对等网络中节点合作激励机制研究
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摘要
对等网络是采用对等模式工作的网络,它能充分利用互联网的边缘资源,极大地提高网络效率。对等网络技术的应用已经越来越显现出它的优势,广泛应用于文件共享、流媒体、计算、即时通信等。然而广泛存在的搭便车行为会降低对等网络的性能,增加系统的脆弱性；此外,还存在着白洗、女巫攻击、以及共谋等恶意节点行为。为保障对等网络高效、安全及可靠运行,有必要对过于严重的搭便车行为进行抑制。
当前,国内外许多学者针对对等网络中大量存在搭便车及恶意节点现象,提出了不同的激励机制理论,分为如下几类激励机制：虚拟支付激励机制、直接互惠激励机制、基于信誉激励机制、无私节点激励机制。当前针对对等网络文件系统中的搭便车等问题,最有效的分析工具是博弈论。如何构建与量化激励机制,促进对等网络节点之间合作等是本文重点研究探讨的问题。采用有效的激励机制,将减少对等网络中普遍存在的搭便车的现象,实现对等网络的稳态运行,从而提高对等网络应用的服务质量。然而,没有一种放之四海皆而有效地激励方法,必须针对特定结构和应用给出特定的机制。
本论文的研究工作在湖北省自然科学基金重点项目(2010CDA011)、湖北省自然科学基金项目(2008CDB342)、湖北省教育厅重点基金项目(D20111409)的支持下,对BitTorrent、Gnutella、Chord和对等网络流媒体系统进行了研究,提出了相应的激励机制。论文的主要研究成果如下：
1)提出了自适应宽容的一报还一报激励策略AGTFT。AGTFT策略在TFT策略基础上进行了改进,若上轮博弈中交互节点背叛自己,则本轮博弈中自身选择一定的概率合作,且这个合作概率是根据环境动态变化的。在不稳定的网络环境下,AGTFT策略比TFT策略更健壮,容错性好；同时由于AGTFT策略对合作节点比TFT策略更加友好,能够更加促进合作节点之间的合作,从而直接和间接抑制搭便车现象,有效提高BitTorrent系统的服务质量。
2)在Gnutella协议基础上提出了基于兴趣簇与声望改进的Gnutella激励机制。基于兴趣簇与声望改进的Gnutella激励模型主要由兴趣簇组成,每个兴趣簇由超级节点管理着若干叶节点。采用声望激励的方式,兴趣簇内超级节点可根据簇内节点服务情况对叶节点进行声望评价,兴趣簇之间可根据兴趣簇服务情况进行声望评价,从而有效抑制搭便车现象。该机制还可有效防止洪泛现象的发生。
3)在Chord协议基础上提出了具有激励机制的、基于优先级排队服务的IChord协议。IChord协议具有如下特性：协议目标是激励Chord网络稳态运行；协议通过节点贡献值量化,优先级排队实现差异化服务的激励机制；协议中的差异化服务具有动态性,从而有效抑制节点搭便车行为,缓解对等网络扰动现象,促进对等网络稳态运行。
4)基于马尔可夫预测机制建模,将节点动态选择为一个合作博弈,并构成一个稳定的联盟,提出基于动态联盟的对等网络流媒体系统激励机制。对等网络流媒体系统中,联盟管理服务器管理着对等网络流媒体网络中的联盟及联盟中的成员。通过节点在联盟内部发布证书与反馈的方式来判断节点是否向其下游节点提供流媒体下载服务,以判断节点是否为搭便车节点。该机制对网络节点自私行为具有约束性,进而能够维护网络的稳定性。
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, which adopts the Peer-to-Peer mode, can make full use of the edge resources in the Internet and greatly improve the efficiency of the network. The application of P2P network technology has increasingly reflected its advantages and been widely used in file sharing, streaming media, computing, instant communication and so on. However, the widespread existence of free-riding actions will reduce the performance of the P2P network, and increase the vulnerability of the system. In addition, there are also malicious node behaviors such as White Washing, Sybil Attack and Collusion. Therefore, in order to guarantee that the P2P network can work effectively, safely and reliablely, it is necessary to take the suitable measurement to restrain the serious free-riding.
Currently, many domestic and foreign scholars propose different theories for incentive mechanism, in view of massive existence of free-riding and malicious node phenomenon. In summary, it can be approximately divided into the following kinds of incentive mechanisms:virtual payment incentive mechanism, direct reciprocal incentive mechanism, reputation-based incentive mechanism, and selfless node incentive mechanism. As for current problems such as the free-riding of P2P file systems, the most effective analysis tool is the game theory. How to construct and quantify the incentive mechanism, and promote the cooperation among P2P network nodes are problems that need to be constantly studied. The effective incentive mechanism in P2P networks can reduce the ubiquitous phenomenon of free-riding, realize the steady-state operation of P2P networks, and thereby improve the Quality of Service (QoS) of P2P network applications. However, there is no universal and effective incentive method; hence a specific mechanism must be given according to the specific overlay structure and application type.
