中国碳市场政策的时间不一致性分析
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摘要
政策的时间不一致性事关政策的执行效率及效果,是政府部门及经济学家关注的宏观经济领域重要课题之一。在中国碳市场领域,政府部门制定的碳市场政策同样呈现出较为明显的时间不一致性,并且影响了市场主体对政策的信任以及对未来全国碳市场的信心。因此,加强对碳市场政策时间不一致性问题的关注具有现实意义。论文首先应用动态规划理论,构建政策时间不一致性的基本模型,并引入市场主体信息透明度这一影响因素作为自变量,利用情景分析法,对政策时间不一致性的产生原理进行理论推演。在此基础上,将推论应用于碳市场政策领域,剖析不同情境下减排企业信息透明度对碳市场政策时间不一致性的影响机理,并通过实例演算进行验证。结果发现:①截至目前,市场政策的时间不一致性问题较少得到关注,已有的政策时间不一致性模型的自变量虽然包含了市场主体的理性预期,但却忽略了市场主体信息透明度的影响。②市场主体信息的不透明及信息失真将直接导致政府部门在政策规划阶段制定的最优目标并非真正最优。③进一步引入市场主体理性预期,最优目标在执行阶段将发生更为显著的偏离。④将上述推演结论应用于碳市场领域仍然是成立的,实例演算验证了其有效性。即,排放企业信息的不透明及信息失真将使得政府的计划碳配额目标在政策执行阶段出现时间的不一致性,排放企业对未来碳政策趋势影响的理性预期则会使这种不一致性更为严重。论文最后就如何增强减排企业排放信息透明度及真实性提出了相关政策建议,包括:增加碳市场政策制定过程的透明度、制定适当而非激进的碳市场目标,以及加快第三方碳核查机构及监管体系建设。
The time-consistency of policy is related to the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation,which is one of the most important topics in government policy making and macroeconomic. In recent years,the carbon policy in China also exhibits an obvious inconsistency. Therefore,it is of practical significance to study the factors affecting carbon policy inconsistency. Firstly,we applied the dynamic programming theory to construct a basic model of inconsistent policy. Then we introduced the information transparency of emission firms into the model as an influence factor and used scenario analysis method to deduce the impact of their information transparency on policy inconsistency. The results showed: ①As of now,the study of time inconsistency in market policies has received less attention. Although the existing policy objective functions consider market players ' rational expectation as the independent variable,they ignore market players' information distortion. ②The information opacity and distortion of market players will result in the planning objective is not really optimal. ③It will have a more significant deviation if market players rationally expect policy trends and impact when the plan is executed. ④The above derivation conclusions are still valid in the carbon market and its effectiveness is proved by an example. That is,the information opacity and distortion of emission firms will result in inconsistent carbon policy for allowance benchmark and the inconsistency will be more severe when carbon market players rationally expect policy trends and impact. Finally,we put forward some policy suggestions to increase emission firms' information transparency and reduce carbon policy inconsistency. These include: increasing carbon policy-making transparency, and developing appropriate carbon market objectives,as well as accelerating the construction of carbon verification agencies and supervision systems.
The time-consistency of policy is related to the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation,which is one of the most important topics in government policy making and macroeconomic. In recent years,the carbon policy in China also exhibits an obvious inconsistency. Therefore,it is of practical significance to study the factors affecting carbon policy inconsistency. Firstly,we applied the dynamic programming theory to construct a basic model of inconsistent policy. Then we introduced the information transparency of emission firms into the model as an influence factor and used scenario analysis method to deduce the impact of their information transparency on policy inconsistency. The results showed: ①As of now,the study of time inconsistency in market policies has received less attention. Although the existing policy objective functions consider market players ' rational expectation as the independent variable,they ignore market players' information distortion. ②The information opacity and distortion of market players will result in the planning objective is not really optimal. ③It will have a more significant deviation if market players rationally expect policy trends and impact when the plan is executed. ④The above derivation conclusions are still valid in the carbon market and its effectiveness is proved by an example. That is,the information opacity and distortion of emission firms will result in inconsistent carbon policy for allowance benchmark and the inconsistency will be more severe when carbon market players rationally expect policy trends and impact. Finally,we put forward some policy suggestions to increase emission firms' information transparency and reduce carbon policy inconsistency. These include: increasing carbon policy-making transparency, and developing appropriate carbon market objectives,as well as accelerating the construction of carbon verification agencies and supervision systems.
引文
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[3]KYDLAND F E,PRESCOTT E C. Rules rather than discretion:the inconsistent of optimal plans[J]. Journal of political economy,1977,85:473-492.
[4]FISCHER S. Dynamic inconsistency,cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government[J]. Journal of economic dynamics&control,1979,2(1):93-107.
[5]LUCAS J R E,STOKEY N L. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital[J]. Journal of monetary economics,1983,12(1):55-93.
[6]BARRO R J,GORDON D B. Rules,discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy[J]. Journal of monetary economics,1983,12(1):101-121.
[7]VICKERS J. Signaling in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information[J]. Oxford economic papers,1986,38(3):443-455.
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[9]HERRENDORF B. Transparency,reputation,and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates[J]. Journal of international economics,1999,49(1):31-50.
