审计任期与强制轮换
|
摘要
随着本世纪初美国一系列财务舞弊丑闻的相继爆发,过长的审计任期对审计独立性或审计质量的不利影响再次引起了人们的普遍关注,审计师轮换也同时成为讨论的热题。然而,尽管这一讨论异常激烈,但无论是在国外,还是在国内,鲜有学者从审计质量的角度对审计任期与强制轮换进行过系统研究,从而大大降低了这场争辩的说服力。正是在这一研究背景下,本文首次从审计质量的角度对审计任期与强制轮换问题进行了系统的理论分析,并以我国特有的签字注册会计师披露信息以及签字注册会计师强制轮换制度为背景,从签字注册会计师任期这一层面对审计任期、强制轮换与审计质量之间的关系进行了一系列实证检验。
具体来说,本文首先以美国为代表,从历史演变的角度回顾了审计师轮换这一概念的出现、发展以及现状,并从审计质量的角度对审计任期与强制轮换问题进行了详细而深入的理论分析,进而对强制轮换政策的实施进行了成本收益比较;随后,本文以2003年强制轮换政策的实施为分界点,详细描述了我国证券审计市场中审计任期与强制轮换的基本概貌;在此基础上,从签字注册会计师任期的角度出发,分别以审计师是否对在财务方面存在可能导致对公司持续经营能力产生疑虑的事项或情况的上市公司,出具持续经营审计意见、审计师是否出具非无保留意见、以及审计任期对会计盈余价值相关性的影响来衡量审计独立性、实际的审计质量和投资者所感知到的审计质量,具体考察了强制轮换政策实施前审计任期与审计独立性、审计质量之间的关系,从而为强制轮换政策制定的合理性提供经验支持;类似地,本文也分别以审计师是否出具非无保留意见和强制轮换对会计盈余价值相关性的影响,来衡量实际的审计质量和投资者所感知到的审计质量,对已实施强制轮换政策的实际效果进行了分析,以判断强制轮换政策实施的可行性。
总体上,本文的研究发现,一方面在理论上,无论是审计任期,还是强制轮换,其对审计质量的影响是不确定的;另一方面在我国,强制轮换政策实施前较长的审计任期损害了审计独立性,进而在形式上或实质上降低了审计质量,这为已制定的签字注册会计师强制轮换政策的合理性提供了经验支持。但本文对强制轮换政策实施效果的检验结果却表明,这一制度无论在形式上还是在实质上并没有提高审计质量,从而不支持该政策实施的可行性。针对这些结论,本文提出了相关政策建议,包括修订已制定的签字注册会计师强制轮换政策,以在最大程度上有效地发挥该政策应有的实施效果;同时在这一政策作用确实有限的情况下,还可以考虑采取其他新的监管措施,例如引入事务所强制轮换或对任期过短的公司实行强制留任制度。无疑,这些研究将促使学术界和实务界更理性地从审计质量的角度思考审计任期与强制轮换问题。
With the successive exposure of financial scandals in America in the early of this century, people were led to pay common attention to the detrimental effect of longer auditor tenure on auditor independence or audit quality again, and at the same time auditor rotation also became the focus of the discussion as before. In spite of this heated argument, few scholars had done systematic research on auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality, which had greatly reduced the cogency of this argument. Just under this research background, for the first time this dissertation systematically analyses the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality in theory, and after making use of the unique disclosure of the name of each signed CPA in audit report and the policy of mandatory CPA rotation in our country, empirically examines the relationships among auditor tenure, mandatory auditor rotation and audit quality from the perspective of CPA tenure.
This study firstly makes a representative of America and reviews the appearance, development and current state of the concept of auditor rotation through history evolution. Then it makes a detailed and deep analysis of the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality in theory, and compares the costs with the benefits of the implementation of mandatory auditor rotation policy. Subsequent to these, this study uses the year of 2003, when the policy of mandatory CPA rotation began to implement, as the dividing point and detailedly describes the overall situation of auditor tenure and mandatory CPA rotation in our auditing market. On the basis of the above, this study respectively chooses whether auditors issue going-concern opinions for financially distressed companies, whether auditors issue modified audit opinions and earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as measures of auditor independence, actual audit quality and perceived audit quality, and examines the relationships between auditor tenure, auditor independence and audit quality before the implementation of mandatory CPA rotation policy from the perspective of CPA tenure, providing empirical support for the rationality of this policy. Similarly, this study also uses whether auditors issue modified audit opinions and earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as measures of actual audit quality and perceived audit quality, and analyses the effectiveness of the mandatory CPA rotation policy which has been carried out so as to determine the feasibility of the policy.
On the whole, this study finds that on the one hand, both auditor tenure’s and mandatory auditor rotation’s impact on audit quality are not sure in theory, and on the other hand, longer auditor tenure lowers auditor independence and further harms audit quality both in appearance and in essence before the implementation of mandatory CPA rotation policy in our country, which provides empirical support for the rationality of the policy. However, the results of the actual effectiveness of the policy indicate that it has not improved audit quality in appearance or in essence and is not feasible. According to these conclusions, this study provides some policy suggestion including revising the current mandatory CPA rotation policy so as to make the most of it, and considering other measures when this policy’s effect is really limited, such as mandatory audit firm rotation policy and mandatory auditor retention policy for companies with shorter tenure. Undoubtedly, these research will help people to think the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation more rationally from the angle of audit quality.
