不完全契约与盈余管理
|
摘要
本文基于不完全契约理论,通过拓展“自我履约范围”和对纵向一体化的重新解释,提出了履约范式的框架。进一步,通过分析作为公共契约会计制度的二元价值诉求,阐述了会计法律、会计技术规范和诚信的功能耦合关系,提出了会计履约范式理论。基于此,分析了盈余管理的性质、产生原因和寻租本质。本文认为,经过盈余管理的会计信息仍是真实的;盈余管理存在的原因是在作为公共契约的会计准则等技术规范存在公共领域的前提下,交易者个体的自我履约范围低于基于市场一般预期的自我履约范围所致,也即交易者个体诚信履约失范的结果;盈余管理实质上是公司管理当局、注册会计师、控股股东等的合谋寻租行为。接着,基于盈余管理的寻租本质,从客户重要性角度和事务所任期角度,为盈余管理寻租行为提供了经验证据。最后,基于前面的理论分析和实证检验,提出了盈余管理的治理建议。
本文主要的创新之处在于:(1)通过拓展“自我履约范围”和对纵向一体化的重新解释,提出了履约范式的框架,并将其运用于会计领域,形成了会计履约范式理论;(2)分析发现会计制度是一个基于社会公正和公司效率的二元价值体系;(3)通过分解会计准则与会计事项,全新地提出了针对会计事项的会计准则配置格局及公共领域概念,据此分析了盈余管理的性质与原因;(3)基于会计履约范式理论,利用博弈论分析工具,从一个较新的角度分析了盈余管理的合谋寻租本质,扩大了盈余管理的研究视野;(4)在实证检验部分,本研究发现,审计师允许客户管理当局盈余管理的方向是不对称的,审计师能够注意管理当局操纵盈余减少(负向盈余管理)的行为,但却不能控制操纵盈余增加(正向盈余管理)的行为,从而发现了与国外盈余管理不一致的特有现象。
Based on the incomplete-contract theory, this paper reconstructs a framework of contract-enforcement by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’theories. The integration relations among accounting law, accounting technology norms and accountants’sincerity are discussed on the basis of dual values of accounting institutions as public contracts. Then contract-enforcement theory of accounting is raised. Furthermore, the author applies the contract-enforcement theory into accounting to discuss the nature of earnings management(EM), why earnings management exists and its essence. The following arguments are then developed. Firstly, the accounting information after EM is still true. Secondly, the reason why earning management exists is that self-enforcing scope of individual transactor is smaller than expected on the market, i.e. the lack of trust performing of individual transactor in case there exist some public domains of accounting technology norms as public contract. Thirdly, earnings management is actually a kind of rent-seeking game among managers, CPA firms and controlling shareholders et al.. Then, this paper provides some empirical evidences of EM based on rent-seeking argument from perspectives of client importance and audit tenure. Finally, this paper puts forward some proposals to restraining earnings management.
The main innovations of this paper are presented as follows. Firstly, by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’, this paper sets up a framework of contract-enforcement and applies it into accounting. Secondly, the author regards accounting system as a dual-value system which aims at both social justness and individual firm’s operation efficiency. Thirdly, by decomposing accounting standards and accounting events, this paper innovatively develops an allocation pattern of accounting standards for accounting events and analyzes the nature and causes of EM. Forth, based on the contract-enforcement theory and game theory, the author analyzes the rent-seeking essence for EM. Finally, in the empirical section, the author discovers an interesting phenomenon that auditors can constraint earnings-decreasing EM, but cannot constraint earnings-increasing EM, which is different from previous findings.
本文主要的创新之处在于:(1)通过拓展“自我履约范围”和对纵向一体化的重新解释,提出了履约范式的框架,并将其运用于会计领域,形成了会计履约范式理论;(2)分析发现会计制度是一个基于社会公正和公司效率的二元价值体系;(3)通过分解会计准则与会计事项,全新地提出了针对会计事项的会计准则配置格局及公共领域概念,据此分析了盈余管理的性质与原因;(3)基于会计履约范式理论,利用博弈论分析工具,从一个较新的角度分析了盈余管理的合谋寻租本质,扩大了盈余管理的研究视野;(4)在实证检验部分,本研究发现,审计师允许客户管理当局盈余管理的方向是不对称的,审计师能够注意管理当局操纵盈余减少(负向盈余管理)的行为,但却不能控制操纵盈余增加(正向盈余管理)的行为,从而发现了与国外盈余管理不一致的特有现象。
Based on the incomplete-contract theory, this paper reconstructs a framework of contract-enforcement by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’theories. The integration relations among accounting law, accounting technology norms and accountants’sincerity are discussed on the basis of dual values of accounting institutions as public contracts. Then contract-enforcement theory of accounting is raised. Furthermore, the author applies the contract-enforcement theory into accounting to discuss the nature of earnings management(EM), why earnings management exists and its essence. The following arguments are then developed. Firstly, the accounting information after EM is still true. Secondly, the reason why earning management exists is that self-enforcing scope of individual transactor is smaller than expected on the market, i.e. the lack of trust performing of individual transactor in case there exist some public domains of accounting technology norms as public contract. Thirdly, earnings management is actually a kind of rent-seeking game among managers, CPA firms and controlling shareholders et al.. Then, this paper provides some empirical evidences of EM based on rent-seeking argument from perspectives of client importance and audit tenure. Finally, this paper puts forward some proposals to restraining earnings management.
The main innovations of this paper are presented as follows. Firstly, by extending‘self-enforcing scope’and re-explaining‘vertical integration’, this paper sets up a framework of contract-enforcement and applies it into accounting. Secondly, the author regards accounting system as a dual-value system which aims at both social justness and individual firm’s operation efficiency. Thirdly, by decomposing accounting standards and accounting events, this paper innovatively develops an allocation pattern of accounting standards for accounting events and analyzes the nature and causes of EM. Forth, based on the contract-enforcement theory and game theory, the author analyzes the rent-seeking essence for EM. Finally, in the empirical section, the author discovers an interesting phenomenon that auditors can constraint earnings-decreasing EM, but cannot constraint earnings-increasing EM, which is different from previous findings.
引文
① 引自阿马蒂亚?森著的《伦理学与经济学》,P9。
② 引自韦森著的《文化与秩序》,P154.
① 引自冯契、徐孝通主编的《外国哲学大辞典》,上海辞书出版社,2000 年。
① 转引自 Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui 著《会计理论》(第四版),上海财经大学出版社,2004 年,p275。
① 引自(美)迈克尔?查特菲尔德著的《会计思想史》,P195。
② 引自(美)迈克尔?查特菲尔德著的《会计思想史》,P41。
① 到 1893 年,在美国六千二百万的人口中,就有 125 万人是股东。Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino,《A Histroy of Accounting in America》,P44。
② 就证券管理法律的规范形式而言,尽管没有两个州的“蓝天法”完全相同,但总体看,它们普遍建立在
三种法律机制之上:第一是反欺诈条款,即授权行政管理人员发布公众警告,调查那些可疑的作弊行为,采取防范禁令及最后的制裁措施;第二是要求欲公开的发行证券的公司进行注册。强行登记注册的规定是要求任何人在从事证券经营,或者在发行某一证券之前,应该按照法律的规定主动履行一定手续,以此防止诈骗者浑水摸鱼,同时保持对经营者的监督。“蓝天法”中以堪萨斯州的立法最为典型,对各州后继立法及至证券法理论的影响也最大。按照堪萨斯州当时的立法说明,证券法有着双重目标,即不仅要保护公民免于欺诈行为的侵害,而且走得更远的是,要使投资者免于“不明智”的投资行为的侵害。历史资料显示,各州的证券法律实践并不尽如人意。这一方面导源于立法技术上的疏漏(比如存在过多的豁免条款)和执法上的马虎敷衍。但最根本的问题是源于各州分别立法所存在的致命缺陷:管辖上的消极冲突为当事人造就了逃避的机会。简言之,证券交易往往因为跨越州界而难由各州独自规范。根据盛学军著《证券公开规制 研 究 》 Pp41-45 , 及 “ history of state securities law ” , “ civl and criminal liability” (http://www.peck-shaffer.com/pa_securities_state_liability.asp)等整理而成。
③ 举例说,在 1899 年,在发起人的授意下,共发行 33.95 亿美元的普通股,然而其中的三分之二或者 22.54
亿美元都是“水份”。Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino《,A Histroy of Accounting in America》,P170。
④ 引自(美)埃尔登?亨德里克森著、王澹如和陈今池编译的《会计理论》, P40。
① “一家有两亿五千万美元资产的公司如要在十年后保持原来的位置,得拥有三亿七千五百万美元的资产。二十世纪六十年代,年销售额达十亿美元的公司并不是罕见的。1968 年,销售额超过十亿美元的工业公司在一百家以上;几乎有五十家银行的存款超过十亿美元;资产超过十亿美元的保险公司有三十家;销售额超过十亿美元的商业公司有二十家……..。”引自[美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著,复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译的《美国企业史》,PP481-482.
② “花旗银行曾发表过一张名单,五十六家公司每家的股票持有者在五万以上,有二十七家公司每家超过十万人。” 引自[美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著,复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译的《美国企业史》,P503.
① 参见陈汉文、王华、郑鑫成(2003)。
[1] [美]A?A?阿伦斯、詹姆士?洛贝克著.当代审计学[M]. 北京:中国商业出版社,1991.
[2] Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui.钱逢胜等译.会计理论[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.
[3] [美]埃尔登?亨德里克森著、王澹如和陈今池编译.会计理论[M].上海:立信会计图书用品社出版,1987.
[4] [美]Y.巴泽尔著,费方域、段毅才译.产权的经济分析[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2003.
