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中央银行外汇市场干预研究
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摘要
几乎所有的汇率制度都存在中央银行外汇市场的干预,几乎所有的汇率制度都可视作广义的汇率目标区制。中央银行外汇市场干预模式的不同,汇率目标区制中组成要素的区别,决定了汇率制度在IMF分类中成为不同类型的钉住制。符合中国国情的人民币汇率目标区制是未来我国汇率安排的理性选择,其中,中央银行外汇市场干预举足轻重。本文在西方中央银行外汇市场干预及其相关理论基础之上,借鉴发达国家和发展中国家中央银行外汇市场干预的实践经验,研究我国中央银行外汇市场干预及人民币汇率形成机制的理论、实践及发展轨迹。全文共分八章。
     第一章对中央银行外汇市场干预作了一般性描述。采用“外汇干预工作小组”的描述,给出了中央银行外汇市场干预的概念,中央银行进入外汇市场通过本币与外币之间的买卖来改变外汇市场的供求关系,进而影响汇率变动的行为。从不同的角度对中央银行外汇市场干预进行了分类:直接干预和间接干预;冲销干预与非冲销干预;单边干预和联合干预等。对中央银行外汇市场干预的方式和目标进行了概括,中央银行可以通过外汇即期交易、远期交易、掉期交易等不同方式进行干预,外汇市场干预的目标主要有三个方面:影响汇率的短期波动趋势;影响汇率的波动区间;作为宏观经济政策的一种工具。对中央银行外汇市场干预的可行性和必然性、中央银行外汇市场干预的相关因素也进行了分析和描述。
     第二章回顾、梳理和分析了中央银行外汇市场干预的相关理论。在中央银行外汇市场干预传递效应的理论分析和回顾中,论述了货币政策及其传递渠道,比较和分析了资产组合效应、信号预期效应、联合干预效应。在中央银行外汇市场干预的目标汇率决定理论的回顾和分析中,论述了汇率决定的流量理论如购买力平价理论和蒙代尔——弗莱明模型,汇率决定的存量理论如资产可
There is central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets in nearly all exchange rare regime arrangements, and nearly all exchange rate regime arrangements may be viewed as exchange rate target zone system in a broad sense. The different categories of pegging systems in the IMF depend on the different modes of central bank intervention, and the factors of exchange rate target zone system. RMB exchange rate target zone system which tallies with China's situation should be the arrangement of China's exchange rate regime in the future, in which the central bank intervention plays an important role. This dissertation studies China's central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market and the theory, practice and the developing track through drawing on the experiences of developed and developing countries on the basis of the theory of west central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market and other relative theories. There are eight chapters in the dissertation.General description of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange markets is given in Chapter 1. According to the description given by "group of intervention in foreign exchange market, central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market is defined, i.e. the fact that the central bank enters the foreign exchange market and changes the relationship between supply and demand through exchanging between domestic currency and foreign currency, and further affects motion of exchange rate. In different aspects the central bank intervention can be divided into different types: direct intervention and indirect intervention; sterilized intervention and unsterilized intervention; unilateral intervention and joint intervention and so on. The pattern and the purposes of the central bank intervention
    are summarized. The patterns of central bank intervention include spot exchange transaction, forward exchange transaction and swap exchange transaction. The main purposes of the intervention are to affect the trend of exchange rate fluctuation in short run, to affect the band of exchange rate fluctuation, and to use the intervention as a tool for macro economy policy. The feasibility and the necessity of the central bank intervention, and the relative factors of central bank intervention are also described and analyzedRelative theories on central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market are reviewed, systematized and analyzed in Chapter 2. In the analysis of the transmitting effect of the central bank intervention, monetary policy and its transmitting channel are discussed, and the effect of asset portfolio, the effect of signaling channel and the effect of joint intervention are compared and analyzed. In the review and analysis of the theory of the determination of target exchange rate in central bank intervention, the flow theory of exchange rate determination, such as the purchasing power parity and the Robert-Fleming Model and the stock theory of exchange rate determination such as the stock theory of the full asset substitution and the portfolio theory of the partial asset substitution. In the analysis of the game of chess of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, the game of chess between central banks and the nature, the reasonable participators and the reasonable speculators are analyzed, and the effect of the intervention in the foreign exchange market. In the reasonable estimate of the target exchange rate of the central bank intervention, the equilibrium exchange rate theory is analyzed and reviewed, and Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate, Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate and Natural Real Exchange Rate are mainly expounded. In the analysis of the exchange rate system and the central bank intervention, the close relationship between central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market and exchange rate system is discussed, and the definition of exchange rate target zone system is given again, and then the exchange rate target zone is divided into the exchange rate target zone in a broad sense and the exchange rate target zone in a narrow sense, and the behavior of central bank intervention in various types of exchange rate target is analyzed and studied.
