上市公司小股东权益有效代理机制研究
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摘要
一直以来,传统的公司治理理论都是基于股权分散的现代公司特征而致力于解决管理者与股东的委托代理问题。随着理论研究和实证分析的进行,许多学者研究发现,对大部分国家的公司而言,股权集中度远远超过了以前的预期,这就决定了这些上市公司治理所要解决的突出问题与股权分散化的上市公司不同,因两权分离而引发的代理问题的重心由股东与经理层之间的利益冲突转向控制性股东与中小投资者之间的利益冲突。在公司所有权集中的情况下,控制性股东与小股东之间的关系代表了最重要的委托—代理问题。在此类委托代理关系中,从信息经济学角度来看,控制性股东作为信息知情者而成为代理人,由于其在公司中有着更多的利益,因此便有了监督的激励,而中小股东作为信息不知情者则成为委托人。理论和实证研究都表明,控制性股东的存在有利于解决所有者和经营者的代理问题,但却同时产生了对小股东利益的侵害。
在我国证券市场十多年的发展历史中,大股东利用所有权通过内幕交易、操纵股市、恶意炒作、散布虚假信息等手段侵害小股东利益的事件屡屡发生。从理性角度分析,小股东受到大股东侵害并不能通过市场和法律手段来维护自己的权益时,仍参与资本市场的可能解释便是投机,甚至于想方设法同流合污,谋求通过内幕信息获得超额利益的机会。因此,小股东之所以能够忍受这种不公平并一直停留在市场,在于这种不公平的交易过于频繁,“黑吃黑”,带来了资本市场的混乱。而那些无奈的小股东对资本市场失去信心,只好退出市场,导致资本市场萎缩。因此,对控制性股东与小股东代理问题进行深刻研究,不仅是公司治理所要解决的问题,亦是促进我国资本市场健康发展的根本所在,有着重要的理论和现实意义。
许多学者也就这一问题提出了很多保护小股东权益的对策和建议,但本文认为要有效解决问题必须建立在对问题全面系统的分析和认识的基础之上,弄清事情的来龙去脉才能“对症下药”。基于此,本文通过深刻剖析上市公司控制性股东与小股东的委托代理关系,研究他们在公司治理中所扮演的角色及作用机理,从公司治理的微观层面探索小股东权益的有效代理机制,为有效解决大小股东的委托代理问题提供具有可操作性的解决思路。需要说明的是,本文所指的有效代理机制,并不是说要废除大小股东的委托代理关系、重新给小股东寻找不与其存在利益冲突的代理人,而是在不改变现行大小股东委托代理格局的情况下,通过公司治理中相关机制的优化和作用来完善大小股东委托代理制度使其更有效。
本文首先利用委托代理理论深刻分析了存在于大小股东之间的隐性委托代理关系,揭示了上市公司大股东在代表全体股东监督经营者的过程中侵害小股东利益的机理,并全面分析了大小股东利益冲突的内外原因:制度安排、监督缺失等使大股东获得膨胀的控制权及小股东在权力配置中受到的歧视,为大股东侵占小股东权益创造了可行的空间,而大股东和经营者的合谋才使得大股东攫取控制权收益的动机成为了现实。其次,利用2003—2004年间发生的国有股协议转让的93个股权交易有效样本,从实证的角度对大小股东委托代理关系的无效性进行了测度,并对影响控制权私有收益的因素进行了分解和相关的检验。最后,基于理论和实证分析从公司治理的内部环境出发,提出完善小股东权益有效代理机制的股权制衡和监督机制。由几个共同分享控制权的大股东构成控制联盟,通过内部牵制,使得任何一个大股东都无法单独控制企业的决策,达到大股东间权力的制衡,同时配合学者所倡导的累积投票表决制、股东表决权代理与信托、股东代位诉讼制度、大股东对小股东利益承诺制度等的实行与完善,达到限制控制性股东过于膨胀的控制权和保障小股东享有必要的剩余控制权,保证权利在各个参与主体之间的合理分配和有效制衡。另一方面,通过构建独立董事协会,使得独立董事在代表小股东监督大股东、董事会及经理人的过程中发挥积极作用,遏制大股东和经营者合谋攫取控制权收益的动机,最终改善大小股东委托代理关系中的弊端,使得小股东权益的委托代理机制更有效。
The traditional corporate governance theory is based the dispersed ownership has been trying to address the agency problem beween stockholders and managers. With the strengthening of normative research and positive research, many scholars found that most enterprises'ownership are not highly dispersed but quite concentrated in the world,therefore the focus of the agency problem , which is caused by the seperation between ownership ans control,turns from interest conflicts beween stockholders and managers to those beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders , which is the focus of the agency problem .In such principal-agent relations, controlling shareholders own information have become agents, they have more benefits that motive them to be supervision in the company. In the other hand ,small shareholders have little information become clients, normative and positive studies show that controlling shareholders is conducive to resolve the agency problems of owners and operators , but it give rise to encroach on minority stockholders' interests.