[5] [美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著.复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译.美国企业史[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1975.
[6] Benjamin Klein.1992.契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用.载于科斯等著的《契约经济学》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[7] 陈汉文、娄权、刘启亮著.财务报告舞弊及其治理:理论与实证检验[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2006.
[8] 陈汉文、刘启亮、余劲松.国家、股权结构、诚信与公司治理——以宏智科技为例[J].管理世界.2005,(8):92-99
[9] 陈汉文、黄宗兰.审计独立性:一项理论研究[J].审计研究.2001,(4):22-28
[10]陈晓.对“上市公司的财务指标与审计意见类型相关性的实证分析”一文的点评[z].中国会计评论,2003,(1):49-50
[11]陈信元、夏立军.事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计学会2004 年年会论文集征文稿(光盘)。
[12]陈少华等.防范企业会计信息舞弊的综合对策研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[13]陈光中、江伟主编.诉讼法论丛(第 1 卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,1998.
[14]陈光中、江伟主编.诉讼法论丛(第 8 卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,1998.
[15]陈长寿、杨仕鹏.会计职业道德与自律机制[M].北京:民主与建设出版社,2002.
[16]蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究.审计研究.2005,(2):3-9.
[17]财政部.关于改进和加强企业年度会计报表审计工作管理的若干规定. 2004 年 1 月 17 日.
[18]财政部会计司翻译. 2003.对美国财务报告采用以原则为基础的会计体系的研究[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社,1-56
[19][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯著、厉以平译.经济史上的结构与变革.上海:商务印书馆,2002.
[20]Eric Brousseau and M’hand Fares. 不完全契约和治理结构:不完全契约理论和新制度经济学是替代还是互补?载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[21]方军雄、洪剑峭.经济依赖性,真的损害审计质量吗?来自中国证券市场的初步证据. 中国第三届实证会计研讨会论文集征文稿,2004:1261-1278.
[22]顾惠忠. 中国证监会首席审计师张为国表示应分阶段借鉴美国法律[N].中国证券报. 2002-12-13.
[23][美]科斯等著、李风圣主译.契约经济学[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[24]R?科斯/A?阿尔钦、D?诺思等著、财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2003.
[25]葛家澍和黄世忠. 反映经济真实是会计的基本职能——学习《会计法》的一点体会[J]. 会计研究, 1999,(12).
[26](美)戈登?塔洛克著.李政军译.寻租:对寻租活动的经济学分析[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,1999.
[27]韩传模.会计人员职业道德与自律机制研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[28]韩厚军.中国证券市场会计师报酬研究——上市公司实证数据分析[J].管理世界. 2002,(2):15-21
[29]贺卫、伍山林主编.制度经济学[z].北京:机械工业出版社,2003.
[30]贺卫、伍山林主编.制度经济学[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2003.
[31]贺卫.寻租经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1999.
[32]贺卫、王浣尘.寻租活动的经济分析[J]. 1999,(4):28-31
[33]何祚文. H 会计师事务所审计失败案例剖析[M]. 2004.厦门大学硕士论文打印稿
[34]何家弘.当代美国法律[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2001.
[35][荷兰]海渥著,文硕等译.会计史[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1991.
[36]胡国成.塑造美国现代经济制度之路[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[37]柯武钢、史漫飞.制度经济学[M].上海:商务印书馆,2002.
[38]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[39]李成云.关于会计寻租主体的探讨[J].财会通讯. 2004,(10):22-24
[40][美]杰拉尔德?冈德森著.杨宇光等译.美国经济史新编[M].北京:商务印书馆,1994.
[41][加]莱昂纳多·J·布鲁克斯著、刘宵仑,叶陈刚译.商务伦理与会计职业道德[M].北京:中信出版社,2004
[42]罗斯?L?瓦茨、杰罗尔德?L?齐默尔曼,陈少华等译.实证会计理论. 大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999.
[43]娄权.财务报告舞弊:四因子假说及其实证检验[M].2004.厦门大学博士论文打印稿
[44]罗斯?L?瓦茨、杰罗尔德?L?齐默尔曼,陈少华等译.实证会计理论[M]. 大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999
[45]林志军著.会计的假定?原则?准则[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1988.
[46]雷光勇.会计契约论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[47]雷光勇、姚晗.会计制度变迁和会计寻租[J].财经理论与实践. 2005,(1):77-80
[48]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界[J]. 2004,(2):97-116
[49]刘启亮.人力资本经营者财务:一个理论框架[J].中国工业经济.2004,(2)
[50]刘启亮、潘涛、李奇凤.人力资本所有者财务理论框架研究[J].投资研究.2005,(8)
[51]李奇凤、刘启亮.会计准则与会计信息的内生逻辑关系[J].河北经贸大学学报.2005,(3)
[52]卢现祥.寻租经济学导论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[53]李绍光.我国市场发育中的自增强现象[J].经济研究.1996,(4)
[54]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[55]李建然、陈政芳[台湾].审计客户重要性与盈余管理幅度[J].会计评论,2004,(38):59-80
[56]李建然、林凤秀[台湾].审计师任期与异常应计数之关联性研究. 2004.working paper
[57]李爽、吴溪. 中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2003.
[58]罗伯特 K 莫茨,侯赛因 A 夏拉夫,文硕等译.审计理论结构[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1990.
[59][美]迈克尔?查德菲尔德著.文硕等译.会计思想史[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1989.
[60]Margaret Levi.恰当防范促成邻居关系:对信任、信任缺乏和不信任的交易成本分析方法. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[61]Neils G. Noorderhaven.1999.交易成本经济学中的机会主义行为和信任.载于约翰?克劳奈维根编,朱舟、黄瑞虹译,交易成本经济学及其超越[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2002.
[62]聂辉华.2005. 新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合——以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J]. 中国人民大学学报,2005,(1)
[63]Oliver D.Hart.费方域译.契约、合同与财务结构[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1998.
[64]秦志敏、郭进.审计独立性探析[J].中国注册会计师.2003,(2):26-27
[65][日] 青木昌彦著、周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2002.
[66]Stéphane Saussier. 不完全理论与交易成本经济学:一个检验. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[67]任春艳.上市公司盈余管理与会计准则制定[M].2004. 厦门大学博士论文打印稿
[68]唐丽子.美国证券法[M].北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社,2005.
[69]Stephen A. Zeff,1992.The Politics of Accounting Standards,载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[70]Stephen A. Zeff,2004.The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces behind Professional Standards(1), 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[71]Stephen A. Zeff,2004.The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces behind Professional Standards(2), 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[72]Stephen A. Zeff,1998.U.S. GAAP Confronts the IASB: Roles of the SEC and the European Commission. 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》,北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005
[73]谭崇台.寻租理论及其思想渊源.经济评论. 1994,(3):30-34
[74]田静、刘启亮.会计事项与会计准则的配置格局.会计之友,2006,(3)上:13-14
[75]王跃堂、赵子夜.股权结构影响审计意见吗?来自沪深股市的经验证据[J]. 中国会计与财务研究. 2003,(4):1-23
[76]吴联生. 会计信息失真的“三分法”:理论框架与证据[J]. 会计研究,2003,(1):25-30
[77]韦森.文化与制序[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003
[78]魏明海、谭劲松、林舒.盈利管理研究[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[79]威廉姆 R.司可脱著,陈汉文等译. 财务会计理论[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2000.
[80]W?A?佩顿、A?C?利特尔顿著,厦门大学会计系翻译组.公司会计准则导论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[81]威廉?H?比弗、薛云奎译.财务呈报:会计革命[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[82]吴水澎、刘启亮. 会计制度、公共领域与会计师职业道德.会计研究[J],2005,(11):2-7
[83]徐国栋.客观诚信与主观诚信的对立统一问题[J].中国社会科学,2001,(6)
[84]夏立军. 盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究.2003,(2): 94-122.
[85]夏立军、陈信元、方轶强. 事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 中国会计与财务研究. 2005,(1):54-79.
[86]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究. 2000,(5):47-51
[87]谢德仁.中国会计规制制定合约安排之变迁——描述与分析[J].会计研究. 2000(12):14-25
[88]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究,2000,(5):47-51
[89]谢德仁.企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2001.
[90]易宪容.现代合约经济学导论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1997
[91]Yoram Barzel.国家与第三方强制实施者的多样性. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[92]约翰?克劳奈维根编,朱舟、黄瑞虹译,交易成本经济学及其超越[M],上海:上海财经大学出版社,2002.
[93]姚国庆.博弈论.天津:南开大学出版社,2003
[94]余玉苗、李琳. 审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析[J]. 经济评论.2003,(11)
[95]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M]. 上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995.
[96]张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础[J].经济研究,2002(1):3-13
[97]张缨.信任、契约及其规制——转型期中国企业间信任关系及结构重组研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2004.
[98]朱贻庭.《伦理学大辞典》,上海:上海辞书出版社,2002
[99] 中国证监会,财政部.关于证券期货审计业务签字注册审计师定期轮换的规定. 2003年 10 月 8 日.
