企业绩效考核的逆向选择研究
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摘要
现代企业制度要求对企业进行绩效考核并以此对员工进行基于绩效的各项人力资源管理。从国内实施绩效考核的企业实际情况来看,绩效考核的效率普遍不高,并进一步影响到企业的绩效。因此研究如何提高绩效考核的效率进而提高企业效益的问题显得尤为必要。
以往有关绩效考核的文献主要关注如何准确的考核员工的绩效问题,如设计更优的考核量表,以考核的结果对员工进行奖惩以及职位晋升等,而忽略了绩效考核的结果反过来对员工绩效的影响；另一方面,逆向选择理论被广泛地应用于劳动力市场、保险市场、以及信贷市场,而绩效考核领域也具有逆向选择产生的基本条件。本文正是切入这个角度并利用逆向选择理论来分析绩效考核效率不佳的问题,是一次新的有意义的探索。
本文应用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,在绩效考核领域中引入逆向选择理论进行分析,阐述了绩效考核中逆向选择内在生成机理,并建立了数学模型对绩效考核中正向和逆向两种过程进行了深入分析,得出正向过程向逆向过程转化的三个条件。之后结合案例作了进一步分析。得出主要结论：由于考核者与被考核者之间的信息不对称,基于被考核者理性人的假设,导致绩效考核中逆向选择的发生。必须采取措施优化绩效考核。
最后对化解绩效考核的逆向选择从调节标准业绩和考核周期、调节绩效分成比例以及甄别机制的设计等方面提出了对策。
Modern enterprise system asks enterprises to implement performance appraisal, and based on the performance of the staff to implement a variety of Human Resource Management. From the view of the actual situation of enterprises which implement performance appraisal, the efficiency of performance appraisal is generally not high,and further affect the efficiency of enterprises. Therefore, to reserch the question of how to improve the efficiency of performance appraisal and thus improve enterprise performance is particularly essential.
The previous literature on performance appraisal focused on the problems of how to accurately assess employee performance. Such as the design of better assessment scale, and give the staff rewards and punishments and job promotion with the results, etc. but ignoring the results of performance appraisal impact on staff performance in turn; On the other hand, adverse selection theory has been widely used in the labor market, insurance market, and credit markets,and the field of performance appraisal also has created the basic conditions for adverse selection. This paper is cut into this point of view and use adverse selection theory to analyze the problem of a poor performance appraisal effectiveness,it is a new and meaningful exploration.
In this paper, used the combing mathod of normative analysis and empirical analysis, introduced the adverse selection theory into the field of performance appraisal to analysis, described the formation mechanism of adverse selection in the performance appraisal, and established mathmatic theoretical model to analysis the forward and reverse process of the performance appraisal in-depthly, obtained three conditions of the transformation from the positive process to reverse process.And made a further analysis of practical case later. Educed major conclusions:As the information asymmetry between the assessmenter and the assessmentee, coupled with the assumption of a rational person who has been assessing, led to the adverse selection in performance appraisal. A reasonable incentive system should be established in order to optimize the performance appraisal.
Finally, proposed countermeasures from adjusting performance standards and appraisal cycle, adjusting the ratio of performance share and designing of screening mechanisms to resolve the adverse selection in performance appraisal.
以往有关绩效考核的文献主要关注如何准确的考核员工的绩效问题,如设计更优的考核量表,以考核的结果对员工进行奖惩以及职位晋升等,而忽略了绩效考核的结果反过来对员工绩效的影响；另一方面,逆向选择理论被广泛地应用于劳动力市场、保险市场、以及信贷市场,而绩效考核领域也具有逆向选择产生的基本条件。本文正是切入这个角度并利用逆向选择理论来分析绩效考核效率不佳的问题,是一次新的有意义的探索。
本文应用规范分析与实证分析相结合的方法,在绩效考核领域中引入逆向选择理论进行分析,阐述了绩效考核中逆向选择内在生成机理,并建立了数学模型对绩效考核中正向和逆向两种过程进行了深入分析,得出正向过程向逆向过程转化的三个条件。之后结合案例作了进一步分析。得出主要结论：由于考核者与被考核者之间的信息不对称,基于被考核者理性人的假设,导致绩效考核中逆向选择的发生。必须采取措施优化绩效考核。
最后对化解绩效考核的逆向选择从调节标准业绩和考核周期、调节绩效分成比例以及甄别机制的设计等方面提出了对策。
Modern enterprise system asks enterprises to implement performance appraisal, and based on the performance of the staff to implement a variety of Human Resource Management. From the view of the actual situation of enterprises which implement performance appraisal, the efficiency of performance appraisal is generally not high,and further affect the efficiency of enterprises. Therefore, to reserch the question of how to improve the efficiency of performance appraisal and thus improve enterprise performance is particularly essential.
