摘要
农地经营权抵押贷款政策已出台,但法律问题以及制度细节问题并不完备,由于金融机构和农户两大农地经营权抵押贷款的供需主体存在行为博弈,而导致农地抵押贷款政策背离了初衷,无法发挥预期效果。以抵押贷款供需主体的行为博弈为中心展开,对农地经营权抵押贷款政策的内生风险控制提出制度完善的建议。
The mortgage loan policy for management right of agricultural land has been issued,but the legal issues and the details of the system are not complete.Because there are behavioral games between the supply and demand main bodies of financial institutions and farmer households operating mortgage mortgage loans,the mortgage loan policy of agricultural land divorced from the original intention,can not play the expected results.This dissertation focuses on the behavioral game of the subjects of mortgage loan supply and demand,and puts forward sound suggestions for the endogenous risk control of the mortgage loan policy of farmland management rights.
引文
[1]姚凤阁,隋昕.新型农业经营主体的融资需求影响因素研究[J].哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(3).
[2]张庆君.关于农村金融创新中土地抵押贷款模式的思考——基于辽宁省法库县农村金融创新试点的实证观察[J].农村经济,2010(11).
[3]王德福.农地流转模式对农村社会稳定的影响[J].学习与实践,2012(6).
[4]胡振华,刘景月,周孔凝.基于演化博弈的PPP模式公私合作机制研究[J].商业研究,2016(7).
[5]郭晓鸣,韩立达,王静.农地承包经营权流转中的政府行为[J].农村经济,2012(12).
[6]付兆刚,郭翔宇.农地经营权抵押贷款农户需求行为影响因素分析——基于黑龙江省6个县1328个农户的问卷调查[J].中国土地科学,2017(3).
[7]朱奎.农业与非农业地租的动态均衡分析[J].上海财经大学学报,2006(6):71-77.