国有企业经营者激励与绩效机制研究
摘要
经营者激励问题一直是企业发展的主题和难题,作为我国国民经济支柱的国有企业,其经营者激励问题更是具有特殊性和复杂性。本文采用现代经济学计量分析的方法,揭示经营者激励与企业绩效之间的关系,遵循机制设计理论的思想,研究设计了国有企业经营者绩效评价体系和激励模式。这一课题研究对于改进国有企业经营者激励措施、创新激励机制具有重要意义。
本文重点研究了经营者激励问题产生的根源,国有企业经营者激励的特殊性,经营者报酬与绩效的相互关系,经营者绩效评价体系改进的可行性,经营者绩效评价体系再设计,国有企业经营者激励模式设计等一系列问题。
通过对上市公司高管层收入与经营绩效的相关分析和回归分析,以及利用因子分析法对经营者能力素质指标的构建和运用AHP层次分析法对经营者绩效评价体系的设计,本研究得出的结论是:经营者绩效而非企业绩效才是经营者激励应遵循的客观依据,引入能力素质指标构建经营者绩效评价体系是可行的,“年薪制+产权期权”是当前国有企业经营者报酬激励模式的最优选择。
The incentive problem of Operators of enterprises is the eternal theme of management, but also the eternal problem. At present, China's leading resources and the large number of outstanding talent are still concentrated in the state-owned enterprises; China's state-owned enterprise reform is the central link of economic restructuring. How to adapt to China's socialist market economic system and gradually perfect the reform process, through system design and the change of mechanisms, and fully mobilize the operators of the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity, and promote the production and operation of state-owned enterprises improve efficiency, the internal reform of state-owned enterprises logical and important element. Therefore, the operators of state-owned enterprises and performance incentive mechanisms, focused on China's state-owned enterprise reform and an objective requirement for the development of great theoretical and practical significance.
According to the thinking of the principal-agent theory, with the establishment of modern enterprise system, there are internal changes: First, entrepreneurs responsibilities of change is the operator has access to the interests of the powers of the enterprises in the three residual value; Fourth, there is a large number of non-symmetric information, which make four changes owners and operators in the pursuit of goals emerged from. Objective is to encourage convergence of the two effective means. In addition, as the operators understand the formation of human capital, capital pursuit of the nature of the reward incentive to become owner operators mobilize the enthusiasm of the inevitable choice.
Compensation on business incentives has done a lot on domestic and foreign scholars in recent years has become a modern forefront of the field of economics and microeconomic theory hot one. However, in many empirical analysis of the literature, there has been a consistent and puzzling findings that the operators of incentive and corporate performance is not entirely relevant, and some are even contrary. In 2005 and 2006 as an example of China's listed companies associated data analysis and regression analysis, we have been basically the same as previous studies and concluded, once again demonstrates the operator's income and corporate performance is not entirely relevant. This results due to various reasons, there are statistical methods, the reasons for selected samples, but also the effectiveness of the capital market weak reasons, but I believe that not enough scientific evaluation system performance, especially on the corporate performance as a substitute operator performance incentive is based on the crux of the problem. As a result, operators on performance evaluation system, then design a scientific and effective incentive model, the root of the problem is the solution path.
Of course, operators of state-owned enterprises and enterprises of other types of ownership nature of the operators compared in terms of identity, or in the work environment are significantly different, completely in a special situation. This special situation of the state-owned enterprises operating performance of an incentive for non-economic incentives and economic incentives coexist, encouraging transition and inadequate incentives, the main incentive is not strong sense of responsibility, lack of clear targets and encouraging economic incentives form a single. The existence of these problems is the operator of state-owned enterprises with the performance incentive mechanism must be faced squarely and face the reality also shows that the operators of state-owned enterprises has a strong incentive issue of the peculiarities.
At present, China's existing performance evaluation system, there are two: One is that in 1999 the Ministry of Finance, Economic and Trade Commission issued four ministries enterprise performance evaluation system and the other is the introduction in 2003 of the State Council, the SASAC central enterprises Interim Procedures for performance evaluation. Looking at these two rating system, we found that 45 ministries and commissions established by the enterprise performance evaluation system there are two problems: First, the lack of target and thus result of the test has not been properly linked with the operators of incentive; Second, it is business as a whole team examination is not directed at individual operators, as operators will not encourage scientific basis. Construction of the SASAC operating system to evaluate the performance of four ministries and the performance evaluation system than there are three main characteristics: First, the four ministries to avoid the bureaucratic system, and more easy to operate, more focused and guided the second is located set the target so that the performance evaluation and management incentives to reward and punishment closely linked to the third is for the responsible persons to evaluate the operating performance of other team members at the rate of contribution for example, the incentive becomes feasible and easy to operate. However, this system still exists in its limitations: First, focus only on the financial indicators of the operator's evaluation, but not on the operators own evaluation, this is not entirely due to financial indicators and operators the ability, quality and level of effort completely relevant, it is inevitable to motivate the unfair phenomenon, the incentive not to play their true role in the enterprise's financial indicators are completely replaced by the operator's job responsibilities indicators Even though they have great consistency, particularly on the key responsible persons particularly, they have different operators of their duties, their assessment indicators should also be differentiated.
