碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业行为研究
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摘要
针对三种碳税决策框架:分权碳税框架、集权碳税框架——固定阀值、集权碳税框架——弹性阀值,分别分析三种碳排放税收政策决策框架下供应链网络中成员企业收益的变化以及各企业间的交互行为,给出了各成员企业的均衡条件,并将其转化为变分不等式问题,建立碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业博弈模型,并提出基于欧拉算法的模型求解方法。最后结合算例分析碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业关于生产决策、分销决策、碳排放量的反应,研究为达到预期的环境目标,政府相关部门如何调整单位碳排放税,同时,根据成员企业相关经济指标的均衡结果,政府相关部门又如何调整碳排放的环境目标。
This paper studies the behavioral response of member firms in the supply chain network to carbon emission tax policy,and the competition and interactive behaviors among these member firms in the network under the policy,aiming at providing decision-making basis for environmental departments to design carbon emission tax policy. The general framework that we develop allows for three distinct types of carbon taxation decision scheme:decentralized scheme,a centralized scheme which assumes a fixed bound,a centralized scheme which allows the bound to be a function of the tax. Along with the three taxation schemes,the change of member firms' profits and interactive behaviors of those will be studied. The equilibrium conditions of member firms are given,and are transformed into variational inequalities. We develop the game models of member firms in supply chain network under carbon emission tax policy,and present solution method of the models based on Euler method. Finally,the developed model is applied to numerical examples,and the equilibrium results are tompiled and discussed.The reactions including production decision,distribution decision,and carbon emission are analyzed. We study how government adjusts carbon emission tax to obtain desired environmental goal properly. Meanwhile,according to the equilibrium results for economical indicators of firms under different scheme and bound,how government also should know how to adjust the environmental goal of carbon emission.
This paper studies the behavioral response of member firms in the supply chain network to carbon emission tax policy,and the competition and interactive behaviors among these member firms in the network under the policy,aiming at providing decision-making basis for environmental departments to design carbon emission tax policy. The general framework that we develop allows for three distinct types of carbon taxation decision scheme:decentralized scheme,a centralized scheme which assumes a fixed bound,a centralized scheme which allows the bound to be a function of the tax. Along with the three taxation schemes,the change of member firms' profits and interactive behaviors of those will be studied. The equilibrium conditions of member firms are given,and are transformed into variational inequalities. We develop the game models of member firms in supply chain network under carbon emission tax policy,and present solution method of the models based on Euler method. Finally,the developed model is applied to numerical examples,and the equilibrium results are tompiled and discussed.The reactions including production decision,distribution decision,and carbon emission are analyzed. We study how government adjusts carbon emission tax to obtain desired environmental goal properly. Meanwhile,according to the equilibrium results for economical indicators of firms under different scheme and bound,how government also should know how to adjust the environmental goal of carbon emission.
引文
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[3]Floros N,Vlachou A.Energy demand and energy related CO2emissions in Greek manufacturing:assessing the impact of a carbon tax[J].Energy Economics,2005,27(3):387-413.
[4]Wissema W,Dellink R.A GE analysis of the impact of a carbon energy tax on the Irish economy[J].Ecologic Economics,2007,61(4):671-683.
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[12]鲍勤,汤铃,杨列勋,乔晗.能源节约型技术进步下碳关税对中国经济与环境的影响——基于动态递归可计算一般均衡模型[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(2):175-186.
[13]鲍勤,汤铃,汪寿阳,乔晗.美国碳关税对我国经济的影响程度到底如何?——基于DCGF模型的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(2):345-353.
[14]杨珺,李金宝,卢巍.系统动力学的碳排放政策对供应链影响[J].工业工程与管理,2012,17(4):21-30.
[15]许士春,何正霞,龙如银.环境政策工具比较:基于企业减排的视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(11):2351-2362.
[16]王明征,刘宽.运输碳排放税及其分摊比例对制造商最优策略的影响[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(5):133-146.
[17]Dupuis P,Nagurney A.Dynamical systems and variational inequalities[J].Annals of Operations Research,1993,44:9-42.
[18]Nagurney A,Zhang D.Projected dynamical systems and variational inequalities with applications[M].Kluwer Academic Publishers,Boston,MA,1996.
[19]Zhang D,Nagurney A.Formulation,stability,and computation of traffic network equilibria as projected dynamical systems[J].Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,1997,93:417-444.
[20]Nagurney A,Dong J.Supernetworks:decision-making for the information age[M].Edward Elgar Publishers,Cheltenham,England,2002.
[2]Ekins P.Competitiveness and exemptions from environmental taxes in Europe[J].Environmental and Resource Economics,1999,11:369-396.
[3]Floros N,Vlachou A.Energy demand and energy related CO2emissions in Greek manufacturing:assessing the impact of a carbon tax[J].Energy Economics,2005,27(3):387-413.
[4]Wissema W,Dellink R.A GE analysis of the impact of a carbon energy tax on the Irish economy[J].Ecologic Economics,2007,61(4):671-683.
[5]Lee CF,Lin SJ.Analysis of the impacts of combining carbon taxation and emission trading on different industry sectors[J].Energy Policy,2008,36(2):722-729.
[6]He Y,Wang L,Wang J.Cap-and-trade vs.carbon taxes:a quantitative comparison from a generation expansion planning perspective[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2012,63:708-716.
[7]Gonzalez F.Distributional effects of carbon taxes:the case of mexico[J].Energy Economics,2012,34(6):2102-2115.
[8]Mori K.Modeling the impact of a carbon tax:a trial analysis for washington state[J].Energy Policy,2012,48:627-639.
[9]Zhang Z,Li Y.The impact of carbon tax on economic growth in China[J].Energy Procedia,2011,5:1757-1761.
[10]高鹏飞,陈文颖.碳税与碳排放[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版),2002,42(10):1335-1338.
[11]姚昕,刘希颖.基于增长视角的中国最优碳税研究[J].经济研究,2010,11:48-58.
[12]鲍勤,汤铃,杨列勋,乔晗.能源节约型技术进步下碳关税对中国经济与环境的影响——基于动态递归可计算一般均衡模型[J].系统科学与数学,2011,31(2):175-186.
[13]鲍勤,汤铃,汪寿阳,乔晗.美国碳关税对我国经济的影响程度到底如何?——基于DCGF模型的分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(2):345-353.
[14]杨珺,李金宝,卢巍.系统动力学的碳排放政策对供应链影响[J].工业工程与管理,2012,17(4):21-30.
[15]许士春,何正霞,龙如银.环境政策工具比较:基于企业减排的视角[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(11):2351-2362.
[16]王明征,刘宽.运输碳排放税及其分摊比例对制造商最优策略的影响[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(5):133-146.
[17]Dupuis P,Nagurney A.Dynamical systems and variational inequalities[J].Annals of Operations Research,1993,44:9-42.
[18]Nagurney A,Zhang D.Projected dynamical systems and variational inequalities with applications[M].Kluwer Academic Publishers,Boston,MA,1996.
[19]Zhang D,Nagurney A.Formulation,stability,and computation of traffic network equilibria as projected dynamical systems[J].Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,1997,93:417-444.
[20]Nagurney A,Dong J.Supernetworks:decision-making for the information age[M].Edward Elgar Publishers,Cheltenham,England,2002.