美国州三代要约收购立法浪潮
摘要
本文记述了从上个世纪60年代后期到80年代末,短短二十年内美国州法对要约收购规制历经了三代发展,最终突破美国联邦最高法院对其进行的合宪性审查的曲折历程。美国联邦最高法院通过对自己理论的调整,在宪法框架下对各方竞争的利益进行权衡,作出了符合时代潮流的选择。本文通过梳理美国州法对要约收购的规制历程,并辅以三个里程碑式的案例进行论述,试图将在那个收购与反收购的战争硝烟弥漫的时代,州与联邦最高法院之间的动态博弈图景呈现出来,同时,在梳理的过程中,笔者不禁为美国最高法院法官驾驭美国司法走向所必需的智识和能力所折服,并发现其对美国经济立法的重大导向作用。
从结构上看,本文分为绪论、正文与余论。引言讨论了本文的研究对象以及研究方法。正文分为三个部分:
第一部分:“州要约收购立法的时代背景及联邦立法背景”,本部分用一系列数据资料来显示那个时代的收购浪潮特点,对敌意收购和杠杆收购引发的混乱进行宏观的描述。这是对州一代又一代坚持不懈地进行收购立法的强烈动机的合理解释,也是本文进行论述的大的经济社会背景。然后对当时要约收购联邦层面的惟一立法---《威廉姆斯法案》的立法精神及主要内容进行简要阐述,这是当时美图各州要约收购立法的法律背景。
第二部分:“州对要约收购立法历程”,本部分为全文的核心,共分为六个小部分。在最开始的一部分中,笔者先概述了美国第一代州要约收购立法的整体特点及人们对其违宪性的种种质疑,随后记述Great Western United V. Kidwell与Edgar V. Mite案如何将这种质疑一步步推向高潮,结果是当最高法院首次判决伊利诺斯州要约收购法违宪时,同时意味着具有相似特征的第一代州要约收购立法破产了。文章进而过渡到了对第二代要约收购立法的介绍,并最终以CTS Corp. V. Dynamics Corp. of America案---最高法院判决印第安纳州要约收购法符合宪法---为转折点,第二代要约收购立法的时代结束。第三代州要约收购立法轰轰烈烈上演,各州纷纷效仿印第安纳州,并创新了自己的模式。这一部分主要是以要约收购立法生成路径为主线,穿插里程碑式的案例,试图展现当时州要约收购立法的历程、法院法官的观点立场以及当时舆论的评价。
第三部分:“对州规制要约收购历程的评价”,本部分从“最高条款”、“贸易条款”、“联邦最高法院”这三个方面分别进行评述,试图从联邦最高法院在Kidwell案、Mite案、CTS案中对这两个条款的解释变化中来窥探其立场、利益的权衡,以及从中可以看出其对美国经济立法的导向作用。
从结构上看,本文分为绪论、正文与余论。引言讨论了本文的研究对象以及研究方法。正文分为三个部分:
第一部分:“州要约收购立法的时代背景及联邦立法背景”,本部分用一系列数据资料来显示那个时代的收购浪潮特点,对敌意收购和杠杆收购引发的混乱进行宏观的描述。这是对州一代又一代坚持不懈地进行收购立法的强烈动机的合理解释,也是本文进行论述的大的经济社会背景。然后对当时要约收购联邦层面的惟一立法---《威廉姆斯法案》的立法精神及主要内容进行简要阐述,这是当时美图各州要约收购立法的法律背景。
第二部分:“州对要约收购立法历程”,本部分为全文的核心,共分为六个小部分。在最开始的一部分中,笔者先概述了美国第一代州要约收购立法的整体特点及人们对其违宪性的种种质疑,随后记述Great Western United V. Kidwell与Edgar V. Mite案如何将这种质疑一步步推向高潮,结果是当最高法院首次判决伊利诺斯州要约收购法违宪时,同时意味着具有相似特征的第一代州要约收购立法破产了。文章进而过渡到了对第二代要约收购立法的介绍,并最终以CTS Corp. V. Dynamics Corp. of America案---最高法院判决印第安纳州要约收购法符合宪法---为转折点,第二代要约收购立法的时代结束。第三代州要约收购立法轰轰烈烈上演,各州纷纷效仿印第安纳州,并创新了自己的模式。这一部分主要是以要约收购立法生成路径为主线,穿插里程碑式的案例,试图展现当时州要约收购立法的历程、法院法官的观点立场以及当时舆论的评价。
第三部分:“对州规制要约收购历程的评价”,本部分从“最高条款”、“贸易条款”、“联邦最高法院”这三个方面分别进行评述,试图从联邦最高法院在Kidwell案、Mite案、CTS案中对这两个条款的解释变化中来窥探其立场、利益的权衡,以及从中可以看出其对美国经济立法的导向作用。
引文
1 [美]本杰明·N·卡多佐著:《司法过程的性质》,苏力译,商务印书馆1998年版,第106页。
2 Black Law Dictionary, fifth edition, West publishing Co., P. 1316,转引自王枫.《要约收购中的信息披露义务》.《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社2005年版,第204页。
3黄锡生、罗世荣主编:《市场经济法论》,重庆大学出版社2002年版,第378页。
4 [美]克拉克著:《公司法则》,胡平译,工商出版社1999年版,第457页。
5 [美]路易斯·罗思、乔尔·赛里格曼著:《美国证券监管法基础》,张路等译,法律出版社2007版,第453页
6同上。
8 [美] J·弗雷德·威斯通、[韩]S·郑光著:《兼并、重组与公司控制》,[美]苏姗·E·侯格,唐旭译,经济科学出版社1998年版,第15页。
9 Ross Cranston,“The Rise and Rise of the Hostile Takeover”, European Takeover, Butterworths, 1992, P.80.
10 http://baike.baidu.com/view/10535.htmfr=ala0_1访问时间:2010‐3‐23。
11数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》,中国商务出版社2004年版,第124页。
12数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》中国商务出版社2004年版,第125页。
13数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》中国商务出版社2004年版,第124页。
14 S.2731,89thCong.,1stSess.(1965).
15 See113CONG.REC.S854‐56(dailyed.Jan.18,1967).
16 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第227页。
