中国上市公司资本结构影响因素研究
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摘要
资本结构理论始终是财务学中最具有争议的课题之一。Myers(1984)在《资本结构之谜》一文中说道，“公司如何选择它们的资本结构?我们不知道……。我们对资本结构知之甚少。我们不知道公司如何选择发行债券、股票或混合证券”。
中国上市公司的资本结构影响因素之迷“更令人困惑”。中国上市公司存在一种特殊的制度环境。比如，股权结构较独特、投资者法律保护不健全、资本市场发展不平衡、公司治理机制有缺陷等。那么，究竟哪些因素影响中国上市公司资本结构选择?西方资本结构理论是否对中国上市公司的融资行为具有解释能力?制度环境如何通过公司特征因素影响资本结构选择?宏观经济因素、行业因素是否显著影响资本结构选择?诸如此类的种种问题，有待理论分析和实证检验。
纵观相关文献，国内学者对中国上市公司资本结构影响因素的研究存在以下问题：(1) 在研究方法上，多数研究者采用简单横截面进行“快照”框架静态回归技术，而资本结构的本质是动态的，因此应该在一个动态框架内进行分析；(2) 没有控制时间特征因素，如利息率和通货膨胀等可观察或不可观察的宏观经济因素；(3)没有控制不可观察的公司特征因素，如管理层的能力，动机和对待风险的态度等；(4)缺乏对公司治理结构如何影响资本结构选择的理论和实证分析，如股权结构、董事会特征、CEO任期和公司控制权市场等；(5) 缺乏对中国上市公司资本结构制度背景的深入研究。
为此，本文集中研究中国上市公司资本结构的影响因素，并探讨中国上市公司的融资行为或偏好。首先构建双向效应动态调整模型(Two-way effects dynamic adjustment model)，在控制时间特征效应和不可观察的公司特征效应下，首次从动态视角研究公司规模、资产构成、非债务税盾、实际税率、成长机会、资产流动性、产品独特性、财务困境成本和产生内部资源能力等公司特征因素如何影响中国上市公司资本结构选择。其次采用因子分析模型研究中国上市公司治理结构对资本结构选择的影响，如股权结构、董事会特征、CEO任期和公司控制权市场等。全文共分八章。
第一章导论。论述研究背景及意义、主要内容及框架、理论基础及研究方法、改进和创新以及相关术语的定义。
中国上市公司资本结构影响因素研究—理论和证据
第二章资本结构理论综述。着重介绍静态权衡理论、代理理论、信息不对称理
论、公司控制权理论、市场时机理论等资本结构理论的主要观点，为分析中国上市
公司资本结构影响因素提供理论依据。
第三章资本结构影响因素实证研究文献回顾。对国内外资本结构影响因素实证
研究文献进行回顾，评价现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，掌握国内外研究动态，并
为相关变量的定义提供依据。
第四章中国上市公司资本结构制度背景分析。对中国上市公司资本结构制度背
景进行分析，以便为解释中国上市公司资本结构选择提供现实背景和理论依据，有
利于我们深入理解资本结构影响因素背后的制度背景。
第五章中国上市资本结构特征分析。对中国上市公司资本结构的总体特征进行
分析，并与其他国家公司资本结构特征进行比较。主要从平均资产负债表、融资结
构趋势、融资行为和行业特征等方面进行分析，以便对中国上市公司的财务行为有
个整体的认识和把握。
第六章公司特征因素影响资本结构选择的理论和实证分析。根据资本结构理论
模型，对影响资本结构选择的公司特征因素(包括公司规模、资产构成、非债务税
盾、实际税率、成长性、资产流动性、产品独特性和产生内部资源能力等)进行理
论分析，构建双向效应动态调整模型，采用中国非金融上市公司的面板数据，从动
态视角研究中国上市公司资本结构选择。
第七章公司治理结构影响资本结构选择的理论和实证研究。结合中国的制度背
景，对中国上市公司治理结构如何影响资本结构选择进行理论分析，应用因子分析
模型，采用中国上市公司的横截面数据，实证检验中国上市公司治理结构对资本结
构选择的影响。
第八章结论与政策性建议。在以上各章分析的基础上，总结论文的主要结论，
并根据本研究所得到的结果，为中国上市公司资本结构的优化、政府部门相关政策的
制定、上市公司财务政策的制定和公司治理结构的设计提供政策性建议。
通过理论分析和实证研究，作者发现:(1)中国上市公司具有强烈的股权融资
偏好。在资本结构中，负债比重偏低:在负债到期结构中，流动负债比重偏高，长
期负债比重偏低，而且杠杆的账面比率大大高于市场比率;(2)不同门类行业间的
资本结构存在显著差异。同一行业门类内不同行业大类公司之间的资本结构不存在
论文摘要
显著差异，受管制行业的资产负债率、流动负债率很低，但长期负债率较高;(3)
行业特征和宏观经济因素显著影响资本结构选择;(4)调整负债比率的交易成本(调
整成本)显著影响资本结构选择，但中国上市公司的债务调整成本小于美国和英国
等发达国家;(5)财务杠杆随着公司规模、固定资产比率、财务困境成本、实际税
率和产品独特性的增加而增加，随着公司未来成长价值、产生内部资源能力、资产
流动性、非债务税盾的增?
Capital structure theory is always one of the most controversial issues in finance.Myers (1984) in his paper "The Capital Structure Puzzle" pointed out, "How do
firms choose their capital structures? we don't know....... We know little about capital
structure. We do not know how firms choose the debt, equity or hybrid securities they issue."
The puzzle of determinants of capital structures for Chinese listed companies is "tougher". Given the special institutional environment such as unique ownership structure, imperfect legal protection to investors, unbalanced development of capital market and defective corporate governance mechanism etc, what factors should be responsible for the choice of capital structures of Chinese listed companies? Can western capital structure theory be used to explain financing ways of Chinese listed companies? How doses institutional environment affect capital structure choice through firm characteristics? Can macro-economy and industry factors significantly influence capital structure choice? All the above problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test.
