供应网络中的企业破产风险、传递机制及其控制策略
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摘要
20世纪90年代以来,随着供应链在各个行业的普遍应用,供应网络中成员企业间的联系越来越密切。一方面,供应链在将原材料转变为中间在制品与最终产品的过程中,通过对信息流、物流和资金流的有效协调与控制,能够获得较大的整体竞争优势。然而,另一方面,随着企业间的各种联系越来越紧密,供应网络中一个企业的破产会增大其他成员企业破产的概率,导致供应网络中发生破产传递现象乃至大规模的破产雪崩现象。
供应链管理领域中现有关于企业间各种联系的研究侧重于如何协调企业间的互动关系以提高供应链的整体运作效率。关于供应网络中企业间的各种联系对企业破产及破产传递风险的影响问题,还缺少相应的研究。本文以现实网络经济中各类机构(如企业、银行等)之间的破产传递现象为背景,研究供应网络中企业之间的各种联系与互动关系对企业破产以及企业间破产传递风险的影响规律,并在此基础上分析提出控制供应网络中成员企业破产及破产传递风险的策略。
本文共六章,主要内容如下：
第一章首先介绍供应网络中破产传递问题的研究背景及研究意义；总结破产传递问题的研究现状,并分析指出当前研究中存在的问题；最后,详细说明了本文的研究目的、研究内容和主要研究方法。
第二章以不考虑资金约束的两阶段链状供应链为背景,分析了供应链成员企业的财务困境对其他供应链成员企业运作及财务状况的影响过程,总结了简单链状供应链中财务困境传递的规律。
第三章建立考虑资金约束的多阶段链状供应链模型,基于常见的供应链契约(收益共享、回购)和常见的供应链协作方式(信息共享、供应商管理库存),研究了有资金约束的多阶段链状供应链中破产风险的传递机制及控制策略。
第四章建立由多个制造商和多个零售商组成的复杂供应网络,综合考虑成员企业的运作决策与财务决策,分析了多类运作参数和财务参数对成员企业破产概率及破产传递的影响规律,总结了网络结构供应链中破产风险的形成与传递机
第五章首先分析了常见的六类供应链契约在降低网络结构供应链中成员企业的破产概率及企业间破产传递概率方面的有效性,在此基础上总结了网络结构供应链中企业破产及企业间破产传递的控制策略。
第六章对本文的研究工作进行总结,并对本文工作中存在的不足之处进行详细分析,指出有待于进一步完善的研究工作。
本文工作的创新性点如下：
(1)基于多种类型的链状供应链模型,分析了供应链成员企业的财务风险(财务困境、破产)对其上下游企业运作及财务状况的影响过程,总结了上下游企业间的各种联系与互动方式对供应链中财务风险传递的影响规律,并由此提炼出了控制链状供应链成员企业破产概率及其传递风险的策略。
(2)建立由多个制造商和多个零售商组成的复杂供应网络模型,综合考虑成员企业的运作决策与财务决策,分析了网络结构供应链中的多类运作与财务参数对成员企业破产发生及破产传递的影响规律,在此基础上总结了网络结构供应链中成员企业破产形成及企业间破产传递的机制。
(3)通过分析六类常见供应链协调契约在降低网络结构供应链中成员企业的破产概率及企业间破产传递风险方面的有效性及适用条件,总结了网络结构供应链中企业破产及企业间破产传递的控制策略。
The concept of supply chain management has been popular in various industries since the 1990s. By effectively coordinating and controlling the flows of material, information and capital, supply chain management can improve the operational efficiency of member firms in the supply chain. On the other hand, however, firms in a supply chain are becoming increasingly interdependent so that one firm's bankruptcy may cause other member firms to get into financial difficulties, leading to the phenomenon of bankruptcy propagation or even bankruptcy avalanche.
Most of the researches in supply chain management have focused on the coordination and collaboration of the behaviors of member firms so as to improve the operational efficiency of the whole supply chain. However, problems related to impacts of various linkages between supply chain members on the occurrence and propagation of financial risks (i.e., financial distress, bankruptcy) in supply chain and methods for mitigating such risks have drawn little attention. This paper is focused on investigating mechanisms of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in supply chain networks where member firms interact under various contracts, and developing strategies for reducing the risks of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in supply chain networks.
