商业银行与小额贷款公司联合贷款研究
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摘要
本文第一部分从当前存在中小企业借款难和商业银行难贷款的矛盾现状分析了中小企业借款难和商业银行难贷款基本原因和客观制约条件,提出创新的解决方案:降低银行认知风险和贷款风险以弥补资金供求双方的匹配差距,这亦是本文贯穿始终的研究视角,本文着重介绍了小额贷款公司对中小企业贷款方面的特点,提出了商业银行与小额贷款公司联合贷款的新思路。
第二部分回顾了中小企业融资理论和传统模式下的银行风险分担机制。基于不对称信息的金融中介理论,相对于中小企业较小的融资额,令传统方式下银行处理信息的中介功能变得不经济,难以降低对中小企业的认知风险,也难以分担经营风险。因此,中小企业贷款需要探求更合理的方式:小额贷款公司正是最好的代替。本部分为银行和小额贷款公司联合贷款提供理论依据和立足点。
第三部分分析了传统模式下各种银行风险分担机制的特点,指出在处理中小企业贷款方面存在的局限性:抵押和担保方式上,抵押资产和第三方担保能有效降低中小企业的风险,但中小企业无法达到低风险偏好的银行对抵押资产的要求,而第三方担保机构的发展状况很大程度决定了担保贷款的使用,令中小企业借款难以与银行风险偏好匹配。团体贷款连带债务的形式将经营风险在多个企业和银行之间进行了分担,有效的弥补资金供求双方的风险匹配问题,但团体内的监督需要时间和成本,而且难度会随着企业和团队规模的扩大而增大,削弱团体贷款在我国的适用性。因此,需要一种创新贷款模式来解决问题。
文章最后引入了多家小银行共同构建贷款池理论,并加以创新发展为商业银行和小额贷款公司合作组成贷款池模式,论述了该模式下小额贷款公司信息优势和贷款分担弥补了银行信息不对称和贷款高风险问题、银行的资金优势弥补了小额贷款公司资产规模缺陷。在本章中对该模式的贷款池构建、流程设计进行了阐述,力求研究在实践过程中推广,从而有效缓解中小企业借款难问题。
The paper summarizes the present situation and the fundamental reason of why it is hard for small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SME) to borrow and hard for commercial banks to loan, which is that the SME high risk and the bank low risk preferences do not match. The paper indicates the newly solution: to reduce the bank’s risk awareness and the loans risks to make up for the match between supply and demand. This is the research angle throughout this paper. Based on the above point, the article introduces the advantages of the loans from small loan companies (SLC) to SME, and bring forward the new ideas of combined loan mode of the commercial banks and the SLC.
The second part reviews the theory of small-and-medium enterprises financing and the traditional system of bank’s risk sharing. Based on the finacial agency theory of information discrepancy, the banks become weak in processing the information under the traditional way, and it’s hard to lower the risk recognition to the SME and also hard to manage the risk sharing. So the SME loan requires more reasonable ways to replace the bank’s traditional angent function of information processing and it turns out that the SLC is the best choice. This part provides the theoretical evidences and standing points for the mode of combined loans of the banks and the SLC.
The third part analyzes the features of the bank’s risk sharing system under the traditional mode and points out the existing disadvantages to process the SME loan issues: On the guaranty and surety methods, the property guaranty and the third party surety are both the risk sharing party and they can lower the SME risks efficiently, but the bank’s preference of low risk requires more on the property guaranty, which could never be accomplished by the SME. Besides, the development status of the third party of surety agent widely determines the usage of the assured loan, which still makes the SME loan hard to match the bank’s risk preference. The union loans and debts dispart the union enterprises’business risk to each single one and the bank, which can effectively make up the risk matching problems between the capital suppliers and demanders. But it requires time and cost, and the difficulty with the scale enlargement increase. That will weaken the organization for the adequacy. Therefore, requires an innovation loan to solve the problem.
Based on the analysis of the theory of loan capital pool built together by various small banks, it makes the innovation and development to introduce the mode of union capital pool of the bank and the SLC, and dissertates that, under this mode, the SLC’s information advantage and loan sharing can make up the bank’s problems of information discrepancy and high loan risks, while, the bank’s capital advantage can make up the SLC’s capital limitation. In this chapter on the way of loans to build, the process design and try to study in the process of practice, thus effectively alleviate the SME loan difficult problem.
