内部人减持对企业投资效率的影响研究
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摘要
以2011—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本对象,从市场迎合效应和融资约束效应的角度出发,考察了内部人减持对我国上市公司投资效率的影响。基于系统GMM的回归方法,研究结果发现:内部人减持在投资过度的情况下提高了公司的投资效率,在投资不足的情况下降低了公司的投资效率,支持了融资约束效应,不支持市场迎合效应。进一步的实证结果表明,融资约束在投资过度的情况下加强了内部人减持与公司投资效率的正相关性,在投资不足的情况下加强了内部人减持与公司投资效率的负相关性。
This paper takes the A-share listed company in China from 2011 to 2017 as the sample object to examine the impact of insider's reduction on the investment efficiency of listed companies from the perspective of market catering effect and financing constraint effect. Based on the system GMM,the research results show that the insider's reduction increases the investment efficiency of the company in the case of excessive investment,but reduces the investment efficiency of the company in the case of insufficient investment; it supports the financing constraint effect,but does not support the market catering effect. According to the further empirical results,financing constraints strengthen the positive correlation between insider's reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of excessive investment,and strengthen the negative correlation between insider's reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of insufficient investment.
This paper takes the A-share listed company in China from 2011 to 2017 as the sample object to examine the impact of insider's reduction on the investment efficiency of listed companies from the perspective of market catering effect and financing constraint effect. Based on the system GMM,the research results show that the insider's reduction increases the investment efficiency of the company in the case of excessive investment,but reduces the investment efficiency of the company in the case of insufficient investment; it supports the financing constraint effect,but does not support the market catering effect. According to the further empirical results,financing constraints strengthen the positive correlation between insider's reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of excessive investment,and strengthen the negative correlation between insider's reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of insufficient investment.
引文
[1]孙淑伟,梁上坤,阮刚铭,等.高管减持、信息压制与股价崩盘风险[J].金融研究,2017(11):175-190.
[2]罗付岩,沈中华.股权激励、代理成本与企业投资效率[J].财贸研究,2013,24(2):146-156.
[3] JOSEPH P. ROULSTONE D. Do Insider Trades Reflect both Contrarian Beliefs and Superior Knowledge about Future Cash Flow Realizations[J]. Journal of Accouting and Economics,2005,39(1):55-81.
[4]翟淑萍,廖筠,顾群,等.集团化运作的融资约束与投资效率研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验分析[J].经济与管理研究,2014(5):103-110.
[5]潘玉香,孟晓咪,赵梦琳.文化创意企业融资约束对投资效率影响的研究[J].中国软科学,2016(8):127-136.
[6]张悦玫,张芳,李延喜.会计稳健性、融资约束与投资效率[J].会计研究,2017(9):35-40+96.
[7] RICHARDSON S. Over-investment of Free cash Flow[J]. Review of Accounting studies,2006(6):159-189.
[8] WOOLDRIDGE J.计量经济学导论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2010:225-230.
[2]罗付岩,沈中华.股权激励、代理成本与企业投资效率[J].财贸研究,2013,24(2):146-156.
[3] JOSEPH P. ROULSTONE D. Do Insider Trades Reflect both Contrarian Beliefs and Superior Knowledge about Future Cash Flow Realizations[J]. Journal of Accouting and Economics,2005,39(1):55-81.
[4]翟淑萍,廖筠,顾群,等.集团化运作的融资约束与投资效率研究——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验分析[J].经济与管理研究,2014(5):103-110.
[5]潘玉香,孟晓咪,赵梦琳.文化创意企业融资约束对投资效率影响的研究[J].中国软科学,2016(8):127-136.
[6]张悦玫,张芳,李延喜.会计稳健性、融资约束与投资效率[J].会计研究,2017(9):35-40+96.
[7] RICHARDSON S. Over-investment of Free cash Flow[J]. Review of Accounting studies,2006(6):159-189.
[8] WOOLDRIDGE J.计量经济学导论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2010:225-230.