具体来说,本文首先以美国为代表,从历史演变的角度回顾了审计师轮换这一概念的出现、发展以及现状,并从审计质量的角度对审计任期与强制轮换问题进行了详细而深入的理论分析,进而对强制轮换政策的实施进行了成本收益比较;随后,本文以2003年强制轮换政策的实施为分界点,详细描述了我国证券审计市场中审计任期与强制轮换的基本概貌;在此基础上,从签字注册会计师任期的角度出发,分别以审计师是否对在财务方面存在可能导致对公司持续经营能力产生疑虑的事项或情况的上市公司,出具持续经营审计意见、审计师是否出具非无保留意见、以及审计任期对会计盈余价值相关性的影响来衡量审计独立性、实际的审计质量和投资者所感知到的审计质量,具体考察了强制轮换政策实施前审计任期与审计独立性、审计质量之间的关系,从而为强制轮换政策制定的合理性提供经验支持;类似地,本文也分别以审计师是否出具非无保留意见和强制轮换对会计盈余价值相关性的影响,来衡量实际的审计质量和投资者所感知到的审计质量,对已实施强制轮换政策的实际效果进行了分析,以判断强制轮换政策实施的可行性。
总体上,本文的研究发现,一方面在理论上,无论是审计任期,还是强制轮换,其对审计质量的影响是不确定的;另一方面在我国,强制轮换政策实施前较长的审计任期损害了审计独立性,进而在形式上或实质上降低了审计质量,这为已制定的签字注册会计师强制轮换政策的合理性提供了经验支持。但本文对强制轮换政策实施效果的检验结果却表明,这一制度无论在形式上还是在实质上并没有提高审计质量,从而不支持该政策实施的可行性。针对这些结论,本文提出了相关政策建议,包括修订已制定的签字注册会计师强制轮换政策,以在最大程度上有效地发挥该政策应有的实施效果;同时在这一政策作用确实有限的情况下,还可以考虑采取其他新的监管措施,例如引入事务所强制轮换或对任期过短的公司实行强制留任制度。无疑,这些研究将促使学术界和实务界更理性地从审计质量的角度思考审计任期与强制轮换问题。
With the successive exposure of financial scandals in America in the early of this century, people were led to pay common attention to the detrimental effect of longer auditor tenure on auditor independence or audit quality again, and at the same time auditor rotation also became the focus of the discussion as before. In spite of this heated argument, few scholars had done systematic research on auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality, which had greatly reduced the cogency of this argument. Just under this research background, for the first time this dissertation systematically analyses the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality in theory, and after making use of the unique disclosure of the name of each signed CPA in audit report and the policy of mandatory CPA rotation in our country, empirically examines the relationships among auditor tenure, mandatory auditor rotation and audit quality from the perspective of CPA tenure.
This study firstly makes a representative of America and reviews the appearance, development and current state of the concept of auditor rotation through history evolution. Then it makes a detailed and deep analysis of the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation from the angle of audit quality in theory, and compares the costs with the benefits of the implementation of mandatory auditor rotation policy. Subsequent to these, this study uses the year of 2003, when the policy of mandatory CPA rotation began to implement, as the dividing point and detailedly describes the overall situation of auditor tenure and mandatory CPA rotation in our auditing market. On the basis of the above, this study respectively chooses whether auditors issue going-concern opinions for financially distressed companies, whether auditors issue modified audit opinions and earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as measures of auditor independence, actual audit quality and perceived audit quality, and examines the relationships between auditor tenure, auditor independence and audit quality before the implementation of mandatory CPA rotation policy from the perspective of CPA tenure, providing empirical support for the rationality of this policy. Similarly, this study also uses whether auditors issue modified audit opinions and earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as measures of actual audit quality and perceived audit quality, and analyses the effectiveness of the mandatory CPA rotation policy which has been carried out so as to determine the feasibility of the policy.
On the whole, this study finds that on the one hand, both auditor tenure’s and mandatory auditor rotation’s impact on audit quality are not sure in theory, and on the other hand, longer auditor tenure lowers auditor independence and further harms audit quality both in appearance and in essence before the implementation of mandatory CPA rotation policy in our country, which provides empirical support for the rationality of the policy. However, the results of the actual effectiveness of the policy indicate that it has not improved audit quality in appearance or in essence and is not feasible. According to these conclusions, this study provides some policy suggestion including revising the current mandatory CPA rotation policy so as to make the most of it, and considering other measures when this policy’s effect is really limited, such as mandatory audit firm rotation policy and mandatory auditor retention policy for companies with shorter tenure. Undoubtedly, these research will help people to think the problems of auditor tenure and mandatory auditor rotation more rationally from the angle of audit quality.
引文
[1]Altman E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of finance22, 589-610.
[2]Altman E., McGough T., 1974. Evaluation of a company as a going concern. Journal of accountancy(December), 50-57.
[3]Amir E., Lev B., 1996. Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: the wireless communication industry. Journal of accounting and economics22, 3-30.
[4]Antle R., 1982. The auditor as an economic agent. Journal of accounting research20(2), 503-527.
[5]Arens A., Loebbecke J., 1976. Auditing: an integrated approach. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
[6]Arrunada B., Paz-Ares C., 1997. Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination. International review of law and economics17, 31-61.