In the history of China's securities market for more than ten years, the cases that controlling stockholders expropriate minority stockholders' interests by trading insider, manipulating stock market, and other means of spreading false information emerge in large numbers. In the view of Rationality ,the explanation of the cases that small shareholders cannot protect their own rights and interests by the market and legal means when they are expropriated by large shareholders and still participate in the capital market is speculation, and even way of colluding insider information to obtain the Excess interests. Therefore, the small shareholders cannot tolerate this unfair and has been staying because of this frequent unfair trading, which has brought the capital market confusion. Those helpless minority shareholders lost confidence in the capital market, had to withdraw from the market, lead to the capital market shrink. Therefore, a deep study of the agency problem beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders is not only the problem of corporate governance, but also the problem Related to the healthy growth of the capital market, has the important theoretical and practical significance.
Many scholars also puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to protect minority shareholders' interests, but we believe the effective solution to the problem must be based on comprehensive analysis and understanding of the problem .based on the above opinion,this paper Profoundly analyze the agency relation beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders, Research the role they play in corporate governance .the thesis explore the effective agency mechanism to protect small shareholders' rights and interests from the points of views of corporate goveraance,puts forward Feasible Solutions to Solve the agency problem beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders. It should be pointed out, the effective agency mechanism referred is not to say that the agency relations between large shareholders and small shareholders should be abolished, to reconsider the agents of small shareholders who never conflict with the cliets, but in such circumstances of the existing agency pattern, through optimizing other mechanisms of corporate governance to improve the agency system and make it more effective.
In accordance with the principal-agent theory, this paper first profoundly analyze the invisible relation beween controlling stockholders and minor stockholders,explain the Mechanism that major shareholders in listed companies expropriate small shareholders 'interests in the process of Oversight operators on behalf of all shareholders, and comprehensively analyze the internal and external reasons of the interest Conflict between large and small shareholders:Institutional arrangements, and lack of supervision make major shareholders' control expanse and small shareholders discriminated in the distribution of power, which create a viable space for major shareholders to Occupate the small shareholders 'interests, the majority shareholder and the operator's collusion make major shareholders' motivation to grab benefits of control become a reality. Secondly, In the period of 2003—2004, 93 cases concerning the transaction of state-owned share and legal share have occurred in the two stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen. We take these cases as our research effect samples,from the perspective of the positive studies measure the invalidity of agency relations between large shareholders and small shareholders, The authors then conduct the multi-variable linear regression analysis on the factors influencing benefits of control. Finally, based on the above normative and positive analysis ,the paper puts forward the optimal ownership structure and oversight mechanisms to improve small shareholders' effective mechanism from the perspective of the internal governance of listed companies. Several majority shareholders shape a control union that prevent any individual shareholder to make the decision controlling the enterprise and achieve an equilibrium between the shareholders'right through Internal contain, at the same time, cope with the cumulative voting, voting right agency and voting right trust, the shareholders'agency lawsuit, senior partners'fiduciary obligation advocated by scholars to limit the expansion of majority shareholders'control and protect small shareholders' necessary remaining control, to achieve the rational allocation and effective balances between all shareholders'right. On the other hand, through Constructing the Association of independent directors, make independent directors on behalf of minority shareholders play an active role in the process of supervising large shareholders, the board of directors and managers, curb the majority shareholder and the operator's collusion motivation to grab control benefits, and ultimately improve the defects of the principal-agent relations between large shareholders and small shareholders , making the agency mechanism of minority shareholders' interests more effective.
