双渠道供应链质量信息披露策略
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摘要
研究了含有线上直销渠道的双渠道供应链中,制造商披露模式和零售商披露模式对产品质量信息披露效果以及供应链成员收益的影响。建模讨论了消费者对供应链中两个渠道内产品关注度不同时产生的均衡需求,分析了质量信息披露策略对制造商和零售商定价策略的影响。考察了生产成本、不同客户关注度以及渠道间竞争强度等因素对制造商、零售商披露策略的影响。通过对比两种披露模式,得到双渠道供应链中最优信息披露模式选择决策。研究发现:产品质量水平较低时,选择零售商披露模式对制造商更加有利,反之则选择制造商披露模式更优;当渠道间产品差异足够大时,零售商比制造商的披露意愿更强烈,且零售商披露模式可以实现更多的信息披露;客户对两个渠道关注度增加都会提升制造商信息披露的意愿,零售商面临增加的实体店关注度时更愿意披露信息,但面临增加的网店关注度时其披露意愿与渠道间产品差异相关。
This paper investigated the effect of two disclosure formats(manufacturer disclosure format and retail disclosure format) on players' disclosure behaviors and profits in a dual-channel supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer, which owns an electronic channel and a downstream retailer. In the presence of consumers' different attentiveness to the quality information of two channels, it discussed the equilibrium demand of the supply chain by building models and analyzed the impact of quality disclosure strategy on the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. It incorporated production cost, different consumer attentiveness, as well as intensity of competition between two channels into the model to analyze the influence of these factors on the disclosure strategies of the two players. Then, it drove the optimal disclosure format in a dual-channel supply chain after comparing the two disclosure formats. The results suggest that the manufacturer may benefit from the retail disclosure format when the quality is relatively low, otherwise, the manufacturer disclosure format may dominate. The retailer has a higher incentive for information revelation than the manufacturer and more information can be revealed in equilibrium when product differentiation between two channels is sufficiently high. The manufacturer should disclose more quality information as the consumer attentiveness in the two channels increases. However, when it comes to the retailer, increasing attentiveness to the retail store leads to the sharing of more information, while his information revelation is related to product differentiation when attentiveness increases in the electronic channel.
This paper investigated the effect of two disclosure formats(manufacturer disclosure format and retail disclosure format) on players' disclosure behaviors and profits in a dual-channel supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer, which owns an electronic channel and a downstream retailer. In the presence of consumers' different attentiveness to the quality information of two channels, it discussed the equilibrium demand of the supply chain by building models and analyzed the impact of quality disclosure strategy on the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer. It incorporated production cost, different consumer attentiveness, as well as intensity of competition between two channels into the model to analyze the influence of these factors on the disclosure strategies of the two players. Then, it drove the optimal disclosure format in a dual-channel supply chain after comparing the two disclosure formats. The results suggest that the manufacturer may benefit from the retail disclosure format when the quality is relatively low, otherwise, the manufacturer disclosure format may dominate. The retailer has a higher incentive for information revelation than the manufacturer and more information can be revealed in equilibrium when product differentiation between two channels is sufficiently high. The manufacturer should disclose more quality information as the consumer attentiveness in the two channels increases. However, when it comes to the retailer, increasing attentiveness to the retail store leads to the sharing of more information, while his information revelation is related to product differentiation when attentiveness increases in the electronic channel.
引文
[1] 丁平, 付超, 肖明,等. 基于不对称需求信息的供应链最小订购量决策 [J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 5(6): 99-106.
[2] Gallego G, Hu M. Dynamic pricing of perishable assets under competition [J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(5): 1241-1259.
[3] Zhang C T, Wang H X, Ren M L. Research on pricing and coordination strategy of green supply chain under hybrid production mode [J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2014, 72(8): 24-31.
[4] 颜波, 刘艳萍, 李鸿媛. 成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 124-134
[5] 吴忠和, 陈宏, 赵千. 不对称信息供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(1): 91-97.
[6] Lee J-Y, Cho R K, Paik S-K. Supply chain coordination in vendor-managed inventory systems with stockout-cost sharing under limited storage capacity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 248(1): 95-106.
[7] Lei Q, Chen J, Wei X, et al. Supply chain coordination under asymmetric production cost information and inventory inaccuracy [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 170(6): 204-218.
[8] 顾波军, 张祥. 风险中性供应商与损失规避零售商基于收益共享契约的供应链协调[J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(1): 67-74.
[9] 范小军. 基于消费者在线渠道接受差异的双渠道定价策略 [J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(3): 413-420.
[10] Xiao T, Choi T-M, Cheng T C E. Product variety and channel structure strategy for a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 233(1): 114-124.