[7]Ashton H., 1989. An empirical analysis of expertise, experience, and error frequency knowledge in auditing. Working paper.
[8]Ashton H., 1991. Experience and error frequency knowledge as potential determinants of audit expertise. The accounting review56(2), 218-239.
[9]Balsam S., Krishnan J., Yang J.S., 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. Auditing22(2), 71-97.
[10]Bates L., Ingram W., Reckers M., 1982. Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on “materiality”. Journal of accountancy(April), 60-63.
[11]Beasley M., Petroni K., 2001. Board independence and audit firm type. Auditing(March), 97-114.
[12]Beatty R.P., 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. The accounting review(October), 693-709.
[13]Becker C., 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of political economy76(2), 169-217.
[14]Bedingfield J., Loeb S., 1974. Auditor changes—an examination. Journal of accountancy(March), 66-69.
[15]Berton L., 1991. GAO weighs auditing plan for big banks. Wall street journal(March27), A3.
[16]Blough G., 1951. Should auditors be changed? Journal of accountancy(April), 624-625.
[17]Bocconi, 2002. The impact of mandatory audit rotation on audit quality and on audit pricing: the case of Italy.
[18]Bonner E., Lewis L., 1990. Determinants of auditor expertise. Journal of accounting research28, 1-28.
[19]Brody R., Kaplan S., 1996. Escalation of commitment among internal auditors. Auditing15(1), 1-15.
[20]Brody R., Moscove S., 1998. Mandatory auditor rotation. National public accountant(May), 32-36.
[21]Burton J., Roberts W., 1967. A study of auditor changes. Journal of accountancy(April), 31-36.
[22]Butt J., 1988. Frequency judgment in an auditing-related task. Journal of accounting research26, 315-330.
[23]Carcello J., Hermanson D., Huss H., 2000. Going-concern opinions: the effects of partner compensation plans and client size. Auditing19(1), 64-81.
[24]Carcello V., Nagy L., 2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing23(2), 55-69.
[25]Carey P., Simnett R., 2006. Audit partner tenure and audit quality. The accounting review81(3), 653-676.
[26]Chen J., Su X., Zhao R., 2000. An emerging market’s reaction to initial modified audit opinions: evidence from the shanghai stock market. Contemporary accounting research17(3), 429-455.
[27]Chow, 1982. The demand for external auditing: size, debt and ownership influences. The accounting reviewLVII, 272-291.
[28]Chow C., McNamee A., Rlumlee R., 1987. Practitioners’ perceptions of audit step difficulty and criticalness: implications for audit research. Auditing(spring), 123-133.
[29]Copley A., Doucet S., 1993. Auditor tenure, fixed fee contracts, and the supply of substandard single audits. Public budgeting & finance(Fall), 23-35.
[30]Davis R., Soo B., Trompeter G., 2000. Auditor tenure, auditor independence and earnings management. Working paper.
[31]DeAngelo L., 1981a. Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation. Journal of accounting and economics3, 113-127.
[32]DeAngelo L., 1981b. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of accounting and economics3, 183-199.
[33]DeFond M., 1992. The association between changes in client firm agency costs and auditor switching. Auditing(Spring), 16-31.
[34]DeFond M., Subramanyam K., 1998. Auditor changes and discretionary accruals. Journal of accounting and economics(February), 35-67.
[35]Deis R., Giroux A., 1992. Determinants of audit quality in the public sector. The accounting review67(3), 462-479.
[36]Dhaliwal D., Lee K., Fargher N., 1991. The association between unexpected earnings and abnormal security returns in the presence of financial leverage. Contemporary accounting research8, 20-41.
[37]Dopuch N., King R., Schwartz R., 2001. An experimental investigation of retention androtation requirements. Journal of accounting research39(1), 93-117.
[38]Dunn K., Mayhew B., Morsefield S., 2000. Auditor industry specialization and client disclosure quality. Working paper.
[39]Elitzur R., Falk H., 1996. Planned audit quality. Journal of accounting and public policy15, 247-269.
[40]Emiliano, Nieves, Cristian, Maria, 2004. Audit quality and the going-concern decision-making process: Spanish evidence. European accounting review13(4), 597-620.
[41]Fan P.H., T.J. Wong, 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of accounting and economics33, 401-425.
[42]Fan P.H., T.J. Wong, 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? evidence from East Asia. Journal of accounting research43(1), 35-72.
[43]Farmer A., Rittenberg E., Trompeter M., 1987. An Investigation of the Impact of Economic and Organizational Factors on Auditor Independence. Auditing7(1), 1-14.
[44]Favere M., Emby N., 2005. The impact of continuity on concurring partner reviews: an exploratory study. Accounting horizons19(1), 1-10.
[45]Firth M., 1980a. Perceptions of auditor independence and official ethical guidelines. The accounting review55(3), 451-466.
[46]Firth M., 1980b. A note on the impact of audit qualifications on lending and credit decisions. Journal of banking and finance4(September), 257-267.
[47]Francis J., Wilson E., 1988. Auditor changes: a joint test of theories relating to agency costs and auditor differentiation. The accounting review(October), 663-682.
[48]Francis J., Schipper K., Vincent L., 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of accounting and economics39, 329-360.
[49]GAO, 2003. Public accounting firms—required study on the potential effect of mandatory audit firm rotation.
