银行系资产管理对流动性风险传递路径的影响研究——一个来自美国自由银行制度的借鉴
|
摘要
资管新规等监管措施的落实和银行理财子公司的成立有助于打破银行系资产管理领域的刚性兑付,改变资产管理领域的业务合作方式,扩大以银行理财子公司为核心的业务合作规模,进而使银行资产管理的资产传递渠道和流动性风险传递路径发生变化。通过对美国自由银行体制时期商业银行流动性风险传递特点的分析,本文证明了在缺乏最后贷款人时,业务合规能力等方面的差异使得资产管理机构的合作加强,同时扩大低信用层级资产管理产品的销售规模。流动性风险表现出以低信用层级资产管理产品为源头,以围绕银行理财子公司的业务合作为传递媒介的特点。基于此,本文建议规范银行系资产管理的投资范围、业务领域以及与银行的业务联系,限制资产管理领域业务的过度扩张。
The implementation of the new asset management rules and other regulatory measures and the establishment of bank wealth management subsidiaries help to break the rigid payment in the asset management field of banks, change the way of business cooperation in the field of asset management, expand the scale of business cooperation with the bank financing subsidiaries as the core, and then change the credit creation channel and liquidity risk transmission of bank asset management. By analyzing the American characteristics of liquidity risk transmission of commercial banks in the free banking system, this paper proves that the differences in business compliance ability and other aspects in the absence of lender of last resort can strengthen the cooperation of asset management departments, and at the same time expand the sales scale of low-credit asset management products. Liquidity risk is characterized by low credit level asset management products as the source and business cooperation of bank financing subsidiaries as the transmission medium. Based on this, this paper suggests standardizing the scope of investment, business areas and business links with banks in asset management, so as to limit excessive cooperation in asset management.
The implementation of the new asset management rules and other regulatory measures and the establishment of bank wealth management subsidiaries help to break the rigid payment in the asset management field of banks, change the way of business cooperation in the field of asset management, expand the scale of business cooperation with the bank financing subsidiaries as the core, and then change the credit creation channel and liquidity risk transmission of bank asset management. By analyzing the American characteristics of liquidity risk transmission of commercial banks in the free banking system, this paper proves that the differences in business compliance ability and other aspects in the absence of lender of last resort can strengthen the cooperation of asset management departments, and at the same time expand the sales scale of low-credit asset management products. Liquidity risk is characterized by low credit level asset management products as the source and business cooperation of bank financing subsidiaries as the transmission medium. Based on this, this paper suggests standardizing the scope of investment, business areas and business links with banks in asset management, so as to limit excessive cooperation in asset management.
引文
[1]Adrian T,Shin H S.Financial intermediary balance sheet management[J].Annu.Rev.Financ.Econ.,2011,3(1):289-307.
[2]Adrian T,Shin H S.Liquidity and leverage[J].Journal of financial intermediation,2010,19(3):418-437.
[3]Allen F,Qian Y,Tu G,et al.Entrusted loans:a close look at China's shadow banking system[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2019.
[4]Allen F,Santomero A M.What do financial intermediaries do?[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2001,25(2):271-294.
[5]Acharya V V,Pedersen L H,Philippon T,et al.Measuring systemic risk[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(1):2-47.
[6]Aghion P,Bolton P,Dewatripont M.Contagious bank failures in a free banking system[J].European Economic Review,2000,44(4-6):713-718.
[7]Bray Hammond.Sovereignty and an Empty Purse:Banks and Politics in the Civil War[M]Princeton,1970,pp.165-229.
[8]Cifuentes R,Ferrucci G,Shin H S.Liquidity risk and contagion[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2005,3(2-3):556-566.
[9]Cornett M M,Mc Nutt J J,Tehranian H.Corporate governance and earnings management at large US bank holding companies[J].Journal of Corporate finance,2009,15(4):412-430.
[10]Economopoulos A J.Free bank failures in New York and Wisconsin:A portfolio analysis[J].Explorations in Economic History,1990,27(4):421-441.
[11]Financial Stability Board:“Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2017”,2018
[12]Gorton G B,Pennacchi G G.Banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets[J].Journal of monetary Economics,1995,35(3):389-411.
