异质委托情境下国企过度自信高管激励合同设计
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摘要
考虑国企高管代理人表现出的过度精确和过高估计两种不同过度自信心理形式,分析了国企高管在异质委托情境下,不同过度自信形式对国有股东和非国有股东纳什均衡合同中最优契约激励系数的影响机理。通过构建包含国有股东、非国有股东和国企高管三方博弈模型发现:在异质委托情境下,国企高管过度精确的自信行为提高了纳什均衡合同中促进经济任务努力的最优激励系数,而对纳什均衡合同中促进社会任务努力的最优激励系数没有影响;国企高管过高估计的自信行为提高了纳什均衡合同中促进社会任务努力的最优激励系数,而对纳什均衡合同中促进经济任务努力的最优激励系数没有影响。从国企高管代理人的努力类型来看,过度精确的自信行为降低了自身对经济任务的努力水平,而过高估计的自信行为提高了自身对社会任务的努力水平。在我国当前推进国有企业混合所有制改革背景下,该契约理论模型将委托代理参与人扩展到包含国有股东、非国有股东和国企高管三方参与人的基础上,充分考虑了非理性国企高管对国企双重任务的行为差异,研究结论可对完善国企治理及高管薪酬机制提供新的参考。
In the context of heterogeneous agent of state-owned enterprises, this paper introduced the overconfidence behavior of excessive accuracy and high estimation of state-owned enterprises' executives, and analyzed the impact of agents' different overconfidence behavior on the optimal incentive contract design of the Nash equilibrium contracts between governmental and social shareholders. By developing a trial-gaming model including state-owned shareholders, non state-owned shareholders, and state-owned enterprises' executives, this study revealed that the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior of executives of state-owned enterprises helped to improve the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. The high estimation in overconfidence behavior increased the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. Viewing from the agents' effort, the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior decreased their own political effort; the high estimation in overconfidence improved their economic effort. The contract theory model in this paper extended the principal-agents' participation to state-owned shareholders, non state-owned shareholders, and executives of state-owned enterprises, taking into consideration the behavioral differences of non-rational SOE executives on dual task of state-owned enterprises. This paper can provide certain references for improving governance and executive compensation mechanism of state-owned enterprises under the mixed ownership reform of the state-owned economy in China.
In the context of heterogeneous agent of state-owned enterprises, this paper introduced the overconfidence behavior of excessive accuracy and high estimation of state-owned enterprises' executives, and analyzed the impact of agents' different overconfidence behavior on the optimal incentive contract design of the Nash equilibrium contracts between governmental and social shareholders. By developing a trial-gaming model including state-owned shareholders, non state-owned shareholders, and state-owned enterprises' executives, this study revealed that the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior of executives of state-owned enterprises helped to improve the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. The high estimation in overconfidence behavior increased the optimal incentive of Nash equilibrium for political effort in the context of heterogeneous agent, but it had no influence on promoting the Nash equilibrium contract for economic effort. Viewing from the agents' effort, the excessive accuracy in overconfidence behavior decreased their own political effort; the high estimation in overconfidence improved their economic effort. The contract theory model in this paper extended the principal-agents' participation to state-owned shareholders, non state-owned shareholders, and executives of state-owned enterprises, taking into consideration the behavioral differences of non-rational SOE executives on dual task of state-owned enterprises. This paper can provide certain references for improving governance and executive compensation mechanism of state-owned enterprises under the mixed ownership reform of the state-owned economy in China.
引文
[1] 马连福,王丽丽,张琦. 混合所有制的优序选择:市场的逻辑[J].中国工业经济, 2015, 33(5): 5-20.
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[13] 袁江天,张维. 多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究[J].管理科学学报, 2006, 25(3): 45-53.
[14] 周权雄,朱卫平. 国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究[J]. 经济学, 2010, 9(2): 571-596.
[15] 黄健柏,杨涛, 伍如昕. 非对称过度自信条件下委托代理模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2009, 29(4): 92-102.
[16] 刘新民,温新刚,吴士健. 基于过度自信的双边道德风险规避问题[J].上海交通大学学报, 2010, 44(3): 373-377.