17 The Supreme Court has indicated its belief that Congress intended to achieve both of these goals. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977), the Court found that the legislative history of the Williams Act "shows that Congress was intent upon regulating takeover bidders, theretofore operating covertly, in order to protect the shareholders of target companies." In his MITE plurality opinion, Justice White wrote "[A] major aspect of the effort to protect investors was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
18 [美]托马斯·李·哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社2003版,第508页。
19 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第228页。
20同上。
21参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年版,第283页。
22同上。
23同上。
24同上。
25参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年,第285页。
26 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第229页。
27参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年版,第285页。
28 See VA. CODE ANN.§13.1-528 to -541 (1978).
29 [美]托马斯·李·哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社, 2003年版,第567页。
30同上。
31 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第568页。
32 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第570页。
33 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第569页。
34同上。
35同上。
36 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
37 577F.2dat1263n.12(citingIDAHOCODE§30‐1501(6)(1980)).
38 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第578页。
39同上。
40 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第578页。
41同上。
42同上。
43 457 U.S. at 627.
44“(a) Congress has explicitly preempted state regulation, (b) compliance with both the state law and federal law is a physical impossibility, and (c) the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
45 457 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added). This passage seems to indicate a belief that the "neutrality" concept of the Williams Act was intended only as a means to protect investors. However, as the ensuing passages indicate, Justice White stressed the "neutrality" principle so often as almost to raise it to the level of an independent goal.
46 457 U.S. at 627
47 457 U.S. at 637 n.12
48 457U.S.at640.
49 457U.S.at628n.3.
50 Thewithdrawalrights,hold‐openperiod,andprorationrequirementsoftheIllinoisactwereallcontainedintheWilliamsAct.Furthermore,JusticeWhitewasunconvincedthatthedisclosuresthattheIllinoisactrequiredaboveandbeyondtheWilliamsActrequirementswouldhelpshareholders.Andthedelaysinducedinthetenderofferprocesswereviewedaspotentiallyharmfultoshareholders'interestsbecauseofthedefensivetacticsthatwouldbeusedbyincumbentmanagement.Id.at644‐45.
51 See sources cited in Prentice, The Rhetoric of the Supreme Court, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 106-10 (1983).
