碳限额交易政策下双寡头企业碳减排决策的演化博弈分析
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摘要
在消费者低碳偏好的背景下,利用演化博弈模型分析了制造商碳减排决策的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:系统的演化均衡结果受单位碳减排成本和消费者碳排放敏感系数的影响;碳限额额度存在边界条件,政府设定碳限额额度小于该边界条件时,碳限额交易政策才能有效地激励企业进行碳减排。为促使系统演化成企业均选择碳减排的均衡,政府应降低企业的碳减排成本及提高消费者节能环保意识。同时,政府设定碳限额额度还应要小于一定的边界条件。
In the context of consumers' low carbon preference, the evolutionary game model was used to analyze the dynamic evolution process of manufacturers' emission reduction decisions in this paper. Results show that the evolutionary equilibrium results of the system are affected by the unit carbon emission abatement cost and the consumer's low carbon preference. The carbon limit quota has boundary conditions. When the government sets the carbon limit amount to be less than the boundary condition, the carbon limit trading policy can effectively encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. In order to promote the evolution of the system into a balance of carbon emission reduction, the government should reduce the cost of enterprises about carbon emission reduction and raise consumers' awareness of energy conservation and environmental protection. Moreover, the government should set the carbon limit to be less than certain boundary conditions.
In the context of consumers' low carbon preference, the evolutionary game model was used to analyze the dynamic evolution process of manufacturers' emission reduction decisions in this paper. Results show that the evolutionary equilibrium results of the system are affected by the unit carbon emission abatement cost and the consumer's low carbon preference. The carbon limit quota has boundary conditions. When the government sets the carbon limit amount to be less than the boundary condition, the carbon limit trading policy can effectively encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. In order to promote the evolution of the system into a balance of carbon emission reduction, the government should reduce the cost of enterprises about carbon emission reduction and raise consumers' awareness of energy conservation and environmental protection. Moreover, the government should set the carbon limit to be less than certain boundary conditions.
引文
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[9] 陈晓红, 曾祥宇, 王傅强. 碳限额交易机制下碳交易价格对供应链碳排放的影响[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(10):2562-2571.
[10] 邓万江, 马士华, 关旭. 碳交易背景下存在顾客环保偏好的双企业竞争策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017(12).
[11] 支帮东, 陈俊霖, 刘晓红. 碳限额与交易机制下基于成本共担契约的两级供应链协调策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(7):48-56.
[12] 周艳菊, 熊凯伦. 碳限额交易机制下嵌入式低碳服务供应链模型研究[J]. 软科学, 2018(2):50-54.
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[14] 何丽红, 王秀. 低碳供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2014:27-30.
[15] 焦建玲, 陈洁, 李兰兰等. 碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(10):140-150.
[16] 陈真玲, 王文举. 环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J]. 管理评论, 2017, 29(5):226-236.
[17] 徐建中, 付静雯. 低碳背景下装备制造企业碳减排研究:一个演化博弈视角[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(5):40-48.
[18] 付秋芳, 忻莉燕, 马士华. 惩罚机制下供应链企业碳减排投入的演化博弈[J]. 管理科学学报, 2016, 19(4):56-70.
[19] 徐春秋, 赵道致, 原白云. 政府补贴政策下产品差别定价与供应链协调机制[J]. 系统工程, 2014, 32(3):78-86.
[20] Benjaafar S, LI Y, Daskin M. Carbon Footprint and the Management of Supply Chains: Insights from Simple Models[J]. Ieee Transactions on Automation Science & Engineering, 2012, 10(1):99-116.
[21] Friedman D. Evolutionary Game in Economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3):637-666.
[22] Yu H, Zeng A Z, Zhao L. Analyzing the Evolutionary Stability of the vendor-managed Inventory Supply Chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(1):274-282.
[2] Konur D, Schaefer B. Integrated Inventory Control and Transportation Decisions under Carbon Emissions Regulations: LTL vs. TL carriers[J]. Transportation Research Part E. 2014, 68(4):14-38.
[3] Zhang J J, NIE T F, DU S F. Optimal Emission-dependent Production Policy with Stochastic Demand[J]. International Journal of Society Systems Science. 2011, 3(1/2):21-39.
[4] Ghosh D, Shah J. Supply Chain Analysis under Green Sensitive Consumer Demand and Cost Sharing Contract[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2015(164):319-329.
[5] Vanclay J K, Shortiss J, Aulsebrook S,et al. Customer Response to Carbon Labelling of Groceries[J]. Journal of Consumer Policy, 2011, 34(1):153-160.
[6] 应瑞瑶, 徐斌, 胡浩. 城市居民对低碳农产品支付意愿与动机研究[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2012, 22(11):165-171.
[7] 帅传敏, 张钰坤. 中国消费者低碳产品支付意愿的差异分析——基于碳标签的情景实验数据[J]. 中国软科学, 2013(7):61-70.
[8] Liuabc Z. Consumer Environmental Awareness and Competition in two-stage Supply Chains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 218(3):602-613.
[9] 陈晓红, 曾祥宇, 王傅强. 碳限额交易机制下碳交易价格对供应链碳排放的影响[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(10):2562-2571.
[10] 邓万江, 马士华, 关旭. 碳交易背景下存在顾客环保偏好的双企业竞争策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017(12).
[11] 支帮东, 陈俊霖, 刘晓红. 碳限额与交易机制下基于成本共担契约的两级供应链协调策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(7):48-56.
[12] 周艳菊, 熊凯伦. 碳限额交易机制下嵌入式低碳服务供应链模型研究[J]. 软科学, 2018(2):50-54.
[13] Young H P. The Evolution of Conventions[J]. Econometrica, 1993, 61(1):57-84.
[14] 何丽红, 王秀. 低碳供应链中政府与核心企业进化博弈模型[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2014:27-30.
[15] 焦建玲, 陈洁, 李兰兰等. 碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017, 25(10):140-150.
[16] 陈真玲, 王文举. 环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J]. 管理评论, 2017, 29(5):226-236.
[17] 徐建中, 付静雯. 低碳背景下装备制造企业碳减排研究:一个演化博弈视角[J]. 运筹与管理, 2018, 27(5):40-48.
[18] 付秋芳, 忻莉燕, 马士华. 惩罚机制下供应链企业碳减排投入的演化博弈[J]. 管理科学学报, 2016, 19(4):56-70.
[19] 徐春秋, 赵道致, 原白云. 政府补贴政策下产品差别定价与供应链协调机制[J]. 系统工程, 2014, 32(3):78-86.
[20] Benjaafar S, LI Y, Daskin M. Carbon Footprint and the Management of Supply Chains: Insights from Simple Models[J]. Ieee Transactions on Automation Science & Engineering, 2012, 10(1):99-116.
[21] Friedman D. Evolutionary Game in Economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3):637-666.
[22] Yu H, Zeng A Z, Zhao L. Analyzing the Evolutionary Stability of the vendor-managed Inventory Supply Chains[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2009, 56(1):274-282.