The previous literature on performance appraisal focused on the problems of how to accurately assess employee performance. Such as the design of better assessment scale, and give the staff rewards and punishments and job promotion with the results, etc. but ignoring the results of performance appraisal impact on staff performance in turn; On the other hand, adverse selection theory has been widely used in the labor market, insurance market, and credit markets,and the field of performance appraisal also has created the basic conditions for adverse selection. This paper is cut into this point of view and use adverse selection theory to analyze the problem of a poor performance appraisal effectiveness,it is a new and meaningful exploration.
In this paper, used the combing mathod of normative analysis and empirical analysis, introduced the adverse selection theory into the field of performance appraisal to analysis, described the formation mechanism of adverse selection in the performance appraisal, and established mathmatic theoretical model to analysis the forward and reverse process of the performance appraisal in-depthly, obtained three conditions of the transformation from the positive process to reverse process.And made a further analysis of practical case later. Educed major conclusions:As the information asymmetry between the assessmenter and the assessmentee, coupled with the assumption of a rational person who has been assessing, led to the adverse selection in performance appraisal. A reasonable incentive system should be established in order to optimize the performance appraisal.
Finally, proposed countermeasures from adjusting performance standards and appraisal cycle, adjusting the ratio of performance share and designing of screening mechanisms to resolve the adverse selection in performance appraisal.
引文
[1]Akerlof, G. The Market for Lemons:Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84:488-500
[2]Wilson.Charles. Equlibrium and Adverse Seletion. American Economic Review,1979,69:313-317.
[3]Wilson.Charles.The Nature of Equlibrium in Markets with Adverse selection. Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11:108-130.
[4]Rose,Colin. Equlibrium and Adverse seletion. Rand Journal of Economics,1993, 24:559-569.
[5]Gary Becker and George J. Stigler (1977). De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. The American Economic Review,67,2:76-90
[6]Arrow.K.Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing.Chicago:Markham Publishing Company,1971
[7]Arrow Kenneth. J. higher Education as a filter Journal of Public Economics,1973, 2:193-216.
[8]Arrow Kenneth. J.Vertical Integration and Communication. Bell Journal of Economics,1975,6:173-183
[9]Spence,A.M. Market Signaling:The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena[Ph.D thesis].Harvard University Press,1972
[10]Spence, A.M Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973, 87:355-374
[11]Spence, A.M. Market Signaling[M].Harvard University Press,1974
[12]William Vickrey.Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Bids. Journal of Finance,1961,16:8-37
[13]Mirrlees.James.Notes on Welfare Economics,information and Uncertainty.in Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty.edited by Michael Balch,Daniel McFadden and Shif-yen Wu,Amsterdam:North-Holland,1974
[14]Mirrlees.James. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part Ⅰ. Mimeo, Nuffield College,Oxford University,1975
[15]Mirrlees.James. The Optimal Structure of Authority and Incentive within an Organization.Bell Journal of Economics,1976,7:105-131
[16]Mirrlees.James. An Explanation in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies,1971,38:334-368
[17]Rothschild and Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90:629-649
[18]Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review,1981,71:393-410
[19]辛琳.信息不对称理论研究.嘉兴学院学报,2001,5：36-40
[20]袁红.息不对称理论及其应用以保险市场为例.情报探索,1998,3：16-17
[21]蔡宁,蒋景楠.信息不对称理论在房地产市场上的应用.价值工程,2003,1：19-21
[22]郝渝,吴俊宏.项目管理中的逆向选择与道德风险.商业时代,2004,8,21-22
[23]黄文平、王则柯.逆向选择的几何解释.经济评论,2004,1：39-41
[24]主父海英.保险业中的逆向选择与道德风险.经济师,2005,1：227-289
[25]胡永远,李少斌.“逆向选择”下的个人人力资本投资.人口与经济,2001,6：48-54
[26]易超琴,万建平.逆向选择下的委托-代理模型分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2008,1：7-15
[27]Ainsworth M.and Smith N.Making it Happen:Managing Performance at Work.Sydney:Prentice Hall.1993.
[28]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[29]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[30]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[31]Michael Armstrong and Angela Baronl.Performance Management.London:The Cromwell Press,1998,15.
[32]McCloy,R.A.,Campbell,J.P.,&Cudeck,R.A.confirmatory test of a model performance determinants.Journal of Applied Psychology,1994,79:493-505.
