官员变更与雾霾污染——来自地级市的证据
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摘要
雾霾治理是重大的民生工程,然而现有文献缺乏关注地方领导人变更对雾霾污染的影响。文章利用2003-2016年中国281个地级城市的面板数据,借助于地方领导人变更这一具有"准自然实验"性质的事件,检验了官员变更对雾霾污染的影响。研究发现,官员变更显著加剧了雾霾污染水平,而这一效应由市长变更所导致,主要发生在东部、中部和资源型城市。同时,官员变更对雾霾污染的影响因官员个体特征而存在差异,在外地官员的子样本中更为显著,并且更年轻、59岁特定年龄的市长有利于缓解官员变更对雾霾污染的加剧作用。进一步,官员变更也显著增加雾霾污染的波动水平,降低环境规制强度与增加固定资产投资是官员变更加剧雾霾污染的两个重要影响因素。文章的结论丰富了官员与污染相关的政治与环境经济学文献,为构建雾霾治理的长效机制提供了有益的政策启示。
Given the fact that local governments in China have the power to control resources in their jurisdictions and have a strong influence on local development,their leaders' turnover may affect the quality of the local environment. However,the existing literature rarely pays attention to the effect of local government leaders' turnover on haze pollution,as well as the specific impact mechanism. To this end,this paper uses a panel data of 281 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2016,and then examines the impact of officials' turnover on haze pollution through a quasi-natural experiment of local government leaders' turnover. The results show that:(1)Compared with cities without officials' turnover,PM2.5 concentration in the cities with officials' turnover increases by 1.12% on average,suggesting that officials' turnover significantly aggravate haze pollution;(2)This promotion effect is mainly caused by the mayor's turnover,while the secretary' turnover has no significant impact on haze pollution,which stems from the different division of labor between the two types of leaders;(3)The impact of officials' turnover on haze pollution is heterogeneous. Specifically,the promotion effect is more significant in the sub-samples of eastern,central cities,and coastal resource cities;(4)The effect of officials' turnover on haze pollution varies due to the individual characteristics of officials,that is,it is more significant in sub-samples of nonlocal officials,and the younger,59-year-old mayor is conducive to alleviating the promotion effect of the mayor's turnover on haze pollution;(5)Officials' turnover significantly increases the fluctuation of haze pollution,and the influence of the secretary on the environmental quality is higher than that of the mayor;(6)Relaxing the environmental regulation intensity and increasing fixed-capital investment are two important mechanisms for officials' turnover to promote haze pollution. Therefore,frequent changes of local officials should be avoided and the continuity of environmental policy implementation should be maintained. At the same time,in order to strengthen the binding force of local government officials on pollution reduction,the central government should build a diversified performance appraisal system oriented by green development. In this way,the newly appointed local officials will strive to find an effective balancing mechanism between economic development and environmental protection.Overall,this paper enriches the political and environmental economics literature related to officials and pollution. Meanwhile,it is helpful to understand the relationship between local government behavior and environmental pollution,and has important policy implications for official governance and haze pollution prevention.
Given the fact that local governments in China have the power to control resources in their jurisdictions and have a strong influence on local development,their leaders' turnover may affect the quality of the local environment. However,the existing literature rarely pays attention to the effect of local government leaders' turnover on haze pollution,as well as the specific impact mechanism. To this end,this paper uses a panel data of 281 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2016,and then examines the impact of officials' turnover on haze pollution through a quasi-natural experiment of local government leaders' turnover. The results show that:(1)Compared with cities without officials' turnover,PM2.5 concentration in the cities with officials' turnover increases by 1.12% on average,suggesting that officials' turnover significantly aggravate haze pollution;(2)This promotion effect is mainly caused by the mayor's turnover,while the secretary' turnover has no significant impact on haze pollution,which stems from the different division of labor between the two types of leaders;(3)The impact of officials' turnover on haze pollution is heterogeneous. Specifically,the promotion effect is more significant in the sub-samples of eastern,central cities,and coastal resource cities;(4)The effect of officials' turnover on haze pollution varies due to the individual characteristics of officials,that is,it is more significant in sub-samples of nonlocal officials,and the younger,59-year-old mayor is conducive to alleviating the promotion effect of the mayor's turnover on haze pollution;(5)Officials' turnover significantly increases the fluctuation of haze pollution,and the influence of the secretary on the environmental quality is higher than that of the mayor;(6)Relaxing the environmental regulation intensity and increasing fixed-capital investment are two important mechanisms for officials' turnover to promote haze pollution. Therefore,frequent changes of local officials should be avoided and the continuity of environmental policy implementation should be maintained. At the same time,in order to strengthen the binding force of local government officials on pollution reduction,the central government should build a diversified performance appraisal system oriented by green development. In this way,the newly appointed local officials will strive to find an effective balancing mechanism between economic development and environmental protection.Overall,this paper enriches the political and environmental economics literature related to officials and pollution. Meanwhile,it is helpful to understand the relationship between local government behavior and environmental pollution,and has important policy implications for official governance and haze pollution prevention.
