晋升问题:锦标赛理论的贡献与挑战
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摘要
文章首先系统介绍了锦标赛理论的发展,强调其对理解科层及其晋升制度的生产性具有重要贡献。随后,文章指出锦标赛属于完全合约,而这使得锦标赛理论并不能很好地理解作为不完全合约产物的科层组织及其晋升制度所具有的政治性。在此基础上,文章认为科层组织内的最优晋升制度应该同时体现晋升安排的生产性和政治性,并在维护上级威权与激发下级努力、挑选优秀人才之间实现某种平衡。
This paper systematically introduces the development of tournament theory, and emphasizes its important contributions to understanding the productivity of the hierarchy and its promotion system. Then, the paper points out that the tournament theory belongs to complete contract theory and cannot well understand the political nature of the bureaucracy and its promotion system which are the result of the incomplete contract. On this basis, this paper argues that the optimal promotion system within the hierarchy should reflect both the productivity and the political nature of the promotion arrangement, that is, to achieve some balance between maintaining the authority of the superior and stimulating the efforts of the subordinate and selecting excellent talents.
This paper systematically introduces the development of tournament theory, and emphasizes its important contributions to understanding the productivity of the hierarchy and its promotion system. Then, the paper points out that the tournament theory belongs to complete contract theory and cannot well understand the political nature of the bureaucracy and its promotion system which are the result of the incomplete contract. On this basis, this paper argues that the optimal promotion system within the hierarchy should reflect both the productivity and the political nature of the promotion arrangement, that is, to achieve some balance between maintaining the authority of the superior and stimulating the efforts of the subordinate and selecting excellent talents.
引文
陶然、苏福兵、陆曦、朱铭,2010:“经济增长能够带来晋升吗?”,《管理世界》,2010,12:13—26。
杨其静、郑楠,2013: “地方领导晋升竞争:标尺赛,锦标赛还是资格赛”,《世界经济》,2013,12:130—156。
周黎安,2004:“晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作”,《经济研究》,2004,6:33—40。
Adams, R., and D.Ferreira, 2007. “A Theory of Friendly Boards.” Journal of Finance. 62(1): 217-250.
Aghion, P., and J.Tirole, 1997, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy. 105(1): 1-29.
Alchian, A., and H.Demsetz, 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review. 62(5): 777-795.
Baker, G., M.Gibbs, and B.Holmstrom, 1994. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109(4): 881-919.
Baker, G., M.Jensen, and K.J.Murphy, 1988. “Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory.” Journal of Finance. 43(3): 593-616.
Bernhardt, D., 1995. “Strategic Promotion and Compensation.” Review of Economic Studies. 62(2): 315-39.
Berry, S., 1993. “Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners.” Public Choice. 77(2): 437-443.
Bhattacharya, S., and J.Guasch, 1988. “Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies.” Journal of Political Economy. 96(4): 867-881.
Cai, H., and D.Treisman, 2005. “Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy.” American Economic Review. 95(3): 817-830.
Chan, W., 1996. “External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion.” Journal of Labor Economics. 14(4): 555-570.
Coase, R.H., 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica. 4(16): 386-405.
Coupe, T., V.Smeets, and F. Warzynski, 2006. “Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 22(1): 137-67.
Curry, P., and S.Mongrain, 2009. “Deterrence in Rank-order Tournaments.” Review of Law and Economics. 5: 723-740.
Deutscher, C., B.Frick, O.Gürtler, and J. Prinz, 2013. “Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 115: 1138-1157.
DeVaro, J., 2006a. “Internal Promotion Competitions in Firms.” The Rand Journal of Economics. 37(3): 521-542.
——2006b. “Strategic Promotion Tournaments and Worker Performance.” Strategic Management Journal. 27(8): 721-740.
DeVaro, J., and H.Morita, 2013. “Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Labor Economics. 31(2): 227-269.
Eriksson, T., 1999. “Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data.” Journal of labor Economics. 17(2): 262-280.
Green, J., and N.Stokey, 1983. “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy. 91(3): 349-364.
Gurtler, O., and J.Munster, 2010. “Sabotage in Dynamic Tournaments.” Journal of Mathematical Economics. 46: 179-190.
Gurtler, O., J.Munster, and P.Nieken, 2013. “Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 115, 932-966.
Holmstrom, B., 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics. 13(2): 324-340.
Konrad, K., 2000. “Sabotage in Rent-seeking Contests.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 16: 155-165.
Holmstrom, B., and P.Milgrom, 1991. “Mulitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 7: 24-52.
Lazear, E., 1989. “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics.” Journal of Political Economy. 97: 561-580.
Lazear, E., and S.Rosen, 1981. “Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of political Economy. 89(5): 841-864.
Malcomson, J., 1984. “Work incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets.” Journal of Political Economy. 92(3): 486-507.
