美国“多层次”证券法公共执法制度的实证分析
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摘要
本文聚焦于美国"多层次"的证券法公共执行制度,即公共机构通过发起执法程序使得违法行为人承担法律责任的机制。美国证券交易委员会、金融业监管局和各州证券监管机构都可以独立执行证券法,多层次的公共执法制度保证证券法得到有效执行。对上述机构执法活动投入和产出数据的分析显示,美国证券交易委员会的执法投入和产出水平都较高,并且保持较为稳定的增长率。它还通过设立公平基金,承担着赔偿投资者的职责。而美国金融业监管局作为自律监管机构,负责对经纪—自营商进行一线监管和自律处罚。美国各州的证券监管机构则有权起诉证券市场的欺诈行为人。多层次执法制度最小化"监管失灵"对证券执法的负面影响,保障了对证券市场违法犯罪行为的威慑力。
This paper focuses on the "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime of securities law in the United States, which mainly concerns the proceedings that public agencies initiate to make violators legally liable. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and state securities regulators can enforce securities laws independently, which ensures that securities laws are effectively enforced. An analysis of the enforcement input and output of these agencies shows that the SEC has a high level of enforcement inputs and outputs and maintains a relatively stable growth rate. It also has the responsibility of compensating investors through the establishment of fair funds. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, as a self-regulatory body, is responsible for regulating broker-dealers. Securities regulators in U.S. states could prosecute fraudsters in the securities market. The "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime minimizes the negative impact of "regulatory failure" on securities market and guarantees the deterrent effect against illegal activities.
This paper focuses on the "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime of securities law in the United States, which mainly concerns the proceedings that public agencies initiate to make violators legally liable. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and state securities regulators can enforce securities laws independently, which ensures that securities laws are effectively enforced. An analysis of the enforcement input and output of these agencies shows that the SEC has a high level of enforcement inputs and outputs and maintains a relatively stable growth rate. It also has the responsibility of compensating investors through the establishment of fair funds. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, as a self-regulatory body, is responsible for regulating broker-dealers. Securities regulators in U.S. states could prosecute fraudsters in the securities market. The "multi-enforcer" public enforcement regime minimizes the negative impact of "regulatory failure" on securities market and guarantees the deterrent effect against illegal activities.
引文
[1]Gary Becker,Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach,76 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 169-217(1968）.
[2]徐文鸣：《证券民事诉讼制度的实证研究》，《中国政法大学学报》2017年第2期，第74-83,160页。
[3]John Coffee,Law and the Market:The Impact of Enforcement,156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 229-311(2007）.
[4]美国的独立监管机构与内阁行政机构存在显著的区别，它们拥有“半立法、半行政、半司法权力”，除了受到司法审查之外，这些独立监管机构处于事前没有权力制约的状态，是“无上级的第四部门”，见席涛：《法律、监管与市场》，《政法论坛》2011年第3期，第47-65页。
[5]比较证监会和SEC执法活动的研究，见徐文鸣，朱良玉：《中美证券法公共执行机制比较研究--基于监管机构投入产出的实证分析》，《财经法学》2017年第3期，第132-145页。
[6]Paul Atkins and Bradley Bondi,Evaluating the Mission:A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program,13 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE&FINANCIAL LAW 367-417(2008）.
[7]Greater Attention Needed to Enhance Communication and Utilization of Resources in the Division of Enforcement,pp.17-18.
[8]SEC,SEC HR Database(2010）.
[9]SEC,SEC HR Database(2010）.
[10]SEC,2009 Performance and Accountability Report(2009）.
[11]证券市场频发的丑闻成了SEC预算增长的催化剂，为了执行《多德-弗兰克法案》，SEC的2010年年度预算增长了约60.4%。
[12]SEC将其预算支出与四个战略目标相挂钩。其中，“促进遵守和执行联邦证券法”列为最重要的战略目标，安排了总额高达9.549亿美元的预算。其他三个战略目标和预算安排分别为“建立和保证有效的监管环境”（1.691亿美元）、“促进投资获得决策所需信息”（2.136亿美元）和“通过统筹人力、信息和金融资本提高证监会的绩效”（2.46亿美元）。See SEC Agency Financial Report:Fiscal Year2015,p.49.