[100]中国企业家调查系统.企业信用:现状、问题及对策——2002 年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[J].管理世界.2002,(5)
[101]中国证监会首席审计师办公室. 谁审计中国证券市场——审计市场分析(1998-2003) [M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[102]章立军.审计师真得被收买了吗?来自上市公司的经验证据[J].中国第三届实证会计研讨会论文集征文稿,2004:1424-1436
[103]章永奎、刘峰.盈余管理与审计意见相关性研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2002,(1):1-13
[104]张卫平.从深圳原野到世纪星源——一项案例研究[J].厦门大学硕士学位论文打印稿.2004 英文部分:
[1] Abdel-khalik, A. R. 1990.The Jointness of Audit Fees and Demand for MAS: A Self-selection Analysis. Contemporary Accounting Research 6:295-322
[2] Aaron S. Edlin; Stefan Reichelstein. Holdups, Standards, and Optimal Investment. The American Economic Review, Vol.86, No.3 (Spring,1996), 478-501
[3] Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey. Renegotiation Design With Unverfiable Information, Econometrica, 1999(62),257-282
[4] Alan Schwartz.1992. Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judical Strategies. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.21, No.2 (Jun.,1992),271-318
[5] Allen Craswell, Donald J.Stokes &Janet Laughton. Auditor Independence and FeeDependence. Journal of Accounting and Economics2002（33），253-275
[6] American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA. The Commission on Auditors’Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations. American Institute of CertifiedPublic Accountants, New York, NY: AICPA. 1978.
[7] American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA. Statement of Position RegardingMandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, NY: AICPA.1992.
[8] Antle, R., P.A. Griffen, D.J. Teece, and O.E. Williamson. 1977. An Economic analysis ofAuditor Independence from a multi-client, Multi-service Public Accounting Firm. ReportPrepared for the AICPA by The Law & Economics Consulting Group, inc.
[9] Arru ada, B. 1999. The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulationof Audit and Non-audit Services. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[10] Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B. Mayhew. 2003. Do Nonaudit Services Comproise AuditorIndependence? Further Evidence. The Accounting Review. 78(Jul):611-639
[11] APB Statement No.4, 1970, par.27.
[12] Bartov E., Gul F.A. and Tsui J.S. Discretionary-accruals Models and Audit Qualifications.The Accounting Review 76 (January，2000): 27-58.
[13] Bazerman, M.H., K.P. Morgan, and G.F. Loewensein. 1997. The Impossibility of AuditorIndependence. Sloan Manangement Review(Summer): 89-94
[14] Beeler, J.D. , and J.E. Hunton. 2001. Contingent Economic Rents: Precursors to PredecisionalDistortion of Client Information. Working paper, University of South Carolina.
[15] Berton L. GAO Weighs Auditing Plan for Big Banks. Wall Street Journal (1991，March 27):A3.
[16] Becker C., Defond M. and Jiambalvo J. The effect of audit quality on earnings management.Contemporary Accounting Research. （1998.Spring）4-24
[17] Beaver，W．，C，Eger，S，Ryan，and M，Wolfson. Financial reporting, supplemental disclosuresand bank share prices，Journal of Accounting Research (1989,Autumn）：157-178．
[18] Beaver，W．，and E．Engel． Discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan lossesand the behavior of security prices．Journal of Accounting and Economics(1996)22：177-206.
[19] Beaver，W．，and M，McNichols． The characteristics and valuation of loss reserves ofpropertycasualty insurers．Working paper, Stanford University．1998．
[20] Beneish，M．D． Detecting GAAP violation：Implications for assessing earnings managementamong firms with extreme financial performance．Journal o f Accounting and Public Policy(1997)16:271-309、
[21] Beneish，M．D． Discussion of: Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic?
Review of Accounting Studies (1998)3:209-221.
[22] Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. Katz. Judical Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. Journal of Law ,Economics, & Organization, Vol.9, No.2 (Spring,1993), 230-255
[23] Benjamin Klein.Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: the Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. Journal of Law ,Economics, & Organization, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring,1988), 199-213
[24] Benjamin Klein; Robert G .Crawford;Armen A . Alchian. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.21, No.2(Spring,1978),297-326
[25] Benjamin Klein. Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements. American Economic Review. Vol.70, No.2(May,1980),356-362
[26] Benjamin Klein. Borderlines of Law and Economic Theory : Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements. American Economic Review Papers and Proceeding 70,May,1980,356-362
[27] Benjamin Klein; Keith B. Leffler. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.89, No.4 (Aug.,1981), 615-641
[28] Benjamin Klein; Kevin M. Murphy. Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.31, No.2 (Spring,1988), 265-297
[29] Benjamin Klein; Kevin M. Murphy. Vertical Restraints as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement. The American Economic Review, Vol.87, No.2 (May,1997), 415-420
[30] Benjamin Klein; Lester F. Saft. The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.28, No.2 (Spring,1985), 345-361
[31] Burgstahler,D.,and I,Dichev.. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses,Journal of Accounting and Economics( 1997)24(1):99-126.
[32] Burgstahler,D.,and I,Dichev. Incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses : Evidence from quarterly earnings . Working paper , University of Washington.1998.
[33] Burgstahler,D.,and M.Eames. Management of earnings and analysts forecasts,Working paper,University of Washington.1998.
[34] Bushee,B. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review (1998)73(3):345-333.
[35] Cahan,S. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals:A refined test of the political cost hypothesis.The Accounting Review(1992) 67:77-95.
[36] Chaney, P., and K. Philipich. 2002. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(4):1221-1245
[37] Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D.Wysocki.Earnings Management and InvestorProtection: an International Comparison. Journal of Accounting and Economics69(2003):505-527.
[38] Coase, Ronald. The Nature of Firm, Economica, (1937) 4:386-405
[39] Crocker, K.J. and S.E. Masten. Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, (1996.)9:5-39
[40] Coleman, J. S., Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1990.
[41] Collins,J.,D.Shackelford,and J.Wahlen. Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory capital , earnings and taxes . Journal of Accounting Research (1995)33(2):263-291.
[42] Craswell A., Francis J. Taylor S. Auditor brand name and industry specializations. 20:297-322.1995.
[43] Davis, L., and D. T. Simon. 1992. The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Actions on Audit Fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 11(1):58-68
[44] Dechun Wang.Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality. 2006. Working paper
[45] DeAngelo, L. E. . auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1981a.)3 : 183-199.
[46] DeAngelo, L.E. Auditor independence, “low balling” and disclosure regulation. The Accounting Review 78(Jul, 1981b.):779-799
[47] DeAngelo, L.E. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Boyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61(July,1986):400-420
[48] DeAngelo,E.,H.DeAngelo,and D.Skinner. Accounting choices of troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January.1994):113-143.
[49] DeAngelo, L.E.Managerial competition,information costs,and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1988)10:3-36.
[50] Dechow, P., R.Sloan, and A. Sweeney. Detecting Earning Management. The Accounting Review (1995)70:193-225
[51] Defond, M., and K. Subramanyam. Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(February,1998) : 35-67
[52] DeFond, M.L.,and J.Jiambalvo. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(January,1994):145--176.
[53] Defond, M., K. Raghunandan and K. Subramanyam. 2002. Do Nonaudit Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions. Journal of Accounting Research 40(4):1247-1274
[54] Davis,L.R.,B. Soo , and G.Trompeter. Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and EarningsManagement. Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill,MA. 2002.
[55] Dunham, K.J. Firms that want to switch auditors find it take time, money and faith. Wall Street Journal (2002.March 15)
[56] Dechow,P. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance:The role of accounting accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics(1994.)18(1):3-40.
[57] Dechow,P.,and R.G.Sloan. Executive incentives and the horizon problem:An empirical investigation.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1991)14:51-89.
[58] Dechow,P.,R.G.Sloan.,and A.P.Sweeney. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.Contemporary Accounting Research (1996)13(I):1-36.
[59] Defeo,V.,R .Lambert,and D.Larcker. The executive compensation effects of equity-for-debt swaps.The Accounting Review (1989)54:201-227.
[60] Degeorge, F ., J . Patel , and R . Zeckhauser. Earnings management to exceed thresholds.Working paper,Boston University. 1998.
[61] Dye,R, Earnings management in an overlapping generations model.Journal of Accounting Research(1988):195-235.
[62] Dopuch, N., R. King and R. Schwartz. 2001. An Experimental Investigation of Retention and Rotation Requirements. Journal of Accounting Research 39:93-117
[63] Erickson,M.,and S-w.Wang. Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers.Journal of Accounting and Economics (April,1999)27:149-176.
[64] Firth, M. 1997. The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to Their Audit Clients. Contemporary Accounting Research 14(2):1-21
[65] Foster,G. Briloff and the capital market.Journal of Accounting Research 17(Spring,1979): 262-274.
[66] Francis J. The Effect of Audit Firm Size on Audit Price: A Study of the Australian Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics(1984) 6 : 133-151
[67] Francis J. , and J. Krishnan. Accounting Accruals and Auditors Reporting Conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research (1999.)16:135-165
[68] Francis J., Maydew E. and Sparks H. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (1999)18(2):17-34
[69] Gaver,J.,K. Gaver,and J.Austin. Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1995)18:3-28.
[70] Gore, P., Pope, P. and A. Singh. 2001. Non-audit Services, Auditor Independence, and Earnings Management. Working paper. Lancaster University
[71] Guay,W.A.,Kothari,S.P.,and Watts,R.L. A market-based evaluation of discretionary-accrual models.Journal of Accounting Research 34(Supplement,1996):83-105.
[72] Guidry,F,A.Leone,and S.Rock. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management By business unit managers,Journal of Accounting and Economics(Januarv, 1999)26:113-142
[73] Gillian K. Hadfield. Judical Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.23, No.1 (Jun.,1994), 159-184
[74] Gareth R. Jones. Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organization Culture: An Exchange Perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.28, No.3 Organizational Culture (Sep.,1983), 454-467
[75] Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar. 2002):67-78.
[76] Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino, A Histroy of Accounting in America. New York: Wiley.1979.
[77] Ghosh A. and Moon D. Does Auditor Tenure Impair Audit Quality? Working Paper. The Securities Exchange Commission. 2003.
[78] Hand,J.R.M. Resolving LIFO uncertainty:A theoretical and empirical examination of 1974-1975 adoptions and non-adoptions.Journal of Accounting Research (1992)31:21-49.
