基于有限理性的个人纳税人遵从决策研究
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摘要
政府要保障其财政收入,实现税收的资源配置、收入再分配等宏观调控作用,大多数纳税人必须表现出税收遵从的意愿。因此,研究纳税人做出税收遵从决策的过程,对于促进税收遵从具有重要的理论与现实意义。本文超越传统经济学的视角,摒弃理性人假设,将纳税人还原为有限理性下的社会人,运用控制实验和建模的方法分析了其税收遵从决策的心理过程,研究结论揭示了真实纳税人的税收遵从决策过程并深化了税收遵从理论的研究。
首先,本文系统分析了税收遵从的动因,除了经典偷逃税模型所涉及到的税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入,影响税收遵从的还有税收道德、对税制公平的认知、纳税人自然属性、公共产品供给、税收遵从成本等,这些因素的存在使得单纯通过基于理性人假设的偷逃税模型来研究税收遵从存在不足。进一步,本文分析了理性人决策理论的缺陷,指出基于此的税收遵从研究无法解释的税收遵从困惑、预缴现象、框架效应等异象。并引入有限理性下的决策理论——前景理论,阐述其区别于期望效用理论的参考点思想在税收遵从领域中应用的可行性。
其次,通过控制实验方法对我国纳税人是否存在有限理性特征,以及前景理论的适用性进行了研究。实验验证了框架效应存在于我国纳税人的税收遵从决策过程之中,且稽查概率低时的框架效应比稽查概率高时显著。实验结果与前景理论对纳税人遵从决策过程的预测吻合地较好,证实了前景理论能较好地描述纳税人的决策过程,且在该过程中参考点为当前资产位置。
再次,本文还基于前景理论建立了以当前资产位置为参考点的税收遵从模型,从数理机制上解析了预缴现象与框架效应。模型结论表明,在纳税人不预缴税款时,会出现完全不遵从的行为;而在纳税人预缴税额足够高,且偷逃税行为会面临严厉的罚款时,纳税人会选择完全遵从。在纳税人预缴税款低于其真实应纳税额,且罚款力度较大时,预缴额、罚款倍数与税收遵从度正相关,税率与税收遵从度负相关。在纳税人预缴税款高于其真实应纳税额,但罚款倍数不够大时,预缴额与税收遵从度负相关,税率和罚款倍数与税收遵从度正相关。模型最优遵从度的计算结果与现实经济相符,可以解释税收遵从困惑。
此外,本文将情绪作为单一独立因素,构建了税收遵从决策框架,描述了即时情绪和预期情绪在纳税人决策过程中的地位,并通过一般性形式化描述,将该框架拓展为无领域的决策可计算框架。
最后,结合实验、模型的结论,针对我国税收遵从的现状,从完善征管制度和激发纳税人情绪两方面给出了提高税收遵从度的建议。
The government can gain fiscal revenue and achieve the goal of macroeconomic such as collocation of resources and redistribution by taxation. And it is necessary for most of the taxpayers to pay their taxes honestly. Therefore, studying why the taxpayers come to a decision of tax compliance or noncompliance is important to promote the level of tax compliance in theory and practice. Traditional economic theory assumes rational agents maximize their expected utility while behavioral studies have shown that individual’s responses are bounded rationality. This dissertation investigates the psychology of individual in tax compliance from the bounded rationality perspective. The results of the control experiment, mathematical model and computable framework can reveal the reality in tax compliance decision process and contribute to the area of tax compliance.
First, the dissertation explores the major factors in tax compliance. These factors include the standard elements of tax rate, audit rate, penalty rate and income, as emphasized by the classical tax evasion models. They also include factors such as tax moral, the perception of tax regime equity, demographic variable, supply of public goods and tax compliance cost. These factors show that only the classical tax evasion models which assume the rational agent can not explore tax compliance. The dissertation analyzes the shortcoming of rational decision making theory and lists the anomalies such as tax compliance puzzle, withholding phenomenon and framing effect which exist in tax compliance decision making and can not be explained by classical tax evasion study. Further, prospect theory which is the representative in bounded rationality decision making theory is introduced and the reference point which is the main difference from expected utility theory is discussed.
Second, a control experiment is designed to identify whether the individual taxpayers have bounded rationality characters and follow the usual results of prospect theory or not. The results of experiments show that framing effect exists in tax compliance decision making process and the power to detect framing effect is greater when the audit rate is low. The results are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory which means that prospect theory can account for tax compliance decision making process and the reference point that Chinese taxpayer used is current asset position.
Third, prospect theory is applied to construct a tax compliance model which uses current asset poison as the reference point, and the model gives a quantitative description of the withholding phenomenon and framing effect. The results of the model show that when the taxpayer does not prepay any taxes noncompliance will be induced. However, if the advance payment is high enough and the penalty is severe full compliance may be induced. Moreover, when the advance payment is set lower than taxpayer’s true liability and penalty is severe, the amount of prepayment and penalty rate have positive relationship with tax compliance level while tax rate has negative relationship. When the advance payment is greater than the true liability and penalty is slight, the amount of prepayment has negative relationship with tax compliance level while tax rate and penalty rate have positive relationship. The model can also be used to calculate the optimal compliance level and the results are consistent with the reality, thus the tax compliance puzzle can be explained.
Moreover, the dissertation proposes an emotion-based cognitive model about how tax compliance decisions are made which takes emotion as an independent factor. Within the general computational framework the influence of both immediate emotion and expected emotion are included. The study also give a formalized description of the model to make it computable and domain-independent.