[50]Geiger A., Raghunandan K., 2002. Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. Auditing21(1), 67-78.
[51]Ghosh A., Moon D., 2005. Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality. The accounting review80(2), 585-612.
[52]Jacobson D., 1967. Rotation of auditors? Yes and no. Journal of accountancy(July), 20.
[53]Johnson W., Lys T., 1990. The market for audit services: evidence from voluntary auditor changes. Journal of accounting and economics(January), 281-308.
[54]Johnson E., Khurana K., Reynolds J., 2002. Audit-firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. Contemporary accounting research19(4), 637-660.
[55]Jones F., 1996. The information content of the auditor’s going concern evaluation. Journal of accounting and public policy15(Spring), 1-27.
[56]Keyser M., 1967. Rotation of auditors? Yes and no. Journal of accountancy(July), 20.
[57]Kida T., 1980. An investigation into auditors’ continuity and related qualification judgments. Journal of accounting research18(2), 506-523.
[58]Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A., 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of law and economics21(2), 297-326.
[59]Knapp C., 1991. Factors that audit committee members use as surrogates for audit quality. Auditing10(1), 35-52.
[60]Kothari S., 1992. Price-earnings regressions in the presence of pricing leading earnings: earnings level versus changes specification and alternative deflators. Journal of accounting and economics15, 173-302.
[61]Krishnan J., 1994. Auditor switching and conservatism. The accounting review69, 200-215.
[62]Lennox C., 1999a. Are large auditors more accurate than small auditors? Accounting and business research29(3), 217-227.
[63]Lennox C., 1999b. The accuracy and incremental information content of audit reports in predicting bankruptcy. Journal of business finance & accounting26, 757-778.
[64]Lennox C., 2000. Do companies successfully engage in opinion shopping? Evidence from the UK. Journal of accounting and economics29(1), 321-338.
[65]Lev B., Zarowin P., 1999. The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them. Journal of accounting research37, 353-385.
[66]Levitan S., Knoblett A., 1985. Indicators of exceptions to the going concern assumption. Auditing5(1), 26-39.
[67]Libby R., Frederick M., 1990. Experience and the ability to explain audit findings. Journal of accounting research28(2), 348-367.
[68]Louwers J., 1998. The relation between going-concern opinions and the auditor’s loss function. Journal of accounting research36(1), 143-156.
[69]Magee P., Tseng M., 1990. Audit pricing and independence. The accounting review65(2), 315-336.
[70]Maletta M., Wright A., 1996. Audit evidence planning: an examination of industry error characteristics. Auditing(Spring), 71-86.
[71]Mangold N., 1988. Changing auditors and the effect on earnings, auditors’ opinions, and stock prices. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press.
[72]Mansi A., Maxwell F., Miller P., 2004. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors? Evidence from the bond market. Journal of accounting research42(4), 755-793.
[73]McLaren N., 1958. Rotation of auditors. Journal of accountancy(July), 41-44.
[74]McMillen D., Smith S., Wells-Parker E., 1989. The effects of alcohol, expectancy, and sensation seeking on driving risk taking. Addictive behaviors14, 477-483.
[75]Melumad N., Amir Z., 1997. A theoretical examination of the market reaction to auditors’ qualifications. Journal of accounting research35(2), 239-256.
[76]Menon K., Williams D., 1994. The insurance hypothesis and market prices. The accountingreview69(2), 327-342.
[77]Menon K., Williams D., 1999. Error cost and auditors’ termination decisions. Journal of accounting, auditing and finance14, 95-123.
[78]Mutchler F., 1984. Auditors’ perceptions of the going-concern opinion decision. Auditing3(2), 17-30.
[79]Mutchler F., 1985. A multivariate analysis of the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision. Journal of accounting research23(2), 668-682.
[80]Mutchler F., 1986. Empirical evidence regarding the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision. Auditing(fall), 148-163.
[81]Mutchler J., Williams D., 1990. The relationship between audit technology, client risk profiles, and the going-concern opinion decision. Auditing(fall), 39-54.
[82]Mutchler F., Hopwood W., Mckeown M., 1997. The influence of contrary information and mitigating factors on audit opinion decisions of bankrupt companies. Journal of accounting research35(2), 295-310.
[83]Myers N., Myers A., Omer C., 2003. Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship and the quality of earnings: a case for mandatory auditor rotation? The accounting review78(3), 779-799.
[84]Myers N., Myers A., Palmrose Z., 2005. The length of auditor-client relationships and financial statement restatements. Working paper.
[85]Palmrose Z., 1986. Litigation and independent auditors: the role of business failures and management fraud. Auditing(Fall), 90-113.
[86]Palmrose Z., 1988. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The accounting review63, 55-73.
[87]Palmrose Z., 1991. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence. Journal of accounting research(Supplement), 149-185.
[88]Petty R., Cuganesan S., 1996. Auditor rotation: framing the debate. Australian accountant(May), 40-41.
[89]Presutti A., 1995. Anchor and adjustment heuristic effect on audit judgment. Managerial auditing journal0(9), 13-21.
[90]Pricewaterhouse, 2002. Mandatory rotation of audit firms: will it improve audit quality?
[91]Raghunathan B., Lewis B., Evans J., 1994. An empirical investigation of problem audits. Research in accounting regulation, 33-58.