52 OnlyChiefJusticeBurgerandJusticesStevensandO'ConnorjoinedJusticeWhite'sholdingonthispoint.
53 SeeBaldwinv.G.A.F.Seelig,Inc.,294U.S.511(1935);
54 Regan, supra note 67, at 1280.
55 Regan, supra note 67, at 1279.
56 Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 732-33 (1987)(citing six studies finding either positive effects or no effects). Furthermore, Romano did a study of the stock prices of corporation in three jurisdictions (Connecticut, Missouri and Pennsylvania) which adopted second generation laws of various kinds (second-tier, shareholder approval, and redemption models, respectively) and found no discernible negative impact on stock prices. Id. at 738.
57 SeeBlock,Barton&Roth,StateTakeoverStatutes:The"SecondGeneration",13SEC.REG.L.J.332,337n.32(1986).
58 SeegenerallyComment,Front‐EndLoadedTenderOffers:TheApplicationofFederalandStateLawtoanInnovativeCorporateAcquisitionTechnique,131U.PA.L.REV.389(1982).
59 See,e.g.,Radolv.Thomas,772F.2d244(6thCir.1985)(rejectingclaimthattwo‐tierbidsare"manipulative"withinthemeaningofsection14(e)oftheWilliamsAct).SeeNote,supranote134,at494.
60 OHIOREV.CODEANN.§§1701.01,1701.831(Anderson1985).ThisstatutewasheldunconstitutionalonbothpreemptionandCommerceClausegroundsinFleetAerospaceCorp.v.Holderman,796F.2d135(6thCir.1986).
61 This statute was held unconstitutional on both preemption and Commerce Clause grounds in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
62 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第571页
63 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第572页。
64 See15PA.STAT.ANN.§§1408,1409.1(c)(1)‐(3),1910(Purdon1986).
65 15PA.STAT.ANN.§1408(PurdonSupp.1984).Althoughmoststatestakingthisapproachmerelyallowthedirectorstoconsiderotherconstituencies,Arizona'slawstatesthatdirectors"shallconsiderthelong‐termaswellastheshort‐terminterestsofthecorporationanditsshareholdersincludingthepossibilitythattheseinterestsmaybebestservedbythecontinuedindependenceofthecorporation."ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.§10‐1202(emphasisadded),asaddedbyH.B.2002,July23,1987.
66 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第572页。
67 Garrity, Addendum: Post-Mite State Takeover Statutes: Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 32 BUS. LAW. 586, 591 (1987).
68 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW§912 (McKinney 1986).
69 107S.Ct.1637(1987).
70 IND.CODE§23‐1‐42‐4(a).
71 IND. CODE§23-1-42-1 (Burns Supp. 1986).
72马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第353页。
73 794F.2d250(7thCir.1986).ForadiscussionofJudgePosner'sanalysisofthepoisonpillissue,seeNote,supranote134,at485‐90.
74马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页。
75 794F.2d250at263.
76 794F.2d250(7thCir.1986).
77 107 S. Ct. 1637,(1987)
78马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页。
79同上。
80马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页
81同上。
82马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第356页。
83 107S.Ct.at 1647.
84马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第356页。
85 107S.Ct.at 1648.Obviously,JusticePowellacceptedthedistinctionbetweencorporatecodesandblueskylawsthatunderliessomanysecondandthirdgenerationlaws.
86 E.g.,Lewisv.B.T.Inv.Managers,Inc.,447U.S.27,36‐37(1980);Philadelphiav.NewJersey,437U.S.617,624(1978).BothJusticePowellandJusticeScalianotedtheconclusionofProfessorRegan,supranote67,thatthethrustofmostSupremeCourtCommerceClausecaseshasbeentostrikedownlawsthatdiscriminatedagainstinterstatecommerceandtoupholdmostothers.
87 107S.Ct.1637,(1987)
88马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第358页。
89同上。
90同上。
91马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第358页。
92同上。
93马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第359页。
94 397U.S.137(1970).
95 Bycloselyreadingthetextof§28,Scaliadecidedthatthereshouldbenopreemptionforconflicting"purposes"(thetestnormallyusedbytheCourt),butonlyforconflicting"provisions."Id.at1653.