The research work of this dissertation is under the support of Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province in China (No.2010CDA011), Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province in China (No.2008CDB342) and t Natural Science Foundation of Education Department of Hubei Province in China (No. D20111409), deeply studies BitTorrent, Gnutella, Chord and streaming media of P2P network, and proposes corresponding incentive mechanisms. The main contribution of this dissertation is listed as follows.
1) This dissertation proposes the incentive strategy named AGTFT (Adaptive Generous Tit-for-Tat). The AGTFT strategy is improved based on the TFT strategy. If the node betrays the interactive node in the last game, then in this game, the node will select cooperation with a certain probability according to the environment dynamically. In the unstable network environment, the AGTFT strategy is more robust and has a better fault tolerance than the TFT strategy. And at the same time, the AGTFT strategy is friendlier to cooperative nodes than that of the TFT strategy, and promotes cooperation between the cooperative nodes. Hence, the AGTFT strategy inhibits the free-riding phenomenon directly and indirectly, and effectively improves the QoS of the BitTorrent system.
2) On the basis of the Gnutella protocol, this dissertation proposes Gnutella incentive mechanism based on the interest cluster and the prestige improvement, which is mainly composed of interest clusters, and each cluster consists of a super node and some leaf nodes which managed by the super node. The super node in the interest cluster adopts the reputation incentive mechanism and evaluates the reputation of leaf nodes according to the service qualificaiton of the cluster nodes. And reputations among the interest clusters can be evaluated according to the service qualification of the interest clusters, so as to effectively restrain the free-riding behavior. The proposed mechanism can effectively prevent the flooding phenomenon, and has an obvious effect to restrain free-riding behavior.
3) On the basis of the Chord protocol, this dissertation proposes the IChord protocol based on priority queuing service with incentive mechanism. The IChord protocol has characteristics including:the target of the IChord protocol is to incent the Chord network working in a steady state; the quantification is according to the contribution value of nodes in the IChord protocol; the incentive mechanism of DiffServ is in accordance with priority queuing, and dynamic DiffServ in the protocol. In the Chord network, service based on priority queuing has the incentive function, which can then restrain the free-riding behavior effectively, reduce Churn phenomenon in P2P networks and promote P2P networks to work in a steady state.
4) By dynamically selecting a cooperative game for modeling nodes based on the Markov prediction mechanism, this dissertation proposes an incentive mechanism for P2P streaming media system based on dynamic alliance to form a stable alliance. In the streaming media system of P2P network, the alliance management server manages the union and its member in P2P streaming media network. Through issuing certificate and feedback of the union to judge whether a node provides streaming media download service to the downstream node, it can judge whether the node is a free-riding node. The proposed mechanism can effectively restrain the selfish behaviors of network nodes and can maintain the stability of the network.
当前,国内外许多学者针对对等网络中大量存在搭便车及恶意节点现象,提出了不同的激励机制理论,分为如下几类激励机制：虚拟支付激励机制、直接互惠激励机制、基于信誉激励机制、无私节点激励机制。当前针对对等网络文件系统中的搭便车等问题,最有效的分析工具是博弈论。如何构建与量化激励机制,促进对等网络节点之间合作等是本文重点研究探讨的问题。采用有效的激励机制,将减少对等网络中普遍存在的搭便车的现象,实现对等网络的稳态运行,从而提高对等网络应用的服务质量。然而,没有一种放之四海皆而有效地激励方法,必须针对特定结构和应用给出特定的机制。
本论文的研究工作在湖北省自然科学基金重点项目(2010CDA011)、湖北省自然科学基金项目(2008CDB342)、湖北省教育厅重点基金项目(D20111409)的支持下,对BitTorrent、Gnutella、Chord和对等网络流媒体系统进行了研究,提出了相应的激励机制。论文的主要研究成果如下：
1)提出了自适应宽容的一报还一报激励策略AGTFT。AGTFT策略在TFT策略基础上进行了改进,若上轮博弈中交互节点背叛自己,则本轮博弈中自身选择一定的概率合作,且这个合作概率是根据环境动态变化的。在不稳定的网络环境下,AGTFT策略比TFT策略更健壮,容错性好；同时由于AGTFT策略对合作节点比TFT策略更加友好,能够更加促进合作节点之间的合作,从而直接和间接抑制搭便车现象,有效提高BitTorrent系统的服务质量。
2)在Gnutella协议基础上提出了基于兴趣簇与声望改进的Gnutella激励机制。基于兴趣簇与声望改进的Gnutella激励模型主要由兴趣簇组成,每个兴趣簇由超级节点管理着若干叶节点。采用声望激励的方式,兴趣簇内超级节点可根据簇内节点服务情况对叶节点进行声望评价,兴趣簇之间可根据兴趣簇服务情况进行声望评价,从而有效抑制搭便车现象。该机制还可有效防止洪泛现象的发生。
3)在Chord协议基础上提出了具有激励机制的、基于优先级排队服务的IChord协议。IChord协议具有如下特性：协议目标是激励Chord网络稳态运行；协议通过节点贡献值量化,优先级排队实现差异化服务的激励机制；协议中的差异化服务具有动态性,从而有效抑制节点搭便车行为,缓解对等网络扰动现象,促进对等网络稳态运行。
4)基于马尔可夫预测机制建模,将节点动态选择为一个合作博弈,并构成一个稳定的联盟,提出基于动态联盟的对等网络流媒体系统激励机制。对等网络流媒体系统中,联盟管理服务器管理着对等网络流媒体网络中的联盟及联盟中的成员。通过节点在联盟内部发布证书与反馈的方式来判断节点是否向其下游节点提供流媒体下载服务,以判断节点是否为搭便车节点。该机制对网络节点自私行为具有约束性,进而能够维护网络的稳定性。
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network, which adopts the Peer-to-Peer mode, can make full use of the edge resources in the Internet and greatly improve the efficiency of the network. The application of P2P network technology has increasingly reflected its advantages and been widely used in file sharing, streaming media, computing, instant communication and so on. However, the widespread existence of free-riding actions will reduce the performance of the P2P network, and increase the vulnerability of the system. In addition, there are also malicious node behaviors such as White Washing, Sybil Attack and Collusion. Therefore, in order to guarantee that the P2P network can work effectively, safely and reliablely, it is necessary to take the suitable measurement to restrain the serious free-riding.