[13]SEC Agency Financial Report:Fiscal Years 2009-2016.
[14]需要说明的是，SEC的执法行动并不仅仅针对上市公司，还包括金融中介机构和投资者等。因而，使用上市公司的数量对执法产出进行标准化是为了调整证券市场的规模。
[15]在1984年以前，SEC并不享有货币处罚权。See Brother Can You Spare$8.9 Billion?Making Sense of SEC Civil Money Penalties,http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/7b9cf03a-e90d-4bba-a373-bb494b063f9b/Presentation/Publication Attachment/e5d51e6b-f798-4bf7-80beebeb853f0ad9/SEC_alert_021114.pdf(last visited May 25,2019).
[16]在2000年至2013年间，上市公司被告在发行人报告和披露违规案件中支付的平均货币处罚为5 790万美元。See Sonia Steinway,SEC Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,but What Do They Say-A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach,124 YALE LAWJOURNAL 209-232(2014）.
[17]Jonathan Karpoff,Scott Lee and Gerald Martin,The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,43 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS 581-611,582(2005）.
[18]Jonathan Karpoff,Scott Lee and Gerald Martin,The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation,88 JOURNAL OFFINANCIAL ECONOMICS 193-215,194(2008）.
[19]Randolph Beatty,Howard Bunsis and John Hand,The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters,50 JOURNALOF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 151-186,152(1998）.
[20]SEC通过公平基金赔偿投资者对我国证券市场投资者赔偿的制度设计有一定的借鉴意义，对该问题的讨论分析，见徐文鸣：《证券民事诉讼与投资者赔偿--基于虚假陈述案件的实证分析》，《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第3期，第67-75页。
[21]《多德-弗兰克法案》第929B章规定即使不存在追缴的非法获利，SEC仍然可以将罚款用于赔偿投资者。See 15 U.S.C.§7246(a）.
[22]Barbara Black,Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?63 BUSINESS LAWYER 317-346(2008）.
[23]Verity Winship,Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors,60 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1103-1144,1108(2008）.
[24]郭雳：《证券执法中的公共补偿--美国公平基金制度的探析与借鉴》，《清华法学》2018年第6期，第59-78页。
[25]Urska Velikonja,Public Compensation for Private Harm:Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions,67 STANFORD LAW REVIEW331-395(2015）.
[26]See Adam Zimmerman,Distributing Justice,86 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 500-572(2011）.
[27]Paul Mahoney,The Exchange as Regulator,83 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1453-1500(1997）.
[28]See http://www.finra.org/about.
[29]Barbara Black,Punishing Bad Brokers:Self-Regulation and FINRA Sanctions,8 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF CORPORATE,FINANCIAL&COMMERCIAL LAW 23-55(2013）.
[30]See http://www.finra.org/industry/member-regulation.
[31]See http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement.
[32]See http://www.finra.org/industry/decisions.
[33]See 2018 FINRA Annual Financial Report,p.26.
[34]监管收入包括交易费、总收益评估、人事评估和地区办公室评估收入等。
[35]用户收入包括会员首次注册和年度注册费、资格检查费等。
[36]合同服务收入主要指FINRA提供的监管服务收费。
[37]总收入等于净收入、利息和红利收入、投资收入和其他投资的权益收入之和。
[38]总支出等于总费用和其他费用之和。
[39]See FINRA 2010 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report,p.7.
[40]See https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics.2017年、2018年雇员数为3500、3400。
[41]See FINRA 2015 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report,p.20.
[42]“联邦主义理论”主要探讨联邦和州如何划分监管权限，相关讨论主要集中于美国各州公司法之间的竞争，存在“向上竞争”（Race to the top）和“向下竞争”（Race to the bottom）两种观点。See William Cary,Federalism and Corporate Law:Reflections Upon Delaware,83 YALE LAW JOURNAL 663-705(1974);Ralph Winter,State Law,Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation,6 JOURNAL OFLEGAL STUDIES 251-292(1977）.