96马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第359页。
97 See generally Daniel Fichel, supra note 30, at 5.
98 See Franl Easterbrook & Daniel Fichel, supra note 100, at 1173-74.
99 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
100 See also Rotunda, The Doctrine of the Inner Political Check, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and Federal Preemption, 53 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 263, 268 (1986)(noting that the Commerce Clause does not require the promotion of efficiency, although a de facto rule of interpretation has arisen that is consistent with this concept).
101 Lowenstein, supra note 228, at 181.
102 Iacocca, Is Your Company Doing Well, Spotlight, Jan. 19, 1987, at 18, col. 1 ("The typical takeover target isn't a company in trouble. It's a company with a solid asset base, low debt, consistent profits and a few bucks in the bank to diversify or get through the next business downturn.").
103 Drucker,CorporateTakeovers‐‐WhatistobeDone,82PUB.INTEREST3,5(1986).Theyalsooftenhavelittlecapitaloftheirown,relyinginsteadonborrowingandfinancialinnovations.Id.Furthermore,stockpricestudiesofacquirersshowthattheyalsofrequentlysustainednegativestockpricereturnsintheyearsbeforetheymadetenderoffers.Malatesta,TheWealthEffectofMergerActivityandtheObjectiveFunctionsofMergingFirms,11J.FIN.ECON.155,180(1983).
104 Professor Lowenstein notes, regarding the large number of LBOs in recent years: They amply demonstrate that attractive opportunities exist for the purchase of large and actively-traded corporations at prices well over the market, despite the fact that by the very nature of the transaction the existing management will be handsomely rewarded and will become even more firmly "entrenched." Yet banks, insurance companies and other passive investors invest substantial sums in these buy-outs, much of which is at risk, and it is plain that they do not often intend to disrupt the executive suite. Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 296.
105 SeeHayes&Garvin,ManagingAsIfTomorrowMattered,HARV.BUS.REV.,May‐June1982,at72,74‐75(Short‐termplanningcanraisestockprices,makingacorporationlookmoreefficientifefficiencyisjudgedonlybythestockmarket;ontheotherhand,corporationswhichplanforthelong‐termmaynotsurviveindependentlytocarryoutthoseplans).
106 Drucker, supra note 257, at 12-13. See also Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 266, at 23-25, 33.
107 Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 215 (1986).
108 Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have been particularly critical of the two-tier bids. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1362 (1978); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 337 (1974). For the view that two-tier bids are not as prevalent or abusive as claimed and that the implementation of poison pill plans is not an appropriate response, see Note, "Poison Pills" as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Ceasefire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 491-97.
109 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
110 291 See Leebron, supra note 281, at 157.
111 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
112 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
113 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
114 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
115 WhileCTSmayhavedealtalegalblowtotenderofferors,itfollowedaseriesoflegalvictoriestheyhadenjoyed,including,mostimportantly,the"auction"principlethatcameoutofsuchcasesasRevlon,506A.2d173.SeeStewart&Hertzberg,LifeBecomesEasierforCorporateRaiders,WallSt.J.,Aug.22,1986,at6,col.1.
116 Yang & Weber, Is Delaware About to Harpoon the Sharks, BUS. WK., Jan. 25, 1988, at 34
117 SeeJarrell&Bradley,supranote300,at401‐02("Todescribethestatetenderofferlawsas'antitakeover'statutesisnotaccuratebyourevidence,althoughthelawsdomarginallyreducethenumberofcashtakeovers.").
118 Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 18, col. 3. Admittedly, if calculated as a percentage of total dollar volume, hostile tender offers constitute a much greater share. One may legitimately ask how much impact a post-CTS wave of state tender offer law adoptions might have. In 1986, when state laws were routinely invalidated by lower courts citing MITE as authority, fully 90% of all hostile tender offers were failures. Austin, Nigem & Barnard, supra note 341, at 49 (not a single contested bid succeeded).