Based on reviewing relevant literatures, the author finds that there are some problems existing in studying the determinants of capital structures of Chinese listed companies. First, most researchers adopted "snapshot" framed static state regression technique to study the cross sectional determinants of capital structure. However, the nature of capital structure is dynamic, it should be analyzed in a dynamic framework. Second, time-specific factors are omitted, such as interest rate, inflation and other macroeconomic factors that are observable or unobservable. Third, unobservable firm-specific factors are omitted, such as, managerial ability, motivation and attitude toward risk. Fourth, there is not theoretical and empirical analysis of how corporate governance affecting capital structure choice, such as ownership structure, governance of board of directors, CEO tenure, market for corporate control, legal environment etc. Finally, institutional environment of Chinese listed companies' capital structures has
not yet been deeply studied.
Therefore, the dissertation concentrates on studying the determinants of capital
structures of Chinese listed companies and investigates their financing ways or their preferences. First, the author constructs a two-way effects dynamic model, and studies how firm characteristics (including: firm size, asset structure, non-debt tax shields, effective tax ratio, growth opportunity, liquidity, uniqueness of the products, financial distress cost and the capacity to generate internal resources) affect the choice of capital structures of Chinese listed companies from a dynamic perspective for the first time by controlling time-specific effects and unobservable firm-specific effects. Then, the author applies factor analysis model to analyze how corporate governance structure affects capital structure choice. The whole dissertation is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 .Introduction.This chapter discusses about background, incentives, underlying theories, main content, methodology and framework. Definitions of relevant terms, improvements and innovations are also given.
Chapter 2, Review of capital structure theory. This chapter emphatically introduces to static trade-off theory, agency theory, information asymmetry theory, corporate control theory, and market timing theory etc, with the aim of providing theoretical basis for analyzing the determinants of capital structures of Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 3, Review of empirical literatures on the determinants of capital structure. The chapter reviews empirical literatures on the determinants of capital structure home and abroad, comments on the extant literatures, and provides foundation to define relevant variables.