Currently, many domestic and foreign scholars propose different theories for incentive mechanism, in view of massive existence of free-riding and malicious node phenomenon. In summary, it can be approximately divided into the following kinds of incentive mechanisms:virtual payment incentive mechanism, direct reciprocal incentive mechanism, reputation-based incentive mechanism, and selfless node incentive mechanism. As for current problems such as the free-riding of P2P file systems, the most effective analysis tool is the game theory. How to construct and quantify the incentive mechanism, and promote the cooperation among P2P network nodes are problems that need to be constantly studied. The effective incentive mechanism in P2P networks can reduce the ubiquitous phenomenon of free-riding, realize the steady-state operation of P2P networks, and thereby improve the Quality of Service (QoS) of P2P network applications. However, there is no universal and effective incentive method; hence a specific mechanism must be given according to the specific overlay structure and application type.
The research work of this dissertation is under the support of Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province in China (No.2010CDA011), Natural Science Foundation of Hubei Province in China (No.2008CDB342) and t Natural Science Foundation of Education Department of Hubei Province in China (No. D20111409), deeply studies BitTorrent, Gnutella, Chord and streaming media of P2P network, and proposes corresponding incentive mechanisms. The main contribution of this dissertation is listed as follows.
1) This dissertation proposes the incentive strategy named AGTFT (Adaptive Generous Tit-for-Tat). The AGTFT strategy is improved based on the TFT strategy. If the node betrays the interactive node in the last game, then in this game, the node will select cooperation with a certain probability according to the environment dynamically. In the unstable network environment, the AGTFT strategy is more robust and has a better fault tolerance than the TFT strategy. And at the same time, the AGTFT strategy is friendlier to cooperative nodes than that of the TFT strategy, and promotes cooperation between the cooperative nodes. Hence, the AGTFT strategy inhibits the free-riding phenomenon directly and indirectly, and effectively improves the QoS of the BitTorrent system.
2) On the basis of the Gnutella protocol, this dissertation proposes Gnutella incentive mechanism based on the interest cluster and the prestige improvement, which is mainly composed of interest clusters, and each cluster consists of a super node and some leaf nodes which managed by the super node. The super node in the interest cluster adopts the reputation incentive mechanism and evaluates the reputation of leaf nodes according to the service qualificaiton of the cluster nodes. And reputations among the interest clusters can be evaluated according to the service qualification of the interest clusters, so as to effectively restrain the free-riding behavior. The proposed mechanism can effectively prevent the flooding phenomenon, and has an obvious effect to restrain free-riding behavior.
3) On the basis of the Chord protocol, this dissertation proposes the IChord protocol based on priority queuing service with incentive mechanism. The IChord protocol has characteristics including:the target of the IChord protocol is to incent the Chord network working in a steady state; the quantification is according to the contribution value of nodes in the IChord protocol; the incentive mechanism of DiffServ is in accordance with priority queuing, and dynamic DiffServ in the protocol. In the Chord network, service based on priority queuing has the incentive function, which can then restrain the free-riding behavior effectively, reduce Churn phenomenon in P2P networks and promote P2P networks to work in a steady state.
4) By dynamically selecting a cooperative game for modeling nodes based on the Markov prediction mechanism, this dissertation proposes an incentive mechanism for P2P streaming media system based on dynamic alliance to form a stable alliance. In the streaming media system of P2P network, the alliance management server manages the union and its member in P2P streaming media network. Through issuing certificate and feedback of the union to judge whether a node provides streaming media download service to the downstream node, it can judge whether the node is a free-riding node. The proposed mechanism can effectively restrain the selfish behaviors of network nodes and can maintain the stability of the network.
引文
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