In order to address these two sets of performance evaluation system is the problem, it is necessary to design a system of performance evaluation and the operators of different performance evaluation system. We used factor analysis Construction of the operators ability and quality indicators, the ability to resolve quality indicators too abstract, not embodied in the problems of listed companies through empirical testing data to prove that the ability and quality of corporate performance, executives of the year in income significant positive correlation between the ability of the introduction of quality indicators on the operators to improve performance evaluation system is feasible. Construction of the new system focus on the realization of the operators of personal ability and quality of performance indicators and post and the combination of quantitative indicators in the index selection, weight set and evaluation procedures and methods, the new system of a comprehensive re-engineering, AHP law and the adoption of an enterprise empirical test proved that this system of science and rationality.
Solve the performance evaluation system operator, after analyzing the current operation is the main mode of incentives - the annual salary system and the characteristics of equity incentives, we found that, although the annual salary system has been extensively applied and played a very good incentive effect, but it is only a kind of effective short-term incentives, operators easily lead to short-term behavior, which is not conducive to maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets and sustainable development; Although Option Incentive is a good long-term incentives, but because of the capital structure, legal system, traditions and cultural factors the impact of the implementation in our country together by many constraints, the road will tortuous and protracted. Therefore, to achieve short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination of annual salary plus incentive options is the optimal mode of operation incentives. Consideration the national conditions of China, the listed companies and non-listed companies coexist, and the joint-stock companies and limited liability companies coexist; we must use a workable method to achieve incentive options, and therefore this paper, "ownership options" concept.
To make research more practical significance, we, as state-owned enterprises in Jilin Province for the study, according to the operators of design performance evaluation system, design the implementation of the "property rights Option + annual salary system," the procedures and methods of operation for the operation of state-owned enterprises in Jilin Province Incentive provides guidance and assistance for the central enterprises and other operators of state-owned enterprises provides a reference work incentives, and has a strong practical significance.
本文重点研究了经营者激励问题产生的根源,国有企业经营者激励的特殊性,经营者报酬与绩效的相互关系,经营者绩效评价体系改进的可行性,经营者绩效评价体系再设计,国有企业经营者激励模式设计等一系列问题。
通过对上市公司高管层收入与经营绩效的相关分析和回归分析,以及利用因子分析法对经营者能力素质指标的构建和运用AHP层次分析法对经营者绩效评价体系的设计,本研究得出的结论是:经营者绩效而非企业绩效才是经营者激励应遵循的客观依据,引入能力素质指标构建经营者绩效评价体系是可行的,“年薪制+产权期权”是当前国有企业经营者报酬激励模式的最优选择。
The incentive problem of Operators of enterprises is the eternal theme of management, but also the eternal problem. At present, China's leading resources and the large number of outstanding talent are still concentrated in the state-owned enterprises; China's state-owned enterprise reform is the central link of economic restructuring. How to adapt to China's socialist market economic system and gradually perfect the reform process, through system design and the change of mechanisms, and fully mobilize the operators of the enthusiasm, initiative and creativity, and promote the production and operation of state-owned enterprises improve efficiency, the internal reform of state-owned enterprises logical and important element. Therefore, the operators of state-owned enterprises and performance incentive mechanisms, focused on China's state-owned enterprise reform and an objective requirement for the development of great theoretical and practical significance.
According to the thinking of the principal-agent theory, with the establishment of modern enterprise system, there are internal changes: First, entrepreneurs responsibilities of change is the operator has access to the interests of the powers of the enterprises in the three residual value; Fourth, there is a large number of non-symmetric information, which make four changes owners and operators in the pursuit of goals emerged from. Objective is to encourage convergence of the two effective means. In addition, as the operators understand the formation of human capital, capital pursuit of the nature of the reward incentive to become owner operators mobilize the enthusiasm of the inevitable choice.