[92]Reynolds J., Francis R., 2001. Does Size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of accounting and economic30, 375-400.
[93]Schultz J., Gustavson G., 1978. Actuaries’ perceptions of variables affecting the independent auditor’s legal liability. The accounting reviewLIII(3), 626-641.
[94]Schwartz K., Menon K., 1985. Auditor switches by failing firms. The accounting review60, 248-261.
[95]Seidman J., 1967a. Letters to the journal. Journal of accountancy(May), 30-32.
[96]Seidman J., 1967b. More on rotation of auditors. Journal of accountancy(September), 30.
[97]Shockley A., 1981. Perceptions of auditors’ independence: an empirical analysis. The accounting reviewLVI(4), 785-800.
[98]Shu S., 2000. Auditor resignations: clientele effects and legal liability. Journal of accounting and economics2, 173-205.
[99]Stice D., 1991. Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The accounting review66(3), 516-533.
[100]St.Pierre, Anderson J., 1984. An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits against public accountants. The accounting reviewLIX(2), 242-263.
[101]Tan H., 1995. Effects of expectations, prior involvement and review awareness on memory for audit evidence and judgment. Journal of accounting research33(1), 113-135.
[102]Teoh S.H., Wong T.J., 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. The accounting review68(2), 346-366.
[103]Vanstraelen A., 1999. The auditor’s going concern opinion decision: a pilot study. International journal of auditing3, 41-57.
[104]Vanstraelen A., 2002. Auditor economic incentives and going-concern opinions in a limited litigious continental european business evironment: empirical evidence from Belgium. Accounting and business research32(3), 171-186.
[105]Watts R., Zimmerman J., 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: some evidence. Journal of law and economics26(3), 613-633.
[106]Weber R., 1980. Some characteristics of the free recall of computer controls on EDP auditors. Journal of accounting research(Spring), 214-241.
[107]Williamson O.E., 1976. Franchise bidding for natural monopoly—in general with respect to CATV. The bell journal of economics7(Spring), 73-107.
[108]Zeff A., 2003. Du Pont’s early policy on the rotation of audit firms. Journal of accounting and public policy22, 1-18.
[109]陈信元、夏立军,2006.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.会计研究(1),44-53.
[110]韩洪灵,2006.中国审计市场的结构、行为与绩效——以审计定价为核心的研究.厦门大学博士论文打印稿.
[111]李斌、陈凌云,2006.我国上市公司审计委员会有效性研究——基于上市公司年报补丁的实证分析.财贸研究(3),121-127.
[112]李树华,2000.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离.上海:上海三联书店,9-80.
[113]李爽、吴溪,2002a.审计意见变通及其监管:经验证据.中国会计与财务研究(4),1-28.
[114]李爽、吴溪,2002b.审计师变更研究:中国证券市场的初步证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,5-16.
[115]李爽、吴溪,2003.中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,27-36.
[116]李爽、吴溪,2004a.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,24-51.
[117]李爽、吴溪,2004b.会计信息、独立审计与公共政策.北京:中国财政经济出版社,26-28.
[118]李爽、吴溪,2006.签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响.会计研究(1),36-43.
[119]李弢,2006.审计师解聘与审计质量问题研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.厦门大学博士论文打印稿.
[120]李眺,2005.审计市场:产业组织视角的分析.上海:上海财经大学出版社,105-190.
[121]李兆华,2005.我国会计师事务所实行定期轮换制的博弈分析.会计研究(3),63-66.
[122]刘骏,2005.会计师事务所轮换制与审计独立性.审计研究(6),39-44.
[123]刘启亮,2006.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.审计研究(4),40-49.
[124]莫茨、夏拉夫著,文硕等译,1990.审计理论结构.北京:中国商业出版社,43-307.
[125]莎伦·布雷姆等著,郭辉等译,2005.亲密关系.北京:人民邮电出版社,3-85.
[126]沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006.我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析.审计研究(4),50-59.
[127]斯科特·普劳斯著,施俊琦、王星译,2004.决策与判断.北京:人民邮电出版社,13-221.
[128]孙铮、王跃堂,2000.说明段与变更审计意见的实证分析.中国证券市场财务与会计透视.上海:上海财经大学出版社,32-43.
[129]吴超鹏、吴世农,2005.基于价值创造和公司治理的财务状态分析与预测模型研究.经济研究(11),99-110.
[130]吴水澎、李斌,2006.上市公司自愿设立审计委员会的影响因素分析.山西财经大学学报(1),129-134.
[131]夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005.审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究(1),54-78.
[132]余玉苗、李琳,2003.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析.经济评论(5),124-128.
[133]张继勋,2002.审计判断研究.大连:东北财经大学出版社,224-234.
[2]Altman E., McGough T., 1974. Evaluation of a company as a going concern. Journal of accountancy(December), 50-57.
[3]Amir E., Lev B., 1996. Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: the wireless communication industry. Journal of accounting and economics22, 3-30.
[4]Antle R., 1982. The auditor as an economic agent. Journal of accounting research20(2), 503-527.
[5]Arens A., Loebbecke J., 1976. Auditing: an integrated approach. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
[6]Arrunada B., Paz-Ares C., 1997. Mandatory rotation of company auditors: a critical examination. International review of law and economics17, 31-61.