第二部分回顾了中小企业融资理论和传统模式下的银行风险分担机制。基于不对称信息的金融中介理论,相对于中小企业较小的融资额,令传统方式下银行处理信息的中介功能变得不经济,难以降低对中小企业的认知风险,也难以分担经营风险。因此,中小企业贷款需要探求更合理的方式:小额贷款公司正是最好的代替。本部分为银行和小额贷款公司联合贷款提供理论依据和立足点。
第三部分分析了传统模式下各种银行风险分担机制的特点,指出在处理中小企业贷款方面存在的局限性:抵押和担保方式上,抵押资产和第三方担保能有效降低中小企业的风险,但中小企业无法达到低风险偏好的银行对抵押资产的要求,而第三方担保机构的发展状况很大程度决定了担保贷款的使用,令中小企业借款难以与银行风险偏好匹配。团体贷款连带债务的形式将经营风险在多个企业和银行之间进行了分担,有效的弥补资金供求双方的风险匹配问题,但团体内的监督需要时间和成本,而且难度会随着企业和团队规模的扩大而增大,削弱团体贷款在我国的适用性。因此,需要一种创新贷款模式来解决问题。
文章最后引入了多家小银行共同构建贷款池理论,并加以创新发展为商业银行和小额贷款公司合作组成贷款池模式,论述了该模式下小额贷款公司信息优势和贷款分担弥补了银行信息不对称和贷款高风险问题、银行的资金优势弥补了小额贷款公司资产规模缺陷。在本章中对该模式的贷款池构建、流程设计进行了阐述,力求研究在实践过程中推广,从而有效缓解中小企业借款难问题。
The paper summarizes the present situation and the fundamental reason of why it is hard for small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SME) to borrow and hard for commercial banks to loan, which is that the SME high risk and the bank low risk preferences do not match. The paper indicates the newly solution: to reduce the bank’s risk awareness and the loans risks to make up for the match between supply and demand. This is the research angle throughout this paper. Based on the above point, the article introduces the advantages of the loans from small loan companies (SLC) to SME, and bring forward the new ideas of combined loan mode of the commercial banks and the SLC.
The second part reviews the theory of small-and-medium enterprises financing and the traditional system of bank’s risk sharing. Based on the finacial agency theory of information discrepancy, the banks become weak in processing the information under the traditional way, and it’s hard to lower the risk recognition to the SME and also hard to manage the risk sharing. So the SME loan requires more reasonable ways to replace the bank’s traditional angent function of information processing and it turns out that the SLC is the best choice. This part provides the theoretical evidences and standing points for the mode of combined loans of the banks and the SLC.
The third part analyzes the features of the bank’s risk sharing system under the traditional mode and points out the existing disadvantages to process the SME loan issues: On the guaranty and surety methods, the property guaranty and the third party surety are both the risk sharing party and they can lower the SME risks efficiently, but the bank’s preference of low risk requires more on the property guaranty, which could never be accomplished by the SME. Besides, the development status of the third party of surety agent widely determines the usage of the assured loan, which still makes the SME loan hard to match the bank’s risk preference. The union loans and debts dispart the union enterprises’business risk to each single one and the bank, which can effectively make up the risk matching problems between the capital suppliers and demanders. But it requires time and cost, and the difficulty with the scale enlargement increase. That will weaken the organization for the adequacy. Therefore, requires an innovation loan to solve the problem.
Based on the analysis of the theory of loan capital pool built together by various small banks, it makes the innovation and development to introduce the mode of union capital pool of the bank and the SLC, and dissertates that, under this mode, the SLC’s information advantage and loan sharing can make up the bank’s problems of information discrepancy and high loan risks, while, the bank’s capital advantage can make up the SLC’s capital limitation. In this chapter on the way of loans to build, the process design and try to study in the process of practice, thus effectively alleviate the SME loan difficult problem.
引文
[1]狄娜,顾强.我国中小企业融资现状、问题与对策,中国融资报告网, 2006年7月, http://www.cnf888.cn/article.asp?id=99
[2]罗正英.我国中小企业信贷融资可获性特征研究--基于苏州地区中小企业财务负责人的观点,上海经济研究, 2005(3):33-42
[3] Frank K. Reilly and Keith C. Brown, Investment analysis and portfoliomanagement, 6th ed.Fort Worth: Dryden Press, c2000.
[4]吴冲锋,行为金融:认知风险与认知期望收益,中国管理科学, 2005.6.1.