Compensation on business incentives has done a lot on domestic and foreign scholars in recent years has become a modern forefront of the field of economics and microeconomic theory hot one. However, in many empirical analysis of the literature, there has been a consistent and puzzling findings that the operators of incentive and corporate performance is not entirely relevant, and some are even contrary. In 2005 and 2006 as an example of China's listed companies associated data analysis and regression analysis, we have been basically the same as previous studies and concluded, once again demonstrates the operator's income and corporate performance is not entirely relevant. This results due to various reasons, there are statistical methods, the reasons for selected samples, but also the effectiveness of the capital market weak reasons, but I believe that not enough scientific evaluation system performance, especially on the corporate performance as a substitute operator performance incentive is based on the crux of the problem. As a result, operators on performance evaluation system, then design a scientific and effective incentive model, the root of the problem is the solution path.
Of course, operators of state-owned enterprises and enterprises of other types of ownership nature of the operators compared in terms of identity, or in the work environment are significantly different, completely in a special situation. This special situation of the state-owned enterprises operating performance of an incentive for non-economic incentives and economic incentives coexist, encouraging transition and inadequate incentives, the main incentive is not strong sense of responsibility, lack of clear targets and encouraging economic incentives form a single. The existence of these problems is the operator of state-owned enterprises with the performance incentive mechanism must be faced squarely and face the reality also shows that the operators of state-owned enterprises has a strong incentive issue of the peculiarities.
At present, China's existing performance evaluation system, there are two: One is that in 1999 the Ministry of Finance, Economic and Trade Commission issued four ministries enterprise performance evaluation system and the other is the introduction in 2003 of the State Council, the SASAC central enterprises Interim Procedures for performance evaluation. Looking at these two rating system, we found that 45 ministries and commissions established by the enterprise performance evaluation system there are two problems: First, the lack of target and thus result of the test has not been properly linked with the operators of incentive; Second, it is business as a whole team examination is not directed at individual operators, as operators will not encourage scientific basis. Construction of the SASAC operating system to evaluate the performance of four ministries and the performance evaluation system than there are three main characteristics: First, the four ministries to avoid the bureaucratic system, and more easy to operate, more focused and guided the second is located set the target so that the performance evaluation and management incentives to reward and punishment closely linked to the third is for the responsible persons to evaluate the operating performance of other team members at the rate of contribution for example, the incentive becomes feasible and easy to operate. However, this system still exists in its limitations: First, focus only on the financial indicators of the operator's evaluation, but not on the operators own evaluation, this is not entirely due to financial indicators and operators the ability, quality and level of effort completely relevant, it is inevitable to motivate the unfair phenomenon, the incentive not to play their true role in the enterprise's financial indicators are completely replaced by the operator's job responsibilities indicators Even though they have great consistency, particularly on the key responsible persons particularly, they have different operators of their duties, their assessment indicators should also be differentiated.
In order to address these two sets of performance evaluation system is the problem, it is necessary to design a system of performance evaluation and the operators of different performance evaluation system. We used factor analysis Construction of the operators ability and quality indicators, the ability to resolve quality indicators too abstract, not embodied in the problems of listed companies through empirical testing data to prove that the ability and quality of corporate performance, executives of the year in income significant positive correlation between the ability of the introduction of quality indicators on the operators to improve performance evaluation system is feasible. Construction of the new system focus on the realization of the operators of personal ability and quality of performance indicators and post and the combination of quantitative indicators in the index selection, weight set and evaluation procedures and methods, the new system of a comprehensive re-engineering, AHP law and the adoption of an enterprise empirical test proved that this system of science and rationality.
Solve the performance evaluation system operator, after analyzing the current operation is the main mode of incentives - the annual salary system and the characteristics of equity incentives, we found that, although the annual salary system has been extensively applied and played a very good incentive effect, but it is only a kind of effective short-term incentives, operators easily lead to short-term behavior, which is not conducive to maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets and sustainable development; Although Option Incentive is a good long-term incentives, but because of the capital structure, legal system, traditions and cultural factors the impact of the implementation in our country together by many constraints, the road will tortuous and protracted. Therefore, to achieve short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination of annual salary plus incentive options is the optimal mode of operation incentives. Consideration the national conditions of China, the listed companies and non-listed companies coexist, and the joint-stock companies and limited liability companies coexist; we must use a workable method to achieve incentive options, and therefore this paper, "ownership options" concept.
To make research more practical significance, we, as state-owned enterprises in Jilin Province for the study, according to the operators of design performance evaluation system, design the implementation of the "property rights Option + annual salary system," the procedures and methods of operation for the operation of state-owned enterprises in Jilin Province Incentive provides guidance and assistance for the central enterprises and other operators of state-owned enterprises provides a reference work incentives, and has a strong practical significance.
引文
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