零售商垄断势力下中国家电制造商的对策研究
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摘要
自20世纪70年代以来,随着全球零售业的巨大变革,大规模的连锁店在西方发达国家普遍兴起,过去生产商相对于零售商拥有完全的垄断势力和谈判能力逐渐减弱,而零售商具有的买方势力越来越强。在这种局势下,作为供应商,如想把产品进入到大型零售商的店铺销售,就要向大型零售商的经营者缴纳进场费、新店开业赞助费、店庆赞助费、新品上架费等费用,这已成为不成文的规矩,有人甚至称之为“商业惯例”或“国际惯例”。由此可以看出零售商与制造商之间的矛盾。但随着分工的不断深入,制造与零售的专业化分工,零售业日益规模化、集中化,并彰显出其强大的平台资源优势,家电大卖场渠道销售成为不可逆转的趋势。在这场变革中,生产商与经销商之间的矛盾应该如何解决,自建渠道能否成功与大卖场渠道博弈,制造业企业在未来的竞争市场上究竟应该怎样应对来自零售商的垄断势力,如何选择营销渠道,就构成了本文研究的出发点。
本文通过分析家电零售市场与家电制造业市场,剖析了大型家电零售买方势力的来源与扩张、运用势力的方式,探讨了家电制造商在面对大型家电零售商买方势力时其优势、劣势及机遇与威胁。并以此为基础,提出了家电制造商的应对策略。当前我国家电制造商要想打破大型零售商买方势力下的不利形势,就必须着手从技术、差异化、品牌、资本运营、人才上提升企业的核心竞争力,并挖掘三、四级市场。同时要充分发挥行业协会的影响力,使之更好地为家电制造业服务。此外,在可能的情况下,要尽可能地加强与零售商的合作,为实现双赢而努力。无论是从环境的驱动力来看,还是从社会、行业的发展来看,合作都是最优的策略。
Since the 1970s, as the global retail industry in the world, large-scale chain stores in Western developed countries generally rise, it has gradually weakened that complete monopoly power and negotiating capacity of producers relative to retailers in the past , and retailers with the buyer forces become stronger and stronger. In this situation, if supplier want to sell products in the shops of the large retailers , it is necessary to pay many kinds of fees to large retailers such as the new business sponsorship fee, semiconductor sponsorship fee, the new devices and other expenses, which has become an unwritten rule, some people even call it " business practices "or" international practice. " Therefore, the contradictions between retailers and manufacturers are obvious. However, with the continuous deepening of division of labor, the specialized division of labor between manufacturing and retail, the increasingly socialized and decentralization of the retail industry, which underlines its strong advantages from platform resource, the appliances sales through the hypermarkets channel becomes an irreversible trend. In this transformation, how to resolve the contradictions between manufacturers and distributors ,what is the result that manufacturers with self-built channels versus large retailers with chain channels, manufacturing enterprises how to deal with the monopoly power from retailers on the competitive market in future and how to choose marketing channels, which constitute the starting point for this paper .
The paper analyses appliances retail market and home appliances manufacturing market, looked into the source of buyer forces of large-scale appliance retailers and how to use the force, then make a analysis on the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities and threats of the appliance makers in the face of buyer forces from large-scale appliance retailers .And on this basis, the paper proposed countermeasures for appliance makers. At present situation, in order to break the buyer forces of large-scale appliance ,the household electrical appliance manufacturers have to make efforts by different ways ,such as enhancing their core competitiveness power which come from the technical, differentiation, brand, capital operation, human resources, etc. At the same time, they have to mining markets grade 3 and 4, because the primary market has been saturated. Meanwhile, we should make full use of trade association's influence, so that it can better service the home electrical appliance manufacturers and for creating good market environment. In addition, if possible, we should try our best to strengthen cooperation with the retailers, and to achieve win-win. Whether the driving force of the environment or the development of the industry and the community, all tell us that cooperation, is the optimal strategy.