[5]彭红枫,基才多层次资本市场的科技创新支持体系研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2007年28卷6期
[6]刘中学,林福永.从财务信息透视中小企业板的健康状况,统计与决策,2005年第11s期
[7]刘中学,林福永.中小企业板中期绩效不佳的实证分析,统计与决策,2007年3期
[8]陈晓红,吴小瑾,彭佳.中小企业集群融资创新,财经.网络版,2007-10-23,
[8] http://www.caijing.com.cn/home/reportpub/2007-10-23/34737.shtml
[9]林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资,经济研究,2001年第1期
[10] Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure." Economic Journal 2002.112:F32-F53.
[11]李志赟,银行结构与中小企业融资,经济研究,2002(6):38-45
[12] Peek, J., Rosengren, E.S., Small Business Credit Availability: How Important Is Size of Lender? In: Saunders, A., Walter, I. (Eds.),Universal Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered,Irwin,Chicago,1996 IL,pp.628-655.
[13] Strahan, P.E., Weston, J.P., Small Business Lending and Bank Consolidation: Is There Cause for Concern? Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York(March),1996
[14] Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Credit Rationing in Markets with ImperfectInformation. American Economic Review, 1981, 17(3):393-410
[15] Bester, Helmut & Hellwig, Martin, "Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues", Agency Theory, Information and Incentives, 1987, pp.136-166
[16] Chan, Yuk-Shee and Thakor, Anjan V. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with MoralHazard and Private Information", The Journal of Finance, 1987, 42(2):345-363
[17]王霄,张捷.银行信贷配给与中小企业融资,经济研究,2003年第7期
[18] Jaffee, Dwight and Stiglitz, Joseph, "Credit Rationing", Handbook of Monetary Economics, 1990 .vol.2, pp. 837-888
[19] Eaton, Jonathan, Gersovitz, Mark and Stiglitz, J.,The Pure Theory of Country Risk, European Economic Review, 1986, 30:481-515
[20] Vercammen, James A. "Credit Bureau Policy and Sustainable ReputationEffects in Credit Markets", Economic, 1995, 62(248):461-478
[21] Pagano, Marco and Jappelli Tullio, "Information Sharing in the Consumer Credit Market", Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(5):1693-17
[22] Stein, Jeremy C. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, 2002 .57, 1891-1921.
[23] Petersen, M.A. and R.G. Rajan, The benefits of firm-creditorrelationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance, 1994, 49, 3-37.
[24] DeMarzo, Peter M.,The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation, Review of Financial Studies, 2005 ,Volume 18, Number 1,pp.1-35(35)
[25] Gorton, G., and Pennacchi, G. Security Baskets and Index-linked Securities, Journal of Business, 1993, .vol.66, 1-27
[26] Gorton, G. and G. Pennacchi, "Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets", Journal of Monetary Economics 1995, 35, 389-411.
[27] Edward L. Glaeser & Hedi D. Kallal, "Thin Markets, Asymmetric Information, and Mortgage-Backed Securities", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, 1997, pp. 64-86.13-40.
[28] Duffee, G. and C. Zhou, "Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for Managing Risk?" Journal of Monetary Economics, 2001, 48, 25-54.
[29] Petersen, M. A. and R. G. Rajan, The benefits of firm-creditor relationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance, 1994, 49, 3-37.
[30] Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor, Security Design, The Journal Of Finance, September 1993, VOL.XLVIII, NO. 4
[31] Hackethal, Andreas, Gintschel, Andreas, Multi-bank loan pool contracts: enhancing the profitability of small commercial banks. Applied Financial Economics, Nov2004 Vol.14 Issue 17, p1239-1252, 14p, 1 chart, 7graphs
[32]许冰梅,金融担保的风险及其化解,沈阳干部期刊,2005年第七卷,第6期
[33]章元,李全.关于"团体贷款"的建议,金融理论与实践,2004年09期
[34]吕晓莹,朱琦.中小企业融资机制创新——商会参与下的合作金融机制,现代经济(现代物业下半月刊),2009年第8卷第8期(总第125期),116-118页
[35]张维,高雅琴.中小企业贷款风险分担与还款激励机制研究,2008
[36]张维,邱勇,郝刚.基于多银行贷款池的合成CDO设计,现代财经,2007年第9期第27卷(总第212期)
[37]张维,王遥.基于多银行贷款池证券化中CDS的应用分析,2009
[2]罗正英.我国中小企业信贷融资可获性特征研究--基于苏州地区中小企业财务负责人的观点,上海经济研究, 2005(3):33-42
[3] Frank K. Reilly and Keith C. Brown, Investment analysis and portfoliomanagement, 6th ed.Fort Worth: Dryden Press, c2000.
[4]吴冲锋,行为金融:认知风险与认知期望收益,中国管理科学, 2005.6.1.