[79] Healy, P. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1985)7:85-107.
[80] Healy, P.,S.Kang,and K.Palepu. The effect of accounting procedure changes on CEOs’cash salary and bonus compensation.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1987)9:7-34.
[81] Healy, P.and K.G.Palepu. Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12(1-3):97-124.
[82] Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons (December 1999), pp.365-384
[83] Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan and Michael S.Wilkins. The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting:Earnings Restatement and Management Turnover.working paper
[84] Hyeesoo Chung,Sanjay Kallapur. Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals. The Accounting Review2003. (4):931-955
[85] Hirst ,D.E.,and P.E.Hopkins. Comprehensive income reporting and analysts' valuation Judgements. Journal of Accounting Research(Supplement,1998):47-75.
[86] Holthausen,R.,and R.Leftwich. The economic consequences of accounting choice: implication、of costly contracting and monitoring.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1983)5:77-117.
[87] Holthausen,R.,D .Larcker,and R.Sloan. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation .1995
[88] John Richard Edwards. The History of Accounting:Critical Perspectives on Business and Management(ⅰ-ⅵ ). Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London.2001.
[89] James Jiambalvo, Discussion of “Causes and Consequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Action by the SEC”. Contemporary Accounting Research: Spring 1996,37-47
[90] James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers. Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review 78(Jul,2003):779-799
[91] James R. Duncan and James A.Knoblett,“investing behavioral antecedents of earnings management: moral reasoning, earnings pressure, and likelihood of detection”,载于《research on accounting ethics》(volume 6),bill N.Schwartz, JAI PRESS INC. Stamford, Connecticut,2000
[92] Johanned H?rner. Reputation and Competition. American Economic Review. Vol.92, No.3(June,2002),644-663
[93] Jean Tirole. Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? Econometrica, Vol.67, No.4 (July,1999), 741-781
[94] Jones,J., Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, Journal of Accounting Research(Autumn,1991), Pp193-228
[95] Joseph P.H.Fan, T. J. Wong. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics33(2002):401-425
[96] Jensen M., and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(October,1976):305-360
[97] Kinney, W., and R. Martin. Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audt-Related Adjustment Studies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory(1994)13:149-159
[98] Kellogg, R. Accounting Activities, Securities Prices, and Class Action Lawsuits. Journal of Law and Economics (1984)6:185-204
[99] Kinney, W., and R. Martin. Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audt-Related Adjustment Studies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory(1994)13:149-159
[100] Kang,S., K. Sivaramakrishnan. Issues in testing earnings management and an instrumental variables approach.Journal of Accounting Research(1995)33:353-368.
[101] Kang,S., K. Sivaramakrishnan. Earnings management to avoid losses and performance of accrual prediction models.Working paper,Yale University.1999.
[102] Kasznik,R. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research(Spring,1999)37:57-82.
[103] Key,K. G. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry.Journal of Accounting and Economics1997(23)3:309-337.
[104] L.G. Telser. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. The Journal of Business, Vol.53, No.1 (Jan.,1980), 27-44
[105] Leftwich,R. Accounting information in private markets:Evidence from private lending agreements. The Accounting Review (1983)58: 23-42.
[106] Levitt,A. The numbers game.Speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business, New York,NY,September,28.1998.
[107] Liu,C.,and S.Ryan. The effect of loan portfolio composition on the market reaction to and anticipation of loan loss provisions.Journal of Accounting Research(Spring,1995):77-94,
[108] Liu,C.,S .Ryan,and J.Wahlen. Differential valuation implications of loan loss provisions across banks and fiscal quarters.The Accounting Review(January,1997):133一 146
[109] Lys, T., Watts, R., Lawsuits against auditors. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (Supplement,1994). 65-102
[110] Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta and Sendhil Mullainathan. Ferreting Out Tunneling: an Appliction to Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002:121-148.
[111] McNichols,M.,and P.Wilson. Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26(Supplement,1988):1-31.
[112] Miller,G.S.,and D.J.Skinner. Determinants of the valuation allowances for deferred tax assets under SFAS No.109.The Accounting Review (1998)73(2):213-233.
[113] Macneil, I. R., The Many Futures of Contract. Southern Califaornia Law Review. (1974)3,691-816
[114] Macneil, I. R., Contract Remedies: A Need for Better Efficiency Analysis. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1972)144,6-30.
[115] Myers J.N., Myers L.A., Palmrose Z.V., and Scholz S.W., Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper. 2004
[116] Ming Jian and T.J.Wong. Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Translations. Working paper.
[117] Myers J.N., Myers L.A., and Omer T.C., Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review (2003) Vol.78:779-799.
[118] Mautz R.K. and Sharaf H.A., The Philosophy of Auditing. American Accounting Association Monograph (1961) No.6. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association.
[119] Moyer,S. Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12:123-154.
[120] Oliver D.Hart. Is Bounded Rationality an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (1990.)146,696-702
[121] Oliver D.Hart. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in O.E. Williamson and S.G. Winter (eds), The Nature of the Firm, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pp.138-159.1991.
[122] Oliver D.Hart. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.1995.
[123] Oliver D.Hart; John Moore. Incimplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, Vol.56, No.4 (July,1988), 755-785
[124] Scott. The Basic of Accounting Principles, The Accounting Review(1941),34
[125] Patricia M. Dechow et al. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research (Spring 1996), pp.1-35
[126] Petty R. and Cuganesan. , Auditor Rotation: Framing the Debate. Australian Accountant 66 (May,1996): 40-41.
[127] Palmrose, Z. The Effect of Nonaudit Service on the Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence. Journal of Accounting Research(1986) 24: 405-411
[128] Palmrose, Z. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement,1991): 149-185
[129] Parkash, M. , and C. F. Venable. 1993. AuditeeIncentives for Auditor Independence: The Case of Nonaudit Services. The Accounting Review 68(1): 113-133
[130] Penalva,F. Loss reserves and accounting discretion in the property-casualty insurance industry.Working paper,University of California at Berkeley.1998.
[131] Perry,S.,and T.Williams. Earnings management preceding management buyout offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1994)18:157-179.
[132] Petroni, K. R. Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics( 1992)15:485-508.
[133] Petroni, K. R.,S .Ryan,and J,Wahlen. Discretionary and non-discretionary revisions of loss reserves by property-casualty insurers : Differential implications for future profitability,risk,and market value.Working paper,Indiana Universitv. 1999.
[134] PeaSnell,K.V.,p,F.Pope,and S. Young. Outside directors,board effectiveness,and abnormal accruals.Working paper,Lancaster University.1999.
[135] Pitt, L., and B. Birenbaum. 1997. Serving the Public Interest: A New Concept Framework for Audit Impendence. New York: NY American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[136] Press, E., and J. Weintrop. Accounting-Based Constraints in Piblic and Private Debt Agreements: Their Association with Leverage and Impact on Accounting Choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12 :65-95
[137] Palmrose, Z. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review 63(January,1988):55-73
[138] Prawitt, D. F. An update on auditor independence. The Auditor’s Report23:6-8.2000.
[139] Roy W. Kenny; Benjamin Klein. The Economics of Block Booking. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26, No.3 (Spring,1983), 497-540
[140] Roy W. Kenny; Benjamin Klein. How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.43, No.2 (Otc.,2000), 427-435
[141] Reynolds J. , Francis J., Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics(2001)30:375-400
[142] Schipper,K. Commentary: Earnings management. Accounting Horizons(December,1989):91-102.
[143] Scholes,M,,G.P.Wilson,and M.Wolfson. Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks.Review of Financial Studies(1990)3:625-650.
[144] Simunic, D. 1984. Auditing, Consulting and Auditor Independence. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn):679-702
[145] Sloan,R.,Do stock prices fully impound information in accruals about future earnings? The Accounting Review (1996)71:289-315.
[146] Smith,C.,and J.B.Warner. On financial contracting:An analysis of bond covenants,Journal of Financial Economics 7 (June,1979):117-161.
[147] Stein,J. Efficient capital markets,inefficient firms:A model of myopic corporate behavior.Quarterly Journal of Economics(1989):655-669.
[148] Stephen A. Zeff. The Rise of Economic Consequences,Journal of Accountancy,(1978)12
[149] Stephen A. Zeff. The Rise of Economic Consequences,Journal of Accountancy, (Dec.1978) 56-63
[150] Stephen A.Zeff, Some Junctures in the Evolution of the Process of Establishing Accounting Principles in the U.S.A.:1917-1972.The Accounting Review (1984) 7:447-468
[151] Stice. J., Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review(1991)66,516-533
[152] Subramanyam,K,R.The pricing of discretionary accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1996)22:249-281.
[153] Sweeney,A.P.Debt-covenant violations and managers’accounting responses.Journal of Accounting and Economics(May,1994):281-308.
[154] Sanford J.Grossman; Oliver D.Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, No.4 (Aug.,1986), 691-719
[155] Subramanyam K.R. ‘The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals’, Journal of Accounting and Economics(1996) 22: 249-282.
[156] Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).Staff Report on Auditor Independence. Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1994.
[157] Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law No:107-204.GPO:Washington D.C,2002.
[158] Steven J. Burton. Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith. Harvard Law Review, Vol.94, No.2 (Dec.,1980), 369-404
[159] Steven Tadelis. Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision. American Economic Review. Vol.92, No.3(May,2002),433-437
[160] Stice. J., Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review(1991)66,516-533
[161] Teoh,S.H.,I.W elch,and T.J.Wong. Earnings management and the post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings.Journal of Financial Economics(October,1998a)50:63-99.
[162] Teoh,S.H.,I.W elch,and T.J.Wong. Earnings management and the long-term market performance of initial public offerings.Journal of Finance(December,1998b)53: 1935-1974.
