上市公司对外担保行为研究
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摘要
本文通过统计分析深市样本公司2005-2006年报中有关担保数据,对中国上市公司对外提供担保的现状及统计特征进行分析,以期分析发现上市公司提供对外担保存在的反常现象以及出现的新特征。其次,实证分析了股权结构对上市公司对外提供对外担保水平产生的影响。最后,根据上述分析,提出对策和建议,从而期望能对市场监管者的监管、报表使用者的决策等提供帮助。
本文的主要发现有:首先,从上市公司的实际控制人角度来分析,相对于上市公司实际控制人性质为国有时,性质为非国有时更倾向于对外提供担保和过度担保,分析了控制人的利益趋同与利益侵占效应,发现当股权越集中,控股股东持股比例高时,上市公司越不容易发生对外担保与过度担保。而持股比例较低,股权较分散时,上市公司控股股东越倾向于运用过度担保掏空上市公司,此外从两权分离的角度考察了实际控制人所有权与控制权分离对上市公司对外担保的影响,发现当实际控制人两权分离越严重时,上市公司越容易发生对外过度担保。其次,从其他股东对上市公司对外担保和对外过度担保的制衡的角度分析了第二大股东对控股股东的制衡作用以及流通股股东,外资股股东对上市公司对外担保决策的影响作用,得出了以下结论:股权制衡度只在国有控制的上市公司中起到制衡作用,而外资股比例越大,上市公司对外担保以及过度担保发生可能性越小。流通股比例越大,上市公司对外担保发生的可能性越小,而与上市公司过度担保的发生相关性不显著。最后,考察了公司财务状况、公司规模以及年度变量对上市公司对外担保的影响,发现越是财务状况差的公司越倾向于对外提供担保与对外过度担保。公司规模对上市公司对外担保情况影响不显著。实证发现2006年上市公司对外担保情况比2005年对外担保情况有所好转。说明相关制度与法规的实施对上市公司对外担保起到了一定的规范作用。
According to Statistical analysis of External Guaranty of Shenzhen stock market in 2005 and 2006.,the author found the abnormal phenomenon feature of providing capital guarantee and expose external guaranty will bring what kinds of risks to the listed company. this paper empirical analyzes the affecting to guarantee behavior from the feature of equity structure, then advances countermeasures and suggestions to help Market Supervision and the financial reports user
This paper mainly found that: (1) ownership structure significantly influences corporation guarantee behavior. There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and guarantee behavior. The probability of guarantee behavior of non-state-owned corporations is higher than that of corporations controlled by state. At the same time, the author analyzed the convergence of interest and Benefit Expropriation of the control person and find that the higher the ownership concentration and the controlling stock proportion of Controlling Shareholder is, the more difficult the guarantise and the over-guaranties will happen, the more serious separation of two rights is, the easier the over-guarantis will happen.(2)The influence of ownership balancing mechanism on guarantee behavior is different in corporations of different types of ultimate controlling shareholders. In state-owned corporations, there is a positive relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index in non-state-owned corporations. And the lager foreign capital share proportion is, the smaller the possibility of providing guaranties and over-guarantis ia. the lager current share proportion is, the smaller the possibility of providing guarantis is. But the relationship between the current share propotion and over-guarantis is not significant.(3) the author investigated the effect of financial situation, firm size and annual variables to guarantee behavior.founding that the worth financial situation of list company is, the more serious the guarantis and over-guarantis will happen. the relationship between the firm size and over-guarantis is not significant. Empirical results show that the situation in 2006 of providing guarantise and over-guarantise is better than which in 2005, there is Important Standardization Role of Implementation rules and regulation to Guarantee Behaviors of China's Listed Corporations.