Chapter 4, Analysis of institutional background of capital structures of Chinese listed companies. This chapter analyzes institutional background of capital structures of Chinese listed companies so as to provide rea
中国上市公司的资本结构影响因素之迷“更令人困惑”。中国上市公司存在一种特殊的制度环境。比如，股权结构较独特、投资者法律保护不健全、资本市场发展不平衡、公司治理机制有缺陷等。那么，究竟哪些因素影响中国上市公司资本结构选择?西方资本结构理论是否对中国上市公司的融资行为具有解释能力?制度环境如何通过公司特征因素影响资本结构选择?宏观经济因素、行业因素是否显著影响资本结构选择?诸如此类的种种问题，有待理论分析和实证检验。
纵观相关文献，国内学者对中国上市公司资本结构影响因素的研究存在以下问题：(1) 在研究方法上，多数研究者采用简单横截面进行“快照”框架静态回归技术，而资本结构的本质是动态的，因此应该在一个动态框架内进行分析；(2) 没有控制时间特征因素，如利息率和通货膨胀等可观察或不可观察的宏观经济因素；(3)没有控制不可观察的公司特征因素，如管理层的能力，动机和对待风险的态度等；(4)缺乏对公司治理结构如何影响资本结构选择的理论和实证分析，如股权结构、董事会特征、CEO任期和公司控制权市场等；(5) 缺乏对中国上市公司资本结构制度背景的深入研究。
为此，本文集中研究中国上市公司资本结构的影响因素，并探讨中国上市公司的融资行为或偏好。首先构建双向效应动态调整模型(Two-way effects dynamic adjustment model)，在控制时间特征效应和不可观察的公司特征效应下，首次从动态视角研究公司规模、资产构成、非债务税盾、实际税率、成长机会、资产流动性、产品独特性、财务困境成本和产生内部资源能力等公司特征因素如何影响中国上市公司资本结构选择。其次采用因子分析模型研究中国上市公司治理结构对资本结构选择的影响，如股权结构、董事会特征、CEO任期和公司控制权市场等。全文共分八章。
第一章导论。论述研究背景及意义、主要内容及框架、理论基础及研究方法、改进和创新以及相关术语的定义。
中国上市公司资本结构影响因素研究—理论和证据
第二章资本结构理论综述。着重介绍静态权衡理论、代理理论、信息不对称理
论、公司控制权理论、市场时机理论等资本结构理论的主要观点，为分析中国上市
公司资本结构影响因素提供理论依据。
第三章资本结构影响因素实证研究文献回顾。对国内外资本结构影响因素实证
研究文献进行回顾，评价现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，掌握国内外研究动态，并
为相关变量的定义提供依据。
第四章中国上市公司资本结构制度背景分析。对中国上市公司资本结构制度背
景进行分析，以便为解释中国上市公司资本结构选择提供现实背景和理论依据，有
利于我们深入理解资本结构影响因素背后的制度背景。
第五章中国上市资本结构特征分析。对中国上市公司资本结构的总体特征进行
分析，并与其他国家公司资本结构特征进行比较。主要从平均资产负债表、融资结
构趋势、融资行为和行业特征等方面进行分析，以便对中国上市公司的财务行为有
个整体的认识和把握。
第六章公司特征因素影响资本结构选择的理论和实证分析。根据资本结构理论
模型，对影响资本结构选择的公司特征因素(包括公司规模、资产构成、非债务税
盾、实际税率、成长性、资产流动性、产品独特性和产生内部资源能力等)进行理
论分析，构建双向效应动态调整模型，采用中国非金融上市公司的面板数据，从动
态视角研究中国上市公司资本结构选择。
第七章公司治理结构影响资本结构选择的理论和实证研究。结合中国的制度背
景，对中国上市公司治理结构如何影响资本结构选择进行理论分析，应用因子分析
模型，采用中国上市公司的横截面数据，实证检验中国上市公司治理结构对资本结
构选择的影响。
第八章结论与政策性建议。在以上各章分析的基础上，总结论文的主要结论，
并根据本研究所得到的结果，为中国上市公司资本结构的优化、政府部门相关政策的
制定、上市公司财务政策的制定和公司治理结构的设计提供政策性建议。
通过理论分析和实证研究，作者发现:(1)中国上市公司具有强烈的股权融资
偏好。在资本结构中，负债比重偏低:在负债到期结构中，流动负债比重偏高，长
期负债比重偏低，而且杠杆的账面比率大大高于市场比率;(2)不同门类行业间的
资本结构存在显著差异。同一行业门类内不同行业大类公司之间的资本结构不存在
论文摘要
显著差异，受管制行业的资产负债率、流动负债率很低，但长期负债率较高;(3)
行业特征和宏观经济因素显著影响资本结构选择;(4)调整负债比率的交易成本(调
整成本)显著影响资本结构选择，但中国上市公司的债务调整成本小于美国和英国
等发达国家;(5)财务杠杆随着公司规模、固定资产比率、财务困境成本、实际税
率和产品独特性的增加而增加，随着公司未来成长价值、产生内部资源能力、资产
流动性、非债务税盾的增?