本文通过分析家电零售市场与家电制造业市场,剖析了大型家电零售买方势力的来源与扩张、运用势力的方式,探讨了家电制造商在面对大型家电零售商买方势力时其优势、劣势及机遇与威胁。并以此为基础,提出了家电制造商的应对策略。当前我国家电制造商要想打破大型零售商买方势力下的不利形势,就必须着手从技术、差异化、品牌、资本运营、人才上提升企业的核心竞争力,并挖掘三、四级市场。同时要充分发挥行业协会的影响力,使之更好地为家电制造业服务。此外,在可能的情况下,要尽可能地加强与零售商的合作,为实现双赢而努力。无论是从环境的驱动力来看,还是从社会、行业的发展来看,合作都是最优的策略。
Since the 1970s, as the global retail industry in the world, large-scale chain stores in Western developed countries generally rise, it has gradually weakened that complete monopoly power and negotiating capacity of producers relative to retailers in the past , and retailers with the buyer forces become stronger and stronger. In this situation, if supplier want to sell products in the shops of the large retailers , it is necessary to pay many kinds of fees to large retailers such as the new business sponsorship fee, semiconductor sponsorship fee, the new devices and other expenses, which has become an unwritten rule, some people even call it " business practices "or" international practice. " Therefore, the contradictions between retailers and manufacturers are obvious. However, with the continuous deepening of division of labor, the specialized division of labor between manufacturing and retail, the increasingly socialized and decentralization of the retail industry, which underlines its strong advantages from platform resource, the appliances sales through the hypermarkets channel becomes an irreversible trend. In this transformation, how to resolve the contradictions between manufacturers and distributors ,what is the result that manufacturers with self-built channels versus large retailers with chain channels, manufacturing enterprises how to deal with the monopoly power from retailers on the competitive market in future and how to choose marketing channels, which constitute the starting point for this paper .
The paper analyses appliances retail market and home appliances manufacturing market, looked into the source of buyer forces of large-scale appliance retailers and how to use the force, then make a analysis on the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities and threats of the appliance makers in the face of buyer forces from large-scale appliance retailers .And on this basis, the paper proposed countermeasures for appliance makers. At present situation, in order to break the buyer forces of large-scale appliance ,the household electrical appliance manufacturers have to make efforts by different ways ,such as enhancing their core competitiveness power which come from the technical, differentiation, brand, capital operation, human resources, etc. At the same time, they have to mining markets grade 3 and 4, because the primary market has been saturated. Meanwhile, we should make full use of trade association's influence, so that it can better service the home electrical appliance manufacturers and for creating good market environment. In addition, if possible, we should try our best to strengthen cooperation with the retailers, and to achieve win-win. Whether the driving force of the environment or the development of the industry and the community, all tell us that cooperation, is the optimal strategy.
