污水处理PPP项目政府补偿决策研究
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摘要
科学合理的补偿机制是吸引社会资本参与污水处理PPP项目的关键,针对污水处理PPP项目特性,采用"有无对比法"量化经济、社会、环境外部效益,建立了污水处理PPP项目政府补偿决策Stackelberg模型,并求解博弈均衡点。实例应用表明:某污水处理PPP项目产生的外部效益为0.922亿元,政府年运营补偿基准值为0.64亿元,通过适当增加前期运营补偿额既可以促使社会资本提高投资额,又可以使社会资本尽快实现盈亏平衡。Stackelberg博弈均衡解中,社会资本投资额高于社会资本独立决策时的最优投资额,低于政府独立决策时期望的社会资本投资额;运营补偿基准值高于政府独立决策时的运营补偿基准值;社会资本净现值随年运营补偿基准值增大而不断增大,政府净现值随运营补偿基准值增大先增大后减小;在社会资本追求自身利益最大化条件约束下,政府前期年运营补偿额高于政府独立决策时年运营补偿额,盈亏平衡年份提前。
Scientific and reasonable compensation mechanism is the key to attract social capital to participate in sewage treatment PPP projects. According to the characteristics of sewage treatment PPP projects, the Stackelberg model of government compensation decision-making for sewage treatment PPP projects was established by using the method of "with or without comparison" to quantify the external economic, social and environmental benefits, and the game equilibrium point was solved. The practical application shows that the external benefit of a sewage treatment PPP project is 922 million Yuan and the annual operation compensation benchmark value of the government is 640 million Yuan. By properly increasing the pre-operation compensation amount, social capital can not only increase the investment in construction, but also achieve the break-even of social capital as soon as possible. In Stackelberg game equilibrium solution, the amount of social capital investment is higher than the optimal amount of social capital investment in independent decision-making, lower than the expected amount of social capital investment in independent decision-making period of government; the benchmark value of operation compensation is higher than the benchmark value of operation compensation in independent decision-making period of government; the net present value of social capital keeps increasing with the increase of annual operation compensation benchmark value. The net present value of the government increases first and then decreases with the increase of the benchmark value of operation compensation; under the restriction of social capital's pursuit of maximizing its own interests, the annual operation compensation of the government in the earlier period is higher than that of the government in the independent decision-making period and the year of profit-loss balance is ahead of schedule.
Scientific and reasonable compensation mechanism is the key to attract social capital to participate in sewage treatment PPP projects. According to the characteristics of sewage treatment PPP projects, the Stackelberg model of government compensation decision-making for sewage treatment PPP projects was established by using the method of "with or without comparison" to quantify the external economic, social and environmental benefits, and the game equilibrium point was solved. The practical application shows that the external benefit of a sewage treatment PPP project is 922 million Yuan and the annual operation compensation benchmark value of the government is 640 million Yuan. By properly increasing the pre-operation compensation amount, social capital can not only increase the investment in construction, but also achieve the break-even of social capital as soon as possible. In Stackelberg game equilibrium solution, the amount of social capital investment is higher than the optimal amount of social capital investment in independent decision-making, lower than the expected amount of social capital investment in independent decision-making period of government; the benchmark value of operation compensation is higher than the benchmark value of operation compensation in independent decision-making period of government; the net present value of social capital keeps increasing with the increase of annual operation compensation benchmark value. The net present value of the government increases first and then decreases with the increase of the benchmark value of operation compensation; under the restriction of social capital's pursuit of maximizing its own interests, the annual operation compensation of the government in the earlier period is higher than that of the government in the independent decision-making period and the year of profit-loss balance is ahead of schedule.
引文
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[2] 万劲波,赵兰香.政府和社会资本合作推进科技创新的机制研究[J].中国科学院院刊,2016,12(4):467-476.
[3] 杜杨,丰景春.基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(11):190-199.
[4] 曹启龙,周晶,盛昭瀚.PPP项目中政府补偿与社会资本投资运营决策研究[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(12):1-8.
[5] CHOWDHURY A N,CHAROENNGAM C.Factors Influencing Finance on IPP Projects in Asia:a Legal Framework to Reach the Goal[J].International Journal of Project Management,2009,27(1):51-58.
[6] 张智慧,张剑寒.城市轨道交通PPP项目运营补贴测算[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2016,56(12):1327-1332.
[7] THACKWAY R,OLSSON k.Public/Private Partnerships and Protected Areas:Selected Australian Case Studies[J].Landscape & Urban Planning,1999,44(2-3):87-97.
[8] BRINKERHOFF D W,BRINKERHOFF J M.Public-Private Partnerships:Perspectives on Purposes,Publicness,and Good Governance[J].Public Administration & Development,2011,31(1):2-14.
[9] 廖楚晖,刘向杰,段吟颖.政府融资项目的财政补贴机制研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2011(1):39-44.
[10] 吴孝灵,周晶,彭以忱,等.基于公私博弈的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(增刊1):198-204.
[11] FEARNLEY Jun.Appraisal of Combined Agreements in BOT Project Finance:Focused on Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Revenue Cap Agreements[J].International Journal of Strategic Property Management,2010,14(2):139-155.
[12] 柯永建,王守清,陈炳泉.私营资本参与基础设施PPP项目的政府激励措施[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2009,49(9):1480-1483.
[13] 邓小鹏,熊伟,袁竞峰,等.基于各方满意的PPP项目动态调价与补贴模型及实证研究[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2009,39(6):1252-1257.
[14] SONG J,HU Y,FENG Z.Factors Influencing Early Termination of PPP Projects in China[J].Journal of Management in Engineering,2018,34(1):8-17.
[15] LONG Y,PAN C,WANG Y.Research on a Microgrid Subsidy Strategy Based on Operational Efficiency of the Industry Chain[J].Sustainability,2018,10(5):1519.
[16] 吴栋梁,朱先策.一种基于指标贡献度的同业对标考核激励模型[J].华北电力大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):21-25.
[17] 徐瑾,王伟.拉萨污水处理厂污泥对沙化土壤改良效果[J].环境工程学报,2018,12(6):1743-1748.