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
The first chapter introduces the background of this thesis, and reviews the researches on bankruptcy propagation, as well as the literature in supply chain management that is related to the coordination and collaboration between supply chain members. At the end of this chapter, main contents and research methods of this thesis are described.
In Chapter 2, for a simple two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, the impacts of the retailer's financial distress on the manufacturer's operational and financial status are firstly investigated. Then combined with the manufacturer's decision behavior, the propagation characteristics of financial distress from the retailer to the manufacturer are analyzed.
In Chapter 3, the mechanisms of bankruptcy propagation in two kinds of serial supply chains (make-to-order and make-to-stock) are investigated, then, based on various supply chain coordinating contracts (e.g., buy back contract, revenue sharing contract, etc) and supply chain collaborating mechanisms (information sharing or vendor managed inventory), the methods for reducing bankruptcy occurrence and propagation in these supply chains are also proposed.
In Chapter 4, we build a supply chain network that is composed of multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers to investigate the operational causes of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks. Through simulation experiments, impacts of various operational parameters and decisions, such as horizontal competition among retailers, order allocation strategies of retailers, characteristics of market demand and number of retailers, on bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation are studied.
Consecutively, in Chapter 5, we further develop methods for reducing bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks. By examining the effectiveness of some typical contractual incentive schemes, including quantity discount, revenue sharing, sales rebate, quantity flexibility, buy back and price discount contracts, in mitigating bankruptcy propagation, the strategies for controlling the risks of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation are proposed.
Innovations and contributions of this thesis are briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Mechanisms of bankruptcy propagation in various kinds of serial supply chains are analyzed from the operational perspective, and then the methods for reducing bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in serial supply chains are proposed.
(2) By building a supply chain network that consist of multiple upstream manufacturers and multiple downstream retailers, impacts of various operational parameters and decisions, as well as financial parameters and decisions, on bankruptcy risk and its propagation mechanisms in complex supply chain networks are also studied.
(3) Effectiveness of some typical contractual incentive schemes, including quantity discount, revenue sharing, sales rebate, quantity flexibility, buy back and price discount contracts, in mitigating bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks is examined, which shed light on the control strategies for bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks.
供应链管理领域中现有关于企业间各种联系的研究侧重于如何协调企业间的互动关系以提高供应链的整体运作效率。关于供应网络中企业间的各种联系对企业破产及破产传递风险的影响问题,还缺少相应的研究。本文以现实网络经济中各类机构(如企业、银行等)之间的破产传递现象为背景,研究供应网络中企业之间的各种联系与互动关系对企业破产以及企业间破产传递风险的影响规律,并在此基础上分析提出控制供应网络中成员企业破产及破产传递风险的策略。
本文共六章,主要内容如下：
第一章首先介绍供应网络中破产传递问题的研究背景及研究意义；总结破产传递问题的研究现状,并分析指出当前研究中存在的问题；最后,详细说明了本文的研究目的、研究内容和主要研究方法。
第二章以不考虑资金约束的两阶段链状供应链为背景,分析了供应链成员企业的财务困境对其他供应链成员企业运作及财务状况的影响过程,总结了简单链状供应链中财务困境传递的规律。
第三章建立考虑资金约束的多阶段链状供应链模型,基于常见的供应链契约(收益共享、回购)和常见的供应链协作方式(信息共享、供应商管理库存),研究了有资金约束的多阶段链状供应链中破产风险的传递机制及控制策略。
第四章建立由多个制造商和多个零售商组成的复杂供应网络,综合考虑成员企业的运作决策与财务决策,分析了多类运作参数和财务参数对成员企业破产概率及破产传递的影响规律,总结了网络结构供应链中破产风险的形成与传递机
第五章首先分析了常见的六类供应链契约在降低网络结构供应链中成员企业的破产概率及企业间破产传递概率方面的有效性,在此基础上总结了网络结构供应链中企业破产及企业间破产传递的控制策略。
第六章对本文的研究工作进行总结,并对本文工作中存在的不足之处进行详细分析,指出有待于进一步完善的研究工作。
本文工作的创新性点如下：
(1)基于多种类型的链状供应链模型,分析了供应链成员企业的财务风险(财务困境、破产)对其上下游企业运作及财务状况的影响过程,总结了上下游企业间的各种联系与互动方式对供应链中财务风险传递的影响规律,并由此提炼出了控制链状供应链成员企业破产概率及其传递风险的策略。
(2)建立由多个制造商和多个零售商组成的复杂供应网络模型,综合考虑成员企业的运作决策与财务决策,分析了网络结构供应链中的多类运作与财务参数对成员企业破产发生及破产传递的影响规律,在此基础上总结了网络结构供应链中成员企业破产形成及企业间破产传递的机制。
(3)通过分析六类常见供应链协调契约在降低网络结构供应链中成员企业的破产概率及企业间破产传递风险方面的有效性及适用条件,总结了网络结构供应链中企业破产及企业间破产传递的控制策略。
