实体企业金融化与审计定价:投入补偿还是风险补偿
|
摘要
结合我国实体企业"产融结合"和"脱实向虚"共存的现状,验证实体企业金融化对审计定价的影响及其内部作用机制。研究结果发现:实体企业金融化导致审计定价提升。其作用机制主要体现在,金融资产配置使得审计工作的复杂程度增加,行业内特定知识和审计经验的积累促使行业专长较强的注册会计师更加倾向于借助提高审计定价来获取投入补偿。同时,在一般状态下,金融资产配置形成的风险机制对审计定价缺乏调整能力。具体表现为,当被审计客户重要性程度较低时,注册会计师倾向于通过提升审计定价实现风险补偿;伴随被审计客户重要性程度增加,审计定价中的风险补偿部分逐渐消失。研究结果表明,金融资产收益较强的波动性和较差的持续性特征导致企业整体业绩波动形成的风险并未在审计定价中完全体现,审计师对不同重要性程度的客户投资金融资产形成的风险存在认知差异。
According to the audit insurance hypothesis,audit fee is the important economic relation between accounting firms and public companies. This paper examines the relationship between financialization of non-financial enterprises and audit pricing. The results show that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing. The mechanism that drives the result is as follows:with the increasing financialization of non-financial enterprises,audit work becomes more complex,as a result,industry specialist auditors will charge higher audit fees to cover the audit costs they spend without asking for the risk compensation. But when client bargaining power is low,the auditors tend to charge risk compensation,which vanishes as the client bargaining power grows. The results indicate that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing,and audit fees mainly represent audit input compensation rather than risk compensation.
According to the audit insurance hypothesis,audit fee is the important economic relation between accounting firms and public companies. This paper examines the relationship between financialization of non-financial enterprises and audit pricing. The results show that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing. The mechanism that drives the result is as follows:with the increasing financialization of non-financial enterprises,audit work becomes more complex,as a result,industry specialist auditors will charge higher audit fees to cover the audit costs they spend without asking for the risk compensation. But when client bargaining power is low,the auditors tend to charge risk compensation,which vanishes as the client bargaining power grows. The results indicate that financialization leads to an increase in audit pricing,and audit fees mainly represent audit input compensation rather than risk compensation.
引文
[1]Menon K,Williams J D. The use of audit committees for monitoring[J]. Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,1994,13(2):121-139.
[2]Eilifsen A,Knechel W R,Wallage P. Application of the Business Risk Audit Model:A Field Study[J]. Accounting Horizons,2001,15(3):193-201.
[3]Bell T B,Doogar R,Solomon I. Audit Labor Usage and Fees under Business Risk Auditing[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2010,46(4):729-760.
[4]Bell TB,Griffin J B. Commentary on Auditing High-Uncertainty Fair Value Estimates[J].Auditing AJournal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(1):147-155.
[5]Bratten B,Gaynor L M,McDaniel L,et al. The audit of fair values and other estimates:The effects of underlying environmental,task,and auditor-specific factors[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2013,32(sp1):7-44.
[6]王守海,吴双双,张盼盼.非活跃市场条件下公允价值审计研究[J].审计研究,2014(2):95-99.
[7]杨书怀.公允价值分层计量、环境不确定性与审计质量[J].审计研究,2018(2):104-112.
[8]朱松,徐浩峰,王爽.公允价值计量下的审计收费研究[J].审计与经济研究,2010(4):29-36.
[9]胡奕明,王雪婷,张瑾.金融资产配置动机:“蓄水池”或“替代”?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2017(1):181-194.
[10]谢家智,王文涛,江源.制造业金融化、政府控制与技术创新[J].经济学动态,2014(11):78-88.
[11]王红建,曹瑜强,杨庆,杨筝.实体企业金融化促进还是抑制了企业创新——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2017(1):155-166.
[12]张成思,张步昙.中国实业投资率下降之谜:经济金融化视角[J].经济研究,2016(12):32-46.
[13]杜勇,张欢,陈建英.金融化对实体企业未来主业发展的影响:促进还是抑制[J].中国工业经济,2017(12):113-131.
[14]宋军,陆旸.非货币金融资产和经营收益率的U形关系——来自我国上市非金融公司的金融化证据[J].金融研究,2015(6):111-127.
[15]王守海,刘志强,张叶,吴韶珺.公允价值、行业专长与审计费用[J].审计研究,2017(2):48-56.
[16]徐经长,汪猛.企业创新能够提高审计质量吗?[J].会计研究,2017(12):80-86,97.
[17]叶陈刚,孔慧平.现代风险导向审计应用探析[J].中国注册会计师,2008(5):74-76.
[18]陈毓圭.对风险导向审计方法的由来及其发展的认识[J].会计研究,2004(2):58-63.
[19]耿建新,朱友干.与公允价值确认相关的审计证据研究[J].审计研究,2008(5):50-54.
[20]Hogan C E,Wilkins M S. Evidence on the audit risk model:Do auditors increase audit fees in the presence of internal control deficiencies?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2008,25(1):219-242.