[5]彭红枫,基才多层次资本市场的科技创新支持体系研究,科学学与科学技术管理,2007年28卷6期
[6]刘中学,林福永.从财务信息透视中小企业板的健康状况,统计与决策,2005年第11s期
[7]刘中学,林福永.中小企业板中期绩效不佳的实证分析,统计与决策,2007年3期
[8]陈晓红,吴小瑾,彭佳.中小企业集群融资创新,财经.网络版,2007-10-23,
[8] http://www.caijing.com.cn/home/reportpub/2007-10-23/34737.shtml
[9]林毅夫,李永军.中小金融机构发展与中小企业融资,经济研究,2001年第1期
[10] Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell. "Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure." Economic Journal 2002.112:F32-F53.
[11]李志赟,银行结构与中小企业融资,经济研究,2002(6):38-45
[12] Peek, J., Rosengren, E.S., Small Business Credit Availability: How Important Is Size of Lender? In: Saunders, A., Walter, I. (Eds.),Universal Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered,Irwin,Chicago,1996 IL,pp.628-655.
[13] Strahan, P.E., Weston, J.P., Small Business Lending and Bank Consolidation: Is There Cause for Concern? Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York(March),1996
[14] Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Credit Rationing in Markets with ImperfectInformation. American Economic Review, 1981, 17(3):393-410
[15] Bester, Helmut & Hellwig, Martin, "Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of the Issues", Agency Theory, Information and Incentives, 1987, pp.136-166
[16] Chan, Yuk-Shee and Thakor, Anjan V. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with MoralHazard and Private Information", The Journal of Finance, 1987, 42(2):345-363
[17]王霄,张捷.银行信贷配给与中小企业融资,经济研究,2003年第7期
[18] Jaffee, Dwight and Stiglitz, Joseph, "Credit Rationing", Handbook of Monetary Economics, 1990 .vol.2, pp. 837-888
[19] Eaton, Jonathan, Gersovitz, Mark and Stiglitz, J.,The Pure Theory of Country Risk, European Economic Review, 1986, 30:481-515
[20] Vercammen, James A. "Credit Bureau Policy and Sustainable ReputationEffects in Credit Markets", Economic, 1995, 62(248):461-478
[21] Pagano, Marco and Jappelli Tullio, "Information Sharing in the Consumer Credit Market", Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(5):1693-17
[22] Stein, Jeremy C. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, 2002 .57, 1891-1921.
[23] Petersen, M.A. and R.G. Rajan, The benefits of firm-creditorrelationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance, 1994, 49, 3-37.
[24] DeMarzo, Peter M.,The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation, Review of Financial Studies, 2005 ,Volume 18, Number 1,pp.1-35(35)
[25] Gorton, G., and Pennacchi, G. Security Baskets and Index-linked Securities, Journal of Business, 1993, .vol.66, 1-27
[26] Gorton, G. and G. Pennacchi, "Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets", Journal of Monetary Economics 1995, 35, 389-411.
[27] Edward L. Glaeser & Hedi D. Kallal, "Thin Markets, Asymmetric Information, and Mortgage-Backed Securities", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, 1997, pp. 64-86.13-40.
[28] Duffee, G. and C. Zhou, "Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful Tools for Managing Risk?" Journal of Monetary Economics, 2001, 48, 25-54.
[29] Petersen, M. A. and R. G. Rajan, The benefits of firm-creditor relationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance, 1994, 49, 3-37.
[30] Arnoud W. A. Boot and Anjan V. Thakor, Security Design, The Journal Of Finance, September 1993, VOL.XLVIII, NO. 4
[31] Hackethal, Andreas, Gintschel, Andreas, Multi-bank loan pool contracts: enhancing the profitability of small commercial banks. Applied Financial Economics, Nov2004 Vol.14 Issue 17, p1239-1252, 14p, 1 chart, 7graphs
[32]许冰梅,金融担保的风险及其化解,沈阳干部期刊,2005年第七卷,第6期
[33]章元,李全.关于"团体贷款"的建议,金融理论与实践,2004年09期
[34]吕晓莹,朱琦.中小企业融资机制创新——商会参与下的合作金融机制,现代经济(现代物业下半月刊),2009年第8卷第8期(总第125期),116-118页
[35]张维,高雅琴.中小企业贷款风险分担与还款激励机制研究,2008
[36]张维,邱勇,郝刚.基于多银行贷款池的合成CDO设计,现代财经,2007年第9期第27卷(总第212期)
[37]张维,王遥.基于多银行贷款池证券化中CDS的应用分析,2009