Main, B., C.O'Reilly III, and J.Wade, 1993. “Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?” Journal of Labor Economics. 11(4): 606-628.
March, J., 1962. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics. 24(4): 662-678.
Marino, A., J.Matsusaka, and Ján Zábojník, 2010. “Disobedience and Authority.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 26(3): 427-459.
Maskin, E., Y.Qian, and C.Xu, 2000. “Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form.” Review of Economic Studies. 67(2): 359-378.
Mesquita, B., and A.Smith, 2011. The Dictator's Handbook. Public Affairs.
Nalebuff, B., and J.Stiglitz, 1983. “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition.” Bell Journal of Economics 14(1): 21-43.
O'Keeffe, M., W.Viscusi, and R.Zeckhauser, 1984. “Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes.” Journal of Labor Economics. 2(1): 27-56.
Opper, S., V.Nee, and S.Brehm. 2015. “Homophily in the Career Mobility of China's Political Elite.” Social Science Research. 54: 332-352.
Owan, H., 2004. “Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-sponsored Training.” Journal of Labor Economics. 22(4):955-78.
Prendergast, C., 1993, “A Theory of ‘Yes Men’.” American Economic Review. 83: 757-770.
Prendergast, C., and R.Topel, 1996. “Favoritism in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy. 104(5): 958-978.
Rajan, R., and L.Zingales, 2001. “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116(3): 805-851.
Shih, V., C.Adolph, and M. Liu, 2012. “Getting a Head in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” American Political Science Review. 106(01): 166-187.
Svolik, M., 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tullock, G., 1987. Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Van den Steen, Eric, 2010a. “Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm.” American Economic Review. 100(1): 466-490.
——2010b. “Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity.” Management Science. 56(10): 1718-1738.
Waldman, M., 1990. “Up-or-out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective.” Journal of Labor Economics. 8(2): 230-50.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Simon & Schuster Inc.
Yang, Q., and J. Yang, 2018. “Productivity, Politics, and the Optimal Qualifying Competition.” Working Paper.
Zabojnik, J., and D.Bernhardt, 2001. “Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-wage Relation.” Review of Economic Studies. 68(3):693-716.
(1)拉齐尔(E.Lazear)被誉为“人事经济学之父”(the father of personnel economics),“Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Conracts”被视为其最重要学术贡献之一。截至2018年11月,谷歌学术(googlescholar)显示该文被引用次数已超过6000。
(1)假设代理人的绝对风险态度为η,效用函数为u(w,a)=-e-η[w-ψ(a)],则对于风险中性的委托人来说,最优分成合约的分成系数为β*=[1+ηb·(δ2θ+δ2ε)]-1。
(2)若把a理解为代理人的人力资本积累,则还可讨论锦标赛对代理人人力资本积累和职业生涯的影响(Zabojnik&Bernhardt,2001)。此外,若把晋升视为一种对外显示代理人人力资本的信号,则委托人对锦标赛的选择还会受外部劳动力市场影响(Bernhardt,1995;Owan,2004)。为了避免焦点模糊化,故本文不对这些文献作专门介绍。
(3)比如,马斯金等人认为苏联采取U型组织结构,即中央管控行业部委而各行业分布于不同地区;相反,中国采取M型组织结构,即中央管控地方政府而各地方有不同产业(Maskin et al.,2000)。由于行业间外生冲击差异往往大于地区间外生冲击差异,因此,地区间相对业绩测度的精度高于部委间相对业绩测度。由此,中国可设计出更有效的激励合约来激发辖区间竞争。
(1)在该逻辑下,霍姆斯特姆认为,当n→%时,标尺竞赛(Yardstick Competition)激励合约■优于锦赛,因为:■而使得■---不仅θ而且其他个体的异质性冲击都被消除,从而使得该测度具有更好的充分统计量(Holmstrom,1982)。
(2)设想代理人i的努力程度为ai而其他代理人的努力程度为珔a。此时,他预计自己的业绩优于一个对手的概率为G(ai-珔a)(>n-10.5)。若规定业绩优于一半以上的参赛者的代理人为获胜者(之一),则代理人i的获胜概率增至■。令G=0.7,则P(n=6)=0.84,P(n=16)=0.95。
(1)库普等人发现在经济学研究领域中存在一个自动分组的现象,即研究成果越多且成果质量越高的学者们一般都在学术实力更强的大学或研究机构工作(Coupe et al.,2006)。
(2)在律师/会计师事务所中“非升即走”(up-or-out)被用来筛选高级别成员(Waldman,1990)。
(1)虽然一些经验研究得出了中国地方官员晋升机会与经济增长业绩显著正相关的结论,但由于缺失反映地区政治影响力的控制变量(比如,人口和GDP规模),因此该结论未必坚实可靠(杨其静、郑楠,2013)。与此同时,还有一些实证研究发现中国地方官员的晋升机会主要与其所拥有的政治禀赋显著相关(Shih et al.,2012;Opper et al.,2015)。
(1)杨其静和郑楠(2013)发现,在中国各省内部市委书记之间晋升竞争可能并非是基于绝对经济增长业绩的锦标赛或者标尺赛,而更有可能是基于省内经济增长业绩排名的宽松资格赛,因为回归分析显示:只有那些经济增长率全省排名不太靠后(比如,前十)的市委书记才具有显著多的晋升机会,但排名靠前(比如,排名前1~2)并不能增加其晋升机会。
(2)杨其静和杨婧然(Yang&Yang,2018)的早期版本论文曾在2016年澳洲中国经济学家联合会(CESA)第28届年会上分享。
杨其静、郑楠,2013: “地方领导晋升竞争:标尺赛,锦标赛还是资格赛”,《世界经济》,2013,12:130—156。
周黎安,2004:“晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作”,《经济研究》,2004,6:33—40。
Adams, R., and D.Ferreira, 2007. “A Theory of Friendly Boards.” Journal of Finance. 62(1): 217-250.