[10]JINGYUAN L,GUOQIANG T. Time inconsistency and reputation in monetary policy:a strategic modelling in continuous time[J].Journal of mathematical physics,2008,28(3):697-710.
[11]LIU X. Time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy[J]. Journal of international money&finance,2013,36(3):47-67.
[12]CONE T E. Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy[J]. Economics letters,2005,87(2):187-191.
[13]BIGLAISER G,HOROWITZ J K,Quiggin J. Dynamic pollution regulation[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,1995,8(1):33-44.
[14]MARSILIANI L, RENSTROM T I. Time inconsistency in environmental policy:tax earmarking as a commitment solution[J].Economic journal,1999,110:123-138.
[15]KENNEDY P W,LAPLANTE B. Environmental policy and time consistency[R]. 1999.
[16]HELM D,HEPBURN C,MASH R. Credible carbon policy[J].Oxford review of economic policy,2003,19(3):438-450.
[17]HOVI J,SPRINZ D F,UNDERDAL A. Implementing long-term climate policy:time inconsistency,domestic politics,international anarchy[J]. Global environmental politics,2009,9(3):20-39.
[18]GARCIA A,LEAL M,LEE S H. Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm:tradable permits versus emission tax[J]. International review of economics&finance,2018,58:523-527.
[19]程均丽,刘枭.货币政策的时间不一致性:可信性与透明度[J].财经科学,2005(6):26-32.
[20]谭旭东.中国货币政策的有效性问题:基于政策时间不一致性的分析[J].经济研究,2008(9):46-57.
[21]祝伟,黄薇.保险业低声誉的经济学解释:基于时间不一致偏好的视角[J].经济研究,2013(8):131-142.
[22]路继业,AHMAD N,张冲.时间不一致性货币政策的理论建模与政策含义:基于新政治经济学的视角[J].经济科学,2016(5):18-30.
[23]FISCHER S. Chapter 21 rules versus discretion in monetary policy[M]. Elsevier,1990:1155-1184.
[24]柴麒敏,傅莎,郑晓奇,等.中国重点部门和行业碳排放总量控制目标及政策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):1-7.
[2]STROTZ R H. Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization[J]. Review of economic studies,1955,23(3):165-180.
[3]KYDLAND F E,PRESCOTT E C. Rules rather than discretion:the inconsistent of optimal plans[J]. Journal of political economy,1977,85:473-492.
[4]FISCHER S. Dynamic inconsistency,cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government[J]. Journal of economic dynamics&control,1979,2(1):93-107.
[5]LUCAS J R E,STOKEY N L. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital[J]. Journal of monetary economics,1983,12(1):55-93.
[6]BARRO R J,GORDON D B. Rules,discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy[J]. Journal of monetary economics,1983,12(1):101-121.
[7]VICKERS J. Signaling in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information[J]. Oxford economic papers,1986,38(3):443-455.
[8]CHARI V V,KEHOE P J,PRESCOTT E C. Time consistency and policy[R]. Staff Report,1988.
[9]HERRENDORF B. Transparency,reputation,and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates[J]. Journal of international economics,1999,49(1):31-50.
[10]JINGYUAN L,GUOQIANG T. Time inconsistency and reputation in monetary policy:a strategic modelling in continuous time[J].Journal of mathematical physics,2008,28(3):697-710.
[11]LIU X. Time consistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a small open economy[J]. Journal of international money&finance,2013,36(3):47-67.
[12]CONE T E. Learnability and transparency with time inconsistent monetary policy[J]. Economics letters,2005,87(2):187-191.
[13]BIGLAISER G,HOROWITZ J K,Quiggin J. Dynamic pollution regulation[J]. Journal of regulatory economics,1995,8(1):33-44.
[14]MARSILIANI L, RENSTROM T I. Time inconsistency in environmental policy:tax earmarking as a commitment solution[J].Economic journal,1999,110:123-138.
[15]KENNEDY P W,LAPLANTE B. Environmental policy and time consistency[R]. 1999.
[16]HELM D,HEPBURN C,MASH R. Credible carbon policy[J].Oxford review of economic policy,2003,19(3):438-450.
[17]HOVI J,SPRINZ D F,UNDERDAL A. Implementing long-term climate policy:time inconsistency,domestic politics,international anarchy[J]. Global environmental politics,2009,9(3):20-39.
[18]GARCIA A,LEAL M,LEE S H. Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm:tradable permits versus emission tax[J]. International review of economics&finance,2018,58:523-527.
[19]程均丽,刘枭.货币政策的时间不一致性:可信性与透明度[J].财经科学,2005(6):26-32.
[20]谭旭东.中国货币政策的有效性问题:基于政策时间不一致性的分析[J].经济研究,2008(9):46-57.
[21]祝伟,黄薇.保险业低声誉的经济学解释:基于时间不一致偏好的视角[J].经济研究,2013(8):131-142.
[22]路继业,AHMAD N,张冲.时间不一致性货币政策的理论建模与政策含义:基于新政治经济学的视角[J].经济科学,2016(5):18-30.
[23]FISCHER S. Chapter 21 rules versus discretion in monetary policy[M]. Elsevier,1990:1155-1184.
[24]柴麒敏,傅莎,郑晓奇,等.中国重点部门和行业碳排放总量控制目标及政策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):1-7.