环境税规制农业面源污染研究——不对称信息和污染者合作共谋的影响
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摘要
研究了完全信息和不完全信息条件下,污染者存在合作共谋可能性时,环境税规制农业面源污染问题的机制和效应.研究表明,在不完全信息条件下,当污染者之间的合作共谋程度不明确或不能被环境监管者有效观测时,利用环境税规制农业面源污染将受到极大的限制;如果监管机构能够投入很高的成本用于监测农业面源污染排放,从而解决不对称信息问题,那么最优的监管政策对于合作共谋的污染者集体有利,会向合作共谋的集体征收税率较低的环境税,但对不合作共谋的集体中的面源污染个体,则会征收最优但税率很高的环境税.同时,如果引入风险偏好因素,当农业面源污染者厌恶风险时,社会整体福利水平会随着污染者合作共谋指数的提高而提升.
The mechanism and effect of environmental tax on agricultural non-point source pollution are studied under the condition of complete information and incomplete information.The results show that under incomplete information,when the degree of cooperation and collusion between polluters is not clear or can not be effectively observed by environmental regulators,the regulation of agricultural non-point source pollution by environmental tax will be greatly restricted.If regulators can invest a high cost in monitoring agricultural non-point source pollution emissions to solve the problem of asymmetric information,then the optimal regulatory policy will be beneficial to the co-conspirators collectively,and will levy a lower environmental tax on the co-conspirators collectively,but will levy an optimal but high tax rate on non-point source pollution individuals in the non-cooperative conspirators collectively.At the same time,if risk preference factor is introduced,when agricultural non-point source polluters are risk averse,the overall social welfare level will increase with the increase of the polluter's cooperative conspiracy index.
The mechanism and effect of environmental tax on agricultural non-point source pollution are studied under the condition of complete information and incomplete information.The results show that under incomplete information,when the degree of cooperation and collusion between polluters is not clear or can not be effectively observed by environmental regulators,the regulation of agricultural non-point source pollution by environmental tax will be greatly restricted.If regulators can invest a high cost in monitoring agricultural non-point source pollution emissions to solve the problem of asymmetric information,then the optimal regulatory policy will be beneficial to the co-conspirators collectively,and will levy a lower environmental tax on the co-conspirators collectively,but will levy an optimal but high tax rate on non-point source pollution individuals in the non-cooperative conspirators collectively.At the same time,if risk preference factor is introduced,when agricultural non-point source polluters are risk averse,the overall social welfare level will increase with the increase of the polluter's cooperative conspiracy index.
引文
[1]周志波,张卫国.环境税规制农业面源污染研究综述[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2017,23(4):37-45.
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[3] HANSEN L G.A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1998,12(1):99-112.
[4] CAMACHO-CUENA E,REQUATE T.The Regulation of Non-Point Source Pollution and Risk Preferences:An Experimental Approach[J].Ecological Economics,2012,73:17-187.
[5] HARFORD J D.Firm Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1978,5(1):26-43.
[6] FISHELSON G.Emission Control Policies Under Uncertainty[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1976,3(3):189-197.
[7] XEPAPADEAS A P.Observability and Choice of Instrument Mix in the Control of Externalities[J].Journal of Public Economics,1995,56(3):485-498.
[8] XEPAPADEAS A P,DE ZEEUW A.Environmental Policy and Competitiveness:The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,37(2):165-182.
[9] SCHMULZLER A.Pollution Control with Imperfectly Observable Emissions[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1996,7(3):251-262.
[10]CABE R,HERRIGES,J A.The Regulation of Nonpoint Source Pollution under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1992,22(3):134-146.
[11]SHORTLE J,ABLER D,HORAN R.Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1998,11(3/4):571-585.
[12]WU J J,BABCOCK B A.The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,38(2):158-175.
[13]HORAN R D,SHORTLE J S,ABLER D G.Ambient Taxes when Polluters Have Multiple Choices[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1998,36(2):186-199.
[14]HOLSTROM B.Moral Hazard in Teams[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13:324-40.
[15]MERAN G,SCHWALBE U.Pollution Control and Collective Penalties[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1987,143(11):616-629.