[33]Borman WC,Motowidlo SJ.Expanding the criterion domain to include elements of contextual performance.San Francisco:Jossey-Bass,1993,71-98.
[34]Michelle Brown and John Benson.Rated to exhaustion?Reaction to performance appraisal processes.Industrial Relations Journal,2003,34:67-80.
[35]Pan S.Kim.Strengthening the Pay-Performance Link in Government:A Case Study of Korea.Public Personnel Management,2002,31(4):447-463.
[36]GAO.PerformanceAppraisalSystemforBand Ⅰ, Ⅱ,andⅢEmployees.GAO,Decem ber,1999.
[37]Jeffrey S.Kane.Stability of Rater Leniency:Three Studies.Academy of Management,Journal,Vol.38,No.4.1036-1051.
[38]Hiromichi Shibata.Wage and Performance Appraisal Systems in Flux:A Japan-United States Comparison.Industrial Relations, Vol.41,No.4(October 2002).629-652.
[39]Robert D.Costigan.An Examination of the Relationship of a Western Performance-Management Process to Key Workplace Behaviors in Transition Economies. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,2005,255-267.
[40]陈乃醒,杨予新.企业工资改革方案与操作方法评述.北京：经济管理出版社,1991,20-30
[41]胡祖光,朱明伟.东方管理学十三篇.北京：中国经济出版社,2002：225-260
[42]彭剑锋,包政.现代管理制度程序方法范例全集之人事考核卷.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1993,1-150
[43]申喜连.从绩效考核到绩效管理是人力资源管理方式的深刻变革.中央民族大学学报,2004,3：137-140
[44]方振邦.绩效管理.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,5：101-105
[45]方振邦.运用360°绩效反馈计划改善绩效.人力资源开发与管理,2002,3：33-37
[46]李海,张德.构建完善的考核体系.企业管理,2005,4：76-79
[47]陈敏等.基于工作分析的绩效考核体系研究.工业工程与管理,2003,5：38-40
[48]涂云海,马培生.组织绩效考核中存在的问题及对策探讨.浙江工贸职业技术学院学报2004,6：94-97
[49]廖泉文.人力资源考核系统.山东：山东人民出版社,2000,1-200
[50]周健平.绩效考核质量研究.中国民航飞行学院学报,2004,5：62-64
[51]徐旭珊,黄玉清,吴碧英.企业项目团队的绩效管理研究探析.现代管理科学,2003,6：3-5
[52]李军,于永华.对知识型员工绩效考核的建议.科学与管理,2003,1：49-50
[53]周青.目标终极管理.过程监督控制的绩效考核评价体系.中国人力资源开发,2003,11：42-45
[54]梁振东.目标管理法在企业管理人员绩效考核中的应用.河北能源职业技术学院学报2005,3：47-49
[56]吴跃,辜晓平.基于目标管理的绩效考核.价值工程,2006,10：102-104
[57]尹凌青.战略绩效考核的价值与意义.市场营销导刊,2007,1：10-13
[58]邵梅.目标管理绩效考核在事业单位的运用.中国人才,2007,13：60-61
[2]Wilson.Charles. Equlibrium and Adverse Seletion. American Economic Review,1979,69:313-317.
[3]Wilson.Charles.The Nature of Equlibrium in Markets with Adverse selection. Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11:108-130.
[4]Rose,Colin. Equlibrium and Adverse seletion. Rand Journal of Economics,1993, 24:559-569.
[5]Gary Becker and George J. Stigler (1977). De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. The American Economic Review,67,2:76-90
[6]Arrow.K.Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing.Chicago:Markham Publishing Company,1971
[7]Arrow Kenneth. J. higher Education as a filter Journal of Public Economics,1973, 2:193-216.
