摘要
建立一种内部交易者可以与做市商或其他交易者等外部人共同分享部分风险资产信息的内部交易模型;证明了由有效定价规则和最优交易策略组成的线性Bayesian-Nash均衡的存在性。结果表明,如果外部人没有各自的私人信息,那么内部交易者的理性信息策略是不向外部人泄漏自己的任何私有信息。
In this paper,we study an insider trading model in which the insider possesses private information and shares some common signals of the underline risky asset with trading outsiders and market makers respectively,and establish the uniqueness and existence of a linear Bayesian-Nash equilibrium,consisting of effective pricing rule and optimal trading strategies. It shows that for a rational insider it is no need to leak any information to the outsiders without private information.
引文
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