[43]本小节对州监管机构的定义包括州证券监管机构和州检察官（State attorneys general），包括50个独立的州证券监管机构。对SEC和州监管者执法行为的讨论，见Margaret Lemos,State Enforcement of Federal Law,86 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 698-765(2011）。
[44]James Landis,The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 29-49(1959）.
[45]Amanda M.Rose,State Enforcement of National Policy:A Contextual Approach,97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1343-1415(2013）.
[46]Amanda M.Rose and Larry J.Le Blanc,Policing Public Companies:An Empirical Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators,65 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 395-442(2013）.
[47]Michael Bloomberg and Charles Schumer,Sustaining New York's and the US’Global Financial Services Leadership(2007),35-36,www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.(last visited May 25,2019).
[48]SEC Memorandum of Inquiry PI No.09-38,http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/pi-09-38.pdf.
[49]Wenming Xu,Jianwei Chen and Guangdong Xu,An Empirical Analysis of the Public Enforcement of Securities Law in China:Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle,18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW,367-389(2017).
[2]徐文鸣：《证券民事诉讼制度的实证研究》，《中国政法大学学报》2017年第2期，第74-83,160页。
[3]John Coffee,Law and the Market:The Impact of Enforcement,156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 229-311(2007）.
[4]美国的独立监管机构与内阁行政机构存在显著的区别，它们拥有“半立法、半行政、半司法权力”，除了受到司法审查之外，这些独立监管机构处于事前没有权力制约的状态，是“无上级的第四部门”，见席涛：《法律、监管与市场》，《政法论坛》2011年第3期，第47-65页。
[5]比较证监会和SEC执法活动的研究，见徐文鸣，朱良玉：《中美证券法公共执行机制比较研究--基于监管机构投入产出的实证分析》，《财经法学》2017年第3期，第132-145页。
[6]Paul Atkins and Bradley Bondi,Evaluating the Mission:A Critical Review of the History and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program,13 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE&FINANCIAL LAW 367-417(2008）.
[7]Greater Attention Needed to Enhance Communication and Utilization of Resources in the Division of Enforcement,pp.17-18.
[8]SEC,SEC HR Database(2010）.
[9]SEC,SEC HR Database(2010）.
[10]SEC,2009 Performance and Accountability Report(2009）.
[11]证券市场频发的丑闻成了SEC预算增长的催化剂，为了执行《多德-弗兰克法案》，SEC的2010年年度预算增长了约60.4%。
[12]SEC将其预算支出与四个战略目标相挂钩。其中，“促进遵守和执行联邦证券法”列为最重要的战略目标，安排了总额高达9.549亿美元的预算。其他三个战略目标和预算安排分别为“建立和保证有效的监管环境”（1.691亿美元）、“促进投资获得决策所需信息”（2.136亿美元）和“通过统筹人力、信息和金融资本提高证监会的绩效”（2.46亿美元）。See SEC Agency Financial Report:Fiscal Year2015,p.49.
[13]SEC Agency Financial Report:Fiscal Years 2009-2016.
[14]需要说明的是，SEC的执法行动并不仅仅针对上市公司，还包括金融中介机构和投资者等。因而，使用上市公司的数量对执法产出进行标准化是为了调整证券市场的规模。
[15]在1984年以前，SEC并不享有货币处罚权。See Brother Can You Spare$8.9 Billion?Making Sense of SEC Civil Money Penalties,http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/7b9cf03a-e90d-4bba-a373-bb494b063f9b/Presentation/Publication Attachment/e5d51e6b-f798-4bf7-80beebeb853f0ad9/SEC_alert_021114.pdf(last visited May 25,2019).
[16]在2000年至2013年间，上市公司被告在发行人报告和披露违规案件中支付的平均货币处罚为5 790万美元。See Sonia Steinway,SEC Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,but What Do They Say-A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach,124 YALE LAWJOURNAL 209-232(2014）.
[17]Jonathan Karpoff,Scott Lee and Gerald Martin,The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books,43 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVEANALYSIS 581-611,582(2005）.