[7]Ashton H., 1989. An empirical analysis of expertise, experience, and error frequency knowledge in auditing. Working paper.
[8]Ashton H., 1991. Experience and error frequency knowledge as potential determinants of audit expertise. The accounting review56(2), 218-239.
[9]Balsam S., Krishnan J., Yang J.S., 2003. Auditor industry specialization and earnings quality. Auditing22(2), 71-97.
[10]Bates L., Ingram W., Reckers M., 1982. Auditor-client affiliation: the impact on “materiality”. Journal of accountancy(April), 60-63.
[11]Beasley M., Petroni K., 2001. Board independence and audit firm type. Auditing(March), 97-114.
[12]Beatty R.P., 1989. Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. The accounting review(October), 693-709.
[13]Becker C., 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of political economy76(2), 169-217.
[14]Bedingfield J., Loeb S., 1974. Auditor changes—an examination. Journal of accountancy(March), 66-69.
[15]Berton L., 1991. GAO weighs auditing plan for big banks. Wall street journal(March27), A3.
[16]Blough G., 1951. Should auditors be changed? Journal of accountancy(April), 624-625.
[17]Bocconi, 2002. The impact of mandatory audit rotation on audit quality and on audit pricing: the case of Italy.
[18]Bonner E., Lewis L., 1990. Determinants of auditor expertise. Journal of accounting research28, 1-28.
[19]Brody R., Kaplan S., 1996. Escalation of commitment among internal auditors. Auditing15(1), 1-15.
[20]Brody R., Moscove S., 1998. Mandatory auditor rotation. National public accountant(May), 32-36.
[21]Burton J., Roberts W., 1967. A study of auditor changes. Journal of accountancy(April), 31-36.
[22]Butt J., 1988. Frequency judgment in an auditing-related task. Journal of accounting research26, 315-330.
[23]Carcello J., Hermanson D., Huss H., 2000. Going-concern opinions: the effects of partner compensation plans and client size. Auditing19(1), 64-81.
[24]Carcello V., Nagy L., 2004. Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Auditing23(2), 55-69.
[25]Carey P., Simnett R., 2006. Audit partner tenure and audit quality. The accounting review81(3), 653-676.
[26]Chen J., Su X., Zhao R., 2000. An emerging market’s reaction to initial modified audit opinions: evidence from the shanghai stock market. Contemporary accounting research17(3), 429-455.
[27]Chow, 1982. The demand for external auditing: size, debt and ownership influences. The accounting reviewLVII, 272-291.
[28]Chow C., McNamee A., Rlumlee R., 1987. Practitioners’ perceptions of audit step difficulty and criticalness: implications for audit research. Auditing(spring), 123-133.
[29]Copley A., Doucet S., 1993. Auditor tenure, fixed fee contracts, and the supply of substandard single audits. Public budgeting & finance(Fall), 23-35.
[30]Davis R., Soo B., Trompeter G., 2000. Auditor tenure, auditor independence and earnings management. Working paper.
[31]DeAngelo L., 1981a. Auditor independence, ‘low balling’, and disclosure regulation. Journal of accounting and economics3, 113-127.
[32]DeAngelo L., 1981b. Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of accounting and economics3, 183-199.
[33]DeFond M., 1992. The association between changes in client firm agency costs and auditor switching. Auditing(Spring), 16-31.
[34]DeFond M., Subramanyam K., 1998. Auditor changes and discretionary accruals. Journal of accounting and economics(February), 35-67.
[35]Deis R., Giroux A., 1992. Determinants of audit quality in the public sector. The accounting review67(3), 462-479.
[36]Dhaliwal D., Lee K., Fargher N., 1991. The association between unexpected earnings and abnormal security returns in the presence of financial leverage. Contemporary accounting research8, 20-41.
[37]Dopuch N., King R., Schwartz R., 2001. An experimental investigation of retention androtation requirements. Journal of accounting research39(1), 93-117.
[38]Dunn K., Mayhew B., Morsefield S., 2000. Auditor industry specialization and client disclosure quality. Working paper.
[39]Elitzur R., Falk H., 1996. Planned audit quality. Journal of accounting and public policy15, 247-269.
[40]Emiliano, Nieves, Cristian, Maria, 2004. Audit quality and the going-concern decision-making process: Spanish evidence. European accounting review13(4), 597-620.
[41]Fan P.H., T.J. Wong, 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of accounting and economics33, 401-425.
[42]Fan P.H., T.J. Wong, 2005. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? evidence from East Asia. Journal of accounting research43(1), 35-72.
[43]Farmer A., Rittenberg E., Trompeter M., 1987. An Investigation of the Impact of Economic and Organizational Factors on Auditor Independence. Auditing7(1), 1-14.
[44]Favere M., Emby N., 2005. The impact of continuity on concurring partner reviews: an exploratory study. Accounting horizons19(1), 1-10.
[45]Firth M., 1980a. Perceptions of auditor independence and official ethical guidelines. The accounting review55(3), 451-466.
[46]Firth M., 1980b. A note on the impact of audit qualifications on lending and credit decisions. Journal of banking and finance4(September), 257-267.
[47]Francis J., Wilson E., 1988. Auditor changes: a joint test of theories relating to agency costs and auditor differentiation. The accounting review(October), 663-682.
[48]Francis J., Schipper K., Vincent L., 2005. Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of accounting and economics39, 329-360.