[163] Teoh,S.H.,T .J .Wong,and G.Rao.Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies (1998)3:175-208.
[164] Trueman,B.,and S.Titman. An explanation for accounting income smoothing,Journal of Accounting Research 26〔Supplement,1988):127-139.
[165] Trompeter, G. The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted Accounting Principals on Audit Partner Judgement. Audit: A Journal of Practice & Theory 13(Fall,1994):56-68
[166] U.S. Senate, The Accounting Establishment. Prepared by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government Affairs, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1976.
[167] Visvanathan,G. Deferred tax valuation allowances and earnings management.Journal of Financial Statement Analysis (1998)3(4):6-15.
[168] W?A?Paton and A?C?Littleton. An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards. 1940.上海图书馆藏书
[169] Williamson, O.E. Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contracual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, (1979)Vol.22
[170] Williamson, O.E. The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.1996.
[171] Williamson, O.E. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations. American Economic Review. (May,1971),112-123
[172] Wahlen,J. The nature of information in commercial bank loan loss disclosures. The Ac counting Review (July,1994):455-478.
[173] Warfield,T.,J. Wild,and K. Wild. Managerial ownership,accounting choices,and informativeness of earnings.Journal of Accounting and Economics1995(20):61-91.
[174] Watts,R.L.,and J.L.Zimmerman. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards.The Accounting Review 53(January,1978):112-134.
[175] Watts,R.L.,and J.L.Zimmerman. Positive accounting theory:A ten-year perspective.The Accounting Review(1990)65:131-156.
[176] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. Positive theory of accounting. Englewood Cliffs, NY:Prentice-Hall.1986.
[177] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. Agent problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 26(Octocber, 1983):613-633
[178] Wallman S., The Future of Accounting, Part iii: Reliability and Auditor Independence. Accounting Horizons (1996.)10:76-97
[179] Warfield T., J. Wild, and K. Wild. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1995)20 : 61-91
[180] Zand, D. E., Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. Administrative Science Quarterly, (1972)17,229-239.
② 引自韦森著的《文化与秩序》,P154.
① 引自冯契、徐孝通主编的《外国哲学大辞典》,上海辞书出版社,2000 年。
① 转引自 Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui 著《会计理论》(第四版),上海财经大学出版社,2004 年,p275。
① 引自(美)迈克尔?查特菲尔德著的《会计思想史》,P195。
② 引自(美)迈克尔?查特菲尔德著的《会计思想史》,P41。
① 到 1893 年,在美国六千二百万的人口中,就有 125 万人是股东。Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino,《A Histroy of Accounting in America》,P44。
② 就证券管理法律的规范形式而言,尽管没有两个州的“蓝天法”完全相同,但总体看,它们普遍建立在
三种法律机制之上:第一是反欺诈条款,即授权行政管理人员发布公众警告,调查那些可疑的作弊行为,采取防范禁令及最后的制裁措施;第二是要求欲公开的发行证券的公司进行注册。强行登记注册的规定是要求任何人在从事证券经营,或者在发行某一证券之前,应该按照法律的规定主动履行一定手续,以此防止诈骗者浑水摸鱼,同时保持对经营者的监督。“蓝天法”中以堪萨斯州的立法最为典型,对各州后继立法及至证券法理论的影响也最大。按照堪萨斯州当时的立法说明,证券法有着双重目标,即不仅要保护公民免于欺诈行为的侵害,而且走得更远的是,要使投资者免于“不明智”的投资行为的侵害。历史资料显示,各州的证券法律实践并不尽如人意。这一方面导源于立法技术上的疏漏(比如存在过多的豁免条款)和执法上的马虎敷衍。但最根本的问题是源于各州分别立法所存在的致命缺陷:管辖上的消极冲突为当事人造就了逃避的机会。简言之,证券交易往往因为跨越州界而难由各州独自规范。根据盛学军著《证券公开规制 研 究 》 Pp41-45 , 及 “ history of state securities law ” , “ civl and criminal liability” (http://www.peck-shaffer.com/pa_securities_state_liability.asp)等整理而成。
③ 举例说,在 1899 年,在发起人的授意下,共发行 33.95 亿美元的普通股,然而其中的三分之二或者 22.54
亿美元都是“水份”。Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino《,A Histroy of Accounting in America》,P170。
④ 引自(美)埃尔登?亨德里克森著、王澹如和陈今池编译的《会计理论》, P40。
① “一家有两亿五千万美元资产的公司如要在十年后保持原来的位置,得拥有三亿七千五百万美元的资产。二十世纪六十年代,年销售额达十亿美元的公司并不是罕见的。1968 年,销售额超过十亿美元的工业公司在一百家以上;几乎有五十家银行的存款超过十亿美元;资产超过十亿美元的保险公司有三十家;销售额超过十亿美元的商业公司有二十家……..。”引自[美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著,复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译的《美国企业史》,PP481-482.
② “花旗银行曾发表过一张名单,五十六家公司每家的股票持有者在五万以上,有二十七家公司每家超过十万人。” 引自[美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著,复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译的《美国企业史》,P503.
① 参见陈汉文、王华、郑鑫成(2003)。
[1] [美]A?A?阿伦斯、詹姆士?洛贝克著.当代审计学[M]. 北京:中国商业出版社,1991.
[2] Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui.钱逢胜等译.会计理论[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.
[3] [美]埃尔登?亨德里克森著、王澹如和陈今池编译.会计理论[M].上海:立信会计图书用品社出版,1987.
[4] [美]Y.巴泽尔著,费方域、段毅才译.产权的经济分析[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2003.
[5] [美]本?巴鲁克?.塞利格曼著.复旦大学资本主义国家经济研究所译.美国企业史[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1975.
[6] Benjamin Klein.1992.契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用.载于科斯等著的《契约经济学》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[7] 陈汉文、娄权、刘启亮著.财务报告舞弊及其治理:理论与实证检验[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2006.
[8] 陈汉文、刘启亮、余劲松.国家、股权结构、诚信与公司治理——以宏智科技为例[J].管理世界.2005,(8):92-99
[9] 陈汉文、黄宗兰.审计独立性:一项理论研究[J].审计研究.2001,(4):22-28
[10]陈晓.对“上市公司的财务指标与审计意见类型相关性的实证分析”一文的点评[z].中国会计评论,2003,(1):49-50
[11]陈信元、夏立军.事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计学会2004 年年会论文集征文稿(光盘)。
[12]陈少华等.防范企业会计信息舞弊的综合对策研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[13]陈光中、江伟主编.诉讼法论丛(第 1 卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,1998.
[14]陈光中、江伟主编.诉讼法论丛(第 8 卷)[M].北京:法律出版社,1998.
[15]陈长寿、杨仕鹏.会计职业道德与自律机制[M].北京:民主与建设出版社,2002.
[16]蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究.审计研究.2005,(2):3-9.
[17]财政部.关于改进和加强企业年度会计报表审计工作管理的若干规定. 2004 年 1 月 17 日.
[18]财政部会计司翻译. 2003.对美国财务报告采用以原则为基础的会计体系的研究[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社,1-56
[19][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯著、厉以平译.经济史上的结构与变革.上海:商务印书馆,2002.
[20]Eric Brousseau and M’hand Fares. 不完全契约和治理结构:不完全契约理论和新制度经济学是替代还是互补?载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[21]方军雄、洪剑峭.经济依赖性,真的损害审计质量吗?来自中国证券市场的初步证据. 中国第三届实证会计研讨会论文集征文稿,2004:1261-1278.
[22]顾惠忠. 中国证监会首席审计师张为国表示应分阶段借鉴美国法律[N].中国证券报. 2002-12-13.
[23][美]科斯等著、李风圣主译.契约经济学[M]. 北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[24]R?科斯/A?阿尔钦、D?诺思等著、财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2003.
[25]葛家澍和黄世忠. 反映经济真实是会计的基本职能——学习《会计法》的一点体会[J]. 会计研究, 1999,(12).
[26](美)戈登?塔洛克著.李政军译.寻租:对寻租活动的经济学分析[M].成都:西南财经大学出版社,1999.
[27]韩传模.会计人员职业道德与自律机制研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[28]韩厚军.中国证券市场会计师报酬研究——上市公司实证数据分析[J].管理世界. 2002,(2):15-21
[29]贺卫、伍山林主编.制度经济学[z].北京:机械工业出版社,2003.
[30]贺卫、伍山林主编.制度经济学[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2003.
[31]贺卫.寻租经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1999.
[32]贺卫、王浣尘.寻租活动的经济分析[J]. 1999,(4):28-31
[33]何祚文. H 会计师事务所审计失败案例剖析[M]. 2004.厦门大学硕士论文打印稿
[34]何家弘.当代美国法律[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2001.
[35][荷兰]海渥著,文硕等译.会计史[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1991.
[36]胡国成.塑造美国现代经济制度之路[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1995.
[37]柯武钢、史漫飞.制度经济学[M].上海:商务印书馆,2002.
[38]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2002.
[39]李成云.关于会计寻租主体的探讨[J].财会通讯. 2004,(10):22-24
[40][美]杰拉尔德?冈德森著.杨宇光等译.美国经济史新编[M].北京:商务印书馆,1994.
[41][加]莱昂纳多·J·布鲁克斯著、刘宵仑,叶陈刚译.商务伦理与会计职业道德[M].北京:中信出版社,2004
[42]罗斯?L?瓦茨、杰罗尔德?L?齐默尔曼,陈少华等译.实证会计理论. 大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999.
