企业规模、股权结构对企业成长影响的实证研究
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摘要
在金融危机的大环境下,企业成长再度成为一个被广泛关注的话题。虽然已有部分理论和经验研究分别关注于企业规模、股权结构对企业成长的影响,但是作为影响企业成长的重要因素,企业规模与股权结构之间存在复杂的关系,因此分别研究企业规模、股权结构对企业成长的影响.与将二者综合起来考察其对企业成长的影响可能存在差异,同时鉴于中国制造业发展比较成熟,样本量充足,目前中国制造业增加值占GDP的比重在30%以上,并且在吸纳就业中大概占到60%,而在企业成长的经验研究方面以发达国家制造业为样本取得了较多的成果,但是以中国制造业为样本进行的研究还并不多见,因此本文在文献综述和理论演绎的基础上进行了研究设计,并以2006-2008年627家制造业上市公司的数据为样本对研究假设进行了验证。
通过对全样本进行相关分析和多元回归分析得到如下结论：企业规模与企业成长之间存在显著正相关关系；第一大股东持股比例与企业成长之间存在U型函数关系；股权集中度与企业成长之间存在倒U型函数关系；股权制衡度对企业成长无明显影响。因此政府及有关部门在财政、税收、金融等政策的制定时对不同规模的企业一视同仁或者适当向中小企业倾斜,平衡大企业与中小企业资源能力上的差异,同时完善法律制度,营造有利于企业成长的环境；对企业而言要通过提高大股东经营积极性、减少信息不对称问题或避免利益侵占、完善公司治理体系来促进企业成长；同时保持股权适度集中,这样一方面能够保证对经理人员的激励和监督,另一方面也能避免大股东对小股东利益的侵占；此外企业还需要采用期权激励等方式进一步完善激励机制,从而减少经营者的短期行为及降低所有者对其进行监督的成本。
通过对细分行业各子样本进行相关分析和多元回归分析得到如下结论：各细分行业企业规模与股权结构对于企业成长的影响存在明显差异,布莱特定律在各细分行业均不成立。各细分行业中股权结构对企业成长的影响也呈现出异质性,因此在制定政策时要充分考虑各细分行业的异质性,根据各细分行业企业成长的不同影响因素做具体分析。
In the condition of financial crisis, enterprise growth has been a widespread topic. Although there have been a lot of theoretical and empirical researches on the effect of enterprise size or ownership structure on enterprise growth, there may be different results in the test where the enterprise size and ownership structure are tested together, as there are complex relation between these two factors. What's more, although there have been lots of researches based on the sample of developed countries'manufacturing industry, there is few researches based on the sample of Chinese manufacturing industry. Therefore, this paper designs the research on the basis of literature review and theoretical interpretation, using 627 listed companies of Chinese manufacturing industry in 2006-2008 as sample to verify the research hypotheses.
This paper gets the following conclusions through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to all samples:enterprise size has positive effect on enterprise growth; there is a U shaped relation between the shareholding proportion of the first-largest shareholder and enterprise growth; the ownership concentration ratio has a reverse U shaped relation with the enterprise growth; and the ownership restriction ratio has no significant effect on enterprise growth. Therefore Government and relevant departments should treat all the enterprises equally without discrimination or pay more attention to small enterprises in establishing the issues of finance, tax and so on, so as to balance the differences between the obtaining abilities resources in of large and small enterprises. At the same time, we should perfect the law system to make a good environment for the growth of enterprises, and keep the shareholding proportion of the first-largest shareholder at a very high or very low level, so that by inspiring the enthusiasm of the leading shareholders, reducing the asymmetric problems or by averting interest occupation and perfecting corporate governance system to promote the growth of enterprises. We should also keep the ownership concentration ratio appropriate, so that we could assure the inspiration and supervise of CEO and avert the interest occupation of the leading shareholders on small shareholders. In addition, enterprises need to improve the incentive mechanism by using the options, so as to reduce the operator's short-term behavior and the oversight cost of the owner.