本文的主要发现有:首先,从上市公司的实际控制人角度来分析,相对于上市公司实际控制人性质为国有时,性质为非国有时更倾向于对外提供担保和过度担保,分析了控制人的利益趋同与利益侵占效应,发现当股权越集中,控股股东持股比例高时,上市公司越不容易发生对外担保与过度担保。而持股比例较低,股权较分散时,上市公司控股股东越倾向于运用过度担保掏空上市公司,此外从两权分离的角度考察了实际控制人所有权与控制权分离对上市公司对外担保的影响,发现当实际控制人两权分离越严重时,上市公司越容易发生对外过度担保。其次,从其他股东对上市公司对外担保和对外过度担保的制衡的角度分析了第二大股东对控股股东的制衡作用以及流通股股东,外资股股东对上市公司对外担保决策的影响作用,得出了以下结论:股权制衡度只在国有控制的上市公司中起到制衡作用,而外资股比例越大,上市公司对外担保以及过度担保发生可能性越小。流通股比例越大,上市公司对外担保发生的可能性越小,而与上市公司过度担保的发生相关性不显著。最后,考察了公司财务状况、公司规模以及年度变量对上市公司对外担保的影响,发现越是财务状况差的公司越倾向于对外提供担保与对外过度担保。公司规模对上市公司对外担保情况影响不显著。实证发现2006年上市公司对外担保情况比2005年对外担保情况有所好转。说明相关制度与法规的实施对上市公司对外担保起到了一定的规范作用。
According to Statistical analysis of External Guaranty of Shenzhen stock market in 2005 and 2006.,the author found the abnormal phenomenon feature of providing capital guarantee and expose external guaranty will bring what kinds of risks to the listed company. this paper empirical analyzes the affecting to guarantee behavior from the feature of equity structure, then advances countermeasures and suggestions to help Market Supervision and the financial reports user
This paper mainly found that: (1) ownership structure significantly influences corporation guarantee behavior. There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration and guarantee behavior. The probability of guarantee behavior of non-state-owned corporations is higher than that of corporations controlled by state. At the same time, the author analyzed the convergence of interest and Benefit Expropriation of the control person and find that the higher the ownership concentration and the controlling stock proportion of Controlling Shareholder is, the more difficult the guarantise and the over-guaranties will happen, the more serious separation of two rights is, the easier the over-guarantis will happen.(2)The influence of ownership balancing mechanism on guarantee behavior is different in corporations of different types of ultimate controlling shareholders. In state-owned corporations, there is a positive relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between overage guaranteeing and Z index in non-state-owned corporations. And the lager foreign capital share proportion is, the smaller the possibility of providing guaranties and over-guarantis ia. the lager current share proportion is, the smaller the possibility of providing guarantis is. But the relationship between the current share propotion and over-guarantis is not significant.(3) the author investigated the effect of financial situation, firm size and annual variables to guarantee behavior.founding that the worth financial situation of list company is, the more serious the guarantis and over-guarantis will happen. the relationship between the firm size and over-guarantis is not significant. Empirical results show that the situation in 2006 of providing guarantise and over-guarantise is better than which in 2005, there is Important Standardization Role of Implementation rules and regulation to Guarantee Behaviors of China's Listed Corporations.
引文
[1] Triantis George G. 1992. Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information [J]. Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 225-258.
[2] J.E. Stiglitz, A. Weiss.1981.Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information [J]. The American Economic Review, 71, 383-410.
[3] H. C. Wette.1983.Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information Note [J]. The American Economic Review, 73, (3), 442-445.
[4] W. A. Boot, A. V. Thakor, G. F. Udell.1991.Secured Lending Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results [J]. The Economic Journal, 101, (4), 458-471.
[5] Morck R, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny.1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20, 293-315.
[6] Michael C. Jensen.1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J].The Journal of Finance, 48, (3), 831-880.
[7] Demsetz Harold, Lehn Kenneth.1985.The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 93, (6), 1155-1177.
[8] LaPorta, R., and L. S. Florencio. 1999. The Benefit s of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics (4), 1193-1294.
[9] Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart .1980. Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.
[10] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
[11]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题——来自中国上市公司的证据[EB/01]. 2004.工作稿. http://www.ncer.tsinghua.edu.cn/lunwen/paper2/wp200415.doc
[12]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005,(4):77-86
[13]李增泉,孙铮,任强.公司的股利政策与所有权结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(12):48-93
[14]贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送和投资者保护[Z].2004.中山大学工作论文.
[15]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12):3-13
[16]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2005,(9):44-50
[17]朱媚.关联担保、隧道效应与公司价值[J].中国工业经济,2007,(5):28-34
[18]刘娜.基于公司治理视角的上市公司关联担保问题研究.[硕士学位论文].广东:暨南大学,2006年.