引文
[1]陈诗一，陈登科.雾霾污染、政府治理与经济高质量发展[J].经济研究，2018,(2).
[2]郭峰，石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究，2017,(7).
[3]黄寿峰.财政分权对中国雾霾影响的研究[J].世界经济，2017,(2).
[4]雷平，曹黎明，赵连荣.乡土官员对区域经济与环境发展路径的影响[J].中国人口?资源与环境，2018,(4).
[5]李后建.官员更替、寻租行为与企业联盟研发投入[J].产业经济研究，2016,(3).
[6]梁平汉，高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界，2014,(6).
[7]刘海洋，林令涛，黄顺武.地方官员变更与企业兴衰——来自地级市层面的证据[J].中国工业经济，2017,(1).
[8]陆铭，冯皓.集聚与减排：城市规模差距影响工业污染强度的经验研究[J].世界经济，2014,(7).
[9]罗党论，佘国满.地方官员变更与地方债发行[J].经济研究，2015,(6).
[10]潘越，陈秋平，戴亦一.绿色绩效考核与区域环境治理——来自官员更替的证据[J].厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2017,(1).
[11]钱先航，徐业坤.官员更替、政治身份与民营上市公司的风险承担[J].经济学（季刊），2014,(4).
[12]秦蒙，刘修岩，仝怡婷.蔓延的城市空间是否加重了雾霾污染——来自中国PM2.5数据的经验分析[J].财贸经济，2016,(11).
[13]邵帅，李欣，曹建华，等.中国雾霾污染治理的经济政策选择——基于空间溢出效应的视角[J].经济研究，2016,(9).
[14]沈坤荣，金刚.中国地方政府环境治理的政策效应——基于“河长制”演进的研究[J].中国社会科学，2018,(5).
[15]王芳.正式制度、非正式制度与公共品供给——来自地级市的证据[J].世界经济文汇，2018,(4).
[16]王贤彬，徐现祥，李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学（季刊），2009,(4).
[17]王贤彬，徐现祥，周靖祥.晋升激励与投资周期——来自中国省级官员的证据[J].中国工业经济，2010,(12).
[18]文雁兵.新官上任三把火：存在中国式政治经济周期吗[J].财贸经济，2014,(11).
[19]吴培材，王忠.官员更替对城市环境污染的影响——基于地级市面板数据的分析[J].城市问题，2016,(5).
[20]于文超，何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故——基于官员政绩诉求的视角[J].世界经济文汇，2013,(2).
[21]张华，丰超，刘贯春.中国式环境联邦主义：环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J].财经研究，2017,(9).
[22]张楠，卢洪友.官员垂直交流与环境治理——来自中国109个城市市委书记（市长）的经验证据[J].公共管理学报，2016,(1).
[23]Barla P,Perelman S. Sulphur emissions and productivity growth in industrialised countries[J]. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,2005,76(2):275–300.
[24]Cai H B,Chen Y Y,Gong Q. Polluting thy neighbor:Unintended consequences of China’s pollution reduction mandates[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2016a,76:86–104.
[25]Cai X Q,Lu Y,Wu M Q,et al. Does environmental regulation drive away inbound foreign direct investment?Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2016b,123:73–85.
[26]Chen Y Y,Ebenstein A,Greenstone M,et al. Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,2013,110(32):12936–12941.
[27]Ebenstein A,Fan M Y,Greenstone M,et al. New evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,2017,114(9):10384–10389.
[28]Kahn M E,Li P,Zhao D X. Water pollution progress at borders:The role of changes in China’s political promotion incentives[J]. American Economic Journal:Economic Policy,2015,7(4):223–242.
[29]Sigman H. Decentralization and environmental quality:An international analysis of water pollution levels and variation[J]. Land Economics,2014,90(1):114–130.
[30]Wu J,Deng Y,Huang J,et al. Incentives and outcomes:China’s environmental policy[R]. NBER Working Paper,No. 18754,2013.
[31]Zhang K,Zhang Z Y,Liang Q M. An empirical analysis of the green paradox in China:From the perspective of fiscal decentralization[J]. Energy Policy,2017,103:203–211.
[32]Zheng S Q,Kahn M E,Sun W Z,et al. Incentives for China’s urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities:The role of the central government and public environmentalism[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,2014,47:61–71.