119 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第574页。
120 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第574页
121同上。
122 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第575页。
123 (Article VI 6- Debts, Supremacy, Oaths:……This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.……)
124“(a) Congress has explicitly preempted state regulation, (b) compliance with both the state law and federal law is a physical impossibility, and (c) the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
125 See: Section 8 - Powers of Congress:”……To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;……”
126四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
127四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
128同上。
129 [美]伯纳德施瓦茨:《美国法律史》,王军译,中国政法大学出版社1997年版,第209页。
130同上。
131四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
132 [美]斯科特R,鲍曼著:《现代公司与美国的政治思想:法律、权力与意识形态》,李存捧译,重庆出版社2001年版,第18,19页。
133四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
134同上。
1.【美】伯纳德施瓦茨:《美国法律史》,王军译,中国政法大学出版社1997年版。
2.【美】莫顿·霍维茨著:《美国法的变迁》(上),谢鸿飞等译,中国政法大学出版社,2004年版。
3.【美】乔尔·塞利格曼著:《华尔街变迁史——证券交易委员会及现代公司融资制度的演化进程(修订版)》,天风辉译,经济科学出版社,2004年版。
4.【美】查理斯·R·吉斯特著:《华尔街史》,郭哲、金鑫译,经济科学出版社,2004年版。
5.【美】路易斯·罗斯,乔尔·赛里格曼著:《美国证券监管法基础》,第5版,张路等译,法律出版社2008年版。
6.【美】莱瑞·D·索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社,2004年版。
7.【美】托马斯·李·哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版。
8.【美】J弗雷德威斯通、【韩】S郑光著:《兼并、重组与公司控制》,【美】苏姗E侯格,唐旭译,经济科学出版社1998年版
9.王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社2005年版。
10.马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版。
11.张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年版。
12.邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》,中国商务出版社2004年版。
13.黄锡生、罗世荣主编:《市场经济法论》,重庆大学出版社2002年版
14.王森,齐莲英主编:《美国证券市场:制度、运作与监管》,经济科学出版社2002年版。
15.刘绪贻,杨生茂总主编:《美国通史》(第五卷)之《富兰克林·D·罗斯福时代1929-1945》,人民出版社2008年版。
16.钟鉄夫,黄文泉编著:《华尔街二百年股市风云录》,百家出版社2003年版。
17.朱伟一著:《美国证券法判例解析》,中国法制出版社2002年版。
18.高如星,王敏祥著:《美国证券法》,法律出版社2000年版。
19.徐冬根,陈慧谷等编著:《美国证券法律与实务》,上海社科院出版社1997年版。
20.吴志攀,白建军主编:《证券市场与法律》,中国政法大学出版社2000年版。
21.李东方著:《证券监管法律制度研究》,北京大学出版社2002年版。
22.陈甦主编:《证券法专题研究》,高等教育出版社2006年版。
23.李朝晖著:《证券市场法律监管比较研究》,人民出版社2000年版。
24. Ross Cranston,“The Rise and Rise of the Hostile Takeover”, European Takeover, Butterworths, 1992,
25. Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, Little, Brown and Company, 1983.
26. Budd Martin L.: Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials, Charl Ouesville.Va.:Micchie Co., 1984.
27. James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman, Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials , 3rd ed., Aspen Publisher, Inc., 2001.
28. Alan R. Palmiter, Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations , 3rd ed, Aspen Publishers, 2005.
29. Marc I. Steinberg, Understanding Securities Law , 3rd ed., Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2001.
30. Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on the law of securities regulation, West Pub. Co., 1995.
31. Michael Halloran, Jack H. Halperin, Hugh H. Makens et al., Blue Sky Laws, Practising Law Institute , 1985.
32. Robert A. Prentice, The Role Of States In Tender offers: An Analysis Of CTS, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1.
33. William C. Tyson ,The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 241
34. P. Joseph Campisi, Jr., EDGAR v. MITE CORP. AND CTS CORP. v. DYNAMICS CORP. OF AMERICA A SUBJECTIVE LOOK AT STATE TAKEOVER LEGISLATION,18 Hofstra L. Rev. 157
2 Black Law Dictionary, fifth edition, West publishing Co., P. 1316,转引自王枫.《要约收购中的信息披露义务》.《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社2005年版,第204页。