This paper gets the following conclusions through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to the samples of sub-industry:there are significant differences among the effects of enterprise size and ownership structure on enterprise growth of different sub-industry, Gibrat's Law is not applicable in each sub-industry. The effects of ownership structure on enterprise growth in different sub-industry are heterogeneous, the heterogeneity should be considered carefully when establishing related issues, and the issues should set by analyzing the different environment factors of different sub-industry.
通过对全样本进行相关分析和多元回归分析得到如下结论：企业规模与企业成长之间存在显著正相关关系；第一大股东持股比例与企业成长之间存在U型函数关系；股权集中度与企业成长之间存在倒U型函数关系；股权制衡度对企业成长无明显影响。因此政府及有关部门在财政、税收、金融等政策的制定时对不同规模的企业一视同仁或者适当向中小企业倾斜,平衡大企业与中小企业资源能力上的差异,同时完善法律制度,营造有利于企业成长的环境；对企业而言要通过提高大股东经营积极性、减少信息不对称问题或避免利益侵占、完善公司治理体系来促进企业成长；同时保持股权适度集中,这样一方面能够保证对经理人员的激励和监督,另一方面也能避免大股东对小股东利益的侵占；此外企业还需要采用期权激励等方式进一步完善激励机制,从而减少经营者的短期行为及降低所有者对其进行监督的成本。
通过对细分行业各子样本进行相关分析和多元回归分析得到如下结论：各细分行业企业规模与股权结构对于企业成长的影响存在明显差异,布莱特定律在各细分行业均不成立。各细分行业中股权结构对企业成长的影响也呈现出异质性,因此在制定政策时要充分考虑各细分行业的异质性,根据各细分行业企业成长的不同影响因素做具体分析。
In the condition of financial crisis, enterprise growth has been a widespread topic. Although there have been a lot of theoretical and empirical researches on the effect of enterprise size or ownership structure on enterprise growth, there may be different results in the test where the enterprise size and ownership structure are tested together, as there are complex relation between these two factors. What's more, although there have been lots of researches based on the sample of developed countries'manufacturing industry, there is few researches based on the sample of Chinese manufacturing industry. Therefore, this paper designs the research on the basis of literature review and theoretical interpretation, using 627 listed companies of Chinese manufacturing industry in 2006-2008 as sample to verify the research hypotheses.
This paper gets the following conclusions through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to all samples:enterprise size has positive effect on enterprise growth; there is a U shaped relation between the shareholding proportion of the first-largest shareholder and enterprise growth; the ownership concentration ratio has a reverse U shaped relation with the enterprise growth; and the ownership restriction ratio has no significant effect on enterprise growth. Therefore Government and relevant departments should treat all the enterprises equally without discrimination or pay more attention to small enterprises in establishing the issues of finance, tax and so on, so as to balance the differences between the obtaining abilities resources in of large and small enterprises. At the same time, we should perfect the law system to make a good environment for the growth of enterprises, and keep the shareholding proportion of the first-largest shareholder at a very high or very low level, so that by inspiring the enthusiasm of the leading shareholders, reducing the asymmetric problems or by averting interest occupation and perfecting corporate governance system to promote the growth of enterprises. We should also keep the ownership concentration ratio appropriate, so that we could assure the inspiration and supervise of CEO and avert the interest occupation of the leading shareholders on small shareholders. In addition, enterprises need to improve the incentive mechanism by using the options, so as to reduce the operator's short-term behavior and the oversight cost of the owner.
This paper gets the following conclusions through correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis to the samples of sub-industry:there are significant differences among the effects of enterprise size and ownership structure on enterprise growth of different sub-industry, Gibrat's Law is not applicable in each sub-industry. The effects of ownership structure on enterprise growth in different sub-industry are heterogeneous, the heterogeneity should be considered carefully when establishing related issues, and the issues should set by analyzing the different environment factors of different sub-industry.
引文
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