[17] 陈克贵,宋学锋,王新宇,黄敏. 非对称过度自信水平下的激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(7): 1887-1895.
[18] 王垒,刘新民,丁黎黎.委托代理理论在国有企业的拓展:从单边道德风险到三边道德风险[J].商业研究, 2015, 58(12): 18-23.
[19] 王垒,刘新民,丁黎黎.异质委托情境下国企高管自利行为对激励契约的影响分析[J].上海经济研究, 2015, 34(9): 41-48.
[20] Moore D A, Healy P J. The trouble with overconfidence[J]. Psychological Review, 2008, 115(2): 502-517.
[21] Kevin S, Todd S, John C. Common agency and state-owned enterprise reform[J]. China Economic Review, 2009, 20(2): 208-217.
[22] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 2004.
[23] Eric V D S.Overconfidence by bayesian-rational agents[J].Management Science, 2011, 57(5): 884-896.
[24] Kerkhove L P, Vanhoucke M. Incentive contract design for projects: The owner’s perspective[J].Omege, 2016, 55(6): 93-114.
[2] 吴先聪,张健,胡志颖. 机构投资者特征、终极控制人性质特征与大股东掏空—基于关联交易视角的研究[J].外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(6): 3-20.
[3] 王垒,刘新民,王松. 基于双重委托代理的创业企业治理框架构建与研究展望[J].山东科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2016, 18(3): 68-73.
[4] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[5] Jorge G A,Santos M S. Stock options and managerial optimal contracts[J].Economic Theory, 2005, 26(4): 813-837.
[6] Holmstrom B. Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective[J].Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (1): 547-581.
[7] Meyer M, Vickers J.Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives[J].Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(3): 547-581.
[8] Desai H,Hogan C E, Wilkins M S.The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting:Earnings restatements and management turnover[J]. Accounting Review, 2006, 81(1): 69-72.
[9] 宋德舜. 国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效[J].中国工业经济, 2004, 192(3): 91-98.
[10] 宋德舜,宋逢明. 国有控股、经理人变更与公司绩效[J].南开管理评论, 2005, 8(1): 10-15.
[11] 孔峰,张微. 基于固定工资和声誉的国企经理行为动态分析[J].系统管理学报, 2012, 21(5): 716-720.
[12] 孔峰,张微. 基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究[J].中国管理科学, 2014, 22(9): 133-140.
[13] 袁江天,张维. 多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究[J].管理科学学报, 2006, 25(3): 45-53.
[14] 周权雄,朱卫平. 国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究[J]. 经济学, 2010, 9(2): 571-596.
[15] 黄健柏,杨涛, 伍如昕. 非对称过度自信条件下委托代理模型[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2009, 29(4): 92-102.
[16] 刘新民,温新刚,吴士健. 基于过度自信的双边道德风险规避问题[J].上海交通大学学报, 2010, 44(3): 373-377.
[17] 陈克贵,宋学锋,王新宇,黄敏. 非对称过度自信水平下的激励机制研究[J].系统工程理论与实践, 2015, 35(7): 1887-1895.
[18] 王垒,刘新民,丁黎黎.委托代理理论在国有企业的拓展:从单边道德风险到三边道德风险[J].商业研究, 2015, 58(12): 18-23.
[19] 王垒,刘新民,丁黎黎.异质委托情境下国企高管自利行为对激励契约的影响分析[J].上海经济研究, 2015, 34(9): 41-48.
[20] Moore D A, Healy P J. The trouble with overconfidence[J]. Psychological Review, 2008, 115(2): 502-517.
[21] Kevin S, Todd S, John C. Common agency and state-owned enterprise reform[J]. China Economic Review, 2009, 20(2): 208-217.
[22] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 2004.
[23] Eric V D S.Overconfidence by bayesian-rational agents[J].Management Science, 2011, 57(5): 884-896.
[24] Kerkhove L P, Vanhoucke M. Incentive contract design for projects: The owner’s perspective[J].Omege, 2016, 55(6): 93-114.