Last, combining the results of experiment and models with the situation of China tax compliance, the dissertation gives some suggestions about how to promote the compliance level which emphasize on the tax levy regime and taxpayer’s emotion.
首先,本文系统分析了税收遵从的动因,除了经典偷逃税模型所涉及到的税率、稽查率、罚款率、收入,影响税收遵从的还有税收道德、对税制公平的认知、纳税人自然属性、公共产品供给、税收遵从成本等,这些因素的存在使得单纯通过基于理性人假设的偷逃税模型来研究税收遵从存在不足。进一步,本文分析了理性人决策理论的缺陷,指出基于此的税收遵从研究无法解释的税收遵从困惑、预缴现象、框架效应等异象。并引入有限理性下的决策理论——前景理论,阐述其区别于期望效用理论的参考点思想在税收遵从领域中应用的可行性。
其次,通过控制实验方法对我国纳税人是否存在有限理性特征,以及前景理论的适用性进行了研究。实验验证了框架效应存在于我国纳税人的税收遵从决策过程之中,且稽查概率低时的框架效应比稽查概率高时显著。实验结果与前景理论对纳税人遵从决策过程的预测吻合地较好,证实了前景理论能较好地描述纳税人的决策过程,且在该过程中参考点为当前资产位置。
再次,本文还基于前景理论建立了以当前资产位置为参考点的税收遵从模型,从数理机制上解析了预缴现象与框架效应。模型结论表明,在纳税人不预缴税款时,会出现完全不遵从的行为;而在纳税人预缴税额足够高,且偷逃税行为会面临严厉的罚款时,纳税人会选择完全遵从。在纳税人预缴税款低于其真实应纳税额,且罚款力度较大时,预缴额、罚款倍数与税收遵从度正相关,税率与税收遵从度负相关。在纳税人预缴税款高于其真实应纳税额,但罚款倍数不够大时,预缴额与税收遵从度负相关,税率和罚款倍数与税收遵从度正相关。模型最优遵从度的计算结果与现实经济相符,可以解释税收遵从困惑。
此外,本文将情绪作为单一独立因素,构建了税收遵从决策框架,描述了即时情绪和预期情绪在纳税人决策过程中的地位,并通过一般性形式化描述,将该框架拓展为无领域的决策可计算框架。
最后,结合实验、模型的结论,针对我国税收遵从的现状,从完善征管制度和激发纳税人情绪两方面给出了提高税收遵从度的建议。
The government can gain fiscal revenue and achieve the goal of macroeconomic such as collocation of resources and redistribution by taxation. And it is necessary for most of the taxpayers to pay their taxes honestly. Therefore, studying why the taxpayers come to a decision of tax compliance or noncompliance is important to promote the level of tax compliance in theory and practice. Traditional economic theory assumes rational agents maximize their expected utility while behavioral studies have shown that individual’s responses are bounded rationality. This dissertation investigates the psychology of individual in tax compliance from the bounded rationality perspective. The results of the control experiment, mathematical model and computable framework can reveal the reality in tax compliance decision process and contribute to the area of tax compliance.
First, the dissertation explores the major factors in tax compliance. These factors include the standard elements of tax rate, audit rate, penalty rate and income, as emphasized by the classical tax evasion models. They also include factors such as tax moral, the perception of tax regime equity, demographic variable, supply of public goods and tax compliance cost. These factors show that only the classical tax evasion models which assume the rational agent can not explore tax compliance. The dissertation analyzes the shortcoming of rational decision making theory and lists the anomalies such as tax compliance puzzle, withholding phenomenon and framing effect which exist in tax compliance decision making and can not be explained by classical tax evasion study. Further, prospect theory which is the representative in bounded rationality decision making theory is introduced and the reference point which is the main difference from expected utility theory is discussed.
Second, a control experiment is designed to identify whether the individual taxpayers have bounded rationality characters and follow the usual results of prospect theory or not. The results of experiments show that framing effect exists in tax compliance decision making process and the power to detect framing effect is greater when the audit rate is low. The results are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory which means that prospect theory can account for tax compliance decision making process and the reference point that Chinese taxpayer used is current asset position.
Third, prospect theory is applied to construct a tax compliance model which uses current asset poison as the reference point, and the model gives a quantitative description of the withholding phenomenon and framing effect. The results of the model show that when the taxpayer does not prepay any taxes noncompliance will be induced. However, if the advance payment is high enough and the penalty is severe full compliance may be induced. Moreover, when the advance payment is set lower than taxpayer’s true liability and penalty is severe, the amount of prepayment and penalty rate have positive relationship with tax compliance level while tax rate has negative relationship. When the advance payment is greater than the true liability and penalty is slight, the amount of prepayment has negative relationship with tax compliance level while tax rate and penalty rate have positive relationship. The model can also be used to calculate the optimal compliance level and the results are consistent with the reality, thus the tax compliance puzzle can be explained.
Moreover, the dissertation proposes an emotion-based cognitive model about how tax compliance decisions are made which takes emotion as an independent factor. Within the general computational framework the influence of both immediate emotion and expected emotion are included. The study also give a formalized description of the model to make it computable and domain-independent.
Last, combining the results of experiment and models with the situation of China tax compliance, the dissertation gives some suggestions about how to promote the compliance level which emphasize on the tax levy regime and taxpayer’s emotion.
引文
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