在我国证券市场十多年的发展历史中,大股东利用所有权通过内幕交易、操纵股市、恶意炒作、散布虚假信息等手段侵害小股东利益的事件屡屡发生。从理性角度分析,小股东受到大股东侵害并不能通过市场和法律手段来维护自己的权益时,仍参与资本市场的可能解释便是投机,甚至于想方设法同流合污,谋求通过内幕信息获得超额利益的机会。因此,小股东之所以能够忍受这种不公平并一直停留在市场,在于这种不公平的交易过于频繁,“黑吃黑”,带来了资本市场的混乱。而那些无奈的小股东对资本市场失去信心,只好退出市场,导致资本市场萎缩。因此,对控制性股东与小股东代理问题进行深刻研究,不仅是公司治理所要解决的问题,亦是促进我国资本市场健康发展的根本所在,有着重要的理论和现实意义。
许多学者也就这一问题提出了很多保护小股东权益的对策和建议,但本文认为要有效解决问题必须建立在对问题全面系统的分析和认识的基础之上,弄清事情的来龙去脉才能“对症下药”。基于此,本文通过深刻剖析上市公司控制性股东与小股东的委托代理关系,研究他们在公司治理中所扮演的角色及作用机理,从公司治理的微观层面探索小股东权益的有效代理机制,为有效解决大小股东的委托代理问题提供具有可操作性的解决思路。需要说明的是,本文所指的有效代理机制,并不是说要废除大小股东的委托代理关系、重新给小股东寻找不与其存在利益冲突的代理人,而是在不改变现行大小股东委托代理格局的情况下,通过公司治理中相关机制的优化和作用来完善大小股东委托代理制度使其更有效。
本文首先利用委托代理理论深刻分析了存在于大小股东之间的隐性委托代理关系,揭示了上市公司大股东在代表全体股东监督经营者的过程中侵害小股东利益的机理,并全面分析了大小股东利益冲突的内外原因:制度安排、监督缺失等使大股东获得膨胀的控制权及小股东在权力配置中受到的歧视,为大股东侵占小股东权益创造了可行的空间,而大股东和经营者的合谋才使得大股东攫取控制权收益的动机成为了现实。其次,利用2003—2004年间发生的国有股协议转让的93个股权交易有效样本,从实证的角度对大小股东委托代理关系的无效性进行了测度,并对影响控制权私有收益的因素进行了分解和相关的检验。最后,基于理论和实证分析从公司治理的内部环境出发,提出完善小股东权益有效代理机制的股权制衡和监督机制。由几个共同分享控制权的大股东构成控制联盟,通过内部牵制,使得任何一个大股东都无法单独控制企业的决策,达到大股东间权力的制衡,同时配合学者所倡导的累积投票表决制、股东表决权代理与信托、股东代位诉讼制度、大股东对小股东利益承诺制度等的实行与完善,达到限制控制性股东过于膨胀的控制权和保障小股东享有必要的剩余控制权,保证权利在各个参与主体之间的合理分配和有效制衡。另一方面,通过构建独立董事协会,使得独立董事在代表小股东监督大股东、董事会及经理人的过程中发挥积极作用,遏制大股东和经营者合谋攫取控制权收益的动机,最终改善大小股东委托代理关系中的弊端,使得小股东权益的委托代理机制更有效。
The traditional corporate governance theory is based the dispersed ownership has been trying to address the agency problem beween stockholders and managers. With the strengthening of normative research and positive research, many scholars found that most enterprises'ownership are not highly dispersed but quite concentrated in the world,therefore the focus of the agency problem , which is caused by the seperation between ownership ans control,turns from interest conflicts beween stockholders and managers to those beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders , which is the focus of the agency problem .In such principal-agent relations, controlling shareholders own information have become agents, they have more benefits that motive them to be supervision in the company. In the other hand ,small shareholders have little information become clients, normative and positive studies show that controlling shareholders is conducive to resolve the agency problems of owners and operators , but it give rise to encroach on minority stockholders' interests.