[18]Jonathan Karpoff,Scott Lee and Gerald Martin,The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation,88 JOURNAL OFFINANCIAL ECONOMICS 193-215,194(2008）.
[19]Randolph Beatty,Howard Bunsis and John Hand,The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters,50 JOURNALOF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 151-186,152(1998）.
[20]SEC通过公平基金赔偿投资者对我国证券市场投资者赔偿的制度设计有一定的借鉴意义，对该问题的讨论分析，见徐文鸣：《证券民事诉讼与投资者赔偿--基于虚假陈述案件的实证分析》，《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2017年第3期，第67-75页。
[21]《多德-弗兰克法案》第929B章规定即使不存在追缴的非法获利，SEC仍然可以将罚款用于赔偿投资者。See 15 U.S.C.§7246(a）.
[22]Barbara Black,Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?63 BUSINESS LAWYER 317-346(2008）.
[23]Verity Winship,Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors,60 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 1103-1144,1108(2008）.
[24]郭雳：《证券执法中的公共补偿--美国公平基金制度的探析与借鉴》，《清华法学》2018年第6期，第59-78页。
[25]Urska Velikonja,Public Compensation for Private Harm:Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions,67 STANFORD LAW REVIEW331-395(2015）.
[26]See Adam Zimmerman,Distributing Justice,86 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 500-572(2011）.
[27]Paul Mahoney,The Exchange as Regulator,83 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1453-1500(1997）.
[28]See http://www.finra.org/about.
[29]Barbara Black,Punishing Bad Brokers:Self-Regulation and FINRA Sanctions,8 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF CORPORATE,FINANCIAL&COMMERCIAL LAW 23-55(2013）.
[30]See http://www.finra.org/industry/member-regulation.
[31]See http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement.
[32]See http://www.finra.org/industry/decisions.
[33]See 2018 FINRA Annual Financial Report,p.26.
[34]监管收入包括交易费、总收益评估、人事评估和地区办公室评估收入等。
[35]用户收入包括会员首次注册和年度注册费、资格检查费等。
[36]合同服务收入主要指FINRA提供的监管服务收费。
[37]总收入等于净收入、利息和红利收入、投资收入和其他投资的权益收入之和。
[38]总支出等于总费用和其他费用之和。
[39]See FINRA 2010 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report,p.7.
[40]See https://www.finra.org/newsroom/statistics.2017年、2018年雇员数为3500、3400。
[41]See FINRA 2015 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report,p.20.
[42]“联邦主义理论”主要探讨联邦和州如何划分监管权限，相关讨论主要集中于美国各州公司法之间的竞争，存在“向上竞争”（Race to the top）和“向下竞争”（Race to the bottom）两种观点。See William Cary,Federalism and Corporate Law:Reflections Upon Delaware,83 YALE LAW JOURNAL 663-705(1974);Ralph Winter,State Law,Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation,6 JOURNAL OFLEGAL STUDIES 251-292(1977）.
[43]本小节对州监管机构的定义包括州证券监管机构和州检察官（State attorneys general），包括50个独立的州证券监管机构。对SEC和州监管者执法行为的讨论，见Margaret Lemos,State Enforcement of Federal Law,86 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 698-765(2011）。
[44]James Landis,The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 29-49(1959）.
[45]Amanda M.Rose,State Enforcement of National Policy:A Contextual Approach,97 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1343-1415(2013）.
[46]Amanda M.Rose and Larry J.Le Blanc,Policing Public Companies:An Empirical Examination of the Enforcement Landscape and the Role Played by State Securities Regulators,65 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW 395-442(2013）.
[47]Michael Bloomberg and Charles Schumer,Sustaining New York's and the US’Global Financial Services Leadership(2007),35-36,www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.(last visited May 25,2019).
[48]SEC Memorandum of Inquiry PI No.09-38,http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/pi-09-38.pdf.
[49]Wenming Xu,Jianwei Chen and Guangdong Xu,An Empirical Analysis of the Public Enforcement of Securities Law in China:Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle,18 EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW,367-389(2017).