发展阶段的资金问题与对策，其研究结论对于当前创新型社会的建设有一定借鉴意义。发展科技型企业不能仅注重对资金的取得，还要时刻关注资金的运用情况，提高资金使用效率，实现技术和资本的良性结合。
Technology companies are important to enhancing international competitiveness of a country. To achieve this goal, technology must be integrated with capital properly. In the development of technology companies, there are two questions to be solved: one is how to get money, the other is how to make full use of the money. Though these two questions exist all through the lifetime of technology, they display different characteristics and need different resolutions. This dissertation analyzes how technology companies financing and the capital structures in start-up period, growing period and mature period quantitatively. And the dissertation also analyzes how the financing behaviors affect the investment decision of technology companies. To maximize the value of the company, the dissertation put forward corresponding resolutions in different periods.
Chapter 2 is a survey of capital structure theory. Capital structure theory can be divided into agency cost theory, asymmetric information theory and financial contract theory. This chapter is the theoritical foundation of the dissertation.
Chapter 3 analyzes the financing characteristics of start-up technology company. The main financing resource for this period is private equity especially venture capital. The major activity of this period is R&D. Because of high risks of R&D activities, investors may terminate the cooperation with entrepreneur too early, bringing underinvestment problem. On the basis of quantitative analyzation and Matlab simulation, the author points that long-term equity contract can resolve the problem well. However, for China, due to the underdevelopment of venture capital industry, the government play an important role in enterprise innovation investment. Because of soft budget of government, much money are wasted in the bad projects. The author believe that debt contract is much better to government which act as investor to innovation enterprise.
Chapter 4 goes to the problem faced by growing period of technology company ------
overinvestment. When a technology company enters growing period, its major task is to commercialize R&D fruit. At this period, debt is a major financing resource for technological company. According to capital structure theory, debt will stimulate overinvestment phenomenon. So technological company will take more risks when commercializing R&D fruits. Taking the R&D commercialization decision as an real option, the author point that debt with a call option can alleviate the problem.
Chapter 5 points that when technological company enters into maturing period, it will go to public market to get money. According to asymmetric information theory, the information known by outside investors is much less than insiders. This will result in depreciation of securities price, then produce underinvestment problem. The author gives a securities design framework to resolve the problem. This chapter also study the dividend policy of listed China technological companies.
Chapter 6 is the empirical study of capital structure of listed Chinese technological companies. I found that earning capacity, asset characteristics, groth potential etc. affect capital structure obviously. But the affecting direction is different from the abroad study results.
论文第二章对现代资本结构理论进行梳理，将现代资本结构理论划分为权衡理论、代理成本理论、信息不对称理论和财务契约理论四个主要分支理论，对企业资本结构的形成以及可能产生的问题分别进行述评，本章是讨论以后几章问题的理论基础。
论文第三章探讨科技型企业在初创期融资时的特征，指出当企业主要从事R&D活动时，其融资渠道主要是私人权益市场。由于R&D活动的高风险性以及双方对项目信息的不对称性，投资者出于保护自己的目的，往往过早中止投资。于是，创业者和投资者之间最主要的问题是解决企业的投资不足问题。投资者对项目能否成功的信念直接影响其投资的时间长度，为了使创业者和投资者都付出最优努力，通过长期股权合约或长期债权合约的设计，将达到缓解双边道德风险问题的目的，从而减少对R&D活动的投资不足。
论文第四章分析科技型企业在成长期的融资特征，指出在这一阶段科技型企业的首要任务是选择恰当时机进行研发成果商业化。由于企业的资本结构在这一阶段已经引入债务，由此引发了这一阶段的主要问题是投资过度。本文引入实物期权方法，将企业的研发成果商业化过程看成是企业的一个期权，定量地分析了债务对科技型企业研发成果商业化的影响，得出债务使科技型企业投资过度的结论。而通过债务契约的设计与改进，可以达到缓解投资过度的目的。
论文第五章分析科技型企业在成熟期的融资特征，这一阶段的企业的融资渠道主要是公开资本市场。由于公开资本市场投资者对企业了解程度低于内部经营者。因此，按照“柠檬市场效应”理论，市场将低估企业发行的证券价格，因此，科技型企业再一次面临投资不足问题。通过设计具有特定得益图形的证券组合可以使特定类型的企业向市场发出信号，从而缓解证券过低定价矛盾，减少投资不足。本章还考察了中国科技型企业的股利政策特征，发现股利数量并不与企业未来盈利呈正向关系。
论文第六章对中国上市科技型企业的资本结构作了实证分析，发现企业的盈利能力、固定资产规模、成长能力、非债务性税盾、管理层和内部职工持股比例、企业规模等因素都能对企业的资本结构产生影响，但影响效果和国外研究结果有所差别。
本论文是以科技与资本的如何实现良性结合为出发点的，详细考察了科技型企业在其各个发展阶段的资金问题与对策，其研究结论对于当前创新型社会的建设有一定借鉴意义。发展科技型企业不能仅注重对资金的取得，还要时刻关注资金的运用情况，提高资金使用效率，实现技术和资本的良性结合。
Technology companies are important to enhancing international competitiveness of a country. To achieve this goal, technology must be integrated with capital properly. In the development of technology companies, there are two questions to be solved: one is how to get money, the other is how to make full use of the money. Though these two questions exist all through the lifetime of technology, they display different characteristics and need different resolutions. This dissertation analyzes how technology companies financing and the capital structures in start-up period, growing period and mature period quantitatively. And the dissertation also analyzes how the financing behaviors affect the investment decision of technology companies. To maximize the value of the company, the dissertation put forward corresponding resolutions in different periods.
Chapter 2 is a survey of capital structure theory. Capital structure theory can be divided into agency cost theory, asymmetric information theory and financial contract theory. This chapter is the theoritical foundation of the dissertation.
Chapter 3 analyzes the financing characteristics of start-up technology company. The main financing resource for this period is private equity especially venture capital. The major activity of this period is R&D. Because of high risks of R&D activities, investors may terminate the cooperation with entrepreneur too early, bringing underinvestment problem. On the basis of quantitative analyzation and Matlab simulation, the author points that long-term equity contract can resolve the problem well. However, for China, due to the underdevelopment of venture capital industry, the government play an important role in enterprise innovation investment. Because of soft budget of government, much money are wasted in the bad projects. The author believe that debt contract is much better to government which act as investor to innovation enterprise.
Chapter 4 goes to the problem faced by growing period of technology company ------
overinvestment. When a technology company enters growing period, its major task is to commercialize R&D fruit. At this period, debt is a major financing resource for technological company. According to capital structure theory, debt will stimulate overinvestment phenomenon. So technological company will take more risks when commercializing R&D fruits. Taking the R&D commercialization decision as an real option, the author point that debt with a call option can alleviate the problem.
Chapter 5 points that when technological company enters into maturing period, it will go to public market to get money. According to asymmetric information theory, the information known by outside investors is much less than insiders. This will result in depreciation of securities price, then produce underinvestment problem. The author gives a securities design framework to resolve the problem. This chapter also study the dividend policy of listed China technological companies.
Chapter 6 is the empirical study of capital structure of listed Chinese technological companies. I found that earning capacity, asset characteristics, groth potential etc. affect capital structure obviously. But the affecting direction is different from the abroad study results.
引文
1 http://www.sts.org.cn/fxyj/zcfx/documents/zcfxR&D.htm
2 http://www.most.gov.cn/kjjr/kjjrlt/index.htm
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