民营企业社会责任履行多群体演化博弈分析
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摘要
民营企业社会责任履行具有一定层次性,分析由低水平到高水平的层次演进内在机理有助于规范和引导民营企业履行社会责任行为。基于演化经济理论,以政府监管部门、民营企业和社会公众为博弈主体,通过构建复制动态演化博弈模型,分析我国民营企业社会责任层次演化机理。理论分析表明:民营企业在履行社会责任过程中不断学习并调整自身策略偏好,其社会责任履行演化博弈存在多重均衡;政府监管部门的强监管措施和社会公众的正面评价有助于促进民营企业社会责任层次由低到高、向社会总福祉增加的方向演化。民营企业的营利实现与社会责任提升可以形成良性循环,在新时代市场经济条件下实现健康发展。
The fulfillment of corporate social responsibility embodies a certain hierarchy. Taking the government regulators,private enterprises and social community as the main players of the games, the paper makes in-depth analyses the mechanism of evolution of the social responsibility hierarchy by using replication dynamic model from the perspective of a multi-population evolutionary game. The results show that, private enterprises learn and adjust their policy preferences continuously in the process of the social responsibility fulfillment. There are multiple equilibriums of the evolutionary game for the social responsibility;the scientific arrangement of government which dominate external rules mainly and the fare evaluation of the publichelp to promote the hierarchy of private enterprise society responsibility evolving from low to high, and in the direction of enhancing the total social welfare.
The fulfillment of corporate social responsibility embodies a certain hierarchy. Taking the government regulators,private enterprises and social community as the main players of the games, the paper makes in-depth analyses the mechanism of evolution of the social responsibility hierarchy by using replication dynamic model from the perspective of a multi-population evolutionary game. The results show that, private enterprises learn and adjust their policy preferences continuously in the process of the social responsibility fulfillment. There are multiple equilibriums of the evolutionary game for the social responsibility;the scientific arrangement of government which dominate external rules mainly and the fare evaluation of the publichelp to promote the hierarchy of private enterprise society responsibility evolving from low to high, and in the direction of enhancing the total social welfare.
引文
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[14]于飞,刘明霞.制度压力对企业社会责任的影响作用——基于高层管理者视角[J].技术经济,2015(11):127-135.
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[18]吉利,何熙琼,毛洪涛.“机会主义”还是“道德行为”——履行社会责任公司的盈余管理行为研究[J].会计与经济研究,2014(5):10-25.
[19]冯帅.形式维度下的公司社会责任立法:域外模式与中国选择[J].现代经济探讨,2016(8):58-62.
[2]王国成.行为经济学视角下深化改革的着力点与实现途径[J].天津社会科学,2015(1):128-131.
[3]李春发,王治莹.生态工业链中企业间合作关系的演化博弈分析[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版),2012(3):12-17.
[4]王洪利.基于演化博弈的共享经济参与主体的行为分析[J].经济与管理,2018(2):75-80.
[5]林鸿熙.民营企业履行社会责任与政府监管的博弈分析[J].重庆工商大学学报(西部论坛),2008(2):94-96.
[6]陆玉梅,高鹏,刘素霞.民营企业社会责任投入与员工离职行为博弈分析[J].企业经济,2015(2):75-80.
[7]王国成.交互行为视野下博弈论与当代经济学的交汇及发展[J].经济研究,2007(12):142-152.
[8]黄晓鹏.演化经济学视角下的企业社会责任政策——兼谈企业社会责任的演化[J].经济评论,2007(4):129-137.
[9]TRAULSEN A,HAUERT C,SILVA H D,et al.Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games[J].Proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the United States of America,2009,106(3):709-712.
[10]YOUNG H P.The economics of convention[J].Journal of economics perspectives,1995,10:105-122.
[11]盛昭翰,蒋德鹏.演化经济学[M].上海:三联书店,2002.
[12]哈耶克.法律、立法与自由[M].邓正来等,译.北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2000.
[13]MART魱NEZ J B,FERNANDEZ M L,FERNANDEZ P M R.Corporate social responsibility:evolution through institutional and stakeholder perspectives[J].European journal of management and business economics,2016,25(1):8-14.
[14]于飞,刘明霞.制度压力对企业社会责任的影响作用——基于高层管理者视角[J].技术经济,2015(11):127-135.
[15]TAYLOR P D,JONKER L.Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics[J].Mathematical biosciences,1978,40:145-156.
[16]FRIEDMAN D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica,1991,59:637-666.
[17]RUBINSTEIN A.Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model[J].Econometrica,1982(50):97-109.
[18]吉利,何熙琼,毛洪涛.“机会主义”还是“道德行为”——履行社会责任公司的盈余管理行为研究[J].会计与经济研究,2014(5):10-25.
[19]冯帅.形式维度下的公司社会责任立法:域外模式与中国选择[J].现代经济探讨,2016(8):58-62.