[16]SEGERSON K.Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1988,15(3):87-98.
[17]MCAFEE R P,MCMILLAN J.Optimal Contracts for Teams.International Economic Review,1991,32(8):561-77.
[18]XEPAPADEAS A P.Environmental Policy Design and Dynamic Nonpoint-Source Pollution[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1992,23(7):22-39.
[19]LEVIS T.Protecting the Environment when Costs and Benefits are Privately Known[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1996,27:819-847.
[20]CHAMBERS R G,QUIGGIN J.Non-Point Source Pollution Regulation as a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem[J].Journal of Public Economics,1996,59(1):95-116.
[21]B9RKEY P,GLANCHANT M,LEVEQUE F.Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy in OECD Countries[R].Paris:OECD,1998.
[22] KANDEL E,LAZEAR E P.Peer Pressure and Partnerships[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(8):801-817.
[23]BESLEY T,AND COATE,S.Group Lending,Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral[J].Journal of Development Economics,1995 46(2):1-18.
[24]DE JANVRY A,MCCARTHY N,SADOULET E.Endogenous Provision and Appropriation in the Commons[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1998,80(8):658-664.
[25]VARIAN H R.Monitoring Agents with Other Agents[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1990,146:153-174.
[26]HOLMSTROM B,MILGROM.Regulating Trade Among Agents[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1990,146(3):85-105.
[27]OSTROM E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].Cambridge,UK:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[28]OSTROM E.Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,14:137-158.
[29]SPAGNOLO G.Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations[J].Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization,1999,38(1):1-25.
[30]GREEN E J,PORTER,R H.Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information[J].Econometrica,1984,52(1):87-100.
[31]RIBAUDO M O,CASWELL M.Environmental Regulation in Agriculture and the Adoption of Environmental Technology[C]//In Flexible Incentives for the Adoption of Environmental Technologies in Agriculture.F.Casey,A.Schmitz,S.Swinton and D.Zilberman,eds.,Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1999:7-25.
[32]HORAN R D,SHORTLE J S.Endogenous Risk and Point-Nonpoint Uncertainty Trading Ratios[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2017,99(2):427-446.
[33]WARDROPPER C B,GILLO S,RISSMAN A R.Uncertain Monitoring and Modeling in a Watershed Nonpoint Pollution Program[J].Land Use Policy,2017,67:690-701.
[34]KAPLOWITZ M D,LUPI F.Stakeholder Preferences for Best Management Practices for Non-Point Source Pollution and Stormwater Control[J].Landscape and Urban Planning,2012,3-4(15):364-372.
[35]MIN J,SHI W M.Nitrogen Discharge Pathways in Vegetable Production as Non-Point Sources of Pollution and Measures to Control it[J].Science of The Total Environment,2018,613-614(1):123-130.
[36]HUANG S Y,LIANG C J.A Conceptual Study on the Formulation of a Permeable Reactive Pavement with Activated Carbon Additives for Controlling the Fate of Non-Point Source Environmental Organic Contaminants[J].Chemosphere,2018,193(1):438-446.
[2]周志波,张卫国.农业面源污染环境税规制机制研究进展[J].西南大学学报(社会科学版),2018,44(3):43-51.
[3] HANSEN L G.A Damage Based Tax Mechanism for Regulation of Non-Point Emissions[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1998,12(1):99-112.
[4] CAMACHO-CUENA E,REQUATE T.The Regulation of Non-Point Source Pollution and Risk Preferences:An Experimental Approach[J].Ecological Economics,2012,73:17-187.
[5] HARFORD J D.Firm Behavior Under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1978,5(1):26-43.
[6] FISHELSON G.Emission Control Policies Under Uncertainty[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1976,3(3):189-197.
[7] XEPAPADEAS A P.Observability and Choice of Instrument Mix in the Control of Externalities[J].Journal of Public Economics,1995,56(3):485-498.
[8] XEPAPADEAS A P,DE ZEEUW A.Environmental Policy and Competitiveness:The Porter Hypothesis and the Composition of Capital[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,37(2):165-182.