3黄锡生、罗世荣主编:《市场经济法论》,重庆大学出版社2002年版,第378页。
4 [美]克拉克著:《公司法则》,胡平译,工商出版社1999年版,第457页。
5 [美]路易斯·罗思、乔尔·赛里格曼著:《美国证券监管法基础》,张路等译,法律出版社2007版,第453页
6同上。
8 [美] J·弗雷德·威斯通、[韩]S·郑光著:《兼并、重组与公司控制》,[美]苏姗·E·侯格,唐旭译,经济科学出版社1998年版,第15页。
9 Ross Cranston,“The Rise and Rise of the Hostile Takeover”, European Takeover, Butterworths, 1992, P.80.
10 http://baike.baidu.com/view/10535.htmfr=ala0_1访问时间:2010‐3‐23。
11数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》,中国商务出版社2004年版,第124页。
12数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》中国商务出版社2004年版,第125页。
13数据参见:邵万钦著:《美国企业并购浪潮》中国商务出版社2004年版,第124页。
14 S.2731,89thCong.,1stSess.(1965).
15 See113CONG.REC.S854‐56(dailyed.Jan.18,1967).
16 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第227页。
17 The Supreme Court has indicated its belief that Congress intended to achieve both of these goals. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977), the Court found that the legislative history of the Williams Act "shows that Congress was intent upon regulating takeover bidders, theretofore operating covertly, in order to protect the shareholders of target companies." In his MITE plurality opinion, Justice White wrote "[A] major aspect of the effort to protect investors was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
18 [美]托马斯·李·哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社2003版,第508页。
19 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第228页。
20同上。
21参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年版,第283页。
22同上。
23同上。
24同上。
25参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年,第285页。
26 [美]莱瑞D索德奎斯特著:《美国证券法解读》,胡轩之、张云辉译,法律出版社2004年版,第229页。
27参见张路译:《美国1934年证券交易法》(中英文对照本),法律出版社2006年版,第285页。
28 See VA. CODE ANN.§13.1-528 to -541 (1978).
29 [美]托马斯·李·哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社, 2003年版,第567页。
30同上。
31 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第568页。
32 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第570页。
33 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第569页。
34同上。
35同上。
36 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
37 577F.2dat1263n.12(citingIDAHOCODE§30‐1501(6)(1980)).
38 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第578页。
39同上。
40 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第578页。
41同上。
42同上。
43 457 U.S. at 627.
44“(a) Congress has explicitly preempted state regulation, (b) compliance with both the state law and federal law is a physical impossibility, and (c) the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
45 457 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added). This passage seems to indicate a belief that the "neutrality" concept of the Williams Act was intended only as a means to protect investors. However, as the ensuing passages indicate, Justice White stressed the "neutrality" principle so often as almost to raise it to the level of an independent goal.
46 457 U.S. at 627
47 457 U.S. at 637 n.12
48 457U.S.at640.
49 457U.S.at628n.3.
50 Thewithdrawalrights,hold‐openperiod,andprorationrequirementsoftheIllinoisactwereallcontainedintheWilliamsAct.Furthermore,JusticeWhitewasunconvincedthatthedisclosuresthattheIllinoisactrequiredaboveandbeyondtheWilliamsActrequirementswouldhelpshareholders.Andthedelaysinducedinthetenderofferprocesswereviewedaspotentiallyharmfultoshareholders'interestsbecauseofthedefensivetacticsthatwouldbeusedbyincumbentmanagement.Id.at644‐45.
51 See sources cited in Prentice, The Rhetoric of the Supreme Court, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 106-10 (1983).
52 OnlyChiefJusticeBurgerandJusticesStevensandO'ConnorjoinedJusticeWhite'sholdingonthispoint.
53 SeeBaldwinv.G.A.F.Seelig,Inc.,294U.S.511(1935);
54 Regan, supra note 67, at 1280.
55 Regan, supra note 67, at 1279.
56 Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 732-33 (1987)(citing six studies finding either positive effects or no effects). Furthermore, Romano did a study of the stock prices of corporation in three jurisdictions (Connecticut, Missouri and Pennsylvania) which adopted second generation laws of various kinds (second-tier, shareholder approval, and redemption models, respectively) and found no discernible negative impact on stock prices. Id. at 738.
57 SeeBlock,Barton&Roth,StateTakeoverStatutes:The"SecondGeneration",13SEC.REG.L.J.332,337n.32(1986).
58 SeegenerallyComment,Front‐EndLoadedTenderOffers:TheApplicationofFederalandStateLawtoanInnovativeCorporateAcquisitionTechnique,131U.PA.L.REV.389(1982).