[43]娄权.财务报告舞弊:四因子假说及其实证检验[M].2004.厦门大学博士论文打印稿
[44]罗斯?L?瓦茨、杰罗尔德?L?齐默尔曼,陈少华等译.实证会计理论[M]. 大连:东北财经大学出版社,1999
[45]林志军著.会计的假定?原则?准则[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1988.
[46]雷光勇.会计契约论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[47]雷光勇、姚晗.会计制度变迁和会计寻租[J].财经理论与实践. 2005,(1):77-80
[48]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊:共生与治理.管理世界[J]. 2004,(2):97-116
[49]刘启亮.人力资本经营者财务:一个理论框架[J].中国工业经济.2004,(2)
[50]刘启亮、潘涛、李奇凤.人力资本所有者财务理论框架研究[J].投资研究.2005,(8)
[51]李奇凤、刘启亮.会计准则与会计信息的内生逻辑关系[J].河北经贸大学学报.2005,(3)
[52]卢现祥.寻租经济学导论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2000.
[53]李绍光.我国市场发育中的自增强现象[J].经济研究.1996,(4)
[54]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[55]李建然、陈政芳[台湾].审计客户重要性与盈余管理幅度[J].会计评论,2004,(38):59-80
[56]李建然、林凤秀[台湾].审计师任期与异常应计数之关联性研究. 2004.working paper
[57]李爽、吴溪. 中国证券市场中的审计报告行为:监管视角与经验证据[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社, 2003.
[58]罗伯特 K 莫茨,侯赛因 A 夏拉夫,文硕等译.审计理论结构[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1990.
[59][美]迈克尔?查德菲尔德著.文硕等译.会计思想史[M].北京:中国商业出版社,1989.
[60]Margaret Levi.恰当防范促成邻居关系:对信任、信任缺乏和不信任的交易成本分析方法. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[61]Neils G. Noorderhaven.1999.交易成本经济学中的机会主义行为和信任.载于约翰?克劳奈维根编,朱舟、黄瑞虹译,交易成本经济学及其超越[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2002.
[62]聂辉华.2005. 新制度经济学中不完全契约理论的分歧与融合——以威廉姆森和哈特为代表的两种进路[J]. 中国人民大学学报,2005,(1)
[63]Oliver D.Hart.费方域译.契约、合同与财务结构[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1998.
[64]秦志敏、郭进.审计独立性探析[J].中国注册会计师.2003,(2):26-27
[65][日] 青木昌彦著、周黎安译.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2002.
[66]Stéphane Saussier. 不完全理论与交易成本经济学:一个检验. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[67]任春艳.上市公司盈余管理与会计准则制定[M].2004. 厦门大学博士论文打印稿
[68]唐丽子.美国证券法[M].北京:对外经济贸易大学出版社,2005.
[69]Stephen A. Zeff,1992.The Politics of Accounting Standards,载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[70]Stephen A. Zeff,2004.The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces behind Professional Standards(1), 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[71]Stephen A. Zeff,2004.The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces behind Professional Standards(2), 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[72]Stephen A. Zeff,1998.U.S. GAAP Confronts the IASB: Roles of the SEC and the European Commission. 载于《会计准则制定:理论与实践》,北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005
[73]谭崇台.寻租理论及其思想渊源.经济评论. 1994,(3):30-34
[74]田静、刘启亮.会计事项与会计准则的配置格局.会计之友,2006,(3)上:13-14
[75]王跃堂、赵子夜.股权结构影响审计意见吗?来自沪深股市的经验证据[J]. 中国会计与财务研究. 2003,(4):1-23
[76]吴联生. 会计信息失真的“三分法”:理论框架与证据[J]. 会计研究,2003,(1):25-30
[77]韦森.文化与制序[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2003
[78]魏明海、谭劲松、林舒.盈利管理研究[M]. 北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001.
[79]威廉姆 R.司可脱著,陈汉文等译. 财务会计理论[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2000.
[80]W?A?佩顿、A?C?利特尔顿著,厦门大学会计系翻译组.公司会计准则导论[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2004.
[81]威廉?H?比弗、薛云奎译.财务呈报:会计革命[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2000.
[82]吴水澎、刘启亮. 会计制度、公共领域与会计师职业道德.会计研究[J],2005,(11):2-7
[83]徐国栋.客观诚信与主观诚信的对立统一问题[J].中国社会科学,2001,(6)
[84]夏立军. 盈余管理计量模型在中国股票市场的应用研究[J].中国会计与财务研究.2003,(2): 94-122.
[85]夏立军、陈信元、方轶强. 事务所任期与审计质量:来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J]. 中国会计与财务研究. 2005,(1):54-79.
[86]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究. 2000,(5):47-51
[87]谢德仁.中国会计规制制定合约安排之变迁——描述与分析[J].会计研究. 2000(12):14-25
[88]谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究,2000,(5):47-51
[89]谢德仁.企业剩余索取权:分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2001.
[90]易宪容.现代合约经济学导论[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,1997
[91]Yoram Barzel.国家与第三方强制实施者的多样性. 载于科斯等著的《制度、契约与组织——从新制度经济学角度的透视》[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2003.
[92]约翰?克劳奈维根编,朱舟、黄瑞虹译,交易成本经济学及其超越[M],上海:上海财经大学出版社,2002.
[93]姚国庆.博弈论.天津:南开大学出版社,2003
[94]余玉苗、李琳. 审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析[J]. 经济评论.2003,(11)
[95]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M]. 上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1995.
[96]张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础[J].经济研究,2002(1):3-13
[97]张缨.信任、契约及其规制——转型期中国企业间信任关系及结构重组研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2004.
[98]朱贻庭.《伦理学大辞典》,上海:上海辞书出版社,2002
[99] 中国证监会,财政部.关于证券期货审计业务签字注册审计师定期轮换的规定. 2003年 10 月 8 日.
[100]中国企业家调查系统.企业信用:现状、问题及对策——2002 年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[J].管理世界.2002,(5)
[101]中国证监会首席审计师办公室. 谁审计中国证券市场——审计市场分析(1998-2003) [M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003.
[102]章立军.审计师真得被收买了吗?来自上市公司的经验证据[J].中国第三届实证会计研讨会论文集征文稿,2004:1424-1436
[103]章永奎、刘峰.盈余管理与审计意见相关性研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2002,(1):1-13
[104]张卫平.从深圳原野到世纪星源——一项案例研究[J].厦门大学硕士学位论文打印稿.2004 英文部分:
[1] Abdel-khalik, A. R. 1990.The Jointness of Audit Fees and Demand for MAS: A Self-selection Analysis. Contemporary Accounting Research 6:295-322
[2] Aaron S. Edlin; Stefan Reichelstein. Holdups, Standards, and Optimal Investment. The American Economic Review, Vol.86, No.3 (Spring,1996), 478-501
[3] Aghion, P., M. Dewatripont and P. Rey. Renegotiation Design With Unverfiable Information, Econometrica, 1999(62),257-282
[4] Alan Schwartz.1992. Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judical Strategies. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.21, No.2 (Jun.,1992),271-318
[5] Allen Craswell, Donald J.Stokes &Janet Laughton. Auditor Independence and FeeDependence. Journal of Accounting and Economics2002（33），253-275
[6] American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA. The Commission on Auditors’Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations. American Institute of CertifiedPublic Accountants, New York, NY: AICPA. 1978.
[7] American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, AICPA. Statement of Position RegardingMandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of Publicly Held Companies. New York, NY: AICPA.1992.
[8] Antle, R., P.A. Griffen, D.J. Teece, and O.E. Williamson. 1977. An Economic analysis ofAuditor Independence from a multi-client, Multi-service Public Accounting Firm. ReportPrepared for the AICPA by The Law & Economics Consulting Group, inc.
[9] Arru ada, B. 1999. The Economics of Audit Quality: Private Incentives and the Regulationof Audit and Non-audit Services. Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[10] Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and B. Mayhew. 2003. Do Nonaudit Services Comproise AuditorIndependence? Further Evidence. The Accounting Review. 78(Jul):611-639
[11] APB Statement No.4, 1970, par.27.
[12] Bartov E., Gul F.A. and Tsui J.S. Discretionary-accruals Models and Audit Qualifications.The Accounting Review 76 (January，2000): 27-58.
[13] Bazerman, M.H., K.P. Morgan, and G.F. Loewensein. 1997. The Impossibility of AuditorIndependence. Sloan Manangement Review(Summer): 89-94
[14] Beeler, J.D. , and J.E. Hunton. 2001. Contingent Economic Rents: Precursors to PredecisionalDistortion of Client Information. Working paper, University of South Carolina.
[15] Berton L. GAO Weighs Auditing Plan for Big Banks. Wall Street Journal (1991，March 27):A3.
[16] Becker C., Defond M. and Jiambalvo J. The effect of audit quality on earnings management.Contemporary Accounting Research. （1998.Spring）4-24
[17] Beaver，W．，C，Eger，S，Ryan，and M，Wolfson. Financial reporting, supplemental disclosuresand bank share prices，Journal of Accounting Research (1989,Autumn）：157-178．
[18] Beaver，W．，and E．Engel． Discretionary behavior with respect to allowances for loan lossesand the behavior of security prices．Journal of Accounting and Economics(1996)22：177-206.
[19] Beaver，W．，and M，McNichols． The characteristics and valuation of loss reserves ofpropertycasualty insurers．Working paper, Stanford University．1998．
[20] Beneish，M．D． Detecting GAAP violation：Implications for assessing earnings managementamong firms with extreme financial performance．Journal o f Accounting and Public Policy(1997)16:271-309、
[21] Beneish，M．D． Discussion of: Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic?
Review of Accounting Studies (1998)3:209-221.