In the history of China's securities market for more than ten years, the cases that controlling stockholders expropriate minority stockholders' interests by trading insider, manipulating stock market, and other means of spreading false information emerge in large numbers. In the view of Rationality ,the explanation of the cases that small shareholders cannot protect their own rights and interests by the market and legal means when they are expropriated by large shareholders and still participate in the capital market is speculation, and even way of colluding insider information to obtain the Excess interests. Therefore, the small shareholders cannot tolerate this unfair and has been staying because of this frequent unfair trading, which has brought the capital market confusion. Those helpless minority shareholders lost confidence in the capital market, had to withdraw from the market, lead to the capital market shrink. Therefore, a deep study of the agency problem beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders is not only the problem of corporate governance, but also the problem Related to the healthy growth of the capital market, has the important theoretical and practical significance.
Many scholars also puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to protect minority shareholders' interests, but we believe the effective solution to the problem must be based on comprehensive analysis and understanding of the problem .based on the above opinion,this paper Profoundly analyze the agency relation beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders, Research the role they play in corporate governance .the thesis explore the effective agency mechanism to protect small shareholders' rights and interests from the points of views of corporate goveraance,puts forward Feasible Solutions to Solve the agency problem beween controlling stockholders and minority stockholders. It should be pointed out, the effective agency mechanism referred is not to say that the agency relations between large shareholders and small shareholders should be abolished, to reconsider the agents of small shareholders who never conflict with the cliets, but in such circumstances of the existing agency pattern, through optimizing other mechanisms of corporate governance to improve the agency system and make it more effective.
In accordance with the principal-agent theory, this paper first profoundly analyze the invisible relation beween controlling stockholders and minor stockholders,explain the Mechanism that major shareholders in listed companies expropriate small shareholders 'interests in the process of Oversight operators on behalf of all shareholders, and comprehensively analyze the internal and external reasons of the interest Conflict between large and small shareholders:Institutional arrangements, and lack of supervision make major shareholders' control expanse and small shareholders discriminated in the distribution of power, which create a viable space for major shareholders to Occupate the small shareholders 'interests, the majority shareholder and the operator's collusion make major shareholders' motivation to grab benefits of control become a reality. Secondly, In the period of 2003—2004, 93 cases concerning the transaction of state-owned share and legal share have occurred in the two stock markets of Shanghai and Shenzhen. We take these cases as our research effect samples,from the perspective of the positive studies measure the invalidity of agency relations between large shareholders and small shareholders, The authors then conduct the multi-variable linear regression analysis on the factors influencing benefits of control. Finally, based on the above normative and positive analysis ,the paper puts forward the optimal ownership structure and oversight mechanisms to improve small shareholders' effective mechanism from the perspective of the internal governance of listed companies. Several majority shareholders shape a control union that prevent any individual shareholder to make the decision controlling the enterprise and achieve an equilibrium between the shareholders'right through Internal contain, at the same time, cope with the cumulative voting, voting right agency and voting right trust, the shareholders'agency lawsuit, senior partners'fiduciary obligation advocated by scholars to limit the expansion of majority shareholders'control and protect small shareholders' necessary remaining control, to achieve the rational allocation and effective balances between all shareholders'right. On the other hand, through Constructing the Association of independent directors, make independent directors on behalf of minority shareholders play an active role in the process of supervising large shareholders, the board of directors and managers, curb the majority shareholder and the operator's collusion motivation to grab control benefits, and ultimately improve the defects of the principal-agent relations between large shareholders and small shareholders , making the agency mechanism of minority shareholders' interests more effective.
引文
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