[13]Gorton G B.Questions and answers about the financial crisis[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2010.
[14]Huntington C C.A history of banking and currency in Ohio before the Civil War[M].Heer,1915.
[15]Jaremski M.Free bank failures:Risky bonds versus undiversified portfolios[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2010,42(8):1565-1587.
[16]Kindleberger C P.The formation of financial centers:A study in comparative economic history[J].1973.
[17]Patchin S A.The development of banking in Minnesota[J].Minnesota History Bulletin,1917,2(3):111-168.
[18]Pozsar Z,Adrian T,Ashcraft A,et al.Shadow banking[J].New York,2010,458(458):3-9.
[19]Pozsar Z.The rise and fall of the shadow banking system[J].Regional Financial Review,2008,44:13-15.
[20]Rockoff H.The free banking era:A reexamination[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,1974,6(2):141-167.
[21]Rolnick A J,Weber W E.Explaining the demand for free bank notes[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1988,21(1):47-71.
[22]Rolnick A J,Weber W E.The causes of free bank failures:Adetailed examination[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1984,14(3):267-291.
[23]Selgin G A.The theory of free banking:Money supply under competitive note issue[M].Rowman&Littlefield Pub Inc,1988.
[24]Sylla R,Legler J B,Wallis J J.Banks and state public finance in the new republic:The United States,1790-1860[J].The Journal of Economic History,1987,47(2):391-403.
[25]Sylla R.Early American banking:the significance of the corporate form[J].Business and Economic History,1985:105-123.
[26]Weber W E.Early state banks in the United States:how many were there and when did they exist?[J].The Journal of Economic History,2006,66(2):433-455.
[27]Weber W E.Interbank payments relationships in the antebellum United States:Evidence from Pennsylvania[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2003,50(2):455-474.
[28]Weber W.Clearing arrangements in the United States before the Federal Reserve system[J].Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper,2012,695.
[29]彼得·纽曼,默里·米尔盖特,约翰·伊特韦尔编.新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典(第一卷A-E)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000.
[30]杰瑞·马克汉姆著,黄佳译.美国金融史(第一卷):从克里斯托弗·哥伦布到强盗大亨(1492-1900)[M].中国金融出版社,2017-8
[31]李波,伍戈.影子银行的信用创造功能及其对货币政策的挑战[J].金融研究,2011,(12):77-84.
[32]孙国峰,贾君怡.中国影子银行界定及其规模测算--基于信用货币创造的视角[J].中国社会科学,2015,11:93-111.
[33]巫云仙.美国金融制度的历史变迁[M].社会科学文献出版社,2017-9-25
[34]殷剑峰.中国资金存量表的统计和分析[J].中国社会科学,2018,(03):146-161.
1.中国银行业监督管理委员会.中国银监会关于规范商业银行理财业务投资运作有关问题的通知,银监发[2013]8号
2.中国人民银行、中国银行保险监督管理委员会、中国证券监督管理委员会、国家外汇管理局.关于规范金融机构资产管理业务的指导意见,银发[2018]106号
3.中国银行保险监督管理委员会.商业银行理财业务监督管理办法,银保监发[2018]6号
4.中国银行保险监督管理委员会.商业银行理财子公司管理办银保监发[2018]7号
5.自由银行的原始资产负债表由明尼阿波尼斯联储收集,可获得于https://www.minneapolisfed.org。
6.数据可见中国理财网(https://www.chinawealth.com.cn)
[2]Adrian T,Shin H S.Liquidity and leverage[J].Journal of financial intermediation,2010,19(3):418-437.
[3]Allen F,Qian Y,Tu G,et al.Entrusted loans:a close look at China's shadow banking system[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2019.
[4]Allen F,Santomero A M.What do financial intermediaries do?[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2001,25(2):271-294.
[5]Acharya V V,Pedersen L H,Philippon T,et al.Measuring systemic risk[J].The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(1):2-47.
[6]Aghion P,Bolton P,Dewatripont M.Contagious bank failures in a free banking system[J].European Economic Review,2000,44(4-6):713-718.
[7]Bray Hammond.Sovereignty and an Empty Purse:Banks and Politics in the Civil War[M]Princeton,1970,pp.165-229.