Aghion, P., and J.Tirole, 1997, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy. 105(1): 1-29.
Alchian, A., and H.Demsetz, 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” American Economic Review. 62(5): 777-795.
Baker, G., M.Gibbs, and B.Holmstrom, 1994. “The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 109(4): 881-919.
Baker, G., M.Jensen, and K.J.Murphy, 1988. “Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory.” Journal of Finance. 43(3): 593-616.
Bernhardt, D., 1995. “Strategic Promotion and Compensation.” Review of Economic Studies. 62(2): 315-39.
Berry, S., 1993. “Rent-Seeking with Multiple Winners.” Public Choice. 77(2): 437-443.
Bhattacharya, S., and J.Guasch, 1988. “Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies.” Journal of Political Economy. 96(4): 867-881.
Cai, H., and D.Treisman, 2005. “Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization, and Public Policy.” American Economic Review. 95(3): 817-830.
Chan, W., 1996. “External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion.” Journal of Labor Economics. 14(4): 555-570.
Coase, R.H., 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica. 4(16): 386-405.
Coupe, T., V.Smeets, and F. Warzynski, 2006. “Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 22(1): 137-67.
Curry, P., and S.Mongrain, 2009. “Deterrence in Rank-order Tournaments.” Review of Law and Economics. 5: 723-740.
Deutscher, C., B.Frick, O.Gürtler, and J. Prinz, 2013. “Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 115: 1138-1157.
DeVaro, J., 2006a. “Internal Promotion Competitions in Firms.” The Rand Journal of Economics. 37(3): 521-542.
——2006b. “Strategic Promotion Tournaments and Worker Performance.” Strategic Management Journal. 27(8): 721-740.
DeVaro, J., and H.Morita, 2013. “Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Labor Economics. 31(2): 227-269.
Eriksson, T., 1999. “Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data.” Journal of labor Economics. 17(2): 262-280.
Green, J., and N.Stokey, 1983. “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy. 91(3): 349-364.
Gurtler, O., and J.Munster, 2010. “Sabotage in Dynamic Tournaments.” Journal of Mathematical Economics. 46: 179-190.
Gurtler, O., J.Munster, and P.Nieken, 2013. “Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 115, 932-966.
Holmstrom, B., 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” Bell Journal of Economics. 13(2): 324-340.
Konrad, K., 2000. “Sabotage in Rent-seeking Contests.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 16: 155-165.
Holmstrom, B., and P.Milgrom, 1991. “Mulitask Principal-agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 7: 24-52.
Lazear, E., 1989. “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics.” Journal of Political Economy. 97: 561-580.
Lazear, E., and S.Rosen, 1981. “Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of political Economy. 89(5): 841-864.
Malcomson, J., 1984. “Work incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets.” Journal of Political Economy. 92(3): 486-507.
Main, B., C.O'Reilly III, and J.Wade, 1993. “Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?” Journal of Labor Economics. 11(4): 606-628.
March, J., 1962. “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition.” Journal of Politics. 24(4): 662-678.
Marino, A., J.Matsusaka, and Ján Zábojník, 2010. “Disobedience and Authority.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 26(3): 427-459.
Maskin, E., Y.Qian, and C.Xu, 2000. “Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form.” Review of Economic Studies. 67(2): 359-378.
Mesquita, B., and A.Smith, 2011. The Dictator's Handbook. Public Affairs.
Nalebuff, B., and J.Stiglitz, 1983. “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition.” Bell Journal of Economics 14(1): 21-43.
O'Keeffe, M., W.Viscusi, and R.Zeckhauser, 1984. “Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes.” Journal of Labor Economics. 2(1): 27-56.