Capital structure theory is always one of the most controversial issues in finance.Myers (1984) in his paper "The Capital Structure Puzzle" pointed out, "How do
firms choose their capital structures? we don't know....... We know little about capital
structure. We do not know how firms choose the debt, equity or hybrid securities they issue."
The puzzle of determinants of capital structures for Chinese listed companies is "tougher". Given the special institutional environment such as unique ownership structure, imperfect legal protection to investors, unbalanced development of capital market and defective corporate governance mechanism etc, what factors should be responsible for the choice of capital structures of Chinese listed companies? Can western capital structure theory be used to explain financing ways of Chinese listed companies? How doses institutional environment affect capital structure choice through firm characteristics? Can macro-economy and industry factors significantly influence capital structure choice? All the above problems are open for theoretical analysis and empirical test.
Based on reviewing relevant literatures, the author finds that there are some problems existing in studying the determinants of capital structures of Chinese listed companies. First, most researchers adopted "snapshot" framed static state regression technique to study the cross sectional determinants of capital structure. However, the nature of capital structure is dynamic, it should be analyzed in a dynamic framework. Second, time-specific factors are omitted, such as interest rate, inflation and other macroeconomic factors that are observable or unobservable. Third, unobservable firm-specific factors are omitted, such as, managerial ability, motivation and attitude toward risk. Fourth, there is not theoretical and empirical analysis of how corporate governance affecting capital structure choice, such as ownership structure, governance of board of directors, CEO tenure, market for corporate control, legal environment etc. Finally, institutional environment of Chinese listed companies' capital structures has
not yet been deeply studied.
Therefore, the dissertation concentrates on studying the determinants of capital
structures of Chinese listed companies and investigates their financing ways or their preferences. First, the author constructs a two-way effects dynamic model, and studies how firm characteristics (including: firm size, asset structure, non-debt tax shields, effective tax ratio, growth opportunity, liquidity, uniqueness of the products, financial distress cost and the capacity to generate internal resources) affect the choice of capital structures of Chinese listed companies from a dynamic perspective for the first time by controlling time-specific effects and unobservable firm-specific effects. Then, the author applies factor analysis model to analyze how corporate governance structure affects capital structure choice. The whole dissertation is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 .Introduction.This chapter discusses about background, incentives, underlying theories, main content, methodology and framework. Definitions of relevant terms, improvements and innovations are also given.
Chapter 2, Review of capital structure theory. This chapter emphatically introduces to static trade-off theory, agency theory, information asymmetry theory, corporate control theory, and market timing theory etc, with the aim of providing theoretical basis for analyzing the determinants of capital structures of Chinese listed companies.
Chapter 3, Review of empirical literatures on the determinants of capital structure. The chapter reviews empirical literatures on the determinants of capital structure home and abroad, comments on the extant literatures, and provides foundation to define relevant variables.
Chapter 4, Analysis of institutional background of capital structures of Chinese listed companies. This chapter analyzes institutional background of capital structures of Chinese listed companies so as to provide rea
引文
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