[49]GAO, 2003. Public accounting firms—required study on the potential effect of mandatory audit firm rotation.
[50]Geiger A., Raghunandan K., 2002. Auditor tenure and audit reporting failures. Auditing21(1), 67-78.
[51]Ghosh A., Moon D., 2005. Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality. The accounting review80(2), 585-612.
[52]Jacobson D., 1967. Rotation of auditors? Yes and no. Journal of accountancy(July), 20.
[53]Johnson W., Lys T., 1990. The market for audit services: evidence from voluntary auditor changes. Journal of accounting and economics(January), 281-308.
[54]Johnson E., Khurana K., Reynolds J., 2002. Audit-firm tenure and the quality of financial reports. Contemporary accounting research19(4), 637-660.
[55]Jones F., 1996. The information content of the auditor’s going concern evaluation. Journal of accounting and public policy15(Spring), 1-27.
[56]Keyser M., 1967. Rotation of auditors? Yes and no. Journal of accountancy(July), 20.
[57]Kida T., 1980. An investigation into auditors’ continuity and related qualification judgments. Journal of accounting research18(2), 506-523.
[58]Klein B., Crawford R., Alchian A., 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of law and economics21(2), 297-326.
[59]Knapp C., 1991. Factors that audit committee members use as surrogates for audit quality. Auditing10(1), 35-52.
[60]Kothari S., 1992. Price-earnings regressions in the presence of pricing leading earnings: earnings level versus changes specification and alternative deflators. Journal of accounting and economics15, 173-302.
[61]Krishnan J., 1994. Auditor switching and conservatism. The accounting review69, 200-215.
[62]Lennox C., 1999a. Are large auditors more accurate than small auditors? Accounting and business research29(3), 217-227.
[63]Lennox C., 1999b. The accuracy and incremental information content of audit reports in predicting bankruptcy. Journal of business finance & accounting26, 757-778.
[64]Lennox C., 2000. Do companies successfully engage in opinion shopping? Evidence from the UK. Journal of accounting and economics29(1), 321-338.
[65]Lev B., Zarowin P., 1999. The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them. Journal of accounting research37, 353-385.
[66]Levitan S., Knoblett A., 1985. Indicators of exceptions to the going concern assumption. Auditing5(1), 26-39.
[67]Libby R., Frederick M., 1990. Experience and the ability to explain audit findings. Journal of accounting research28(2), 348-367.
[68]Louwers J., 1998. The relation between going-concern opinions and the auditor’s loss function. Journal of accounting research36(1), 143-156.
[69]Magee P., Tseng M., 1990. Audit pricing and independence. The accounting review65(2), 315-336.
[70]Maletta M., Wright A., 1996. Audit evidence planning: an examination of industry error characteristics. Auditing(Spring), 71-86.
[71]Mangold N., 1988. Changing auditors and the effect on earnings, auditors’ opinions, and stock prices. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press.
[72]Mansi A., Maxwell F., Miller P., 2004. Does auditor quality and tenure matter to investors? Evidence from the bond market. Journal of accounting research42(4), 755-793.
[73]McLaren N., 1958. Rotation of auditors. Journal of accountancy(July), 41-44.
[74]McMillen D., Smith S., Wells-Parker E., 1989. The effects of alcohol, expectancy, and sensation seeking on driving risk taking. Addictive behaviors14, 477-483.
[75]Melumad N., Amir Z., 1997. A theoretical examination of the market reaction to auditors’ qualifications. Journal of accounting research35(2), 239-256.
[76]Menon K., Williams D., 1994. The insurance hypothesis and market prices. The accountingreview69(2), 327-342.
[77]Menon K., Williams D., 1999. Error cost and auditors’ termination decisions. Journal of accounting, auditing and finance14, 95-123.
[78]Mutchler F., 1984. Auditors’ perceptions of the going-concern opinion decision. Auditing3(2), 17-30.
[79]Mutchler F., 1985. A multivariate analysis of the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision. Journal of accounting research23(2), 668-682.
[80]Mutchler F., 1986. Empirical evidence regarding the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision. Auditing(fall), 148-163.
[81]Mutchler J., Williams D., 1990. The relationship between audit technology, client risk profiles, and the going-concern opinion decision. Auditing(fall), 39-54.
[82]Mutchler F., Hopwood W., Mckeown M., 1997. The influence of contrary information and mitigating factors on audit opinion decisions of bankrupt companies. Journal of accounting research35(2), 295-310.
[83]Myers N., Myers A., Omer C., 2003. Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship and the quality of earnings: a case for mandatory auditor rotation? The accounting review78(3), 779-799.
[84]Myers N., Myers A., Palmrose Z., 2005. The length of auditor-client relationships and financial statement restatements. Working paper.
[85]Palmrose Z., 1986. Litigation and independent auditors: the role of business failures and management fraud. Auditing(Fall), 90-113.
[86]Palmrose Z., 1988. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The accounting review63, 55-73.
[87]Palmrose Z., 1991. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence. Journal of accounting research(Supplement), 149-185.
[88]Petty R., Cuganesan S., 1996. Auditor rotation: framing the debate. Australian accountant(May), 40-41.
[89]Presutti A., 1995. Anchor and adjustment heuristic effect on audit judgment. Managerial auditing journal0(9), 13-21.