    The practice of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market of both developed countries and developing countries are compared and studied in Chapter 3. The history of central bank intervention of the main developed countries during 1999-2003 is reviewed, especially the joint intervention of G7. It is pointed that the evolving process of central bank intervention of developed countries in the exchange market goes through the phrases of no intervention, occasional intervention and joint intervention. In the review and the comparison of central bank intervention of the developed countries, the central bank intervention of southeast countries are mainly analyzed, especially the successful experiences and the failing lessons during the period of financial crisis. In the case study of central bank intervention of Thailand, it is pointed out that the failing of Thailand central bank intervention is certainty, and the effect of lever in the central bank intervention of Thailand. At last, China central bank intervention, Japan central bank intervention and South Korea central bank intervention are compared and analyzed, and the color of mercantilism in central bank intervention of the three countries are expounded, and the difference from the intervention of west countries is pointed out.The theory of China central bank intervention, the process and the change of the policy and practice of China central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market are reviewed and analyzed in Chapter 4. On January 1, 1994, China set up the single and managed floating exchange rate system which is on the basis of supply and demand. In April 1994, China Foreign Exchange Trade Center was set up and began running, and the central bank started foreign exchange market intervention in a real sense. The practice of China central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market before China entered WTO, i.e. during 1994-2000, is recalled and analyzed, and the successful experience and the problem existed of China central bank intervention in 1994 are examined closely at first. The stability of exchange rate, the increase of foreign exchange reserve and the development of foreign trade became the symbol of the success of central band intervention in the foreign exchange market, but the intervention had also negative influence that the intervention formed the impact on internal equilibrium, and the inflation pressure existing was aggravated, which once caused the inflation rate to be over 20%. The
    practice of China central bank intervention after China entered WTO, i.e. during 2001-2004, is reviewed and analyzed, and the situation and the problems of the intervention are focused on. Although RMB exchange rate was very steady, the rapid increase of foreign exchange reserves and the sustaining double surplus in the balance of payments, it was the monetary factor which resulted in the too rapid economy growth during the end of 2003 and the early of 2004. Positive analysis of China central bank intervention in foreign exchange market indicates that excess intervention in the foreign exchange market restrains the market extent of exchange rate forming mechanism, and make the current managed floating exchange rate regime become a kind of arrangement of pegging the U.S. dollar; the excess stabilization of exchange rate lost the independency of monetary policy; improper sterilized intervention affected on the efficiency of domestic recourse distribution and resulted in the unrational fund structure.The inherent relation between the central bank intervention in the exchange market and the foreign exchange rate regime is analyzed systematically and theoretically in Chapter 5. There is close relation between the forming mechanism and the central bank intervention in the exchange market. In the 8 categories of exchange rate arrangements by the IMF, there is central bank intervention in foreign exchange market to a different extent in nearly all categories of exchange rate arrangements, the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market determines the types of exchange rate regimes. Pure fixed exchange rate system and pure floating exchange rate system are only the abstraction, and they do not exist in the real life. In the real life, the middle exchange rate arrangement —different types of pegging, can be found largely, which is defied as the exchange rate target zone system in a broad sense. Through using Krugman's model of exchange rate target zone for reference, the writer described the tracks of exchange rate under the central bank intervention in free floating exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rate regime and the exchange rate target zone regime respectively. On the basis of re-defining the exchange rate target zone, the writer categories exchange rate regime arrangement according to the different intervention behavior of central banks. The current RMB exchange rate forming mechanism is also analyzed thoroughly and the