[8]Arrow Kenneth. J.Vertical Integration and Communication. Bell Journal of Economics,1975,6:173-183
[9]Spence,A.M. Market Signaling:The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena[Ph.D thesis].Harvard University Press,1972
[10]Spence, A.M Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1973, 87:355-374
[11]Spence, A.M. Market Signaling[M].Harvard University Press,1974
[12]William Vickrey.Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Bids. Journal of Finance,1961,16:8-37
[13]Mirrlees.James.Notes on Welfare Economics,information and Uncertainty.in Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty.edited by Michael Balch,Daniel McFadden and Shif-yen Wu,Amsterdam:North-Holland,1974
[14]Mirrlees.James. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part Ⅰ. Mimeo, Nuffield College,Oxford University,1975
[15]Mirrlees.James. The Optimal Structure of Authority and Incentive within an Organization.Bell Journal of Economics,1976,7:105-131
[16]Mirrlees.James. An Explanation in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies,1971,38:334-368
[17]Rothschild and Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1976,90:629-649
[18]Stiglitz, J and Weiss, A. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review,1981,71:393-410
[19]辛琳.信息不对称理论研究.嘉兴学院学报,2001,5：36-40
[20]袁红.息不对称理论及其应用以保险市场为例.情报探索,1998,3：16-17
[21]蔡宁,蒋景楠.信息不对称理论在房地产市场上的应用.价值工程,2003,1：19-21
[22]郝渝,吴俊宏.项目管理中的逆向选择与道德风险.商业时代,2004,8,21-22
[23]黄文平、王则柯.逆向选择的几何解释.经济评论,2004,1：39-41
[24]主父海英.保险业中的逆向选择与道德风险.经济师,2005,1：227-289
[25]胡永远,李少斌.“逆向选择”下的个人人力资本投资.人口与经济,2001,6：48-54
[26]易超琴,万建平.逆向选择下的委托-代理模型分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2008,1：7-15
[27]Ainsworth M.and Smith N.Making it Happen:Managing Performance at Work.Sydney:Prentice Hall.1993.
[28]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[29]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[30]Richard S Williams.Performance Management.International Thomson Business Press,1998,13.
[31]Michael Armstrong and Angela Baronl.Performance Management.London:The Cromwell Press,1998,15.
[32]McCloy,R.A.,Campbell,J.P.,&Cudeck,R.A.confirmatory test of a model performance determinants.Journal of Applied Psychology,1994,79:493-505.
[33]Borman WC,Motowidlo SJ.Expanding the criterion domain to include elements of contextual performance.San Francisco:Jossey-Bass,1993,71-98.
[34]Michelle Brown and John Benson.Rated to exhaustion?Reaction to performance appraisal processes.Industrial Relations Journal,2003,34:67-80.
[35]Pan S.Kim.Strengthening the Pay-Performance Link in Government:A Case Study of Korea.Public Personnel Management,2002,31(4):447-463.
[36]GAO.PerformanceAppraisalSystemforBand Ⅰ, Ⅱ,andⅢEmployees.GAO,Decem ber,1999.
[37]Jeffrey S.Kane.Stability of Rater Leniency:Three Studies.Academy of Management,Journal,Vol.38,No.4.1036-1051.
[38]Hiromichi Shibata.Wage and Performance Appraisal Systems in Flux:A Japan-United States Comparison.Industrial Relations, Vol.41,No.4(October 2002).629-652.
[39]Robert D.Costigan.An Examination of the Relationship of a Western Performance-Management Process to Key Workplace Behaviors in Transition Economies. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,2005,255-267.
[40]陈乃醒,杨予新.企业工资改革方案与操作方法评述.北京：经济管理出版社,1991,20-30
[41]胡祖光,朱明伟.东方管理学十三篇.北京：中国经济出版社,2002：225-260
[42]彭剑锋,包政.现代管理制度程序方法范例全集之人事考核卷.北京：中国人民大学出版社,1993,1-150
[43]申喜连.从绩效考核到绩效管理是人力资源管理方式的深刻变革.中央民族大学学报,2004,3：137-140
[44]方振邦.绩效管理.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,5：101-105
[45]方振邦.运用360°绩效反馈计划改善绩效.人力资源开发与管理,2002,3：33-37
[46]李海,张德.构建完善的考核体系.企业管理,2005,4：76-79
[47]陈敏等.基于工作分析的绩效考核体系研究.工业工程与管理,2003,5：38-40
[48]涂云海,马培生.组织绩效考核中存在的问题及对策探讨.浙江工贸职业技术学院学报2004,6：94-97
[49]廖泉文.人力资源考核系统.山东：山东人民出版社,2000,1-200
[50]周健平.绩效考核质量研究.中国民航飞行学院学报,2004,5：62-64
[51]徐旭珊,黄玉清,吴碧英.企业项目团队的绩效管理研究探析.现代管理科学,2003,6：3-5
[52]李军,于永华.对知识型员工绩效考核的建议.科学与管理,2003,1：49-50
[53]周青.目标终极管理.过程监督控制的绩效考核评价体系.中国人力资源开发,2003,11：42-45
[54]梁振东.目标管理法在企业管理人员绩效考核中的应用.河北能源职业技术学院学报2005,3：47-49
[56]吴跃,辜晓平.基于目标管理的绩效考核.价值工程,2006,10：102-104
[57]尹凌青.战略绩效考核的价值与意义.市场营销导刊,2007,1：10-13
[58]邵梅.目标管理绩效考核在事业单位的运用.中国人才,2007,13：60-61