[90]Pricewaterhouse, 2002. Mandatory rotation of audit firms: will it improve audit quality?
[91]Raghunathan B., Lewis B., Evans J., 1994. An empirical investigation of problem audits. Research in accounting regulation, 33-58.
[92]Reynolds J., Francis R., 2001. Does Size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of accounting and economic30, 375-400.
[93]Schultz J., Gustavson G., 1978. Actuaries’ perceptions of variables affecting the independent auditor’s legal liability. The accounting reviewLIII(3), 626-641.
[94]Schwartz K., Menon K., 1985. Auditor switches by failing firms. The accounting review60, 248-261.
[95]Seidman J., 1967a. Letters to the journal. Journal of accountancy(May), 30-32.
[96]Seidman J., 1967b. More on rotation of auditors. Journal of accountancy(September), 30.
[97]Shockley A., 1981. Perceptions of auditors’ independence: an empirical analysis. The accounting reviewLVI(4), 785-800.
[98]Shu S., 2000. Auditor resignations: clientele effects and legal liability. Journal of accounting and economics2, 173-205.
[99]Stice D., 1991. Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The accounting review66(3), 516-533.
[100]St.Pierre, Anderson J., 1984. An analysis of the factors associated with lawsuits against public accountants. The accounting reviewLIX(2), 242-263.
[101]Tan H., 1995. Effects of expectations, prior involvement and review awareness on memory for audit evidence and judgment. Journal of accounting research33(1), 113-135.
[102]Teoh S.H., Wong T.J., 1993. Perceived auditor quality and the earnings response coefficient. The accounting review68(2), 346-366.
[103]Vanstraelen A., 1999. The auditor’s going concern opinion decision: a pilot study. International journal of auditing3, 41-57.
[104]Vanstraelen A., 2002. Auditor economic incentives and going-concern opinions in a limited litigious continental european business evironment: empirical evidence from Belgium. Accounting and business research32(3), 171-186.
[105]Watts R., Zimmerman J., 1983. Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: some evidence. Journal of law and economics26(3), 613-633.
[106]Weber R., 1980. Some characteristics of the free recall of computer controls on EDP auditors. Journal of accounting research(Spring), 214-241.
[107]Williamson O.E., 1976. Franchise bidding for natural monopoly—in general with respect to CATV. The bell journal of economics7(Spring), 73-107.
[108]Zeff A., 2003. Du Pont’s early policy on the rotation of audit firms. Journal of accounting and public policy22, 1-18.
[109]陈信元、夏立军,2006.审计任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.会计研究(1),44-53.
[110]韩洪灵,2006.中国审计市场的结构、行为与绩效——以审计定价为核心的研究.厦门大学博士论文打印稿.
[111]李斌、陈凌云,2006.我国上市公司审计委员会有效性研究——基于上市公司年报补丁的实证分析.财贸研究(3),121-127.
[112]李树华,2000.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离.上海:上海三联书店,9-80.
[113]李爽、吴溪,2002a.审计意见变通及其监管:经验证据.中国会计与财务研究(4),1-28.
[114]李爽、吴溪,2002b.审计师变更研究:中国证券市场的初步证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,5-16.
[115]李爽、吴溪,2003.中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,27-36.
[116]李爽、吴溪,2004a.审计定价研究:中国证券市场的初步证据.北京:中国财政经济出版社,24-51.
[117]李爽、吴溪,2004b.会计信息、独立审计与公共政策.北京:中国财政经济出版社,26-28.
[118]李爽、吴溪,2006.签字注册会计师的自然轮换状态与强制轮换政策的初步影响.会计研究(1),36-43.
[119]李弢,2006.审计师解聘与审计质量问题研究——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.厦门大学博士论文打印稿.
[120]李眺,2005.审计市场:产业组织视角的分析.上海:上海财经大学出版社,105-190.
[121]李兆华,2005.我国会计师事务所实行定期轮换制的博弈分析.会计研究(3),63-66.
[122]刘骏,2005.会计师事务所轮换制与审计独立性.审计研究(6),39-44.
[123]刘启亮,2006.事务所任期与审计质量——来自中国证券市场的经验证据.审计研究(4),40-49.
[124]莫茨、夏拉夫著,文硕等译,1990.审计理论结构.北京:中国商业出版社,43-307.
[125]莎伦·布雷姆等著,郭辉等译,2005.亲密关系.北京:人民邮电出版社,3-85.
[126]沈玉清、戚务清、曾勇,2006.我国审计师强制轮换制度有效性的实证分析.审计研究(4),50-59.
[127]斯科特·普劳斯著,施俊琦、王星译,2004.决策与判断.北京:人民邮电出版社,13-221.
[128]孙铮、王跃堂,2000.说明段与变更审计意见的实证分析.中国证券市场财务与会计透视.上海:上海财经大学出版社,32-43.
[129]吴超鹏、吴世农,2005.基于价值创造和公司治理的财务状态分析与预测模型研究.经济研究(11),99-110.
[130]吴水澎、李斌,2006.上市公司自愿设立审计委员会的影响因素分析.山西财经大学学报(1),129-134.
[131]夏立军、陈信元、方轶强,2005.审计任期与审计独立性:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究(1),54-78.
[132]余玉苗、李琳,2003.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析.经济评论(5),124-128.
[133]张继勋,2002.审计判断研究.大连:东北财经大学出版社,224-234.