59 See,e.g.,Radolv.Thomas,772F.2d244(6thCir.1985)(rejectingclaimthattwo‐tierbidsare"manipulative"withinthemeaningofsection14(e)oftheWilliamsAct).SeeNote,supranote134,at494.
60 OHIOREV.CODEANN.§§1701.01,1701.831(Anderson1985).ThisstatutewasheldunconstitutionalonbothpreemptionandCommerceClausegroundsinFleetAerospaceCorp.v.Holderman,796F.2d135(6thCir.1986).
61 This statute was held unconstitutional on both preemption and Commerce Clause grounds in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986).
62 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第571页
63 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第572页。
64 See15PA.STAT.ANN.§§1408,1409.1(c)(1)‐(3),1910(Purdon1986).
65 15PA.STAT.ANN.§1408(PurdonSupp.1984).Althoughmoststatestakingthisapproachmerelyallowthedirectorstoconsiderotherconstituencies,Arizona'slawstatesthatdirectors"shallconsiderthelong‐termaswellastheshort‐terminterestsofthecorporationanditsshareholdersincludingthepossibilitythattheseinterestsmaybebestservedbythecontinuedindependenceofthecorporation."ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.§10‐1202(emphasisadded),asaddedbyH.B.2002,July23,1987.
66 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第572页。
67 Garrity, Addendum: Post-Mite State Takeover Statutes: Constitutional Issues and Recent Cases, 32 BUS. LAW. 586, 591 (1987).
68 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW§912 (McKinney 1986).
69 107S.Ct.1637(1987).
70 IND.CODE§23‐1‐42‐4(a).
71 IND. CODE§23-1-42-1 (Burns Supp. 1986).
72马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第353页。
73 794F.2d250(7thCir.1986).ForadiscussionofJudgePosner'sanalysisofthepoisonpillissue,seeNote,supranote134,at485‐90.
74马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页。
75 794F.2d250at263.
76 794F.2d250(7thCir.1986).
77 107 S. Ct. 1637,(1987)
78马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页。
79同上。
80马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第355页
81同上。
82马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第356页。
83 107S.Ct.at 1647.
84马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第356页。
85 107S.Ct.at 1648.Obviously,JusticePowellacceptedthedistinctionbetweencorporatecodesandblueskylawsthatunderliessomanysecondandthirdgenerationlaws.
86 E.g.,Lewisv.B.T.Inv.Managers,Inc.,447U.S.27,36‐37(1980);Philadelphiav.NewJersey,437U.S.617,624(1978).BothJusticePowellandJusticeScalianotedtheconclusionofProfessorRegan,supranote67,thatthethrustofmostSupremeCourtCommerceClausecaseshasbeentostrikedownlawsthatdiscriminatedagainstinterstatecommerceandtoupholdmostothers.
87 107S.Ct.1637,(1987)
88马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第358页。
89同上。
90同上。
91马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第358页。
92同上。
93马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第359页。
94 397U.S.137(1970).
95 Bycloselyreadingthetextof§28,Scaliadecidedthatthereshouldbenopreemptionforconflicting"purposes"(thetestnormallyusedbytheCourt),butonlyforconflicting"provisions."Id.at1653.
96马其家主编:《英国及欧盟证券法案例选评》,对外经济贸易大学出版社2006年版,第359页。
97 See generally Daniel Fichel, supra note 30, at 5.
98 See Franl Easterbrook & Daniel Fichel, supra note 100, at 1173-74.
99 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
100 See also Rotunda, The Doctrine of the Inner Political Check, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and Federal Preemption, 53 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 263, 268 (1986)(noting that the Commerce Clause does not require the promotion of efficiency, although a de facto rule of interpretation has arisen that is consistent with this concept).
101 Lowenstein, supra note 228, at 181.
102 Iacocca, Is Your Company Doing Well, Spotlight, Jan. 19, 1987, at 18, col. 1 ("The typical takeover target isn't a company in trouble. It's a company with a solid asset base, low debt, consistent profits and a few bucks in the bank to diversify or get through the next business downturn.").