[22] Benjamin E. Hermalin; Michael L. Katz. Judical Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. Journal of Law ,Economics, & Organization, Vol.9, No.2 (Spring,1993), 230-255
[23] Benjamin Klein.Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: the Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. Journal of Law ,Economics, & Organization, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring,1988), 199-213
[24] Benjamin Klein; Robert G .Crawford;Armen A . Alchian. Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.21, No.2(Spring,1978),297-326
[25] Benjamin Klein. Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements. American Economic Review. Vol.70, No.2(May,1980),356-362
[26] Benjamin Klein. Borderlines of Law and Economic Theory : Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements. American Economic Review Papers and Proceeding 70,May,1980,356-362
[27] Benjamin Klein; Keith B. Leffler. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance.The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.89, No.4 (Aug.,1981), 615-641
[28] Benjamin Klein; Kevin M. Murphy. Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.31, No.2 (Spring,1988), 265-297
[29] Benjamin Klein; Kevin M. Murphy. Vertical Restraints as a Self-Enforcing Contractual Arrangement. The American Economic Review, Vol.87, No.2 (May,1997), 415-420
[30] Benjamin Klein; Lester F. Saft. The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.28, No.2 (Spring,1985), 345-361
[31] Burgstahler,D.,and I,Dichev.. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses,Journal of Accounting and Economics( 1997)24(1):99-126.
[32] Burgstahler,D.,and I,Dichev. Incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses : Evidence from quarterly earnings . Working paper , University of Washington.1998.
[33] Burgstahler,D.,and M.Eames. Management of earnings and analysts forecasts,Working paper,University of Washington.1998.
[34] Bushee,B. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review (1998)73(3):345-333.
[35] Cahan,S. The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals:A refined test of the political cost hypothesis.The Accounting Review(1992) 67:77-95.
[36] Chaney, P., and K. Philipich. 2002. Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(4):1221-1245
[37] Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter D.Wysocki.Earnings Management and InvestorProtection: an International Comparison. Journal of Accounting and Economics69(2003):505-527.
[38] Coase, Ronald. The Nature of Firm, Economica, (1937) 4:386-405
[39] Crocker, K.J. and S.E. Masten. Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, (1996.)9:5-39
[40] Coleman, J. S., Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1990.
[41] Collins,J.,D.Shackelford,and J.Wahlen. Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory capital , earnings and taxes . Journal of Accounting Research (1995)33(2):263-291.
[42] Craswell A., Francis J. Taylor S. Auditor brand name and industry specializations. 20:297-322.1995.
[43] Davis, L., and D. T. Simon. 1992. The Impact of SEC Disciplinary Actions on Audit Fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 11(1):58-68
[44] Dechun Wang.Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality. 2006. Working paper
[45] DeAngelo, L. E. . auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1981a.)3 : 183-199.
[46] DeAngelo, L.E. Auditor independence, “low balling” and disclosure regulation. The Accounting Review 78(Jul, 1981b.):779-799
[47] DeAngelo, L.E. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Boyouts of Public Stockholders. The Accounting Review 61(July,1986):400-420
[48] DeAngelo,E.,H.DeAngelo,and D.Skinner. Accounting choices of troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (January.1994):113-143.
[49] DeAngelo, L.E.Managerial competition,information costs,and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1988)10:3-36.
[50] Dechow, P., R.Sloan, and A. Sweeney. Detecting Earning Management. The Accounting Review (1995)70:193-225
[51] Defond, M., and K. Subramanyam. Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25(February,1998) : 35-67
[52] DeFond, M.L.,and J.Jiambalvo. Debt covenant effects and the manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17(January,1994):145--176.
[53] Defond, M., K. Raghunandan and K. Subramanyam. 2002. Do Nonaudit Service Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions. Journal of Accounting Research 40(4):1247-1274
[54] Davis,L.R.,B. Soo , and G.Trompeter. Auditor Tenure, Auditor Independence and EarningsManagement. Working paper, Bobton College, Chestnut Hill,MA. 2002.
[55] Dunham, K.J. Firms that want to switch auditors find it take time, money and faith. Wall Street Journal (2002.March 15)
[56] Dechow,P. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance:The role of accounting accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics(1994.)18(1):3-40.
[57] Dechow,P.,and R.G.Sloan. Executive incentives and the horizon problem:An empirical investigation.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1991)14:51-89.
[58] Dechow,P.,R.G.Sloan.,and A.P.Sweeney. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation:An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.Contemporary Accounting Research (1996)13(I):1-36.
[59] Defeo,V.,R .Lambert,and D.Larcker. The executive compensation effects of equity-for-debt swaps.The Accounting Review (1989)54:201-227.
[60] Degeorge, F ., J . Patel , and R . Zeckhauser. Earnings management to exceed thresholds.Working paper,Boston University. 1998.
[61] Dye,R, Earnings management in an overlapping generations model.Journal of Accounting Research(1988):195-235.
[62] Dopuch, N., R. King and R. Schwartz. 2001. An Experimental Investigation of Retention and Rotation Requirements. Journal of Accounting Research 39:93-117
[63] Erickson,M.,and S-w.Wang. Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers.Journal of Accounting and Economics (April,1999)27:149-176.
[64] Firth, M. 1997. The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to Their Audit Clients. Contemporary Accounting Research 14(2):1-21
[65] Foster,G. Briloff and the capital market.Journal of Accounting Research 17(Spring,1979): 262-274.
[66] Francis J. The Effect of Audit Firm Size on Audit Price: A Study of the Australian Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics(1984) 6 : 133-151
[67] Francis J. , and J. Krishnan. Accounting Accruals and Auditors Reporting Conservatism. Contemporary Accounting Research (1999.)16:135-165
[68] Francis J., Maydew E. and Sparks H. The role of Big 6 auditors in the credible reporting of accruals. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (1999)18(2):17-34
[69] Gaver,J.,K. Gaver,and J.Austin. Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1995)18:3-28.
[70] Gore, P., Pope, P. and A. Singh. 2001. Non-audit Services, Auditor Independence, and Earnings Management. Working paper. Lancaster University
[71] Guay,W.A.,Kothari,S.P.,and Watts,R.L. A market-based evaluation of discretionary-accrual models.Journal of Accounting Research 34(Supplement,1996):83-105.
[72] Guidry,F,A.Leone,and S.Rock. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management By business unit managers,Journal of Accounting and Economics(Januarv, 1999)26:113-142
[73] Gillian K. Hadfield. Judical Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.23, No.1 (Jun.,1994), 159-184
[74] Gareth R. Jones. Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Organization Culture: An Exchange Perspective. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.28, No.3 Organizational Culture (Sep.,1983), 454-467
[75] Geiger M.A. and Raghunandan K., Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory (Mar. 2002):67-78.
[76] Gray John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino, A Histroy of Accounting in America. New York: Wiley.1979.
[77] Ghosh A. and Moon D. Does Auditor Tenure Impair Audit Quality? Working Paper. The Securities Exchange Commission. 2003.
[78] Hand,J.R.M. Resolving LIFO uncertainty:A theoretical and empirical examination of 1974-1975 adoptions and non-adoptions.Journal of Accounting Research (1992)31:21-49.
[79] Healy, P. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1985)7:85-107.
[80] Healy, P.,S.Kang,and K.Palepu. The effect of accounting procedure changes on CEOs’cash salary and bonus compensation.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1987)9:7-34.
[81] Healy, P.and K.G.Palepu. Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12(1-3):97-124.
[82] Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons (December 1999), pp.365-384
[83] Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan and Michael S.Wilkins. The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting:Earnings Restatement and Management Turnover.working paper
[84] Hyeesoo Chung,Sanjay Kallapur. Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals. The Accounting Review2003. (4):931-955
[85] Hirst ,D.E.,and P.E.Hopkins. Comprehensive income reporting and analysts' valuation Judgements. Journal of Accounting Research(Supplement,1998):47-75.
[86] Holthausen,R.,and R.Leftwich. The economic consequences of accounting choice: implication、of costly contracting and monitoring.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1983)5:77-117.
[87] Holthausen,R.,D .Larcker,and R.Sloan. Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation .1995
[88] John Richard Edwards. The History of Accounting:Critical Perspectives on Business and Management(ⅰ-ⅵ ). Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London.2001.
[89] James Jiambalvo, Discussion of “Causes and Consequence of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Action by the SEC”. Contemporary Accounting Research: Spring 1996,37-47
[90] James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers. Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review 78(Jul,2003):779-799
[91] James R. Duncan and James A.Knoblett,“investing behavioral antecedents of earnings management: moral reasoning, earnings pressure, and likelihood of detection”,载于《research on accounting ethics》(volume 6),bill N.Schwartz, JAI PRESS INC. Stamford, Connecticut,2000
[92] Johanned H?rner. Reputation and Competition. American Economic Review. Vol.92, No.3(June,2002),644-663
[93] Jean Tirole. Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? Econometrica, Vol.67, No.4 (July,1999), 741-781
[94] Jones,J., Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations, Journal of Accounting Research(Autumn,1991), Pp193-228
[95] Joseph P.H.Fan, T. J. Wong. Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics33(2002):401-425
[96] Jensen M., and W. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(October,1976):305-360
[97] Kinney, W., and R. Martin. Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audt-Related Adjustment Studies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory(1994)13:149-159
[98] Kellogg, R. Accounting Activities, Securities Prices, and Class Action Lawsuits. Journal of Law and Economics (1984)6:185-204
[99] Kinney, W., and R. Martin. Does Auditing Reduce Bias in Financial Reporting? A Review of Audt-Related Adjustment Studies. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory(1994)13:149-159
[100] Kang,S., K. Sivaramakrishnan. Issues in testing earnings management and an instrumental variables approach.Journal of Accounting Research(1995)33:353-368.