    institutional malpractice that results in the current pressure of RMB appreciation: the Non-symmetric Property in the forming mechanism behind the central bank intervention. At last, the writer puts forward the scheme of RMB exchange rate reformation: the measures in short term — cutting the non-symmetric property in the mechanism; the selection in medium term — RMB exchange rate target zone system in a broad sense; the scheme in long term — the floating exchange rate regime in which there is the central bank intervention, but no central exchange rate and no exchange rare bands.The rationality of the central exchange rate in the foreign exchange market intervention is estimated in Chapter 6. There is close relation between the central exchange rate of central bank intervention and the equilibrium exchange rate, but the central exchange rate does not equal the equilibrium exchange rate or the rational rate. The central exchange rate should be the rate which has inherent stability, and only the central rate which has the inherent stability can be viewed as the target exchange rate — central exchange rate. Regarding the equilibrium rate as the central rate, as the frame of reference of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market satisfies the requirement of the inherent stability, and so the equilibrium exchange rate can be used as the estimating standards of rational central exchange rates of exchange rate target zone system, and RMB equilibrium exchange rate can be used as the central rate in the RMB exchange rate target zone system arrangement. Examining the research achievements on RMB equilibrium exchange rate, many scholars have designed RMB equilibrium exchange rate model, and hereby estimate the rationality of the current exchange rate. Because the rationality of the equilibrium exchange rate may be only estimated and can not be observed directly, this dissertation accepts the estimating result according to RMB equilibrium exchange rate model by Zhang Bing and Qin Wanshun, simultaneously considering the definition of the equilibrium exchange rate by Jian Boke, and regards it as the criterion of the central exchange rate in the regime of RMB exchange rate target zone and also as the criterion of the central exchange rate realignment in the regime of RMB exchange rate target zone. The writer also surveys the function and realization of the equilibrium exchange rate from the angle of economy lever, and
    discusses the influence of RMB central exchange rate on China's economy growth. The other question which relates to the central exchange rate closely is the exchange rate band in target zone system, and according to the relative theories, other countries' experiences and the views of domestic scholars, and considering the historical data of RMB exchange rate fluctuation, the initial scheme of the exchange rate band in RMB exchange rate target zone system is put forward.The conflict between internal equilibrium and external equilibrium in the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market is examined and studied m Chapter 7. The central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market affects on the level of the exchange rate, and further will affect on the realization of the internal equilibrium. The description of exchange rate policy in the Robert-Fleming Model provides China's central bank to take more active and flexible exchange rate policies with theoretical basis. In the current exchange rate system in our country, proper exchange rate policy can not only restrain the decrease tendency of the current account balance after the Asian financial crisis, but also be beneficial to the realization of internal equilibrium target, i.e., expanding the demand and increasing output. In the respect of realization of external equilibrium, it is necessary to have the foreign exchange market intervened by the central bank in order to have the balance of payments not influence on by the liquidity restriction, in order to make the balance of current account be reasonable and sustainable, and in order to keep the exchange rate steady and rational. There is the conflict between the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market and the realization of internal and external equilibrium. The central bank intervention in China has once kept the stability of RMB exchange rate, but resulted in the impact on the internal equilibrium, and once made China's inflation rate arrive at 20%. In the recent rapid economic growth appearing in China, the excess intervention in the foreign market by the central bank played an important role. Adopting the policy match which includes monetary policy, exchange rate policy and other relative policies, and surveying the equilibrium exchange rate from the angle of economy lever contributes to overcoming the conflict between internal and external equilibrium, and realizing the equilibrium of both interior and exterior simultaneously.
