基于买卖双方影子价格的水权交易基础定价模型研究
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摘要
基于影子价格方法建立两阶段水权交易均衡价格测算模型。第一阶段为单边测算阶段,对转让方、受让方分别构建影子价格模型。以各部门用水边际收益最大为目标,基于用水投入产出平衡关系构建转让方影子价格模型;以各部门用水净效益最大为目标,基于各部门用水上下限和总供水量等建立受让方影子价格模型,利用Lingo测算双方各用水部门影子价格。第二阶段为双边耦合测算阶段,以国民经济整体效益最大为目标,将第一阶段测算的双方影子价格,结合微分博弈均衡理论,运用HJB条件确定均衡水价。最后结合中国首批水权交易试点地区甘肃、内蒙古进行算例研究,并提出政策建议。
Based on the shadow price method, a two-stage water right trade equilibrium price measurement model is established. The first stage is the unilateral measurement stage. The shadow price model is built for the transferor and the transferee respectively. Taking the maximum marginal revenue of water use of each department as the target, the shadow price model of transferor is constructed based on the equilibrium relation of water input and output. Aiming at the maximum net benefit of each department, the shadow price model of the transferee is established based on the upper and lower limits of each department's water consumption and the total water supply, etc. Lingo is used to calculate the shadow price of each water sector on both sides. The second stage is the bilaterally coupled calculation stage. Aiming at the maximum overall benefit of the national economy, the shadow price calculated in the first stage is combined with the equilibrium theory of differential game, and the HJB condition is used to determine the equilibrium water price. Finally, the case study of Gansu and Inner Mongolia in China's first water rights trading pilot areas is carried out, and policy suggestions are put forward.
Based on the shadow price method, a two-stage water right trade equilibrium price measurement model is established. The first stage is the unilateral measurement stage. The shadow price model is built for the transferor and the transferee respectively. Taking the maximum marginal revenue of water use of each department as the target, the shadow price model of transferor is constructed based on the equilibrium relation of water input and output. Aiming at the maximum net benefit of each department, the shadow price model of the transferee is established based on the upper and lower limits of each department's water consumption and the total water supply, etc. Lingo is used to calculate the shadow price of each water sector on both sides. The second stage is the bilaterally coupled calculation stage. Aiming at the maximum overall benefit of the national economy, the shadow price calculated in the first stage is combined with the equilibrium theory of differential game, and the HJB condition is used to determine the equilibrium water price. Finally, the case study of Gansu and Inner Mongolia in China's first water rights trading pilot areas is carried out, and policy suggestions are put forward.
引文
[1] 吕兰军.南方丰水地区节水存在的主要问题与对策研究[J].珠江现代建设,2016(2):20-23.
[2] Mohammad A S,Tabieh J S,et al.Pricing Mechanism as a Tool for Water Policy Using a Linear Programming Model [J].Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences,2010 (8):3159-3173.
[3] 刘秀丽,陈锡康,张红霞,等.水资源影子价格计算和预测模型研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009(2):162-165.
[4]Hee Kyun Oh,Hee Chan Lee.Analyzing the Shadow Price of Industrial Water Resources and Water Shortage Scenario-An Application of Water Input-Output Linear Programming [J].Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences,2018(12):155-168.
[5] 何静,陈锡康.水资源影子价格动态投入产出优化模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(5):49-54.
[6] Jeremy J W.Natural Resources and Economic Policy in Developing Countries [J].The Annals of Regional Science,1987(6):6-8.
[7] 李海红,王光谦.水权交易中的水价估算[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2005(6):768-771.
[8] 陈锡康,等.中国9大流域水利投入占用产出表的编制及在流域经济研究中的应用[J].水利经济,2005(2):3-6.
[9] Xin B G,Sun M H.A Differential Oligopoly Game for Optimal Production Planning and Water Savings [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2018(1):206-217.
[10] 刘钢,等.准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):151-159.
[11] 中国投入产出学会课题组,等.国民经济各部门水资源消耗及用水系数的投入产出分析——2002年投入产出表分析报告之五[J].统计研究,2007(3):20-25.
[12] 汪林,甘泓,倪红珍,等.水经济价值及其相关政策影响分析[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2009.95-158.
[13] Zhang W,Mao H,Yin H,et al.A Pricing Model for Water Rights Trading between Agricultural and Industrial Water Users in China [J].Journal of Water Supply Research and Technology-Aqua,2018(3):346-350.