Opper, S., V.Nee, and S.Brehm. 2015. “Homophily in the Career Mobility of China's Political Elite.” Social Science Research. 54: 332-352.
Owan, H., 2004. “Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-sponsored Training.” Journal of Labor Economics. 22(4):955-78.
Prendergast, C., 1993, “A Theory of ‘Yes Men’.” American Economic Review. 83: 757-770.
Prendergast, C., and R.Topel, 1996. “Favoritism in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy. 104(5): 958-978.
Rajan, R., and L.Zingales, 2001. “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116(3): 805-851.
Shih, V., C.Adolph, and M. Liu, 2012. “Getting a Head in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China.” American Political Science Review. 106(01): 166-187.
Svolik, M., 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tullock, G., 1987. Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Van den Steen, Eric, 2010a. “Interpersonal Authority in a Theory of the Firm.” American Economic Review. 100(1): 466-490.
——2010b. “Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity.” Management Science. 56(10): 1718-1738.
Waldman, M., 1990. “Up-or-out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective.” Journal of Labor Economics. 8(2): 230-50.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Simon & Schuster Inc.
Yang, Q., and J. Yang, 2018. “Productivity, Politics, and the Optimal Qualifying Competition.” Working Paper.
Zabojnik, J., and D.Bernhardt, 2001. “Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size-wage Relation.” Review of Economic Studies. 68(3):693-716.
(1)拉齐尔(E.Lazear)被誉为“人事经济学之父”(the father of personnel economics),“Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Conracts”被视为其最重要学术贡献之一。截至2018年11月,谷歌学术(googlescholar)显示该文被引用次数已超过6000。
(1)假设代理人的绝对风险态度为η,效用函数为u(w,a)=-e-η[w-ψ(a)],则对于风险中性的委托人来说,最优分成合约的分成系数为β*=[1+ηb·(δ2θ+δ2ε)]-1。
(2)若把a理解为代理人的人力资本积累,则还可讨论锦标赛对代理人人力资本积累和职业生涯的影响(Zabojnik&Bernhardt,2001)。此外,若把晋升视为一种对外显示代理人人力资本的信号,则委托人对锦标赛的选择还会受外部劳动力市场影响(Bernhardt,1995;Owan,2004)。为了避免焦点模糊化,故本文不对这些文献作专门介绍。
(3)比如,马斯金等人认为苏联采取U型组织结构,即中央管控行业部委而各行业分布于不同地区;相反,中国采取M型组织结构,即中央管控地方政府而各地方有不同产业(Maskin et al.,2000)。由于行业间外生冲击差异往往大于地区间外生冲击差异,因此,地区间相对业绩测度的精度高于部委间相对业绩测度。由此,中国可设计出更有效的激励合约来激发辖区间竞争。
(1)在该逻辑下,霍姆斯特姆认为,当n→%时,标尺竞赛(Yardstick Competition)激励合约■优于锦赛,因为:■而使得■---不仅θ而且其他个体的异质性冲击都被消除,从而使得该测度具有更好的充分统计量(Holmstrom,1982)。
(2)设想代理人i的努力程度为ai而其他代理人的努力程度为珔a。此时,他预计自己的业绩优于一个对手的概率为G(ai-珔a)(>n-10.5)。若规定业绩优于一半以上的参赛者的代理人为获胜者(之一),则代理人i的获胜概率增至■。令G=0.7,则P(n=6)=0.84,P(n=16)=0.95。
(1)库普等人发现在经济学研究领域中存在一个自动分组的现象,即研究成果越多且成果质量越高的学者们一般都在学术实力更强的大学或研究机构工作(Coupe et al.,2006)。
(2)在律师/会计师事务所中“非升即走”(up-or-out)被用来筛选高级别成员(Waldman,1990)。
(1)虽然一些经验研究得出了中国地方官员晋升机会与经济增长业绩显著正相关的结论,但由于缺失反映地区政治影响力的控制变量(比如,人口和GDP规模),因此该结论未必坚实可靠(杨其静、郑楠,2013)。与此同时,还有一些实证研究发现中国地方官员的晋升机会主要与其所拥有的政治禀赋显著相关(Shih et al.,2012;Opper et al.,2015)。
(1)杨其静和郑楠(2013)发现,在中国各省内部市委书记之间晋升竞争可能并非是基于绝对经济增长业绩的锦标赛或者标尺赛,而更有可能是基于省内经济增长业绩排名的宽松资格赛,因为回归分析显示:只有那些经济增长率全省排名不太靠后(比如,前十)的市委书记才具有显著多的晋升机会,但排名靠前(比如,排名前1~2)并不能增加其晋升机会。
(2)杨其静和杨婧然(Yang&Yang,2018)的早期版本论文曾在2016年澳洲中国经济学家联合会(CESA)第28届年会上分享。