基于政府补贴的城乡配送末端网点博弈分析
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摘要
为响应国家物流业"十三五"规划,加快城乡网点建设的推进工作,基于末端网点建设现状,探讨不同补贴形式下政府与企业在末端网点建设中的博弈问题。当政府给予参与企业一次性补贴时,建立两者间的单次博弈;分阶段补贴时,建立重复博弈。分析两种补贴形式下博弈双方的稳定策略及影响因素,并对比分析两种补贴形式的成效。结果表明:1)增大政府补贴金额、增强投入产出转化率、增大政府收益系数、减少企业运营成本有助于末端网点建设;2)收益权重越大,分阶段补贴金额越小,政府宜采取分阶段补贴;政府收益系数越大,分阶段补贴金额越大,此时宜采取一次性补贴。
In response to the national planning of logistics and to accelerate the construction of network of urban and rural areas,the game problem of government and enterprises in different forms of subsidies terminal network construction was explored based on the construction situation of the terminal network.When government gives a one-time subsidy to enterprises,it establishes a single game model between the two.When the government gives phased subsidy,it establishes repeated game model.Based on the above forms,some stability strategies and the influencing factors were analyzed,and the effectiveness of this two forms of subsidies were compared.The results show that increasing the amount of government subsidies,enhancing the input-output conversion rate,increasing government revenue coefficient,and reducing enterprise operating costs will contribute to the construction of terminal network.In addition,the greater the gain weight is,the smaller amount of phased subsidy will be,when the government should adopt phased subsidies.The greater the government income coefficient is,the more amount of phased subsidy will be,when government shoud use a one-time subsidy.
In response to the national planning of logistics and to accelerate the construction of network of urban and rural areas,the game problem of government and enterprises in different forms of subsidies terminal network construction was explored based on the construction situation of the terminal network.When government gives a one-time subsidy to enterprises,it establishes a single game model between the two.When the government gives phased subsidy,it establishes repeated game model.Based on the above forms,some stability strategies and the influencing factors were analyzed,and the effectiveness of this two forms of subsidies were compared.The results show that increasing the amount of government subsidies,enhancing the input-output conversion rate,increasing government revenue coefficient,and reducing enterprise operating costs will contribute to the construction of terminal network.In addition,the greater the gain weight is,the smaller amount of phased subsidy will be,when the government should adopt phased subsidies.The greater the government income coefficient is,the more amount of phased subsidy will be,when government shoud use a one-time subsidy.
引文
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[12]潘峰,西宝,王琳.基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(6):1393-1404.
[13]汪秋明,韩庆潇,杨晨.战略性新兴产业中的政府补贴与企业行为——基于政府规制下的动态博弈分析视角[J].财经研究,2014,40(7):43-53.
[14]牛文娟,王慧敏,牛富.跨界水资源冲突中地方保护主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2014,28(2):64-72.
[15]Xiao L,Wang X J,Chin K S,et al.Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidy[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2017,26(4):417-432.
[16]BiG B,Jin M Y,Ling L Y,et al.Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,255(1/2):547-568.
[17]Byungil K,Hyunsu L,Hyoungkwan K,et al.Determining the Value of Governmental Subsidies for the Installation of Clean Energy Systems Using Real Options[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2012,138(3):422-430.
[18]Xiong Y Q,Yang X H.Government Subsidies for the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry[J].Energy Policy,2016,99:111-119.
[2]朱清香,曹秋芳,刘晶,等.基于改进灰色关联的商业网点最优选址研究[J].统计与决策,2016(8):51-53.
[3]孙元欣,黄培清.竞争型连锁经营网点选址模型与遗传算法解[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2001,22(10):60-63.
[4]周向红,高阳,任剑,等.政府补贴下的再制造逆向物流多目标选址模型及算法[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(8):1996-2003.
[5]张文博,苏秦,程光路.基于动态需求的带时间窗的车辆路径问题[J].工业工程与管理,2016,21(6):68-74.
[6]张亚洁,刘烨.快递企业服务网点选址优化及其配送路径的研究[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014,16(S1):98-101.
[7]Shi H T,Dong Y C,Yi L H,et al.Study on the Route Optimization of Military Logistics Distribution in Wartime Based on the Ant Colony Algorithm[J].Computer and Information Science,2010,3(1):139-143.
[8]Tan Y,Wu D.Research on Optimization of Distribution Routes for Fresh Agricultural Products Based on Dijkstra Algorithm[J].Applied Mechanics and Materials,2013,336-338(1):2500-2503.
[9]马祖军,胡书,代颖.政府规制下电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J].工业工程与管理,2016,21(1):45-51.
[10]赵晓敏,徐阳阳,林英晖.纳什均衡市场下政府补贴对再制造的影响效应[J].工业工程与管理,2015,20(1):90-94.
[11]李锦飞,刘坪,贡文伟.考虑政府奖惩的逆向供应链定价策略研究[J].工业工程与管理,2013,18(4):109-116.
[12]潘峰,西宝,王琳.基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2015,35(6):1393-1404.
[13]汪秋明,韩庆潇,杨晨.战略性新兴产业中的政府补贴与企业行为——基于政府规制下的动态博弈分析视角[J].财经研究,2014,40(7):43-53.
[14]牛文娟,王慧敏,牛富.跨界水资源冲突中地方保护主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报,2014,28(2):64-72.
[15]Xiao L,Wang X J,Chin K S,et al.Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidy[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2017,26(4):417-432.
[16]BiG B,Jin M Y,Ling L Y,et al.Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers[J].Annals of Operations Research,2017,255(1/2):547-568.
[17]Byungil K,Hyunsu L,Hyoungkwan K,et al.Determining the Value of Governmental Subsidies for the Installation of Clean Energy Systems Using Real Options[J].Journal of Construction Engineering and Management,2012,138(3):422-430.
[18]Xiong Y Q,Yang X H.Government Subsidies for the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry[J].Energy Policy,2016,99:111-119.