[14] 吴凤平,于倩雯,沈俊源,等.基于市场导向的水权交易价格形成机制理论框架研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(7):17-25.
[15] FU Q,ZHAO K,LIU D,et al.The Application of a Water Rights Trading Model Based on Two-stage Interval-parameter Stochastic Programming[J].Water Resources Management,2016(7):2227-2243.
[16] 朱启林,申碧峰,孙静,等.基于优化配置的北京市水资源影子价格研究[J].人民黄河,2016(12):97-98.
[17] Bekchanov M,Bhaduri A,Ringler C,et al.Potential Gains from Water Rights Trading in the Aral Sea Basin [J].Agricultural Water Management,2015:41-56.
[18] 吴丹,吴凤平.基于水权初始配置的区域协同发展效度评价[J].软科学,2011(2):80-83.
[19] Wang Y B,Liu D,Cao X C,et al.Agricultural Water Rights Trading and Virtual Water Export Compensation Coupling Model:A Case Study of on Inrigation District in China[J].Agricultural Wuter Management,2017(18):99-106.
[20] 骆进仁,刘姗.跨流域调水工程水资源供应链利益博弈分析[J].软科学,2018(5):49-54.
(1)参考汪林等的方法[12]和甘肃省各行业用水量确定用水净效益分摊系数。
[2] Mohammad A S,Tabieh J S,et al.Pricing Mechanism as a Tool for Water Policy Using a Linear Programming Model [J].Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences,2010 (8):3159-3173.
[3] 刘秀丽,陈锡康,张红霞,等.水资源影子价格计算和预测模型研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009(2):162-165.
[4]Hee Kyun Oh,Hee Chan Lee.Analyzing the Shadow Price of Industrial Water Resources and Water Shortage Scenario-An Application of Water Input-Output Linear Programming [J].Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences,2018(12):155-168.
[5] 何静,陈锡康.水资源影子价格动态投入产出优化模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(5):49-54.
[6] Jeremy J W.Natural Resources and Economic Policy in Developing Countries [J].The Annals of Regional Science,1987(6):6-8.
[7] 李海红,王光谦.水权交易中的水价估算[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2005(6):768-771.
[8] 陈锡康,等.中国9大流域水利投入占用产出表的编制及在流域经济研究中的应用[J].水利经济,2005(2):3-6.
[9] Xin B G,Sun M H.A Differential Oligopoly Game for Optimal Production Planning and Water Savings [J].European Journal of Operational Research,2018(1):206-217.
[10] 刘钢,等.准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017(4):151-159.
[11] 中国投入产出学会课题组,等.国民经济各部门水资源消耗及用水系数的投入产出分析——2002年投入产出表分析报告之五[J].统计研究,2007(3):20-25.
[12] 汪林,甘泓,倪红珍,等.水经济价值及其相关政策影响分析[M].北京:中国水利水电出版社,2009.95-158.
[13] Zhang W,Mao H,Yin H,et al.A Pricing Model for Water Rights Trading between Agricultural and Industrial Water Users in China [J].Journal of Water Supply Research and Technology-Aqua,2018(3):346-350.
[14] 吴凤平,于倩雯,沈俊源,等.基于市场导向的水权交易价格形成机制理论框架研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2018(7):17-25.
[15] FU Q,ZHAO K,LIU D,et al.The Application of a Water Rights Trading Model Based on Two-stage Interval-parameter Stochastic Programming[J].Water Resources Management,2016(7):2227-2243.
[16] 朱启林,申碧峰,孙静,等.基于优化配置的北京市水资源影子价格研究[J].人民黄河,2016(12):97-98.
[17] Bekchanov M,Bhaduri A,Ringler C,et al.Potential Gains from Water Rights Trading in the Aral Sea Basin [J].Agricultural Water Management,2015:41-56.
[18] 吴丹,吴凤平.基于水权初始配置的区域协同发展效度评价[J].软科学,2011(2):80-83.
[19] Wang Y B,Liu D,Cao X C,et al.Agricultural Water Rights Trading and Virtual Water Export Compensation Coupling Model:A Case Study of on Inrigation District in China[J].Agricultural Wuter Management,2017(18):99-106.
[20] 骆进仁,刘姗.跨流域调水工程水资源供应链利益博弈分析[J].软科学,2018(5):49-54.
(1)参考汪林等的方法[12]和甘肃省各行业用水量确定用水净效益分摊系数。