(1)样本中，市长年龄的最大值为61岁，考虑到“59岁”现象是离任之前的一种特定现象，因此本文将“59岁”现象这一变量定义为，如果市长大于等于59岁，则赋值为1，否则为0。可以说，本文考察的是一种广义上的“59岁”现象。
[2]郭峰，石庆玲.官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J].经济研究，2017,(7).
[3]黄寿峰.财政分权对中国雾霾影响的研究[J].世界经济，2017,(2).
[4]雷平，曹黎明，赵连荣.乡土官员对区域经济与环境发展路径的影响[J].中国人口?资源与环境，2018,(4).
[5]李后建.官员更替、寻租行为与企业联盟研发投入[J].产业经济研究，2016,(3).
[6]梁平汉，高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界，2014,(6).
[7]刘海洋，林令涛，黄顺武.地方官员变更与企业兴衰——来自地级市层面的证据[J].中国工业经济，2017,(1).
[8]陆铭，冯皓.集聚与减排：城市规模差距影响工业污染强度的经验研究[J].世界经济，2014,(7).
[9]罗党论，佘国满.地方官员变更与地方债发行[J].经济研究，2015,(6).
[10]潘越，陈秋平，戴亦一.绿色绩效考核与区域环境治理——来自官员更替的证据[J].厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2017,(1).
[11]钱先航，徐业坤.官员更替、政治身份与民营上市公司的风险承担[J].经济学（季刊），2014,(4).
[12]秦蒙，刘修岩，仝怡婷.蔓延的城市空间是否加重了雾霾污染——来自中国PM2.5数据的经验分析[J].财贸经济，2016,(11).
[13]邵帅，李欣，曹建华，等.中国雾霾污染治理的经济政策选择——基于空间溢出效应的视角[J].经济研究，2016,(9).
[14]沈坤荣，金刚.中国地方政府环境治理的政策效应——基于“河长制”演进的研究[J].中国社会科学，2018,(5).
[15]王芳.正式制度、非正式制度与公共品供给——来自地级市的证据[J].世界经济文汇，2018,(4).
[16]王贤彬，徐现祥，李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学（季刊），2009,(4).
[17]王贤彬，徐现祥，周靖祥.晋升激励与投资周期——来自中国省级官员的证据[J].中国工业经济，2010,(12).
[18]文雁兵.新官上任三把火：存在中国式政治经济周期吗[J].财贸经济，2014,(11).
[19]吴培材，王忠.官员更替对城市环境污染的影响——基于地级市面板数据的分析[J].城市问题，2016,(5).
[20]于文超，何勤英.辖区经济增长绩效与环境污染事故——基于官员政绩诉求的视角[J].世界经济文汇，2013,(2).
[21]张华，丰超，刘贯春.中国式环境联邦主义：环境分权对碳排放的影响研究[J].财经研究，2017,(9).
[22]张楠，卢洪友.官员垂直交流与环境治理——来自中国109个城市市委书记（市长）的经验证据[J].公共管理学报，2016,(1).
[23]Barla P,Perelman S. Sulphur emissions and productivity growth in industrialised countries[J]. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,2005,76(2):275–300.
[24]Cai H B,Chen Y Y,Gong Q. Polluting thy neighbor:Unintended consequences of China’s pollution reduction mandates[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2016a,76:86–104.
[25]Cai X Q,Lu Y,Wu M Q,et al. Does environmental regulation drive away inbound foreign direct investment?Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2016b,123:73–85.
[26]Chen Y Y,Ebenstein A,Greenstone M,et al. Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,2013,110(32):12936–12941.
[27]Ebenstein A,Fan M Y,Greenstone M,et al. New evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River Policy[J]. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,2017,114(9):10384–10389.
[28]Kahn M E,Li P,Zhao D X. Water pollution progress at borders:The role of changes in China’s political promotion incentives[J]. American Economic Journal:Economic Policy,2015,7(4):223–242.
[29]Sigman H. Decentralization and environmental quality:An international analysis of water pollution levels and variation[J]. Land Economics,2014,90(1):114–130.
[30]Wu J,Deng Y,Huang J,et al. Incentives and outcomes:China’s environmental policy[R]. NBER Working Paper,No. 18754,2013.
[31]Zhang K,Zhang Z Y,Liang Q M. An empirical analysis of the green paradox in China:From the perspective of fiscal decentralization[J]. Energy Policy,2017,103:203–211.
[32]Zheng S Q,Kahn M E,Sun W Z,et al. Incentives for China’s urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities:The role of the central government and public environmentalism[J]. Regional Science and Urban Economics,2014,47:61–71.
(1)样本中，市长年龄的最大值为61岁，考虑到“59岁”现象是离任之前的一种特定现象，因此本文将“59岁”现象这一变量定义为，如果市长大于等于59岁，则赋值为1，否则为0。可以说，本文考察的是一种广义上的“59岁”现象。