The concept of supply chain management has been popular in various industries since the 1990s. By effectively coordinating and controlling the flows of material, information and capital, supply chain management can improve the operational efficiency of member firms in the supply chain. On the other hand, however, firms in a supply chain are becoming increasingly interdependent so that one firm's bankruptcy may cause other member firms to get into financial difficulties, leading to the phenomenon of bankruptcy propagation or even bankruptcy avalanche.
Most of the researches in supply chain management have focused on the coordination and collaboration of the behaviors of member firms so as to improve the operational efficiency of the whole supply chain. However, problems related to impacts of various linkages between supply chain members on the occurrence and propagation of financial risks (i.e., financial distress, bankruptcy) in supply chain and methods for mitigating such risks have drawn little attention. This paper is focused on investigating mechanisms of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in supply chain networks where member firms interact under various contracts, and developing strategies for reducing the risks of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in supply chain networks.
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
The first chapter introduces the background of this thesis, and reviews the researches on bankruptcy propagation, as well as the literature in supply chain management that is related to the coordination and collaboration between supply chain members. At the end of this chapter, main contents and research methods of this thesis are described.
In Chapter 2, for a simple two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, the impacts of the retailer's financial distress on the manufacturer's operational and financial status are firstly investigated. Then combined with the manufacturer's decision behavior, the propagation characteristics of financial distress from the retailer to the manufacturer are analyzed.
In Chapter 3, the mechanisms of bankruptcy propagation in two kinds of serial supply chains (make-to-order and make-to-stock) are investigated, then, based on various supply chain coordinating contracts (e.g., buy back contract, revenue sharing contract, etc) and supply chain collaborating mechanisms (information sharing or vendor managed inventory), the methods for reducing bankruptcy occurrence and propagation in these supply chains are also proposed.
In Chapter 4, we build a supply chain network that is composed of multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers to investigate the operational causes of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks. Through simulation experiments, impacts of various operational parameters and decisions, such as horizontal competition among retailers, order allocation strategies of retailers, characteristics of market demand and number of retailers, on bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation are studied.
Consecutively, in Chapter 5, we further develop methods for reducing bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks. By examining the effectiveness of some typical contractual incentive schemes, including quantity discount, revenue sharing, sales rebate, quantity flexibility, buy back and price discount contracts, in mitigating bankruptcy propagation, the strategies for controlling the risks of bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation are proposed.
Innovations and contributions of this thesis are briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Mechanisms of bankruptcy propagation in various kinds of serial supply chains are analyzed from the operational perspective, and then the methods for reducing bankruptcy occurrence and bankruptcy propagation in serial supply chains are proposed.
(2) By building a supply chain network that consist of multiple upstream manufacturers and multiple downstream retailers, impacts of various operational parameters and decisions, as well as financial parameters and decisions, on bankruptcy risk and its propagation mechanisms in complex supply chain networks are also studied.
(3) Effectiveness of some typical contractual incentive schemes, including quantity discount, revenue sharing, sales rebate, quantity flexibility, buy back and price discount contracts, in mitigating bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks is examined, which shed light on the control strategies for bankruptcy propagation in complex supply chain networks.
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