[19]王立彦,林小驰.上市公司对外担保行为的股权结构特征解析.南开管理评论,2007,(1):62-69
[20]陈宏.中国上市公司对外担保行为研究.[博士学位论文].福建:厦门大学,2006年
[21]冯根福,马亚军,姚树洁.中国上市公司担保行为的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2005, (3):13-21
[22]王力军.金字塔结构控制、投资者保护与公司价值---来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据.财贸研究,2008,(4):74-82
[23]张祥建,刘建军,徐晋.大股东终极控制与掠夺行为研究[J].当代经济科学,2004,(9):60-64
[24]许小年,王燕,梁能.中国上市公司的所有所有制结构与公司治理[A].公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[C].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000
[25]张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000, (4): 34-44
[26]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005,(1):63-85
[27]鹿小楠,张卫东.中国民营上市公司发展研究[R].上证研究.2004,(2)
[28]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京:中国发展出版社.2005
[29]周蝶飞,郑远民.论我国上市公司对外担保风险防范制度的完善.现代商业,2008,(15):35-38
[30]陈世文,吴静,熊建设.试论上市公司对外担保的风险及规避方法.中国市场,2008, (13):52-53
[2] J.E. Stiglitz, A. Weiss.1981.Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information [J]. The American Economic Review, 71, 383-410.
[3] H. C. Wette.1983.Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information Note [J]. The American Economic Review, 73, (3), 442-445.
[4] W. A. Boot, A. V. Thakor, G. F. Udell.1991.Secured Lending Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results [J]. The Economic Journal, 101, (4), 458-471.
[5] Morck R, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny.1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20, 293-315.
[6] Michael C. Jensen.1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J].The Journal of Finance, 48, (3), 831-880.
[7] Demsetz Harold, Lehn Kenneth.1985.The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 93, (6), 1155-1177.
[8] LaPorta, R., and L. S. Florencio. 1999. The Benefit s of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics (4), 1193-1294.
[9] Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart .1980. Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation [J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.
[10] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
[11]余明桂,夏新平.控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题——来自中国上市公司的证据[EB/01]. 2004.工作稿. http://www.ncer.tsinghua.edu.cn/lunwen/paper2/wp200415.doc
[12]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据[J].经济研究,2005,(4):77-86
[13]李增泉,孙铮,任强.公司的股利政策与所有权结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国会计与财务研究,2004,(12):48-93
[14]贺建刚,刘峰.大股东控制、利益输送和投资者保护[Z].2004.中山大学工作论文.
[15]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004,(12):3-13
[16]马曙光,黄志忠,薛云奎.股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策[J].会计研究,2005,(9):44-50
[17]朱媚.关联担保、隧道效应与公司价值[J].中国工业经济,2007,(5):28-34
[18]刘娜.基于公司治理视角的上市公司关联担保问题研究.[硕士学位论文].广东:暨南大学,2006年.
[19]王立彦,林小驰.上市公司对外担保行为的股权结构特征解析.南开管理评论,2007,(1):62-69
[20]陈宏.中国上市公司对外担保行为研究.[博士学位论文].福建:厦门大学,2006年
[21]冯根福,马亚军,姚树洁.中国上市公司担保行为的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2005, (3):13-21
[22]王力军.金字塔结构控制、投资者保护与公司价值---来自我国民营上市公司的经验证据.财贸研究,2008,(4):74-82
[23]张祥建,刘建军,徐晋.大股东终极控制与掠夺行为研究[J].当代经济科学,2004,(9):60-64
[24]许小年,王燕,梁能.中国上市公司的所有所有制结构与公司治理[A].公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验[C].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000
[25]张红军.中国上市公司股权结构与公司绩效的理论及实证分析[J].经济科学,2000, (4): 34-44
[26]唐清泉,罗党论,王莉.大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,2005,(1):63-85
[27]鹿小楠,张卫东.中国民营上市公司发展研究[R].上证研究.2004,(2)
[28]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京:中国发展出版社.2005
[29]周蝶飞,郑远民.论我国上市公司对外担保风险防范制度的完善.现代商业,2008,(15):35-38
[30]陈世文,吴静,熊建设.试论上市公司对外担保的风险及规避方法.中国市场,2008, (13):52-53