103 Drucker,CorporateTakeovers‐‐WhatistobeDone,82PUB.INTEREST3,5(1986).Theyalsooftenhavelittlecapitaloftheirown,relyinginsteadonborrowingandfinancialinnovations.Id.Furthermore,stockpricestudiesofacquirersshowthattheyalsofrequentlysustainednegativestockpricereturnsintheyearsbeforetheymadetenderoffers.Malatesta,TheWealthEffectofMergerActivityandtheObjectiveFunctionsofMergingFirms,11J.FIN.ECON.155,180(1983).
104 Professor Lowenstein notes, regarding the large number of LBOs in recent years: They amply demonstrate that attractive opportunities exist for the purchase of large and actively-traded corporations at prices well over the market, despite the fact that by the very nature of the transaction the existing management will be handsomely rewarded and will become even more firmly "entrenched." Yet banks, insurance companies and other passive investors invest substantial sums in these buy-outs, much of which is at risk, and it is plain that they do not often intend to disrupt the executive suite. Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 296.
105 SeeHayes&Garvin,ManagingAsIfTomorrowMattered,HARV.BUS.REV.,May‐June1982,at72,74‐75(Short‐termplanningcanraisestockprices,makingacorporationlookmoreefficientifefficiencyisjudgedonlybythestockmarket;ontheotherhand,corporationswhichplanforthelong‐termmaynotsurviveindependentlytocarryoutthoseplans).
106 Drucker, supra note 257, at 12-13. See also Lipton, Finance Corporatism, supra note 266, at 23-25, 33.
107 Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 215 (1986).
108 Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have been particularly critical of the two-tier bids. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1362 (1978); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 337 (1974). For the view that two-tier bids are not as prevalent or abusive as claimed and that the implementation of poison pill plans is not an appropriate response, see Note, "Poison Pills" as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Ceasefire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 491-97.
109 107 S. Ct. at 1646.
110 291 See Leebron, supra note 281, at 157.
111 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
112 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
113 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
114 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
115 WhileCTSmayhavedealtalegalblowtotenderofferors,itfollowedaseriesoflegalvictoriestheyhadenjoyed,including,mostimportantly,the"auction"principlethatcameoutofsuchcasesasRevlon,506A.2d173.SeeStewart&Hertzberg,LifeBecomesEasierforCorporateRaiders,WallSt.J.,Aug.22,1986,at6,col.1.
116 Yang & Weber, Is Delaware About to Harpoon the Sharks, BUS. WK., Jan. 25, 1988, at 34
117 SeeJarrell&Bradley,supranote300,at401‐02("Todescribethestatetenderofferlawsas'antitakeover'statutesisnotaccuratebyourevidence,althoughthelawsdomarginallyreducethenumberofcashtakeovers.").
118 Sprinkel, The Real Issue in Corporate Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987, at 18, col. 3. Admittedly, if calculated as a percentage of total dollar volume, hostile tender offers constitute a much greater share. One may legitimately ask how much impact a post-CTS wave of state tender offer law adoptions might have. In 1986, when state laws were routinely invalidated by lower courts citing MITE as authority, fully 90% of all hostile tender offers were failures. Austin, Nigem & Barnard, supra note 341, at 49 (not a single contested bid succeeded).
119 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第574页。
120 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第574页
121同上。
122 [美]托马斯李哈森著:《证券法》,.张学安等译,中国政法大学出版社,2003版,第575页。
123 (Article VI 6- Debts, Supremacy, Oaths:……This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.……)
124“(a) Congress has explicitly preempted state regulation, (b) compliance with both the state law and federal law is a physical impossibility, and (c) the state "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
125 See: Section 8 - Powers of Congress:”……To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;……”
126四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
127四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
128同上。
129 [美]伯纳德施瓦茨:《美国法律史》,王军译,中国政法大学出版社1997年版,第209页。
130同上。
131四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
132 [美]斯科特R,鲍曼著:《现代公司与美国的政治思想:法律、权力与意识形态》,李存捧译,重庆出版社2001年版,第18,19页。
133四方.《美国反收购立法合法性问题》.《金融法苑》,2003年第8期,147—158页。
134同上。
1.【美】伯纳德施瓦茨:《美国法律史》,王军译,中国政法大学出版社1997年版。
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