[9] SCHMULZLER A.Pollution Control with Imperfectly Observable Emissions[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1996,7(3):251-262.
[10]CABE R,HERRIGES,J A.The Regulation of Nonpoint Source Pollution under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1992,22(3):134-146.
[11]SHORTLE J,ABLER D,HORAN R.Research Issues in Nonpoint Pollution Control[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1998,11(3/4):571-585.
[12]WU J J,BABCOCK B A.The Relative Efficiency of Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1999,38(2):158-175.
[13]HORAN R D,SHORTLE J S,ABLER D G.Ambient Taxes when Polluters Have Multiple Choices[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1998,36(2):186-199.
[14]HOLSTROM B.Moral Hazard in Teams[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13:324-40.
[15]MERAN G,SCHWALBE U.Pollution Control and Collective Penalties[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1987,143(11):616-629.
[16]SEGERSON K.Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1988,15(3):87-98.
[17]MCAFEE R P,MCMILLAN J.Optimal Contracts for Teams.International Economic Review,1991,32(8):561-77.
[18]XEPAPADEAS A P.Environmental Policy Design and Dynamic Nonpoint-Source Pollution[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1992,23(7):22-39.
[19]LEVIS T.Protecting the Environment when Costs and Benefits are Privately Known[J].RAND Journal of Economics,1996,27:819-847.
[20]CHAMBERS R G,QUIGGIN J.Non-Point Source Pollution Regulation as a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Problem[J].Journal of Public Economics,1996,59(1):95-116.
[21]B9RKEY P,GLANCHANT M,LEVEQUE F.Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy in OECD Countries[R].Paris:OECD,1998.
[22] KANDEL E,LAZEAR E P.Peer Pressure and Partnerships[J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(8):801-817.
[23]BESLEY T,AND COATE,S.Group Lending,Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral[J].Journal of Development Economics,1995 46(2):1-18.
[24]DE JANVRY A,MCCARTHY N,SADOULET E.Endogenous Provision and Appropriation in the Commons[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1998,80(8):658-664.
[25]VARIAN H R.Monitoring Agents with Other Agents[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1990,146:153-174.
[26]HOLMSTROM B,MILGROM.Regulating Trade Among Agents[J].Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,1990,146(3):85-105.
[27]OSTROM E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action[M].Cambridge,UK:Cambridge University Press,1990.
[28]OSTROM E.Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms[J].Journal of Economic Perspectives,2000,14:137-158.
[29]SPAGNOLO G.Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations[J].Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization,1999,38(1):1-25.
[30]GREEN E J,PORTER,R H.Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information[J].Econometrica,1984,52(1):87-100.
[31]RIBAUDO M O,CASWELL M.Environmental Regulation in Agriculture and the Adoption of Environmental Technology[C]//In Flexible Incentives for the Adoption of Environmental Technologies in Agriculture.F.Casey,A.Schmitz,S.Swinton and D.Zilberman,eds.,Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1999:7-25.
[32]HORAN R D,SHORTLE J S.Endogenous Risk and Point-Nonpoint Uncertainty Trading Ratios[J].American Journal of Agricultural Economics,2017,99(2):427-446.
[33]WARDROPPER C B,GILLO S,RISSMAN A R.Uncertain Monitoring and Modeling in a Watershed Nonpoint Pollution Program[J].Land Use Policy,2017,67:690-701.
[34]KAPLOWITZ M D,LUPI F.Stakeholder Preferences for Best Management Practices for Non-Point Source Pollution and Stormwater Control[J].Landscape and Urban Planning,2012,3-4(15):364-372.
[35]MIN J,SHI W M.Nitrogen Discharge Pathways in Vegetable Production as Non-Point Sources of Pollution and Measures to Control it[J].Science of The Total Environment,2018,613-614(1):123-130.
[36]HUANG S Y,LIANG C J.A Conceptual Study on the Formulation of a Permeable Reactive Pavement with Activated Carbon Additives for Controlling the Fate of Non-Point Source Environmental Organic Contaminants[J].Chemosphere,2018,193(1):438-446.