[21]Keefe T B O,King R D,Gaver K M.Audit fees,industry specialization,and compliance with GAAS reporting standards[J].Auditing,1994,13(2):41-53.
[22]韩晓梅,周玮.客户业绩波动与审计风险防范:信息鉴证还是保险功能?[J].会计研究,2013(9):71-77,97.
[23]韩维芳.审计风险、审计师个人的经验与审计质量[J].审计与经济研究,2017(3):35-45,12
[24]彭俞超,韩珣,李建军.经济政策不确定性与企业金融化[J].中国工业经济,2018(1):137-155.
[25]Fung S Y K,Gul FA,Krishnan J. City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization,Economies of Scale,and Audit Pricing[J].Accounting Review,2012,87(4):1281-1307.
[26]Craswell A T,Francis J R,Taylor S L. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,1995,20(3):297-322.
[27]陈胜蓝,马慧.竞争压力、规模经济性与会计师事务所行业专长溢价[J].会计研究,2015(5):87-93,95.
[28]Zeff S A,Fossum R L. An Analysis of Large Audit Clients[J]. Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298-320.
[2]Eilifsen A,Knechel W R,Wallage P. Application of the Business Risk Audit Model:A Field Study[J]. Accounting Horizons,2001,15(3):193-201.
[3]Bell T B,Doogar R,Solomon I. Audit Labor Usage and Fees under Business Risk Auditing[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,2010,46(4):729-760.
[4]Bell TB,Griffin J B. Commentary on Auditing High-Uncertainty Fair Value Estimates[J].Auditing AJournal of Practice&Theory,2012,31(1):147-155.
[5]Bratten B,Gaynor L M,McDaniel L,et al. The audit of fair values and other estimates:The effects of underlying environmental,task,and auditor-specific factors[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2013,32(sp1):7-44.
[6]王守海,吴双双,张盼盼.非活跃市场条件下公允价值审计研究[J].审计研究,2014(2):95-99.
[7]杨书怀.公允价值分层计量、环境不确定性与审计质量[J].审计研究,2018(2):104-112.
[8]朱松,徐浩峰,王爽.公允价值计量下的审计收费研究[J].审计与经济研究,2010(4):29-36.
[9]胡奕明,王雪婷,张瑾.金融资产配置动机:“蓄水池”或“替代”?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2017(1):181-194.
[10]谢家智,王文涛,江源.制造业金融化、政府控制与技术创新[J].经济学动态,2014(11):78-88.
[11]王红建,曹瑜强,杨庆,杨筝.实体企业金融化促进还是抑制了企业创新——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2017(1):155-166.
[12]张成思,张步昙.中国实业投资率下降之谜:经济金融化视角[J].经济研究,2016(12):32-46.
[13]杜勇,张欢,陈建英.金融化对实体企业未来主业发展的影响:促进还是抑制[J].中国工业经济,2017(12):113-131.
[14]宋军,陆旸.非货币金融资产和经营收益率的U形关系——来自我国上市非金融公司的金融化证据[J].金融研究,2015(6):111-127.
[15]王守海,刘志强,张叶,吴韶珺.公允价值、行业专长与审计费用[J].审计研究,2017(2):48-56.
[16]徐经长,汪猛.企业创新能够提高审计质量吗?[J].会计研究,2017(12):80-86,97.
[17]叶陈刚,孔慧平.现代风险导向审计应用探析[J].中国注册会计师,2008(5):74-76.
[18]陈毓圭.对风险导向审计方法的由来及其发展的认识[J].会计研究,2004(2):58-63.
[19]耿建新,朱友干.与公允价值确认相关的审计证据研究[J].审计研究,2008(5):50-54.
[20]Hogan C E,Wilkins M S. Evidence on the audit risk model:Do auditors increase audit fees in the presence of internal control deficiencies?[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2008,25(1):219-242.
[21]Keefe T B O,King R D,Gaver K M.Audit fees,industry specialization,and compliance with GAAS reporting standards[J].Auditing,1994,13(2):41-53.
[22]韩晓梅,周玮.客户业绩波动与审计风险防范:信息鉴证还是保险功能?[J].会计研究,2013(9):71-77,97.
[23]韩维芳.审计风险、审计师个人的经验与审计质量[J].审计与经济研究,2017(3):35-45,12
[24]彭俞超,韩珣,李建军.经济政策不确定性与企业金融化[J].中国工业经济,2018(1):137-155.
[25]Fung S Y K,Gul FA,Krishnan J. City-Level Auditor Industry Specialization,Economies of Scale,and Audit Pricing[J].Accounting Review,2012,87(4):1281-1307.
[26]Craswell A T,Francis J R,Taylor S L. Auditor brand name reputations and industry specializations[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,1995,20(3):297-322.
[27]陈胜蓝,马慧.竞争压力、规模经济性与会计师事务所行业专长溢价[J].会计研究,2015(5):87-93,95.
[28]Zeff S A,Fossum R L. An Analysis of Large Audit Clients[J]. Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298-320.