[101] Kang,S., K. Sivaramakrishnan. Earnings management to avoid losses and performance of accrual prediction models.Working paper,Yale University.1999.
[102] Kasznik,R. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research(Spring,1999)37:57-82.
[103] Key,K. G. Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry.Journal of Accounting and Economics1997(23)3:309-337.
[104] L.G. Telser. A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements. The Journal of Business, Vol.53, No.1 (Jan.,1980), 27-44
[105] Leftwich,R. Accounting information in private markets:Evidence from private lending agreements. The Accounting Review (1983)58: 23-42.
[106] Levitt,A. The numbers game.Speech delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business, New York,NY,September,28.1998.
[107] Liu,C.,and S.Ryan. The effect of loan portfolio composition on the market reaction to and anticipation of loan loss provisions.Journal of Accounting Research(Spring,1995):77-94,
[108] Liu,C.,S .Ryan,and J.Wahlen. Differential valuation implications of loan loss provisions across banks and fiscal quarters.The Accounting Review(January,1997):133一 146
[109] Lys, T., Watts, R., Lawsuits against auditors. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (Supplement,1994). 65-102
[110] Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta and Sendhil Mullainathan. Ferreting Out Tunneling: an Appliction to Indian Business Groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002:121-148.
[111] McNichols,M.,and P.Wilson. Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts. Journal of Accounting Research 26(Supplement,1988):1-31.
[112] Miller,G.S.,and D.J.Skinner. Determinants of the valuation allowances for deferred tax assets under SFAS No.109.The Accounting Review (1998)73(2):213-233.
[113] Macneil, I. R., The Many Futures of Contract. Southern Califaornia Law Review. (1974)3,691-816
[114] Macneil, I. R., Contract Remedies: A Need for Better Efficiency Analysis. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. (1972)144,6-30.
[115] Myers J.N., Myers L.A., Palmrose Z.V., and Scholz S.W., Mandatory Auditor Rotation: Evidence from Restatements, Working paper. 2004
[116] Ming Jian and T.J.Wong. Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Translations. Working paper.
[117] Myers J.N., Myers L.A., and Omer T.C., Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and the Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation? The Accounting Review (2003) Vol.78:779-799.
[118] Mautz R.K. and Sharaf H.A., The Philosophy of Auditing. American Accounting Association Monograph (1961) No.6. Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association.
[119] Moyer,S. Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12:123-154.
[120] Oliver D.Hart. Is Bounded Rationality an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, (1990.)146,696-702
[121] Oliver D.Hart. Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in O.E. Williamson and S.G. Winter (eds), The Nature of the Firm, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Pp.138-159.1991.
[122] Oliver D.Hart. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.1995.
[123] Oliver D.Hart; John Moore. Incimplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica, Vol.56, No.4 (July,1988), 755-785
[124] Scott. The Basic of Accounting Principles, The Accounting Review(1941),34
[125] Patricia M. Dechow et al. Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research (Spring 1996), pp.1-35
[126] Petty R. and Cuganesan. , Auditor Rotation: Framing the Debate. Australian Accountant 66 (May,1996): 40-41.
[127] Palmrose, Z. The Effect of Nonaudit Service on the Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence. Journal of Accounting Research(1986) 24: 405-411
[128] Palmrose, Z. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: some empirical evidence. Journal of Accounting Research (Supplement,1991): 149-185
[129] Parkash, M. , and C. F. Venable. 1993. AuditeeIncentives for Auditor Independence: The Case of Nonaudit Services. The Accounting Review 68(1): 113-133
[130] Penalva,F. Loss reserves and accounting discretion in the property-casualty insurance industry.Working paper,University of California at Berkeley.1998.
[131] Perry,S.,and T.Williams. Earnings management preceding management buyout offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1994)18:157-179.
[132] Petroni, K. R. Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics( 1992)15:485-508.
[133] Petroni, K. R.,S .Ryan,and J,Wahlen. Discretionary and non-discretionary revisions of loss reserves by property-casualty insurers : Differential implications for future profitability,risk,and market value.Working paper,Indiana Universitv. 1999.
[134] PeaSnell,K.V.,p,F.Pope,and S. Young. Outside directors,board effectiveness,and abnormal accruals.Working paper,Lancaster University.1999.
[135] Pitt, L., and B. Birenbaum. 1997. Serving the Public Interest: A New Concept Framework for Audit Impendence. New York: NY American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[136] Press, E., and J. Weintrop. Accounting-Based Constraints in Piblic and Private Debt Agreements: Their Association with Leverage and Impact on Accounting Choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990)12 :65-95
[137] Palmrose, Z. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review 63(January,1988):55-73
[138] Prawitt, D. F. An update on auditor independence. The Auditor’s Report23:6-8.2000.
[139] Roy W. Kenny; Benjamin Klein. The Economics of Block Booking. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26, No.3 (Spring,1983), 497-540
[140] Roy W. Kenny; Benjamin Klein. How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.43, No.2 (Otc.,2000), 427-435
[141] Reynolds J. , Francis J., Does size matter? The influence of large clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics(2001)30:375-400
[142] Schipper,K. Commentary: Earnings management. Accounting Horizons(December,1989):91-102.
[143] Scholes,M,,G.P.Wilson,and M.Wolfson. Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks.Review of Financial Studies(1990)3:625-650.
[144] Simunic, D. 1984. Auditing, Consulting and Auditor Independence. Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn):679-702
[145] Sloan,R.,Do stock prices fully impound information in accruals about future earnings? The Accounting Review (1996)71:289-315.
[146] Smith,C.,and J.B.Warner. On financial contracting:An analysis of bond covenants,Journal of Financial Economics 7 (June,1979):117-161.
[147] Stein,J. Efficient capital markets,inefficient firms:A model of myopic corporate behavior.Quarterly Journal of Economics(1989):655-669.
[148] Stephen A. Zeff. The Rise of Economic Consequences,Journal of Accountancy,(1978)12
[149] Stephen A. Zeff. The Rise of Economic Consequences,Journal of Accountancy, (Dec.1978) 56-63
[150] Stephen A.Zeff, Some Junctures in the Evolution of the Process of Establishing Accounting Principles in the U.S.A.:1917-1972.The Accounting Review (1984) 7:447-468
[151] Stice. J., Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review(1991)66,516-533
[152] Subramanyam,K,R.The pricing of discretionary accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics (1996)22:249-281.
[153] Sweeney,A.P.Debt-covenant violations and managers’accounting responses.Journal of Accounting and Economics(May,1994):281-308.
[154] Sanford J.Grossman; Oliver D.Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.94, No.4 (Aug.,1986), 691-719
[155] Subramanyam K.R. ‘The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals’, Journal of Accounting and Economics(1996) 22: 249-282.
[156] Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).Staff Report on Auditor Independence. Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1994.
[157] Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Law No:107-204.GPO:Washington D.C,2002.
[158] Steven J. Burton. Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith. Harvard Law Review, Vol.94, No.2 (Dec.,1980), 369-404
[159] Steven Tadelis. Complexity, Flexibility, and the Make-or-Buy Decision. American Economic Review. Vol.92, No.3(May,2002),433-437
[160] Stice. J., Using financial and market information to identify pre-engagement factors associated with lawsuits against auditors. The Accounting Review(1991)66,516-533
[161] Teoh,S.H.,I.W elch,and T.J.Wong. Earnings management and the post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings.Journal of Financial Economics(October,1998a)50:63-99.
[162] Teoh,S.H.,I.W elch,and T.J.Wong. Earnings management and the long-term market performance of initial public offerings.Journal of Finance(December,1998b)53: 1935-1974.
[163] Teoh,S.H.,T .J .Wong,and G.Rao.Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? Review of Accounting Studies (1998)3:175-208.
[164] Trueman,B.,and S.Titman. An explanation for accounting income smoothing,Journal of Accounting Research 26〔Supplement,1988):127-139.
[165] Trompeter, G. The Effect of Partner Compensation Schemes and Generally Accepted Accounting Principals on Audit Partner Judgement. Audit: A Journal of Practice & Theory 13(Fall,1994):56-68
[166] U.S. Senate, The Accounting Establishment. Prepared by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on Government Affairs, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1976.
[167] Visvanathan,G. Deferred tax valuation allowances and earnings management.Journal of Financial Statement Analysis (1998)3(4):6-15.
[168] W?A?Paton and A?C?Littleton. An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards. 1940.上海图书馆藏书
[169] Williamson, O.E. Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contracual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics, (1979)Vol.22
[170] Williamson, O.E. The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.1996.
[171] Williamson, O.E. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations. American Economic Review. (May,1971),112-123
[172] Wahlen,J. The nature of information in commercial bank loan loss disclosures. The Ac counting Review (July,1994):455-478.
[173] Warfield,T.,J. Wild,and K. Wild. Managerial ownership,accounting choices,and informativeness of earnings.Journal of Accounting and Economics1995(20):61-91.
[174] Watts,R.L.,and J.L.Zimmerman. Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards.The Accounting Review 53(January,1978):112-134.
[175] Watts,R.L.,and J.L.Zimmerman. Positive accounting theory:A ten-year perspective.The Accounting Review(1990)65:131-156.
[176] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. Positive theory of accounting. Englewood Cliffs, NY:Prentice-Hall.1986.
[177] Watts R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. Agent problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of Law and Economics 26(Octocber, 1983):613-633
[178] Wallman S., The Future of Accounting, Part iii: Reliability and Auditor Independence. Accounting Horizons (1996.)10:76-97
[179] Warfield T., J. Wild, and K. Wild. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics (1995)20 : 61-91
[180] Zand, D. E., Trust and Managerial Problem Solving. Administrative Science Quarterly, (1972)17,229-239.