    The effect of the central bank intervention in the foreign market is analyzed in Chapter 8. The comparison and analysis of the asset effect of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market according to the flexible-price monetary model of full substitution of assets and to the portfolio model of partial substitution of assets indicates that the unsterilized intervention is valid and the sterilized intervention is not valid in the analysis of the monetary model, but according to the portfolio model, not only unsterilized intervention, but also sterilized intervention has influence on exchange rates, although the influence of the monetary model is not as strong as the influence of the portfolio model. Although the markedness of sterilized intervention in the positive test is week, some benefits of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market have been achieved in the practice of China. There are many negative effects in the sterilized intervention of China's central bank in the foreign exchange market. The analysis of signal mechanism is related to the analysis of game of chess in the central bank intervention, and technological graphs and diagrams can be used to analyze the effect of signals and game of chess. The analysis on the direct effect and indirect effect of the central bank intervention indicates that sterilized intervention produces the effect of time lag which is shorter and the unsterilized intervention produces the effect of time lag which is longer. The cost and the profit of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market are also analyzed in this chapter.The following aspects are also explored in this dissertation.The necessity and the feasibility of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market are expounded theoretically and systemically. "Plaza Announcement" issued jointly by the west countries in 1995 is the symbol of the transformation from the free floating exchange rate regime after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the exchange rate system with central bank intervention. It seems that the necessary and the rationality of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market has been resolved, but it is still a problem disputed greatly in a real life. In the current RMB exchange rate forming mechanism, the necessity and the rationality of the behavior of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market has been paid close attention to by people of both China and
    foreign countries, and has become the focus of RMB exchange rate mechanism and the RMB exchange rate level which is rational or not.The causes which bring on the appreciation of RMB's value will be searched for from the arrangement and the vicissitude of exchange rate regimes, and the path through which RMB's value can be reduced is effortfully discovered. Many scholars of both China and foreign countries explain the causes from the surplus in the balance of payments, designing the model of RMB equilibrium exchange rate, the structure of import and export, the large inflow of FID, the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. This writer tries to search for the causes from the institutional factor which results in the sustainable surplus in the balance of payments and the central bank intervention.From the angle of the inherent relation between exchange rate regime and the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, the necessity of cental bank intervention in the exchange rate forming mechanism is discovered. Traditional theories divides exchange rate regime into three categories: floating exchange rate system, fixed exchange rate system and the exchange rate arrangement between floating exchange rate system and fixed exchange rate system. In contemporary west countries, there is the view of "disappearance of middle regimes", and there is central bank intervention only in the fixed exchange rate regime. This dissertation does not accept the prevail view, and tries to bring the central bank intervention into nearly all exchange rate arrangements, and regard it as the grounds of arguments of the necessity and the certainty of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market.The definition of exchange rate target zone is re-defined in this dissertation. The exchange rate in a narrow sense refers to the international policy harmony scheme which centers exchange rate control by Williamson in 1987, and includes center exchange rate, the determine of exchange rate band, the domestic policy match maintaining the target zone, and the domestic policy coordination and so forth. Some scholar defined the target zone as the exchange rate system which limits exchange rate into some band, but this dissertation tries to bring all exchange rate systems including floating exchange rate system and fixed rate system into the
    exchange rate target zone systems according to the factors of the extent of the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, the center exchange rate and the exchange rate band.On the basis of the target zone model in a narrow sense by Krugman, the tracks of exchange rate in the different types of pegging arrangements of the exchange rate target zone system in a broad sense are sketched, according to the extent of the intervention, the center exchange rate, the exchange rate fluctuate band and the degree of transparency and so on.The concepts of a center rate, an equilibrium exchange rate, and the rational exchange rate that are easy to be confused, but are very important for the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, are analyzed, compared and differentiated. The grounds of argument are expounded from the angle of economy lever and the internal and external equilibrium.On the basis of the study above, the scheme in short term, the scheme in the midterm and the scheme in long term of RMB exchange rate forming mechanism reformation are sketched, especially the countermeasure suggestions in short term and in midterm.
引文
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