引文
7 曹士兵:《反垄断法研究》,法律出版社1996年版,第148页。
10 杨公朴、夏大慰主编:《产业经济学教程》,上海财经大学出版社,2002年,第145页。
11 张振宇:《超市进场费的经济分析和规制》,《经济论坛》,2005年第4期。
12 孟雁北:《反垄断法视野中的行业协会》,《云南大学学报(法学版)》,2004年第3期。
13 朱如梦、樊秀峰:《零售商与制造商合作双赢的经济学分析》,《商业经济与管理》,2004年4月。
14 胡左浩、欧阳桃花、段志蓉:《日本家电企业营销模式的动态演变及其特征分析》,《中国工业经济》,2004年第9期。
[1]卜妙金:《分销渠道管理》,高等教育出版社,2004年。
[2]崔华锋:《中国家电企业的营销渠道模式与评价》,《市场营销案例》,2005年。
[3]戴亦:《营销渠道》,朝华出版社,2004年。
[4]菲利普科特勒:《营销管理》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[5]弗雷德.R.戴维:《战略管理》,经济科学出版社,2006年。
[6]郭朝阳:《冲突管理:寻找矛盾的正面效应》,广东经济出版社,2000年8月。
[7]郭金龙、林文龙:《中国市场十种盈利模式》,清华大学出版社,2005年。
[8]候忠义:《渠道手册》,中国纺织出版社,2005年。
[9]黄培伦:《组织行为学》,华南理工大学出版社,2001年。
[10]李飞、汪旭晖:《Profit Models in Chinese Retailing:Past Today and Future.》,《改革》,2006年第8期。
[11]李飞:《分销渠道设计与管理》,清华出版社,2003年。
[12]刘永炬:《渠道》,中国工人出版社,2003年。
[13]罗伯特.J.博尔盖塞、保.F.博尔盖塞.:《并购从计划到整合》,机械工业出版社,2004年。
[14]马龙龙、裴艳丽:《零售商买方势力的滥用及其对策研究》,《商业经济与管理》,2003年第5期。
[15]迈克尔·波特:《竞争战略》,华夏出版社,1980年。
[16]任燕:《我国大家电企业营销渠道问题探析》,《商业研究》,2004年第307期。
[17]任淮秀:《兼并与收购》,中国人民大学出版社,2004年。
[18]泰勒尔著、张维迎译:《产业组织理论》,中国人民大学出版社,1998年。
[19]王方华、徐飞:《盈利胜经》,上海交通大学出版社,2005,年。
[20]吴宏:《通道费问题的法律分析》,神州律师网,2005年8月26日。
[21]夏春玉:《营销渠道的冲突与管理》,《当代经济科学》,2004年。
[22]徐彬:《企业营销渠道的变化与渠道管理思考》,《科技创业月刊》,2004年第5期。
[23]杨东龙:《渠道无疆》,中国经济出版社,2003年。
[24]于立、吴绪亮:《纵向限制的经济逻辑与反垄断政策》,《中国工业经济》,2005年第8期。
[25]张剑渝:《渠道关系论》,《中国优秀硕士(博士)论文选》,2003年。
[26]郑灿朝、高景远:《聚焦中国连锁业》,中国商业出版社1999年。
[27]朱如梦、樊秀峰:《零售商与制造商合作双赢的经济学分析》,《商业经济与管理》,2004年第4期。
[28]庄贵军:《权力、冲突与合作—西方的渠道行为理论》,《北京商学院学报》2000年第9期。
[29]Chu,Wujin,Demand Signaling and Screening in Channels of Distribution.Marketing Science,11,1992,pp.327-347.
[30]Cinanor,William S.,and Patrick Rey,Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors.Review of Industrial Organization,17,2000,pp.135-153.
[31]Dobson,Paul,Roger Clarke et al,Buyer Power and Impact on Competition in the Food Retail Distribution Sector of the EuropeanUnion,2000,http://eurorpe.eu.int/comm/dg04/publications/studie.
[32]Kelly,Kenneth H.,The Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances,The Procompetitive Case.Journal of Public Policy & Marketing,17,1991,pp.173-184.
[33]Macacoy,Christopher J.,Enforcement Policy Regarding Slotting Allowances.,Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances,May 31-June 1,2000.
[34]Pondy L R.Organizational Conflict:Concepts and Models.Administrative Science Quarterly,September,1967,Vo1.12(2):298.