[11] 徐广业, 张旭梅. 风险规避下基于价格折扣的双渠道供应链协调 [J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(6): 1114-1120.
[12] Lu Q, Liu N. Effects of e-commerce channel entry in a two-echelon supply chain: A comparative analysis of single- and dual-channel distribution systems [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 165(2): 100-111.
[13] 陈军, 赖信, 许茂增, 等. 零售商开辟二级市场下双渠道供应链定价决策[J]. 系统工程学报, 2013, 28(6): 786-794.
[14] Guo L. Quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel [J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(9): 1513-1526.
[15] Guo L, Zhao Y. Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction [J]. Marketing Science, 2009, 28(3): 488-501.
[16] Ghosh B, Galbreth M R. The impact of consumer attentiveness and search costs on firm quality disclosure: A competitive analysis [J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(11): 2604-2621.
[17] 周建亨,赵瑞娟. 搭便车效应影响下双渠道供应链信息披露策略 [J]. 系统工程与理论实践, 2016, 36(11): 2839-2852.
[18] Swinney R. Selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain: The value of matching supply and demand [J]. Management Science, 2011, 57(10): 1737-1751.
1) 本文主要考虑披露成本z足够低时,披露主体会考虑披露产品质量信息。关于披露成本z的取值范围会在附录中详细讨论
2)比较xf和xu1,易得xf>xu1,由于qi的取值最大为1,最小为q,得出|qr-qe|≤1-q,易得xf 3)披露条件隐含qr>q,也即要求qr>q时才会披露信息。如果产品的实际质量qr 4)q1表达式较为复杂,为简洁正文中不列出,具体见附录
5 )证明见附录ωR*=ω1的证明
[2] Gallego G, Hu M. Dynamic pricing of perishable assets under competition [J]. Management Science, 2014, 60(5): 1241-1259.
[3] Zhang C T, Wang H X, Ren M L. Research on pricing and coordination strategy of green supply chain under hybrid production mode [J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2014, 72(8): 24-31.
[4] 颜波, 刘艳萍, 李鸿媛. 成本信息不对称下零售商主导的混合渠道供应链决策分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 124-134
[5] 吴忠和, 陈宏, 赵千. 不对称信息供应链应对突发事件协调模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(1): 91-97.
[6] Lee J-Y, Cho R K, Paik S-K. Supply chain coordination in vendor-managed inventory systems with stockout-cost sharing under limited storage capacity [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2016, 248(1): 95-106.
[7] Lei Q, Chen J, Wei X, et al. Supply chain coordination under asymmetric production cost information and inventory inaccuracy [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 170(6): 204-218.
[8] 顾波军, 张祥. 风险中性供应商与损失规避零售商基于收益共享契约的供应链协调[J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(1): 67-74.
[9] 范小军. 基于消费者在线渠道接受差异的双渠道定价策略 [J]. 系统管理学报, 2015, 24(3): 413-420.
[10] Xiao T, Choi T-M, Cheng T C E. Product variety and channel structure strategy for a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2014, 233(1): 114-124.
[11] 徐广业, 张旭梅. 风险规避下基于价格折扣的双渠道供应链协调 [J]. 系统管理学报, 2016, 25(6): 1114-1120.
[12] Lu Q, Liu N. Effects of e-commerce channel entry in a two-echelon supply chain: A comparative analysis of single- and dual-channel distribution systems [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2015, 165(2): 100-111.
[13] 陈军, 赖信, 许茂增, 等. 零售商开辟二级市场下双渠道供应链定价决策[J]. 系统工程学报, 2013, 28(6): 786-794.
[14] Guo L. Quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel [J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(9): 1513-1526.
[15] Guo L, Zhao Y. Voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction [J]. Marketing Science, 2009, 28(3): 488-501.
[16] Ghosh B, Galbreth M R. The impact of consumer attentiveness and search costs on firm quality disclosure: A competitive analysis [J]. Management Science, 2013, 59(11): 2604-2621.
[17] 周建亨,赵瑞娟. 搭便车效应影响下双渠道供应链信息披露策略 [J]. 系统工程与理论实践, 2016, 36(11): 2839-2852.
[18] Swinney R. Selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain: The value of matching supply and demand [J]. Management Science, 2011, 57(10): 1737-1751.
1) 本文主要考虑披露成本z足够低时,披露主体会考虑披露产品质量信息。关于披露成本z的取值范围会在附录中详细讨论
2)比较xf和xu1,易得xf>xu1,由于qi的取值最大为1,最小为q,得出|qr-qe|≤1-q,易得xf
5 )证明见附录ωR*=ω1的证明