[8]Cifuentes R,Ferrucci G,Shin H S.Liquidity risk and contagion[J].Journal of the European Economic Association,2005,3(2-3):556-566.
[9]Cornett M M,Mc Nutt J J,Tehranian H.Corporate governance and earnings management at large US bank holding companies[J].Journal of Corporate finance,2009,15(4):412-430.
[10]Economopoulos A J.Free bank failures in New York and Wisconsin:A portfolio analysis[J].Explorations in Economic History,1990,27(4):421-441.
[11]Financial Stability Board:“Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2017”,2018
[12]Gorton G B,Pennacchi G G.Banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets[J].Journal of monetary Economics,1995,35(3):389-411.
[13]Gorton G B.Questions and answers about the financial crisis[R].National Bureau of Economic Research,2010.
[14]Huntington C C.A history of banking and currency in Ohio before the Civil War[M].Heer,1915.
[15]Jaremski M.Free bank failures:Risky bonds versus undiversified portfolios[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2010,42(8):1565-1587.
[16]Kindleberger C P.The formation of financial centers:A study in comparative economic history[J].1973.
[17]Patchin S A.The development of banking in Minnesota[J].Minnesota History Bulletin,1917,2(3):111-168.
[18]Pozsar Z,Adrian T,Ashcraft A,et al.Shadow banking[J].New York,2010,458(458):3-9.
[19]Pozsar Z.The rise and fall of the shadow banking system[J].Regional Financial Review,2008,44:13-15.
[20]Rockoff H.The free banking era:A reexamination[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,1974,6(2):141-167.
[21]Rolnick A J,Weber W E.Explaining the demand for free bank notes[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1988,21(1):47-71.
[22]Rolnick A J,Weber W E.The causes of free bank failures:Adetailed examination[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,1984,14(3):267-291.
[23]Selgin G A.The theory of free banking:Money supply under competitive note issue[M].Rowman&Littlefield Pub Inc,1988.
[24]Sylla R,Legler J B,Wallis J J.Banks and state public finance in the new republic:The United States,1790-1860[J].The Journal of Economic History,1987,47(2):391-403.
[25]Sylla R.Early American banking:the significance of the corporate form[J].Business and Economic History,1985:105-123.
[26]Weber W E.Early state banks in the United States:how many were there and when did they exist?[J].The Journal of Economic History,2006,66(2):433-455.
[27]Weber W E.Interbank payments relationships in the antebellum United States:Evidence from Pennsylvania[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,2003,50(2):455-474.
[28]Weber W.Clearing arrangements in the United States before the Federal Reserve system[J].Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper,2012,695.
[29]彼得·纽曼,默里·米尔盖特,约翰·伊特韦尔编.新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典(第一卷A-E)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000.
[30]杰瑞·马克汉姆著,黄佳译.美国金融史(第一卷):从克里斯托弗·哥伦布到强盗大亨(1492-1900)[M].中国金融出版社,2017-8
[31]李波,伍戈.影子银行的信用创造功能及其对货币政策的挑战[J].金融研究,2011,(12):77-84.
[32]孙国峰,贾君怡.中国影子银行界定及其规模测算--基于信用货币创造的视角[J].中国社会科学,2015,11:93-111.
[33]巫云仙.美国金融制度的历史变迁[M].社会科学文献出版社,2017-9-25
[34]殷剑峰.中国资金存量表的统计和分析[J].中国社会科学,2018,(03):146-161.
1.中国银行业监督管理委员会.中国银监会关于规范商业银行理财业务投资运作有关问题的通知,银监发[2013]8号
2.中国人民银行、中国银行保险监督管理委员会、中国证券监督管理委员会、国家外汇管理局.关于规范金融机构资产管理业务的指导意见,银发[2018]106号
3.中国银行保险监督管理委员会.商业银行理财业务监督管理办法,银保监发[2018]6号
4.中国银行保险监督管理委员会.商业银行理财子公司管理办银保监发[2018]7号
5.自由银行的原始资产负债表由明尼阿波尼斯联储收集,可获得于https://www.minneapolisfed.org。
6.数据可见中国理财网(https://www.chinawealth.com.cn)