10 杨公朴、夏大慰主编:《产业经济学教程》,上海财经大学出版社,2002年,第145页。
11 张振宇:《超市进场费的经济分析和规制》,《经济论坛》,2005年第4期。
12 孟雁北:《反垄断法视野中的行业协会》,《云南大学学报(法学版)》,2004年第3期。
13 朱如梦、樊秀峰:《零售商与制造商合作双赢的经济学分析》,《商业经济与管理》,2004年4月。
14 胡左浩、欧阳桃花、段志蓉:《日本家电企业营销模式的动态演变及其特征分析》,《中国工业经济》,2004年第9期。
[1]卜妙金:《分销渠道管理》,高等教育出版社,2004年。
[2]崔华锋:《中国家电企业的营销渠道模式与评价》,《市场营销案例》,2005年。
[3]戴亦:《营销渠道》,朝华出版社,2004年。
[4]菲利普科特勒:《营销管理》,中国人民大学出版社,2001年。
[5]弗雷德.R.戴维:《战略管理》,经济科学出版社,2006年。
[6]郭朝阳:《冲突管理:寻找矛盾的正面效应》,广东经济出版社,2000年8月。
[7]郭金龙、林文龙:《中国市场十种盈利模式》,清华大学出版社,2005年。
[8]候忠义:《渠道手册》,中国纺织出版社,2005年。
[9]黄培伦:《组织行为学》,华南理工大学出版社,2001年。
[10]李飞、汪旭晖:《Profit Models in Chinese Retailing:Past Today and Future.》,《改革》,2006年第8期。
[11]李飞:《分销渠道设计与管理》,清华出版社,2003年。
[12]刘永炬:《渠道》,中国工人出版社,2003年。
[13]罗伯特.J.博尔盖塞、保.F.博尔盖塞.:《并购从计划到整合》,机械工业出版社,2004年。
[14]马龙龙、裴艳丽:《零售商买方势力的滥用及其对策研究》,《商业经济与管理》,2003年第5期。
[15]迈克尔·波特:《竞争战略》,华夏出版社,1980年。
[16]任燕:《我国大家电企业营销渠道问题探析》,《商业研究》,2004年第307期。
[17]任淮秀:《兼并与收购》,中国人民大学出版社,2004年。
[18]泰勒尔著、张维迎译:《产业组织理论》,中国人民大学出版社,1998年。
[19]王方华、徐飞:《盈利胜经》,上海交通大学出版社,2005,年。
[20]吴宏:《通道费问题的法律分析》,神州律师网,2005年8月26日。
[21]夏春玉:《营销渠道的冲突与管理》,《当代经济科学》,2004年。
[22]徐彬:《企业营销渠道的变化与渠道管理思考》,《科技创业月刊》,2004年第5期。
[23]杨东龙:《渠道无疆》,中国经济出版社,2003年。
[24]于立、吴绪亮:《纵向限制的经济逻辑与反垄断政策》,《中国工业经济》,2005年第8期。
[25]张剑渝:《渠道关系论》,《中国优秀硕士(博士)论文选》,2003年。
[26]郑灿朝、高景远:《聚焦中国连锁业》,中国商业出版社1999年。
[27]朱如梦、樊秀峰:《零售商与制造商合作双赢的经济学分析》,《商业经济与管理》,2004年第4期。
[28]庄贵军:《权力、冲突与合作—西方的渠道行为理论》,《北京商学院学报》2000年第9期。
[29]Chu,Wujin,Demand Signaling and Screening in Channels of Distribution.Marketing Science,11,1992,pp.327-347.
[30]Cinanor,William S.,and Patrick Rey,Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors.Review of Industrial Organization,17,2000,pp.135-153.
[31]Dobson,Paul,Roger Clarke et al,Buyer Power and Impact on Competition in the Food Retail Distribution Sector of the EuropeanUnion,2000,http://eurorpe.eu.int/comm/dg04/publications/studie.
[32]Kelly,Kenneth H.,The Antitrust Analysis of Grocery Slotting Allowances,The Procompetitive Case.Journal of Public Policy & Marketing,17,1991,pp.173-184.
[33]Macacoy,Christopher J.,Enforcement Policy Regarding Slotting Allowances.,Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances,May 31-June 1,2000.
[34]Pondy L R.Organizational Conflict:Concepts and Models.Administrative Science Quarterly,September,1967,Vo1.12(2):298.